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ABSTRACT 
 
Analysing the Characteristics and Performance of Islamic Funds:  
A Critical Review of the Malaysian Case 
by 
Mohd Rahimie Bin Abd Karim 
 
This study provides a critical review of the characteristics and performance of Islamic funds 
in Malaysia with the main objectives of identifying the return and risk profile of Islamic funds 
and examining the Islamic funds’ performance and valuation methods.  The study was 
conceived on the back of the impressive growth of the Islamic fund industry amid abundant 
evidence and a common perception that Islamic funds generally underperform conventional 
funds.  
The study is designed to address four main areas, namely to analyse the return and risk 
characteristics of Islamic funds; to examine the performance trend of Islamic funds; to 
investigate the impact of Shariah-compliance requirements on Islamic funds’ performance; 
and, to explore the actual Islamic fund operation by fund management companies through the 
perception of those involved in the actual practice.   
To ensure that the study is undertaken thoroughly, the study employed the methodological 
triangulation technique, of which, the findings are deduced from three methods of analysis 
namely literature review, quantitative analysis, and qualitative analysis based on primary data 
collected through interviews.   
The findings of the study are deemed both intriguing and thought provoking.  The study 
found that the existing Islamic funds have been created largely by mimicking conventional 
funds whilst economic motive, rather than religious motive, is arguably the main reason 
behind the creation of Islamic funds. Islamic funds are distinguished from conventional funds 
based on their Shariah identities, particularly with regards to stock selection and Shariah-
compliance supervision. In general, relative to conventional funds, Islamic funds are 
characterised by a lower return but with higher volatility, have limited numbers of profitable 
stocks or industries whose returns are strongly and positively correlated, have a smaller fund 
size and low fund subscription rate, and are mainly invested in heavyweight stocks involved 
in defensive industries.  Interestingly, although the Shariah-screening may expose Islamic 
funds’ portfolio to have high investment concentration in small-capitalised stocks, the study 
found that Islamic funds which invest mainly in large-capitalised stocks could outperform 
conventional funds and the market index. The analysis of Islamic fund performance is also 
sensitive to the benchmark used for performance comparison. The study also found that 
Shariah requirements affect Islamic funds’ performance adversely by incurring additional 
Shariah-related costs and introducing new Shariah non-compliance risks which are peculiar 
only to Islamic funds.  In addition, the study revealed that there is a huge gap in terms of 
Shariah understanding and adoption of Shariah principles in the creation of Islamic funds.   
It is noted that despite the finding of Islamic funds’ underperformance, it can be argued that 
the evidence does not in any way represent a disadvantage of Islamic funds, considering that 
the underlying philosophy of the funds is not merely to maximise monetary return, but rather, 
to attain other non-pecuniary motives including adherence to religious principles and 
achievement of the objectives of the Shariah (maqasid al-shariah).   
With regards to Islamic fund performance valuation, the study found that the popular methods 
used by Islamic fund managers are the peer group comparison and the tracking error 
techniques instead of the traditional risk-adjusted return valuation models.   
The study also found that active fund management is probably the best strategy for Islamic 
funds in Malaysia as compared to the simple buy-and-hold or passive fund management 
strategy. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Menganalisa Ciri-Ciri dan Pencapaian Dana-Dana Amanah Islam: 
Satu Ulasan Kritikal Terhadap Kes Di Malaysia 
Oleh 
Mohd Rahimie Bin Abd Karim 
Kajian ini menyediakan ulasan kritikal terhadap ciri-ciri dan pencapaian dana-dana amanah Islam 
di Malaysia dengan objektif utamanya ialah untuk mengenalpasti profil pulangan dan risiko dana-
dana amanah Islam serta memeriksa pencapaian dan kaedah menilai pencapaian dana-dana 
amanah Islam tersebut. Kajian ini diilhamkan daripada pertumbuhan memberangsangkan dalam 
industri dana amanah Islam di samping terdapatnya bukti dan tanggapan umum bahawa dana-
dana amanah Islam secara amnya tidak dapat mengatasi dana-dana amanah konvensional.   
Kajian ini direka untuk menyelesaikan empat isu utama, iaitu menganalisa ciri-ciri pulangan dan 
risiko dana-dana amanah Islam; menilai trend pencapaian dana-dana amanah Islam; menyiasat 
kesan kepatuhan Shariah terhadap pencapaian dana-dana amanah Islam; dan, menyiasat operasi 
sebenar dana-dana amanah Islam oleh syarikat-syarikat pengurusan dana amanah.   
Untuk memastikan bahawa kajian ini dilakukan sedalam yang mungkin, kajian ini menggunakan 
teknik kaedah ‘methodological triangulation’ di mana dapatan kajian ini diperolehi daripada tiga 
kaedah analisa iaitu ulasan literatur, analisa kuantitatif dan analisa kualitatif.   
Dapatan kajian ini boleh dianggap sebagai menarik dan menyentak pemikiran.  Kajian ini 
mendapati bahawa dana-dana amanah Islam yang ada sekarang sebahagian besarnya dibentuk 
dengan meniru dana-dana amanah konvensional dengan motif ekonomi, berbanding motif 
keagamaan, adalah sebab utama dana-dana amanah Islam itu dilancarkan. Dana-dana amanah 
Islam dibezakan daripada dana-dana amanah konvensional berdasarkan kepada identiti Shariah 
mereka khususnya yang berkaitan dengan pemilihan stok dan penyeliaan keakuran Shariah. 
Secara amnya, berbanding dengan dana-dana amanah konvensional, dana-dana amanah Islam 
memberi pulangan lebih rendah tetapi dengan volatiliti lebih tinggi, mempunyai jumlah stok dan 
industri menguntungkan yang terhad dengan tahap korelasi pulangan yang kuat dan positif, 
mempunyai saiz dana-dana dan kadar langgangan yang lebih kecil, dan pelaburan yang banyak di 
dalam stok-stok berwajaran tinggi yang terlibat di dalam industri bersifat defensif. Yang 
menariknya ialah, walaupun tapisan Shariah boleh menyebabkan portfolio dana-dana amanah 
Islam terdedah kepada pelaburan yang besar di dalam stok-stok bersaiz kecil, kajian ini mendapati 
dana-dana amanah Islam yang melabur terutamanya di dalam stok-stok bersaiz besar mampu 
mengatasi dana-dana amanah konvensional dan indeks pasaran.  Analisa pencapaian dana-dana 
amanah Islam juga adalah sensitif kepada penanda aras yang diguna sebagai perbandingan 
pencapaian.  Kajian ini mendapati keperluan-keperluan Shariah memberi kesan negatif terhadap 
pencapaian dana-dana amanah Islam kerana ia menyebabkan kos meningkat dan memperkenalkan 
risiko baru iaitu risiko keingkaran Shariah yang hanya wujud pada dana-dana amanah Islam.  
Tambahan pula, kajian ini mendedahkan adanya jurang yang besar berkaitan dengan tahap 
kefahaman Shariah dan penggunaan prinsip-prinsip Shariah di dalam pembentukan dana-dana 
amanah Islam. 
Perlu ditekankan di sini bahawa disebalik dapatan yang menunjukkan kelemahan pencapaian 
dana-dana amanah Islam, bukti-bukti tersebut tidak boleh dianggap sebagai menunjukkan 
kekurangan dana-dana amanah Islam setelah mengambilkira falsafah utama dana-dana amanah 
Islam yang bukan semata-mata untuk memaksimakan keuntungan tetapi juga untuk mencapai 
motif-motif bukan kewangan seperti kepatuhan kepada prinsip-prinsip agama dan mencapai 
tujuan-tujuan Shariah (maqasid al-shariah).  Berhubung dengan penilaian pencapaian dana-dana 
amanah Islam, kajian ini mendapati bahawa kaedah popular yang digunakan oleh pengurus-
pengurus dana-dana amanah Islam ialah perbandingan kumpulan sebaya dan teknik menjejak ralat 
berbanding dengan model-model penilaian tradisional yang berdasarkan pulangan disesuaikan-
risiko.  Kajian ini juga mendapati bahawa pengurusan dana amanah aktif berkemungkinan adalah 
strategi terbaik untuk dana-dana amanah Islam di Malaysia berbanding dengan strategi mudah 
beli-dan-pegang atau strategi pengurusan dana pasif.      
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 1 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This study is motivated by the impressive growth of the Islamic fund industry.  Over the 
last two decades, the asset value of Islamic funds‟ portfolios has increased tremendously, 
supported by their ability to generate a rather reasonable rate of return relative to 
conventional funds.  There was also considerable success in the creation and development 
of Islamic fund products to cater for the increasing needs of the general investing public, 
thus making Islamic funds a viable investment alternative to conventional funds.  Despite 
this, the Islamic fund industry still has a lot to offer considering that it is a relatively new 
market amid the continuing interest towards Islamic-based funds worldwide.   
 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY  
 
The interest on ethically-oriented investment, in which investors screen their stocks or 
securities based upon certain religious, social or personal values; has increased markedly 
due to the lucrative opportunities fuelled by strong demand, particularly from ethically-
concerned investors.  The value of ethical investment in the UK is estimated at £6.1 
billion in 2010 whilst in the US the value of socially responsible investing (SRI) is 
estimated at US$3.7 trillion in 2009.  Among the fast growing ethically-oriented 
investment is Islamic-based investment
1
 which assets is estimated at between US$200 
billion to US$500 billion and continues to grow at an impressive rate of 10 per cent to 15 
per cent annually
2
.  Though it is a relatively new industry and being significantly outsized 
by the conventional finance and banking industry, the total asset value of the global 
Islamic banking and finance (IBF) industry has increased considerably over the last two 
decades, attracting huge interest beyond its traditional market of Muslim-dominated 
countries.  The substantial growth in the asset value is accompanied by the expansion in 
                                                 
1
  Islamic-based or Shariah-compliant investment is defined as investment in stocks or securities that are 
approved as halal (permissible) by the Islamic Shariah law.    
2
  The Middle East. May 2004. p. 37. 
 2 
IBF‟s products and services from the traditional finance and banking products into takaful 
(insurance), sukuk (bonds) as well as fund management services.  In Malaysia, Islamic-
based investment has also enjoyed widespread acceptance from general investors.  There 
are currently a total of 871 halal-approved securities on Bursa Malaysia Berhad (formerly 
known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange), representing 85 per cent of the total listed 
securities, with market capitalisation valued at around 461 billion Malaysian Ringgit 
(RM) (£1 = RM4.90 approximately) or 63 per cent of the overall market capitalisation
3
.  
The figures clearly indicate the significance of Islamic-based investment and its huge 
potential in the Malaysian stock market.  In addition, the number of Shariah-compliant 
unit trust funds in the country has increased from a mere two equity funds in 1993 to 85 
funds currently in operation with a net asset value (NAV) amounting to RM8.6 billion, 
representing 8 per cent of the total NAV of the Malaysian unit trust industry
4
.  Despite 
this impressive growth however, the market share of Islamic funds, which is about 11.14 
per cent of the overall industry‟s NAV, is deemed relatively small, thus indicating the 
huge potential of the Islamic fund industry in the country.     
 
 Considering that ethically-oriented funds (including Islamic funds) are essentially 
a type of specialised investment product which is usually offered in parallel with 
conventional funds, they directly compete with their conventional counterparts in the 
open market to attract subscription from the general investing public.  In this respect, the 
viability of the ethically-oriented funds is primarily measured based upon their ability to 
generate satisfactory positive return for investors.  Unfortunately however, empirical 
evidence from past studies suggests that ethically-oriented funds may have to 
compromise profit in return for holding onto their ethical principles, thus resulting in 
difficulties for the funds to outperform unrestricted or conventional funds.  One 
hypothesis to explain the ethical funds‟ underperformance is the cost-of-discipleship 
hypothesis which suggests that there is an opportunity cost incurred when investment is 
made based on certain (ethical) standards, since ethical screening will deprive ethical 
funds their choices and flexibilities in asset selection (see Schwab, 1996; Mueller, 1994).  
In Malaysia, the performance of Islamic funds looks rather unimpressive based on actual 
published data that shows the long-term return of the existing Islamic funds is below that 
                                                 
3
  Securities Commission. 2006. Quarterly Bulletin of Malaysian Islamic Capital Market. Vol. 1. No. 1. 
May 2006. p. 13. 
4
  Ibid. p. 13. 
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of conventional funds.  On the other hand, empirical analyses on Islamic fund 
performance are deemed limited both in terms of their numbers and scope whilst their 
results are rather inconclusive.  For instance, Yaacob and Yakob (2002), Shah Zaidi et al. 
(2004) and Abdullah et al. (2007) claimed that Islamic funds outperformed the market 
portfolio or conventional funds but a recent study by Nik Muhammad and Mokhtar 
(2008) has concluded otherwise.  Furthermore, Islamic funds are said to outperform 
conventional funds only during bear market period but underperformed during bull 
market period as reported by Abdullah et al. (2007) and Abdullah et al. (2002; cited in 
Nik Muhammad and Mokhtar, 2008).  Among the major reasons for the contradictory 
findings in the past studies are the differences in the samples of Islamic funds and time 
period used as well as the prevailing market condition during which the studies were 
undertaken.  With the exception of the study by Yaacob and Yakob (2002) that used 
hypothetical portfolio, the other studies were based on samples of actual Islamic funds 
available in the market.    
 
 The published data and empirical evidence showing Islamic funds‟ 
underperformance implies that religious funds suffer some forms of disadvantage in 
comparison to conventional funds.  However, in view that Islamic funds were created 
mainly by mimicking conventional funds and handled by similar fund managers, the 
existing Islamic funds are virtually similar in terms of their structure, operation and 
investment approach with conventional funds.  Therefore, ceteris paribus, the observed 
difference in the performance of the two types of funds may be explained through the 
impact of Shariah-compliance requirements on the portfolio composition of Islamic 
funds, and the valuation methods used in measuring the performance of Islamic funds.  
While the composition of Islamic funds‟ portfolio is by itself a de facto interest of this 
study which will be analysed thoroughly later, it is worthwhile to provide a brief 
discussion of the suitability of the traditional portfolio performance measurement models 
to evaluate Islamic funds‟ performance.      
 
 Past studies analysing the performance of Islamic funds such as by Yaacob and 
Yakob (2002), Shah Zaidi et al. (2004), Hussein and Omran (2005) and Abdullah et al. 
(2007) commonly used the traditional portfolio valuation models namely the Sharpe 
Index, the Treynor Index and the Jensen-alpha Index, or their variants.  These traditional 
portfolio performance measurement models have their root from the basic economic 
 4 
theory of attaining the highest expected utility for an individual economic agent.  
Beginning with the works by Bernoulli (1738) who argued that the value of an asset 
should be determined by the utility it yields rather than its price, the research on risk and 
asset pricing expanded rapidly, driven particularly by the outstanding works of Arrow and 
Debreu (1954) and Sharpe (1964).  However, it was the seminal work on portfolio 
selection by Markowitz (1952) that underpins the modern portfolio theory.  His 
distinction between the variability of return from an individual security and its 
contribution to the overall riskiness of a portfolio correctly demonstrates that the efficient 
way of reducing the risk of a portfolio is by avoiding securities that have high covariances 
with the other component securities in the portfolio.  In other words, the risk of a portfolio 
can be minimised by investing in securities whose returns are uncorrelated.  This intuition 
gives rise to the concept of efficient portfolio or a set of optimal portfolio that offers the 
highest possible expected return for a given level of risk, or has the lowest risk for a given 
level of expected return.  Nevertheless, research on portfolio performance valuation 
theory continues to grow and has benefited particularly from the works by Treynor 
(1965), Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968).  Central to the modern financial theory, 
including the asset pricing theory and the portfolio theory, are the three vital assumptions 
namely: markets are highly efficient; investors exploit potential arbitrage opportunities; 
and, investors are rational (see Dimson and Mussavian, 1999).  In order to achieve the 
highest expected utility, an individual investor, acting as a rational economic agent, is 
assumed to be seeking to maximise profit from his/her investment.  Hence, conventional 
portfolios which are mainly formulated to give maximum return to their investors place 
more emphasis on selecting the combination of securities that will generate the highest 
possible return in line with their pre-determined portfolios‟ objectives or mandates 
without due concern towards ethical, social or religious motives and they are not subject 
to any screening obstacles.   
 
 Contrary to conventional investment however, a pious or ethically-motivated 
investor is supposedly looking beyond the mere profit maximisation objectives when 
investing his/her money.  Therefore, in the case of Islamic funds, the attainment of the 
highest expected utility especially for a pious Muslim investor is not merely achieved 
through profit maximisation alone but also by submitting to religious obligation. This 
contention however, should not be construed as demanding pious Muslim investors to be 
less profit consciousness than conventional investors.  Instead, Islam encourages its 
 5 
followers to create and accumulate wealth as long as the wealth is obtained through 
legitimate means.  Thus, although profit maximisation is allowed in Islam, it should not 
be perceived as the ultimate objective by Muslim investors that would potentially 
undermining their other religious obligations, or as the one that will justify any means for 
its achievement. Islamic teachings do not only place emphases on wealth creation and 
accumulation but are equally concerned with the manner of how the wealth is utilised.  
With this understanding in mind, it can be argued that the expected utility function of a 
pious Muslim investor should be different from the utility function of a conventional 
investor since the former will take into consideration his religious belief and constraints 
when making an investment whilst the latter‟s main concern would naturally be about the 
expected monetary reward from his/her investment merely.       
 
 Subsequently, there is a concern that Shariah restrictions may have somehow 
affected the return of Islamic funds unfavourably.  By eliminating non-halal stocks from 
their portfolio, Islamic funds will certainly be deprived from enjoying the profit potential 
offered by non-halal securities, thus making the religious funds rather less competitive in 
terms of their potential return as compared to conventional funds.  Moreover, such 
restrictions also expose Islamic funds to the risk of moral hazard problem since Islamic 
fund managers will be able to conceal their ineffectiveness by citing Shariah restrictions 
as the primary cause for the poor performance of Islamic funds under their management 
(Wilson, 1997).   The Shariah constraints raise yet another daunting issue that poses a 
challenge to Islamic-based investment.  In so far as modern portfolio theory is concerned, 
it has been argued that such restrictions, although religiously or ethically correct, will not 
be acceptable (see Kurtz, 2005).  Under modern portfolio theory, an investor is deemed to 
be rational and concerned only with the return and risk relationship of the chosen 
securities in the portfolio, subsequently he/she shall have unlimited choices of assets at 
his/her disposal whenever he/she intends to diversify that would allow him/her to achieve 
the optimum mean-variance portfolio.  Therefore, putting certain restrictions on the 
choice of securities would have considerable impact on the analysis of the performance of 
an Islamic-based investment portfolio since the portfolio arguably might not be able to 
achieve the status of an optimal portfolio as defined by the Markowitz‟s theory.  
Consequently, any results from analysis related to portfolio optimality of Islamic funds 
under the framework of the modern portfolio theory should be interpreted cautiously. 
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 The appropriateness of using the standard portfolio performance valuation models 
that have obviously failed to take into account the ethical and Islamic funds‟ objectives 
and investment constraints may be questioned on two important grounds.  First, the 
traditional portfolio performance measurement models developed under modern portfolio 
theory have their roots in the utility maximisation theory – based on the premise that 
investors will always attempt to maximise their positive return and minimise risk.  The 
maxim that a rational economic agent is only concerned with maximising monetary return 
however, has been seriously challenged by McKenzie (1977), Cullis et al. (1992), Anand 
and Cowton (1993), Mackenzie and Lewis (1999), and Beal et al. (2005) who assert that 
some investors are equally motivated by factors other than just maximising monetary 
return.  In this respect, Islamic and ethical fund investors are categorised as the group of 
investors whose investment objectives also include the pursuit of certain religious or 
ethical values in addition to higher monetary return. Moreover, such diverse 
characteristics are not exclusive to individual investors per se since ethical funds, as 
suggested by Mallin et al. (1995), also possess some unique characteristics, rendering a 
direct comparison between the performance of ethical funds and stock market 
benchmarks somewhat misleading (see Hussein and Omran, 2005: 106).   
 
 Secondly, argument against the standard portfolio valuation models lies in the 
inability of the traditional models to take into account the non-pecuniary motives of 
ethical and Islamic funds as well as their investors.   Since the standard models, in their 
original constructs, are merely concerned with monetary return and risk and deliberately 
ignore the existence of other investment objectives, the models are incapable of giving 
due consideration to the impact of incorporating ethical or religious values in portfolio 
performance.  Such limitation is admitted by Sharpe (1994: 50) when he states that: 
 
... when such considerations [i.e. the difference in portfolios’ objectives] are 
especially important, return mean and variance may not suffice, requiring the use 
of additional or substitute measures.  (clarification is researcher‟s) 
 
Similar criticism was also made by Basso and Funari (2003: 521) when they claim that: 
 
... the traditional performance indicators for financial portfolios cannot take into 
account both objectives [i.e. (1) to satisfy an ethical need; and (2) to obtain a 
satisfactory return] since they assume by definition that the only aspect to 
assess is the investment return, which should have the highest expected value 
with the minimum risk.  (clarification is researcher‟s) 
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 To conclude, this study is particularly motivated by the tremendous growth of the 
Islamic fund industry.  The demand for Islamic funds remains strong despite published 
data showing that the long-term return of the religious funds is generally below the return 
of conventional funds.  Hence, it is apparent that the attractiveness of Islamic funds is not 
entirely due to its profit potential, rather, investors subscribing into Islamic funds are also 
driven by other non-pecuniary motives. Empirical results from past studies on Islamic 
fund performance are rather inconclusive. The majority of the studies have applied the 
three traditional portfolio performance measurement models, namely: the Sharpe Index, 
the Treynor Index and the Jensen-alpha Index, or their variants.  However, the fact that 
the standard models consider only return and risk elements of an investment has raised 
serious doubts on the suitability of the traditional portfolio valuation models for 
evaluating ethical or Islamic funds.  This is in view that both ethical and Islamic funds are 
principally created to achieve certain socially- or religiously-oriented objectives in 
addition to generating positive return for their investors whilst their performance is not 
only vulnerable to various risks similar to conventional funds but also subjected to the 
constraints imposed by their portfolio mandates.  Consequently, the traditional portfolio 
performance valuation models based upon the mean-variance framework may not be 
capable of measuring the performance of ethical and Islamic funds accurately since they 
may produce biased results against ethical and Islamic funds.  Therefore, the findings 
from previous studies derived from the traditional portfolio valuation models, particularly 
those alleging that ethical or Islamic funds are unable to outperform conventional funds 
or market index, amid the disadvantages of the funds such as the reduced investment asset 
universe, additional monitoring costs and the lack of diversification benefits, may be 
misleading and should be interpreted cautiously.  This point is made clear by Gregory et 
al. (1997) when they argued that the observed underperformance of ethical funds 
measured using the Jensen-alpha Index is not surprising given the ethical portfolio‟s high 
concentration of investment in small-capitalised stocks.  In this respect, thorough 
investigation is needed to determine the return and risk characteristics of Islamic funds 
and to improve the assessment methods of the funds. 
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1.3 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
There are two primary aims of this study, namely to explore and analyse the performance 
of Islamic funds in the case of Malaysia by employing econometrics modelling whereby 
to contribute positively to the development of the Islamic fund industry by exploring the 
means to further enhance the assessment methods of Islamic funds.  In addition, this study 
aims to critically examine the outstanding issues relating to the performance of Islamic 
funds through the perception of the fund managers by reflecting on the actual 
performance and practice.    
 
The main objectives of this study are: 
 
(i)  To examine the return and risk characteristics of Islamic funds thoroughly 
using a hypothetical portfolio consisting entirely of Shariah-compliant stocks 
listed on the Malaysian stock market;  
 
A thorough analysis of the return and risk characteristics of Islamic funds will address the 
issue of whether the return of Islamic funds is justified, or otherwise.  The analysis will 
also unlock the issues surrounding Islamic funds‟ underperformance. Since the return and 
risk characteristics of Islamic funds are determined based upon the analysis of a 
hypothetical Shariah-compliant portfolio instead of actual unit trust or mutual funds, this 
study is able to control the risk of sample-bias resulting from selecting performing or 
underperforming Islamic funds which, in turn, results from the differences in their fund 
managers‟ investment skills or operational efficiency.  Therefore, the results obtained 
from the Shariah-compliant hypothetical portfolio are anticipated to be unbiased results, 
through which, the actual return and risk characteristics of Islamic funds can be 
established.     
 
 
(ii)  To analyse the performance trend of Islamic funds using a hypothetical 
Shariah-compliant portfolio;  
 
This study attempts to examine whether Islamic funds‟ performance exhibits certain 
recognisable trends as reported by previous studies.  The analysis is important as it will 
reveal the performance trend of Islamic funds, through which, the nature of Islamic 
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funds‟ return and their potential can be better appreciated.  A hypothetical portfolio is 
suggested for this study because, unlike past studies using existing Islamic unit trust or 
mutual funds, its performance is not subjected to external influences such as fund 
managers‟ superior trading skill or pre-determined investment objectives that affect the 
stock selection process. Therefore, more robust and independent results of the 
performance of Islamic funds can be achieved by this study.     
 
 
(iii)  To conduct interview surveys with fund/investment managers of fund 
management companies in Malaysia on issues pertaining to the handling of 
Islamic funds and their perception towards the nature and performance of 
Islamic funds; and   
 
The survey is vital as it provides primary data on the actual operations and performance 
of Islamic funds.  The focus of the interview survey includes the structure and 
characteristics of the existing Islamic funds, the handling of the funds, the factors 
affecting Islamic fund performance, the Shariah-compliance practice and the current 
valuation methods used by Islamic fund managers.  The survey will also indicate the level 
of satisfaction amongst Islamic fund managers towards the performance of their Islamic 
funds vis-à-vis conventional funds, and their views of how the Shariah-compliance 
requirements affect the operation and investment decision-making process of their Islamic 
funds.  More importantly, the interview survey offers fresh insights, seriously lacking in 
the existing literatures related to Islamic fund performance, of Islamic funds‟ operation 
from the perspective of the industry practitioners.    
 
 
(iv)  To investigate the current practice of fund performance valuation specifically 
for Islamic funds and explore the possibility of improving Islamic fund 
valuation techniques.   
 
In view that the traditional portfolio performance valuation models were derived based 
upon certain economic theories that totally ignore the ethical or religious values, the 
standard models are presumed to be biased against ethical or religious funds due to their 
failure to give due recognition to ethically- or religiously-conscious investors for their 
willingness to accept less than optimal portfolio in favour of their religious or ethical 
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belief, or to forgo the excess return that they may potentially earn by investing in non-
ethical or haram (forbidden) securities. Therefore, this study attempts to examine the 
current fund performance valuation techniques and the perception of Islamic fund 
managers towards the compatibility of the traditional portfolio performance measures for 
evaluating Islamic funds.  The study also intends to investigate the existence of any 
additional variables that could influence Islamic fund performance and address the issue 
of whether Islamic funds require a unique portfolio valuation model which is not only 
distinctively different from the traditional portfolio performance measurement models but 
will supposedly produce a more accurate valuation of Islamic fund performance.  The 
understanding of the characteristics of Islamic funds and the current Islamic fund 
valuation techniques may eventually help to pave the way for improving the assessment 
method of Islamic funds. 
 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The problem statements of this study are as follow: 
 
1.4.1 What are the general characteristics of return and risk of Islamic-based 
portfolios?  
 
The issue that this study attempts to investigate is whether the return and risk of Islamic 
funds are significantly different from the return and risk of conventional funds.  In view 
that the investment asset universe of Islamic funds is restricted by Shariah-screening – 
which admits only halal (permissible) securities and excludes interest-based securities 
such as conventional banking, finance and insurance companies as well as companies 
involved in haram (forbidden) or gharar (uncertainty) activities such as gambling and 
production of liquor, tobacco, armaments, pork-related and other unethical products or 
services –  the return and risk profile of Islamic funds may also be altered by the Shariah 
restrictions on asset selection.  By examining the return and risk profile of Islamic funds, 
it is possible to identify the actual factors that contribute to the performance of Islamic 
funds.     
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1.4.2 Is the performance of Islamic-based portfolios significantly different from the 
performance of conventional portfolios? 
 
The issue that this study intends to analyse is whether Islamic fund performance exhibits 
a specific trend and whether the performance is significantly different from the 
performance of conventional funds.  The analysis is important since previous results 
pertaining to Islamic fund performance are rather inconclusive – there is evidence that 
Islamic funds have outperformed, underperformed or levelled the return of conventional 
funds or the key market index.  The contradictory findings are mainly attributed to the 
bias related to sample selection and time period covered by the previous studies.  
Therefore, by examining the performance of Islamic funds based on hypothetical 
portfolios covering a longer time period, it would be possible to determine the long-term 
trend of Islamic funds‟ returns and identify whether the observed differences between 
Islamic funds and conventional funds are statistically significant and so could undermine 
the viability of investment in Islamic funds.    
 
 
1.4.3 How Shariah-compliance requirements affect the performance of Islamic-
based portfolios? 
 
The issue that this study wishes to investigate is whether the Shariah-compliance 
requirements have significant impact on the performance of Islamic funds.  Two main 
issues pertaining to Shariah-compliancy are the restriction on securities selection, and the 
appointment of Shariah scholars to advise fund management companies on Shariah-
related matters.  Although the adherence to Shariah guidelines is crucial to ensure that 
Islamic funds remain Shariah-compliant, the two requirements, in particular, may have an 
adverse impact on Islamic funds‟ performance since they effectively reduce the 
investment asset universe, introduce an additional Shariah-risk, and increase the 
operating cost of Islamic funds.  By examining the Shariah issue further, it will allow for 
better understanding of Islamic funds‟ return and risk and why the performance of the 
religious-based funds is different from conventional funds.         
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1.4.4 How fund management companies handle their Islamic funds and how the 
performance of the funds is evaluated? 
 
The issue that this study attempts to examine is related to the current handling of Islamic 
funds by fund management companies and how the performance of Islamic funds is being 
evaluated in actual practice.  This issue is stimulated by the argument that since Islamic 
funds are subjected to certain Shariah-compliance requirements; the standard portfolio 
valuation models may not be entirely accurate to measure the performance of Islamic 
funds.  Therefore, an alternative portfolio valuation model which is tailored to the specific 
needs of Islamic funds may be needed.  However, to produce an alternative portfolio 
valuation model would require a different economic paradigm or, at least, some 
modification to the existing economic theory.  Since Islamic fund managers are at the 
front line of the Islamic fund industry, their input pertaining to Islamic funds‟ operation 
and performance valuation is crucial to determine the necessity of developing an 
alternative portfolio performance valuation model.  Hence, this study intends to 
investigate the need for such an alternative portfolio valuation model from the perspective 
of the industry‟s practitioners.  The issue is also stimulated by the general perception that 
Islamic funds were created largely by mimicking conventional portfolios, for which, the 
study will reveal how fund management companies actually perceive and handle their 
Islamic funds. 
 
 
1.5 THE RATIONALE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
In spite of the tremendous growth of Islamic-based investment and the continuing strong 
interest towards the Islamic banking and finance industry worldwide, literature on Islamic 
fund management and performance is, unfortunately, still deemed to be rather limited.  
Moreover, past studies have mainly based their analysis upon a sample comprising of 
either actual Islamic mutual funds or Islamic stock market index whilst the performance 
is measured using traditional portfolio performance valuation models.  The findings, 
while valuable, are generally varied and inconclusive due to various limitations and 
shortcomings in the methodologies employed by past studies.   
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 This study on the other hand, attempts to investigate the issues surrounding 
Islamic fund performance using different approaches.  First, the characteristics of 
Shariah-compliant funds are examined using a hypothetical portfolio with the objective to 
determine the return and risk profile of Islamic funds.  Secondly, the study seeks to 
investigate the issues related to Islamic fund management and performance from the 
perspective of Islamic fund managers; particularly the handling of Islamic funds, the 
impact of Shariah-compliance requirements on Islamic funds‟ performance, the 
appropriateness of using the traditional portfolio valuation models to evaluate Islamic 
funds‟ performance, and the necessity of an alternative portfolio performance measure for 
Islamic funds. Lastly, through the comprehensive understanding of the profile and 
operations of Islamic funds, this study attempts to suggest the appropriate course of 
actions to improve Islamic fund operation, thus contributing positively to the Islamic fund 
industry. 
 
 The study is different from past studies on two grounds: (1) it uses hypothetical 
portfolio, free from bias relating to fund managers‟ investment skills to determine the 
return and risk characteristics of Islamic funds; and (2) unlike previous studies which 
were entirely based on secondary data, this study uses both secondary and primary data.  
The secondary data is used in the analysis of hypothetical portfolios whilst the primary 
data is obtained through interview with Islamic fund managers.  The input from industry 
practitioners is an added advantage of this study as it complements the quantitative 
analysis by broadening the scope of this study, enhancing the depth of the analysis and 
offers real-life perspective to the issues at hand. Therefore, this study is crucial since it 
helps to enrich the quality of research on Islamic funds and paves the way for future 
research on the development of an alternative portfolio valuation model appropriate for 
Islamic funds. 
 
 
1.6 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
This study is organised as follows.  A comprehensive analysis of past studies and actual 
data pertaining to portfolio theory and mutual fund performance is discussed in the 
literature review which spans three chapters.  Chapter 2 elaborates the development of the 
modern portfolio theory over the half-century period since the 1950s to-date, including 
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discussions of the pioneering work of Markowitz (1952) portfolio theory, capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) theory, efficient market analysis (EMH) theory, traditional 
portfolio performance valuation models and the analysis of portfolio managers‟ 
investment skills.  The chapter also discusses the various other portfolio performance 
valuation methods which are different from the mean-variance framework.  The review of 
past literatures on portfolio performance indicates that despite the extensive research, the 
truth about fund performance and fund managers‟ ability remain elusive due to various 
theoretical and empirical limitations inherent in the existing valuation models.  
 
 Chapter 3 provides a detailed review of ethically-oriented and Islamic-based 
funds. The analysis reveals that ethical and Islamic funds were created with certain non-
pecuniary objectives, which make the funds fundamentally different from their 
conventional counterparts.  Although there may be some doubt about the underlying 
motives behind the offer of ethical and Islamic funds by fund management companies, the 
funds have, nonetheless, provided alternative investments to the growing population of 
ethically- or religiously-concerned investors.  However, despite their noble and divine 
intention, the funds may suffer from several disadvantages in terms of securities selection 
and higher operational costs which make it very difficult for the funds to outperform 
conventional funds.  On the other hand, reviewing past literatures indicates that the 
analysis of ethical and Islamic fund performance have largely been based on the 
traditional portfolio valuation models which, in turn, have clearly failed to give due 
consideration to the constraints faced by ethical and Islamic funds, thus possibly 
producing rather biased results against the funds.  
 
 Chapter 4 looks into the historical development of the Malaysian stock market and 
fund management industry, particularly the growth of Islamic-based investments in the 
country.   Malaysia is among several countries that have a dual financial system in which 
its Islamic finance and banking system is running successfully in parallel with 
conventional finance and banking.  As the country aspires to become a global Islamic 
financial and investment centre, it has positioned itself well by developing a 
comprehensive infrastructure and regulatory framework to cater for the needs of the 
Islamic finance and banking industry.  The success of the Malaysian stock market has 
stimulated the growth and development of the unit trust or mutual fund industry in the 
country.  Past studies on the performance of the Malaysian conventional and Islamic unit 
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trust funds however, reveal that the findings are rather inconclusive, whilst in the case of 
Islamic funds, the outcomes are also sensitive to the type of benchmark used between 
conventional and Shariah-compliant instruments.    
 
 The research methodology used in this study is elaborated in Chapters 5 and 6.  
The study employed two research methods, namely quantitative analysis and qualitative 
analysis, which makes the study essentially different from previous studies analysing 
Islamic funds‟ performance.  Chapter 5 explains the general research approach of this 
study including the nature of the study, the research strategy and tools, the types of data 
used and the analytical methods employed to analyse the data.  The nature of this study 
indicates that it is a case study analysis and employs a methodological triangulation 
technique since there are two sets of data involved. The secondary data is analysed using 
quantitative analysis method whilst the primary data is analysed using qualitative analysis 
methodology.  The quantitative analysis attempts to determine the salient features 
between return and risk characteristics of Islamic funds and conventional funds and 
examines the performance of the former relative to the latter.  The analysis is undertaken 
based on samples of three hypothetical portfolios comprising entirely of Malaysian listed 
companies‟ stocks.  The qualitative analysis is undertaken to gain greater insight into 
Islamic funds handling by fund management companies and valuation of Islamic funds‟ 
performance.  The qualitative analysis employed semi-structured, face-to-face interview 
with Islamic fund/investment managers and the data is analysed using coding analysis 
based on the template analysis method.   
 
 Chapter 6 explains the empirical modelling used in the quantitative analysis which 
is designed to provide a comprehensive understanding of the portfolios‟ return and risk 
performance.  The analysis begins with descriptive analysis which examines the general 
characteristics of the return and risk of the hypothetical portfolios. This is followed by in-
depth analysis of the behaviour of the hypothetical portfolios‟ return in terms of their 
correlation, volatility and the impact of the different equity sizes on the portfolios‟ return.  
The final part of the quantitative analysis measures the performance of the hypothetical 
portfolios based on their risk-adjusted return using the three traditional portfolio 
performance valuation models.   
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 The subsequent three chapters present the analysis and discussion of the results.  
Chapter 7 provides the discussion of the results obtained from the quantitative analysis.  
The descriptive analysis indicates that return of the Shariah-compliant portfolio is 
generally below the return of both the non-Shariah-compliant portfolios and the 
benchmark index which is in-line with the cost of discipleship hypothesis.  This is 
attributed to the lower diversification benefits and high concentration of small-capitalised 
stocks in the Islamic-based portfolio.  The analysis also suggests that the performance of 
Islamic-based portfolio that invests only in large capitalised stocks is superior to the 
performance of conventional portfolios and the benchmark index particularly during a 
bearish market condition.  The results also highlights that in the process of portfolio 
construction involving stock selection, what is crucial to portfolio performance is the 
investment quality of the stocks rather than the quantity of the stocks.  In addition, the 
results also confirm that the valuation of Islamic-funds is sensitive to the type of 
instruments used as the performance benchmark, particularly the choice between 
conventional and Shariah-compliant instruments.  Another interesting finding from the 
quantitative analysis is that the historical performance of the hypothetical portfolios‟ 
returns shows a very strong mean reversion trend, thus suggesting that a passive buy-and-
hold policy is unlikely to generate favourable positive return over a long-term period.   
 
 Chapter 8 discusses the results obtained from the qualitative analysis.  The 
analysis found that Islamic funds are particularly characterised by their Shariah identities 
but generally have a smaller fund size and subscription rate, and generate lower return 
relative to conventional funds.  The analysis also found that economic motive is normally 
the main reason behind Islamic funds offering.  The analysis has identified several factors 
that significantly influence Islamic fund performance such as the fund managers‟ special 
investment skills, the general market condition, the stock selection approach, and the 
consequences of Shariah-compliance.  The analysis also revealed that although all 
existing Islamic funds have been certified as Shariah-compliant, there is still a huge gap 
in terms of Shariah understanding and adoption of Shariah principles in the creation of 
the Islamic funds especially when considering that the funds were created mostly by 
mimicking conventional funds.      
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 Chapter 9 contextualises the findings from the three sources of analysis namely 
the literature review, the quantitative analysis and the qualitative analysis. The discussion 
revolves around the four problem statements of this study which are related to the general 
return and risk characteristics of Islamic funds, the performance trend of Islamic funds, 
the Shariah impact on Islamic fund performance, and the Islamic fund management 
practice and performance measurement. Since the results of the three sources of analysis 
are not contradicting but complementing each other‟s findings, the study was able to 
derive a comprehensive conclusion pertaining to Islamic funds‟ operation and 
performance in Malaysia.   
 
 Chapter 10 gives the conclusion of the study. The chapter summarises the findings 
of the study and highlights the limitations as well as recommendations for future studies 
related to Islamic fund performance.  Finally, the overall findings of this study were 
artistically encapsulated in an epilogue which underlines the real challenge that faces the 
Islamic fund management industry, in particular, and the Islamic finance industry, in 
general.       
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Chapter 2 
 
PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND 
FUND MANAGERS’ INVESTMENT SKILLS: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A glance over past literatures from the 1950s to date regarding the concept of portfolio 
investment and performance measurement reveals that modern portfolio theory has 
evolved from a pure theoretical pursuit into practical applications.   Studies undertaken in 
the 1950s and 1960s that witnessed the development of the mean-variance equilibrium 
theory, in particular, were largely directed towards providing strong theoretical 
foundations for the portfolio performance measurement.  Research carried out in the 
1970s and 1980s were mainly aimed at testing and refining the original portfolio 
equilibrium models in the quest of finding the best way of constructing an optimal 
portfolio.   The central issue in the literatures produced during 1950s to 1980s is primarily 
the aptness of variance (and standard deviation) as the ultimate measure of risk.  
However, a more significant development in modern portfolio theory actually occurred in 
the last two decades, with studies conducted in the 1990s mainly focussing on scrutinising 
the role and ability of fund managers, while studies carried out in this decade (2000s) 
have concentrated on the impact of trading microstructures on fund performance and the 
search for alternative portfolio performance measurement models beyond the traditional 
mean-variance framework. 
 
 This chapter begins with a discussion on literatures pertaining to the modern 
portfolio theory pioneered by Markowitz (1952) which paved the way for the 
development of the capital asset pricing theory (CAPM), in particular.  This is followed 
by a review on literatures on the arbitrage pricing theory (APT), considered as the rival 
theory of the CAPM, and a discussion on how the modern portfolio theory fits into the 
concept of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH).   The chapter then continues with a 
discussion on literatures related to portfolio performance measurement, considering both 
the portfolio performance measurement models developed based upon the mean-variance 
framework and the portfolio performance measurement models applying alternative 
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methods other than the mean-variance criterion.  In view that the role of fund managers 
forms an integral part of portfolio theory, the chapter also explores the literatures 
concerning the performance of the fund managers.  Here, the analysis primarily 
concentrates on two areas, namely the fund managers‟ return performance and the fund 
managers‟ investment capability.  A critical analysis on past literatures then follows, after 
which, the chapter ends with a conclusion. 
 
 
2.2 THE MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY 
 
2.2.1 Markowitz’s Portfolio Theory 
 
The modern portfolio theory has benefited largely from the pioneering works of Harry 
Markowitz, dubbed as the father of the modern portfolio theory (see Elton et al., 1997: 
1744).    Markowitz (1952) explained for the first time ever how a rational investor would 
make portfolio selection under an uncertainty condition.  Markowitz rejected the then 
conventional belief that to maximise return an investor should diversify into all securities 
that give the highest expected return based on the premise that returns of different assets 
in a portfolio are inter-correlated: hence such diversification may not be able to eliminate 
all the portfolio‟s risk.  Instead, he argued that the variability of portfolio return is 
attributed to the portfolio‟s variance, of which, the risk can only be reduced by avoiding 
securities with high covariance.  Therefore, what is important in a portfolio construction 
is to consider how the individual assets in the portfolio co-move with each other, thus 
contributing to the overall portfolio‟s ultimate risk.   
 
 Within the mean-variance framework, Markowitz proved that the superiority of 
diversification is only attainable through a combination of securities with a low 
covariance level, whilst the best (or efficient) portfolio for a risk-averse investor is not 
merely the one that offers the highest expected return, but rather, the portfolio that gives 
the most return for a given level of variance or the lowest variance for a given level of 
return.  Through the distinction between the portfolio return and risk, it was then possible 
to formulate the “efficient frontier”, a graphical presentation that shows the combination 
of all portfolios of risky securities that are mean-variance efficient.   
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 An influential work by Tobin (1958) further extended the modern portfolio 
selection theory.  Tobin showed that an investor who has access to risk-free instruments 
may also combine the riskless assets with risky assets to attain an optimal portfolio.  The 
distinction between the investment in risk-free securities and risky securities, known as 
the Separation Theorem, enables an investor to determine the single optimal portfolio that 
has the combination of both riskless and risky securities on Markowitz‟s efficient frontier.  
Specifically, the best portfolio would be the one which is located at the point where the 
line passing the riskless securities (Rf) is tangent with the curve of the efficient frontier as 
illustrated by Figure 2.1.  From the figure, the efficient frontier is shown by the curve A-
C whilst the Rf -B line forms the capital market line (CML) which represents all possible 
combinations between riskless and risky securities that become efficient portfolios.  
However, the best and dominant portfolio of all the efficient portfolios is the one 
indicated by Point B.   These findings stimulated further studies on the valuation of 
financial assets within the mean-variance framework and provide the necessary 
foundation for the formulation of all the mean-variance-related asset valuation models, of 
which, the most popular is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) theory.       
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Efficient Frontier with Risk-Free Rate 
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2.2.2 The Portfolio Theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Theory (CAPM) 
 
One of the most celebrated theories in financial economics is the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM), a single-index asset pricing equilibrium model developed separately by 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966).   CAPM has been very influential as it 
is widely used as a benchmark to measure the value of financial assets and capital 
budgeting projects as well as to assess fund managers‟ performance.  Prior to CAPM, 
financial assets were mainly evaluated on the basis of their individual return whilst 
performance of investment funds were assessed mainly through relative measures such as 
fund ranking techniques due to the unavailability of a specific market equilibrium model 
suitable for use as a performance benchmark (Jensen, 1968).  Hence, the discovery of the 
CAPM has provided the much needed benchmark for comparing financial assets and fund 
managers‟ performance.  In academic fraternity, the main appeal of the model is its 
derivation from the expected-utility theory following the works on portfolio selection 
theory by Markowitz (1952) who had, in turn, extended the works on utility theory by 
Bernoulli (1738) and Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) as well as the theory of 
general equilibrium involving risks by Arrow-Debreu (1954) (see Dimson and 
Mussavian, 1999).    
 
 For general investors and fund managers, the main attraction of the theory is its 
simple yet powerful interpretation of the risk as the most crucial factor affecting financial 
assets.  By distinguishing between diversifiable and non-diversifiable risks, the model 
brilliantly reduces all forms of risks inherent in an asset into just a single factor, the beta 
(β), which measures non-diversifiable risks hence making it easily understandable by both 
investors and fund managers alike as compared to other asset valuation models.  
Nevertheless, since its inception, the CAPM has been tested rigorously both theoretically 
and empirically such as by Fama (1968), Black (1972), Fama and MacBeth (1973), 
Blume and Friend (1973), Merton (1973), Dybvig and Ross (1985), and Gibbon et al. 
(1989).  It was also subjected to intense academic debates by Friend and Blume (1970), 
Roll (1978), Roll and Ross (1980), Green (1986), Grinblatt and Titman (1987), and Fama 
and French (1992).  Notwithstanding this, despite being highly controversial, CAPM 
arguably remained as the most dominant single-index model in financial economics 
theory. 
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 The CAPM is principally derived based upon Markowitz‟s (1952) efficient 
frontier and Tobin‟s (1958) separation theorem.  It depicts a linear relationship theory 
between return and risk (or mean-variance relationship) based on the underlying 
assumptions: (1) All investors are risk-averse and would choose an efficient portfolio that 
would maximise their end-of-period expected utility (the marginal utility decreases as 
wealth increases); (2) All investors have the same one-period investment horizon; (3) All 
investors measured portfolio performance solely based on mean and variance (return and 
risk) and they all have homogenous expectations on the distribution of the end-of-period 
future returns; (4) There is no friction in the trading of financial assets such as the absence 
of taxes or transaction costs, and that the financial market is informationally efficient; 
and, (5) All investors can choose to invest in any financial assets, and they may borrow or 
lend any amount of money at the rate similar to risk-free rates.   Under these assumptions, 
the CAPM shows that the expected return for an asset or portfolio i is related to the 
expected excess return of the market portfolio adjusted for the systematic risk of the asset 
or portfolio, commonly represented as:  
 
                              (2.1) 
 
where     is the expected return on asset i,      is the expected return on the market 
portfolio;  Rf  is the return on a risk-free asset which represents the lending or borrowing 
rate; and,     is the measure of the asset‟s systematic risk, calculated as follows: 
 
    
           
  
  (2.2) 
 
where              is the covariance between return on the asset and return on the market 
and   
   is the variance of the market returns.  In so far that the return and risk of an asset 
is represented by a linear relationship as proposed by Equation 2.1, the CAPM asserts that 
the asset‟s beta coefficient, β, is the only factor that contributes to the variability of return 
since the other forms of unsystematic risks will be eliminated by diversification.  This 
insight is rather appealing as it has significantly simplified the process of portfolio 
selection and allows investors and fund managers to focus on a single risk factor when 
diversifying their investment.   
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 Earlier literatures on CAPM have mainly focussed on testing the robustness of the 
theory and its application for portfolio performance measurement.  Notwithstanding 
however, since the model was developed based on specific assumptions, certain studies 
have been directed towards the testing of the validity of the assumptions to determine 
their accuracy in representing the real world situation.  For instance, Black (1972) 
analysed the validity of the assumption of using the risk-free rate as borrowing and 
lending rate; Fama and MacBeth (1973) as well as Blume and Friend (1973) examined 
the assumption of the perfect capital market; Merton (1973), Gressis et al. (1976) and 
Mulvey et al. (2003) explored the robustness of the CAPM in multi-period setting instead 
of the single-period horizon assumption; Goldsmith (1976) studied the impact of 
transaction costs; Dybvig and Ross (1985), Ippolito (1989) and Elton et al. (1993) 
analysed the effect of information asymmetry; and Longstaff (2001) analysed the impact 
of liquidity constraints on the CAPM valuation.  By relaxing certain assumptions to better 
represent the real world situation, several studies have stimulated the development of 
other CAPM variants.  The following section briefly discusses the findings of some of 
these studies. 
 
 
2.2.2.1 Tests of the CAPM and CAPM Variants              
 
Black (1972) contended that the assumption of the risk-free rate as a suitable proxy for 
borrowing and lending rate is the most restrictive among all the CAPM assumptions, 
saying that the assumption “is not a very good approximation for many investors, and one 
feels that the model would be changed substantially if this assumption were dropped”  
(Black, 1972: 445).  He proved that the original CAPM equation needs to be adjusted 
when no riskless securities are available and proposed the zero-beta CAPM as an 
alternative equation.  Merton (1973) attempted to relax the CAPM assumption that all 
investors have a single-period investment horizon.  He argued that for an investor who is 
risk-averse, his utility function is not influenced solely by his own wealth confined in a 
single time period but is also subjected to the overall state of the economy that expands in 
a multiple period horizon.  This view is shared by Gressis et al. (1976) who found that an 
individual‟s portfolio choice is also affected by his investment horizon and that 
“knowledge of one‟s utility function is not sufficient for determining his choice of 
portfolio”.    
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 The necessity to adapt for a multi-period model is further strengthened by Mulvey 
et al. (2003) who argued that the single-period model of CAPM has failed to consider the 
variability of portfolio return and risk caused by dynamic portfolio strategy such as 
portfolio rebalancing activities undertaken by fund managers.  They asserted that “[A] 
multi-period model will perform better than single-period mean-variance (MV) models 
for long-term investors” (Mulvey et al., 2003: 36).  To make the CAPM more adaptable 
to a longer time period, Merton (1973) developed the Intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM), a 
variant of CAPM that caters for a multi-period setting.  Breeden (1979) subsequently 
extended the works of Merton (1973) on ICAPM by introducing Consumption CAPM 
(CCAPM), a single-beta factor of multi-period CAPM which is in contrast with the multi-
beta factor of Merton‟s ICAPM.  For CCAPM however, the beta is estimated based upon 
an aggregate consumption flow instead of market return as in ICAPM.    
 
 The impact of transaction costs is analysed by Goldsmith (1976) who found that 
an investor will hold more securities as his wealth increases but when there are 
transaction costs incurred, the investor will adjust his portfolio composition by investing 
more in risky assets.  Thus, his finding implies that transaction costs could, in fact, 
influence the portfolio decision process of an investor.  Carhart (1997) in his analysis on 
the persistence of mutual fund performance provides further evidence on the significance 
of transaction costs when he concluded that “the investment costs of expense ratios, 
transaction costs and load fees all have a direct, negative impact on performance” 
(Carhart, 1997: 81).  Indeed, these findings contradict the original CAPM‟s assumption 
that simply ignores transaction costs. 
 
 Several studies have tested the CAPM assumption of the informationally efficient 
market.  For this purpose, the natural candidates are usually investment fund or portfolio 
managers who are deemed to have access to privileged information not normally 
available to general investors.  The first such study applying the CAPM model was 
undertaken by Jensen (1968).  His analysis on 115 mutual funds concluded that fund 
managers, in general, were unable to outperform the market or even to beat the simple 
buy-and-hold strategy.   Dybvig and Ross (1985) however, found that fund managers who 
possess superior information were able to achieve superior performance.  Their study 
highlights an apparent deviation in the CAPM‟s security market line (SML) when the 
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performance for fund managers with superior information cannot be accurately plotted on 
or around the SML.  
 
 Ippolito (1989) studied the impact of information cost on capital market 
efficiency. Contrary to earlier findings that mutual funds underperformed the market 
index such as by Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968), he claimed that mutual funds are 
efficient enough in their trading and information gathering activities and that they do earn 
superior returns which are sufficient to cover for the higher fees they charged their 
investors.  Elton et al. (1993) however, rejected Ippolito‟s (1989) findings by arguing that 
his sample of mutual funds has failed to properly account for the performance of non-
S&P (Standard & Poor‟s) stocks.  Further, they contended that once the returns on non-
S&P stocks are included, his analysis will produce similar results as the previous studies.  
Regardless of the outcomes however, the assumption of an informationally efficient 
market as assumed by the CAPM has clearly being challenged which, in turn, raises 
serious doubt about the validity of the CAPM itself.   
 
 Of all the critics on the validity of the CAPM, arguably the most significant are 
those that centred on issues pertaining to the appropriate proxy to represent the market 
portfolio and the assumption that the beta alone is sufficient to explain the variability of 
securities return.   The following section discusses some of the major findings related to 
this debate.     
 
 
2.2.2.2 Critics on CAPM 
 
Prior to Roll (1977), the CAPM has generally succeeded in resisting criticisms and has 
withstood various tests designed to challenge its validity.  Blume and Friend (1973) 
rejected the CAPM as the pricing equilibrium for all financial assets.  Their analysis 
found that the CAPM is suitable for valuing common stocks but not suitable for valuing 
corporate bonds.  Elton et al. (1976: 1341) highlighted three main obstacles that hinder 
the successful implementation of Makowitz‟s portfolio theory, from which the CAPM 
was derived, namely the difficulty in estimating the type of input data necessary; the 
lengthy time and the huge costs involved to generate an efficient portfolio; and, the 
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difficulty of educating portfolio managers on the relationship between return and risk 
expressed in terms of covariances and standard deviations.   
 
 The seminal works by Roll (1977, 1978) however, cast serious doubts on the 
validity of the pricing equilibrium to the extent that the theory was relegated to a 
defensive position.  Unlike previous critics on CAPM that usually focussed on the testing 
of the model‟s restrictive assumptions, Roll argued that the CAPM itself may not be 
testable since the model is highly vulnerable to mis-specification error thus no appropriate 
and conclusive test on the theory is possible.  He pointed out that the CAPM “is testable 
in principle”, however, “no correct and unambiguous test of the theory has appeared in 
the literature” and “there is practically no possibility that such a test can be accomplished 
in the future” (Roll, 1977: 129-130).   
 
 Roll (1977) contended that both CAPM parameters, namely the market portfolio 
(m) and the beta (β), are subject to serious flaws, if they are not treated properly.  He 
stressed that the market portfolio (m) in Equation 2.1 should consist of all assets, both 
tangibles and intangibles, available in the market.  Otherwise, it will not be possible to 
determine whether the market portfolio (m) is mean-variance efficient, which is a pre-
requisite condition of the theory.  Consequently, the use of a proxy portfolio or market 
index to represent the market portfolio (m) in the equation, as normally applied in past 
literatures, when the true market portfolio (m) is actually unknown will not yield 
definitive results:  If the proxy portfolio is mean-variance efficient, the outcomes 
generated from the computation using the proxy portfolio might seem to satisfy all the 
theory‟s assumptions even if the true market portfolio (m) is, in fact, not mean-variance 
efficient.   
 
 Shanken (1987) provides further empirical evidence on the danger of using a 
proxy portfolio in the testing of the CAPM.  He examined the correlation between a proxy 
and a true market portfolio and found that the former does not fully represent the latter.  
Since his analysis is effectively a joint hypothesis between the validity of the CAPM and 
the efficiency of the proxy portfolio, his findings suggests that either the CAPM theory is 
invalid or the proxy has been mis-specified.  Further, he concluded that the use of a proxy 
market in the testing of the CAPM to replace the true market portfolio (m) is only valid 
on condition that the proxy portfolio is an unambiguous representative of the true market 
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portfolio.  Other studies such as Frankfurter (1976), Peterson and Rice (1980), Green 
(1986), Lehmann and Modest (1987), Grinblatt and Titman (1994), and Matallín-Sáez 
(2006) have also supported the view that the CAPM is highly sensitive to the use of a 
proxy portfolio or market index.   
 
 Roll (1977, 1978) also criticises the notion that the beta alone can explain the 
variability of asset return.  The CAPM assumes that only non-diversifiable or systematic 
risks, represented by the beta (β), affect an asset‟s return.  However, Roll (1977) argued 
that since the linear relationship between expected return and beta is derived from the 
assumption of market portfolio‟s mean-variance efficiency, neither are independently 
testable.  Therefore, an empirical test on the model is practically a joint test between the 
validity of the linearity relationship between return and beta, and the mean-variance 
efficiency of the market portfolio.  Another crucial problem with beta is that the 
parameter is estimated using historical (ex-post) time series data.  Considering that the 
stock market is proven to be informationally efficient, at least in the weak form, securities 
returns are not expected to be correlated from one period to another since such 
correlation, if it exists, would entail the rejection of the efficient market.  Therefore, an 
estimation obtained from an ex-ante model using the beta estimated from ex-post data 
which is not supposed to be correlated is poised to be dubious.      
 
 Contrary to the notion that beta alone is a sufficient measure of risks, numerous 
studies have concluded just the opposite with evidence that asset returns are equally 
affected by various micro- and macro-economic factors in both quantitative (such as stock 
market, economics and financial data) as well as qualitative (such as management 
efficiency, marketing strategy and business policy) natures.  The observed anomalies in 
stock returns such as the price–earnings ratio effect (Basu, 1977; Ball, 1978), the size 
effect (Banz, 1981), the leverage effect (Bhandari, 1988), and the book-to-market-equity 
ratio (Fama and French, 1992) proved the insufficiency of beta as the only factor 
affecting asset returns (see Fama, 1996: 441).  In a recent paper, Pendaraki et al. (2005) 
proposed a new methodology for portfolio construction and selection based on the multi-
criteria decision aid (MCDA) method.  They argued that the new model which takes into 
account the multi-dimensional nature of risks is more accurate than the traditional linear-
based models that assume variance (or standard deviation) as the only source of 
variability (risk) to return of an asset.   
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 Criticism on the CAPM has not only been directed towards the original standard 
model but also towards its other variant model, since these models shared similar 
properties with the standard model (Shanken, 1987: 108).  For instance, although the 
ICAPM is deemed to be significant in theoretical perspective, it is “not very tractable for 
empirical testing, nor is it very useful for financial decision-making” (Breeden, 1979: 
266).  This viewed is shared by Fama (1996: 442) who argued that the ICAPM is too 
complicated mathematically that it “lacks the simple intuition that makes the CAPM so 
attractive”.       
 
 In brief, past studies have indicated that the single-index model is a poor predictor 
for future expected return due to the various empirical restrictions inherent in the CAPM.  
Alternatively, a multi-index equilibrium model has been proposed to replace the single-
index model.  The advantage of the multi-index model over the single-index model has 
been tested empirically by Gibbons et al. (1989).  The most popular multi-index model is 
the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) developed by Ross (1976).  The following section 
discusses the nature of the APT. 
 
 
2.2.3 The Portfolio Theory and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
 
The prospect of the use of a multi-factor pricing model to explain the variability of asset 
return was initially discussed by Gehr (1975; cited in Roll and Ross, 1980).  However, it 
was the seminal works by Ross (1976, 1978) that led to the development of the arbitrage 
pricing theory (APT), the testable form of the multi-index asset pricing model.   It is 
rather obvious that the APT was developed as a viable alternative to the CAPM amid the 
various shortcomings of the single-index model.  The APT implies that the random return 
on asset i (Ri) satisfies the following K-factor linear model as follows:  
 
1 1 ...i i i iK K iR E           i = 1, . . ., N (2.3) 
 
where Ei is the expected return on asset i, the δK are the mean zero common factors, the βi 
measure the systematic risk of the common factor δK, and the εi are the noise term or 
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unsystematic risk component of the common factor assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
δK and with each other (see Roll and Ross, 1980; Shanken, 1982).   
 
 In hindsight, the APT appears as if it is a multi-beta version of the CAPM.  In fact, 
Shanken (1985: 1189) claimed that the APT is simply “a multi-beta interpretation of the 
CAPM”.  He further argued that the use of the CAPM intuition pertaining to the linearity 
relationship between asset returns and beta in the APT has exposed the multi-index 
equilibrium model to similar limitation faced by the CAPM.  Therefore, if any test based 
on a joint hypothesis between the linearity of asset return–beta relationship as well as the 
market portfolio efficiency rejected the CAPM, the same rejection would also apply to the 
APT.   In view of the Shanken (1985) argument, it is necessary to underline the 
difference(s) between the CAPM and the APT. 
 
 The major difference between the CAPM and the APT lies on the merit given on 
their factor variables.  The CAPM theory essentially emphasises the relationship between 
the covariance of asset returns and a certain market portfolio based on the presumption 
that the universe of an asset‟s risk factors can be reduced into a mere two categories, 
namely the systematic (non-diversifiable) and unsystematic (diversifiable) risk, thus 
resulting in the beta alone as the sufficient measure for risk.  Consequently, the 
characteristics of any economic variables or securities do not play a significant part in 
CAPM theory.  On the contrary, APT theory emphasises the covariance of asset returns 
and certain pre-selected common factor variables that are deemed to affect asset returns, 
hence making it essentially a multi-factor model that allows for more than one factor to 
be incorporated in the return equilibrium model (see Shanken, 1985; Roll and Ross, 1980; 
and Dimson and Mussavian, 1999).  In addition, Roll and Ross (1980) outlined the 
theoretical differences between the CAPM and the APT, of which, they argued that “the 
APT is based on a linear return generating process as a first principle, and requires no 
utility assumptions beyond monotonicity and concavity”.  Unlike CAPM, the APT can be 
applied in both single-period and multi-period investment settings, and it does not depend 
on the condition that the market portfolio must be mean-variance efficient (Roll and Ross, 
1980: 1074). 
 
 Benefiting from lesser restrictions than the CAPM, the APT is arguably more 
testable than, and superior to, the single-index model as argued by Roll and Ross (1980), 
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Grinblatt and Titman (1987), Chen et al. (1986), Fama and French (1992), and Fama 
(1996).  Its ability to cater for multiple systematic risks enables the APT to replicate the 
real world situation better than the CAPM, refuting the notion that systematic risk, or 
beta, alone is sufficient to explain the variability of asset returns as proposed by the 
CAPM.  Shanken (1982) attributed the advantage of the APT over the CAPM to its multi-
beta setting.  Amid the overwhelming evidence that asset returns are affected not just by 
the market‟s beta, Fama (1996: 441-442) suggested that “multifactor models should be 
considered in research applications that require estimates of expected returns”.   Past 
literatures also reveal that the APT has enjoyed less criticism as compared to the CAPM.  
This however, does not indicate that the multi-factor model is free from any obstacles. 
 
 Perhaps the main difficulty in the process of formulating the APT is to determine 
what common factors (δ) are to be included and how many of these factors are required in 
the model (see Elton and Gruber, 1997).  Although the APT has been proven as a viable 
alternative to CAPM, the theory is practically silent in terms of identifying the common 
factors that are relevant as well as the exact number of these factors that are needed to 
construct an appropriate APT model.  Several studies have attempted to identify the 
common factors:  Roll and Ross (1980) used the factor analysis method to determine the 
common factors, but this method is argued by Shanken (1982) as inadequate since the 
method is purely based on statistical correlations without having significant economic 
interpretation.    
 
 Chen et al. (1986) analysed a set of macroeconomic variables and observed that 
industrial production as well as changes in the risk premium, the yield curve and the 
inflation are among the systematic factors that affect asset returns.  Surprisingly however, 
they found that stock market indices, real per capita consumption and oil price changes do 
not affect asset returns systematically.  In another study, Fama and French (1992) 
identified the common factors from a cross section analysis on firm characteristics 
through a portfolio of stocks.  Their findings that size and book-to-market equity are the 
two most important factors affecting securities returns have added to the volume of 
research that show the significance of firm characteristics as the determinant of stock 
returns such as size (Banz, 1981), leverage (Bhandari, 1988), and price-earnings ratio 
(Basu, 1977; Ball, 1978). 
 
 31 
 To conclude, the APT has been suggested as a viable alternative to the CAPM.  
The proponents of the APT have provided the evidence that the multi-factor model is 
superior to the single-factor model in view of its ability to capture more than one 
systematic risk factor in the pricing equilibrium. Notwithstanding however, the 
difficulties in selecting the appropriate factors as well as in determining the optimal 
number of factors to be included in the APT remain as the major obstacle in the 
construction of the multi-factor model.     
  
 
2.2.4 Portfolio Theory and the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
 
This section discusses how the portfolio theory fits into the concept of efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH).   Since the beginning of the works by Fama (1970), the EMH 
continues to evolve and has become an integral part of the modern financial theory.  The 
EMH is principally the notion that securities prices „fully reflect‟ all available information 
and that prices will adjust instantaneously to the arrival of new information.   The 
intuition behind the EMH is simple, but very significant.  If EMH holds, then securities 
prices are deemed to trade at their fair (or intrinsic) value.  Consequently, since prices are 
poised to move in a random fashion over time, their unpredictability means no investor is 
expected to be able to earn abnormal profit through any trading strategy designed to 
manipulate the historical price trend.  In its extreme form, the EMH implies that all 
trading techniques whether based on fundamental analysis or technical analysis or any 
other investment strategies of fund managers are doomed to fail. 
 
 Prior to Fama (1970), securities prices were believed to fluctuate randomly 
without exhibiting significant correlation between time periods as reported by Kendall 
and Hill (1953).  However, Fama (1970) made a rather significant contribution to the 
theory of finance when he formalised the concept of market efficiency and developed a 
way to test the EMH by dividing the market efficiency into three levels: (1) the weak 
form efficient; (2) the semi-strong form efficient; and (3) the strong form efficient.  In this 
regards, the test of EMH within the portfolio management environment is essentially the 
test of the strong form of the market efficiency, for which, portfolio or fund managers 
obviously are the natural candidates.   
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 Earlier works on EMH have utilised the CAPM as the benchmark to measure fund 
managers‟ performance.  Studies by Fama and MacBeth (1973), Kon (1983), Chang and 
Lewellen (1984) and Henriksson (1984) found that fund managers generally are not able 
to predict or capitalise on stock price movements, a finding which is consistent with the 
EMH.  Ippolito (1989) analysed mutual fund managers‟ performances under the condition 
that information is costly to obtain.  His study extended the earlier works by Grossman 
(1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who found that, under the condition in which 
information is costly to obtain, it is reasonable to expect that trading by informed 
investors will take place at a price level which is different from uninformed investors in 
order to compensate the informed investors for the cost of obtaining the information.  His 
findings that fund managers were able to outperform index funds are consistent with the 
two studies but contradict the results of the much earlier studies and the EMH.  
Responding to Ippolito‟s (1989) claim, Elton et al. (1993) re-analysed the same sample 
used in his study and argued that his findings were subjected to the sample mis-
specification error due to poor treatment of non-index securities returns.    
 
 Studies undertaken in the 1990s have generally challenged the validity of the 
EMH particularly with respect to the strong form version of the EMH.  Using more 
comprehensive database and analysis techniques, researchers were able to analyse mutual 
fund performance in greater detail by incorporating the impact of trading microstructure 
such as transaction costs, taxes, management fees and fund flows in their analysis.  Mech 
(1993) analysed the autocorrelation of portfolio return and found that transaction costs 
affect return by causing delays in price adjustment.  His findings contradict the EMH 
which states that securities prices adjust immediately to fully reflect all available 
information.  Further evidence disputing the strong form version of the EMH can be 
found in literatures on the persistency of mutual fund performance such as by Grinblatt 
and Titman (1992), Hendricks et al. (1993) and Carhart (1997).  Though the evidence of 
persistency in fund managers‟ performance indicates that either it is a short-term 
phenomenon or is not robust statistically, the findings have nevertheless proved that some 
fund managers do enjoy informational advantages or possess superior investment skills 
which allow them to outperform the market continuously.  
 
 Notwithstanding, evidence against the EMH is far from conclusive.  For instance, 
there are more studies showing mutual funds underperformance and hence supporting the 
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EMH, than otherwise.  One possible cause that deters researchers from reaching an 
unambiguous conclusion is the limitation in the standard asset pricing model used in the 
analysis of the EMH.  In addition, any test on EMH is essentially a joint hypothesis test 
on: (1) the validity of the EMH; and (2) the validity of the equilibrium model used to 
carry out the test.  Therefore, amid the contradicting results on EMH, it will be difficult to 
ascertain whether the observed anomalies in stock returns and the evidence of fund 
managers‟ underperformance actually signify that the EMH is invalid or it might be due 
to certain flaws in the existing asset pricing models (see Ball, 1978).  However, as far as 
the fund managers‟ performance is concerned, the overwhelming evidence of their barely 
average performance indicates that at least the strong form of the EMH does hold (see 
Dimson and Mussavian, 1998).  
 
 
2.3 PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS 
 
There are various portfolio performance valuation methods that have been proposed in 
previous studies which can be categorised into portfolio performance measurement 
methods based on the mean-variance criterion and non mean-variance criterion.  Both 
methods are discussed in the following sections. 
 
 
2.3.1 Portfolio Performance Measurements Based on the Mean-Variance Criterion 
 
Prior to the CAPM, analysis on the mutual fund performance was based primarily on 
performance ranking techniques due to the unavailability of a benchmark against which 
the mutual fund performance can be compared.  Through the CAPM, researchers were 
able to formulate an absolute measurement value to evaluate mutual fund performance.  
The three most widely used risk-adjusted portfolio performance measures are the Treynor 
Index (Treynor, 1965), the Sharpe Index (Sharpe, 1966), and the Jensen-alpha Index 
(Jensen, 1968).  The three measures were principally derived from the CAPM equation.  
Friend and Blume (1970) provide a concise description of the derivation process.  
Assuming that all the CAPM assumptions hold, the financial market is said to be in 
equilibrium with the individual asset or portfolio (represented by the symbol i) poised to 
trade at their fair value price satisfying the general ex-ante CAPM as Equation 2.1 below: 
 
 34 
                             (2.1) 
 
However, considering the extreme limitation imposed by the CAPM assumptions, it is 
possible that one or more of the assumptions would be violated thus resulting in 
disequilibrium in the financial market.  To reflect the disequilibrium, Equation 2.1 is re-
written as follows: 
 
                                  (2.4) 
 
where ηi is the measure for disequilibrium.  If ηi equals zero, the asset or portfolio is in 
equilibrium.   However, if ηi is greater than zero, the expected return of the asset or 
portfolio is larger than the return anticipated by the CAPM equation thus indicating 
undervalued position.  Likewise, if ηi is lesser than zero, the expected return of the asset 
or portfolio is lower than the return anticipated by the CAPM equation thus implying 
overvalued position.  The Jensen-alpha Index is essentially derived from Equation 2.4 
with ηi is replaced by an alpha (α) in Jensen (1968) but applying similar intuition and re-
written as follows: 
 
                                  (2.5) 
 
The Treynor Index is derived by dividing both sides of Equation 2.4 with βi yielding: 
 
         
  
    
  
  
                   (2.6) 
 
The Treynor Index is represented by the left hand side of Equation 2.6 above.  If ηi equals 
zero, the Treynor Index will equal to              which, in turn, is independent from 
the systematic risk, β.  The measure is essentially similar to the Jensen-alpha Index as 
shown when              is transferred to the left hand side of the equation to obtain: 
 
 
  
  
     
          
  
                (2.7) 
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Therefore, the Treynor Index can be interpreted as the measure of excess return per unit 
of systematic risk. 
 
 Similar to Jensen-alpha Index and Treynor Index, the Sharpe Index is essentially 
derived from Equation 2.4.  Substituting the systematic risk, β, in Equation 2.4 with its 
definition as in Equation 2.2 gives: 
 
                   
            
 
   
              (2.8) 
 
Since,                                         (2.9) 
 
hence,                    
               
    
             (2.10) 
 
Sharpe (1964) proved that if the portfolio is efficient, then            = 1. Therefore, 
dividing both sides of Equation 2.10 with      yields: 
 
          
    
  
  
    
   
           
    
 (2.11) 
 
The left hand side of Equation 2.11 is the Sharpe Index which indicates the excess return 
per unit of standard deviation of the return.  However, since risk is the dominant factor, 
the Sharpe Index is suitable only for evaluating a well-diversified or efficient portfolio, 
for which, the systematic risk is the remaining risk available.  Therefore, unlike the 
Treynor Index and the Jensen-alpha Index that can be used to measure both a portfolio or 
individual securities and do not require efficiency as a prior condition for their usage, the 
Sharpe Index is not appropriate for evaluating individual securities due to the presence of 
unsystematic risk. 
 
 Of the three measures, the Jensen-alpha Index is arguably the most widely used in 
empirical studies probably owing to its direct adaptation to the CAPM.  Studies such as 
by Kon (1983), Henriksson (1984), Lehman and Modest (1987), Gibbons et al. (1989), 
Ippolito (1989), Grinblatt and Titman (1992, 1994), Elton et al. (1993), Hendricks et al. 
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(1993), Malkiel (1995), Cai et al. (1997), Daniel et al. (1997), Detzler (1999), Bers and 
Madura (2000), Patro (2001) as well as Otten and Bams (2007) have all applied the 
original Jensen-alpha Index or its variations.  However, more recent studies such as by 
Agudo and Sarto Marzal (2004), Avramov and Wermers (2006), and Choi (2006) have 
utilised the Sharpe Index.  
 
 Several studies have attempted to use a combination of more than one type of 
measure to examine the effect of the different measures on portfolio performance 
valuation and ranking.  For instance Peterson and Rice (1980), Kryzanowski and Sim 
(1990), Bauman and Miller (1994), Chunhachinda et al. (1994) and Rahman (1994) 
combined both the Treynor Index and Sharpe Index, whilst Friend and Blume (1970), 
Chuan (1995), Shukla and Singh (1997), Leong and Lian (1998) and Artikis (2003) used 
all the three portfolio measures.  Controversial though it is, each measure could produce 
different portfolio performance rankings, hence, making it rather difficult to reach a 
conclusive result when more than one performance measure is used or when a different 
group of portfolios are analysed (see for instance Bers and Madura, 2000; Artikis, 2003; 
Agudo and Sarto Marzal, 2004).  Critics have argued that since the three measures were 
derived from the CAPM theory, each measure is subjected to similar criticism afflicting 
the CAPM particularly the criticism by Roll (1977, 1978).  Friend and Blume (1970) even 
suggested that the accuracy of performance measurement results obtained using any of 
the three measures may be suspicious due to possible bias against risky portfolios which, 
in turn, is attributed to the CAPM‟s assumption that all investors enjoy similar lending 
and borrowing rates equal to the risk-free rate instrument.        
 
 Apart from the three portfolio performance measures, the CAPM has also been 
popularly used as a tool to differentiate between performing portfolios or securities with 
their underperforming counterparts.  By plotting the expected return against its beta 
coefficients, one obtains a linear regression line known as the securities market line 
(SML) which is a graphical representation of the CAPM.   A portfolio that is mean-
variance efficient shall be plotted exactly on the SML implying that no abnormal profit 
greater than anticipated by the CAPM could be earned from this portfolio.   Any deviation 
from the SML would imply that it might be possible to earn abnormal profit by investing 
in undervalued portfolios.  In this respect, undervalued or performing portfolios are those 
plotted above the SML whilst overvalued or underperforming portfolios are those lying 
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below the SML.   The simplicity of its usage and easily understandable interpretation are 
the attractive qualities that make the SML a popular tool for segregating between 
outperforming and underperforming portfolios.   
 
 Several studies however, have criticised the validity of using the SML for 
portfolio valuation purposes.  Dybvig and Ross (1985) argued that the SML is prone to 
error caused by information asymmetry, a factor which is beyond the mean-variance 
efficiency domain and not properly captured by the SML.  Therefore, any deviation from 
the SML may not necessarily indicate superior or inferior performance as Dybvig and 
Ross (1985: 397) have stated that:  
 
... a manager who makes optimal use of superior information may plot above, 
on, or below the SML, and may plot inside, on, or outside the efficient frontier – 
and every combination of these cases is possible.   
 
In addition, Green (1986) has shown that the SML is vulnerable to benchmark error since 
it is highly sensitive to the portfolio or benchmark used as proxy to the market portfolio 
especially if the chosen proxy is not mean-variance efficient.    
   
 Despite their theoretical limitations, the traditional portfolio performance 
measures continue to dominate the analysis of mutual fund performance both in academic 
literatures as well as in the real world.  Like the CAPM, their prevailing popularity is 
attributed mainly to their simple yet powerful inferences.  Nevertheless, various 
alternative portfolio performance measures departing away from the mean-variance 
framework have also been developed.  The following section discusses some of these 
measures. 
 
 
2.3.2 Other Portfolio Performance Measurements Methods 
 
One of the major difficulties afflicting portfolio performance measures derived based on 
the mean-variance framework is the considerable mathematical knowledge required 
before the measures can be fully appreciated.  Therefore, several alternative measures for 
portfolio performance valuation have been proposed that do not utilise extensive 
mathematical algorithms.  For instance, Clarkson and Meltzer (1960) introduced a 
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portfolio selection technique using a heuristic approach, computer programming that 
simulates the procedures and decision-making processes for selecting portfolios.  They 
argued that this method of portfolio selection is more appropriate than the mathematical 
approach which might rest solely on probabilistic assumptions or not be testable.  
 
 Renwick (1968) suggested that portfolio performance is essentially characterised 
by the quality of securities that make up a particular portfolio.  Therefore, a portfolio with 
superior (inferior) performance can be consistently created through a proper selection of 
best (poorly) performing securities.  He used the discriminant analysis technique in which 
securities are selected based upon any two of the four economic/financial variables, 
namely: the rate of return on total assets; the rate of output growth; capital structure; as 
well as the rate of retention of available income.  In a similar vein, Treynor and Black 
(1973) stressed the importance of securities‟ analysis in portfolio construction and argued 
that such analysis could significantly help to improve portfolio performance especially if 
the fund manager does not have sufficient knowledge in the more mathematically 
complicated portfolio construction methods of Markowitz or Sharpe.  
 
 Arguing that the CAPM could not possibly be true for all assets, Dybvig (1988) 
proposed the payoff distribution pricing model (PDPM) as an alternative to the CAPM.  
Notwithstanding however, the PDPM is arguably an extension of the CAPM itself by 
virtue that the PDPM employs numerous theoretical assumptions similar to the CAPM.  
Furthermore, he admitted that while the PDPM has been tested successfully in theoretical 
form, the model has yet to undergo rigorous empirical tests. 
 
 Bauman and Miller (1994) contended that portfolio valuation measures which are 
based exclusively on beta and sigma have failed to take into account the dynamism in 
portfolio objectives as well as the impact of investment holding period.  They argued that 
this has resulted in the portfolio ranking produced by both the Treynor and the Sharpe 
measures becoming inconsistent over time.  To mitigate the problem, Bauman and Miller 
(1994) proposed a measurement model that takes into account a particular portfolio‟s 
objectives assuming that fund managers will maintain similar investment style throughout 
the investment period.   The other significant attribute of their valuation model is that it 
takes a period of complete market cycle which will lessen the impact of temporary market 
volatility such as the over-reaction to bull and bear market thus producing a more 
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consistent portfolio ranking between the successive market cycles.  They found evidence 
of correlation in the year-to-year returns of mutual funds which implies that it is possible 
to predict the future returns of the funds. 
 
 Chunhachinda et al. (1994) compared the portfolio ranking produced by the 
Treynor Index and the Sharpe Index with the ranking generated by the higher moment 
performance measures developed by Prakash and Bear (1986) as well as Stephen and 
Proffitt (1991) (cited in Chunhachinda et al., 1994: 74-75).  Their study focussed on 
investigating the effect of investment horizon on portfolio performance following the 
argument that if the return distribution is not symmetrical, the CAPM-based two moment 
measures will not be appropriate to measure portfolio performance.  They found evidence 
of skewness and kurtosis in the return distribution of the 14 international stock markets in 
their sample, thus indicating that the shape of the return distribution is rather 
asymmetrical.  Therefore, they argued that the higher moment performance measures 
would be the more appropriate measures for evaluating portfolio performance.  This is 
confirmed by the comparison made on portfolio ranking when the ranking produced by 
the alternative measures are found to be highly correlated as compared to portfolio 
ranking generated by the Treynor Index and the Sharpe Index.  
 
 Chen and Knez (1996: 513) claimed that a portfolio performance measure can 
only be accepted if it satisfies four conditions namely it assigns zero performance to each 
portfolio in some reference set and it is linear, continuous and nontrivial.  They further 
argued that such conditions can only be achieved if the market strictly abides to the law of 
one price implying that there are no arbitrage opportunities.   In their analysis, they found 
that there is room for arbitraging in the portfolio valuation measurement thus prompted 
them to propose an alternative measure known as the no-arbitrage performance measure 
(NA-based measure).  The alternative measure is purportedly independent from the 
standard asset pricing equilibrium models hence they argued that it is free from any 
misspecification error. 
    
 In their attempt to address the shortcomings in the Jensen-alpha Index and the 
Sharpe Index particularly with regards to the benchmark problem, market timing and 
transaction costs, Murthi et al. (1997) introduced the DEA portfolio efficiency index 
(DPEI), a non-parametric approach based on the data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
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technique.  Since the method does not require any benchmark specification, it is arguably 
impervious of benchmark error.  The other advantage of the DPEI is that it is able to 
incorporate transaction costs explicitly into the model.  Using the new method, they found 
that all the 2,083 mutual funds in their sample are approximately mean-variance efficient.   
Joro and Na (2006) used an extended version of the DEA method to measure portfolio 
performance under the mean-variance-skewness framework arguing that investors‟ 
preferences are better represented by the mean-variance-skewness case than the mean-
variance framework of the CAPM. Unfortunately however, the results obtained from their 
analysis are rather inconclusive despite the complex and expensive computational 
programming involved.  
 
 Indro et al. (1999) proposed a non-linear approach for portfolio performance 
measures by applying a technique called the artificial neural network (ANN).  Originally 
developed to study the biological neural network, particularly the functionality of the 
human brain, the ANN is modified to become a performance forecasting model by 
employing non-linear function mappings using a multi-layer perceptron model and a 
general purpose non-linear optimiser (GRG2) computational methodology as well as a 
heuristic model on specific fund characteristics such as fund return, turnover, price-
earnings (P/E) ratio, price-book (P/B) ratio and market capitalisation as variables to 
predict fund performance.  They argued that the forecasts generated by the ANN model 
are superior to the linear model with respect to growth and blend funds, however, the 
linear model surpasses the ANN model when analysing value-oriented funds.  
 
 Bowden (2000) introduced the ordered mean difference (OMD) as an alternative 
to evaluate portfolio performance arguing that the standard linear models failed to 
properly account for market timing ability as well as differences in investors‟ risk profile.  
The OMD procedure involves the running of the difference of means between return of a 
particular fund and return of a benchmark (such as the market portfolio) ordered by 
values of the benchmark, from which, the expected value known as the conditional 
ordered mean difference  (COMD) can be used for measuring portfolio performance.  
While admitting that his study is “somewhat limited in scope” (Bowden, 2000: 219), it 
nevertheless reveals that some mutual funds were indeed able to outperform the market 
portfolio.    
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 Pendaraki et al. (2005) proposed an integrated methodological approach using a 
two-stage multicriteria decision aid (MCDA) framework to construct and evaluate a 
portfolio of mutual funds.  In the first stage, once the mutual funds have been identified 
based upon specific evaluation criteria, they are then evaluated and classified into 
appropriate groups using the UTADIS (UTilités Additives DIScriminates) classification 
method from which the best performing mutual funds will be selected to be included in 
the final portfolio.  Subsequently, in the second stage, a goal programming method is 
employed to determine the necessary proportion of each of the chosen mutual funds in the 
final portfolio.  They reported that the MCDA methodology has produced encouraging 
results using a sample of Greek mutual funds.      
 
 Choi (2006) suggested the incentive-compatible portfolio performance measure 
which links fund performance to the incentive structure of their respective fund managers.  
The proposed measure seeks to minimise the moral hazard problem in fund management 
industry by encouraging fund managers to maximise the return of their funds for higher 
managerial fees.  However, in view of the infancy stage of the measure, his paper merely 
provides the theoretical foundations for the new measure but offers no evidence in terms 
of data analysis to support the theory empirically.   
 
 Despite lacking concrete results, what is obvious from the above studies is that the 
quest for finding an appropriate portfolio performance measures is still continuing.  
Arguably, the traditional portfolio valuation measures based on the mean-variance theory, 
particularly the Jensen-alpha Index and the Sharpe Index, remain popular among both the 
academics and practitioners which is attributed mainly to the simplicity and the elegance 
of the mean-variance efficiency theory as well as the lack of further analysis being carried 
out on the alternative measures either due to theoretical or empirical limitations or costs 
constraints.  On a rather negative note, the availability of various portfolio performance 
measures with different valuation outcomes unfortunately makes the choice of the 
portfolio valuation method to be more difficult (see comment by Chunhachinda et al. 
1994; and Chen and Knez, 1996).    
 
 Nevertheless, past literatures have highlighted the significance of the search for an 
appropriate portfolio performance measure to give fair valuation of fund performance 
which, in turn, reflects the actual capabilities and services rendered by fund managers.  In 
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fact, the scope of study of fund managers‟ performance has expanded from the earlier 
focus of analysing portfolio return and risk to include broader issues involving trading 
microstructures (such as the persistency in fund performance and the impact of 
transaction costs) as well as the fund managers‟ special investment skills (such as market 
timing ability, stock picking talent and management styles).  The following section 
discusses the issues in greater detail.    
  
   
2.4 ANALYSIS OF FUND MANAGERS’ PERFORMANCE   
 
Following the seminal works by Treynor (1965), Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968), 
numerous studies have been undertaken to examine the performance of fund managers 
thoroughly. The keen interest towards this issue is understandable.  Actively managed 
mutual funds account for about 90 per cent of the total $4 trillion invested in US domestic 
equity mutual funds in 2006 (Avramov and Wermers, 2006).  Apart from the sheer size of 
public investment entrusted to fund managers, the fund managers themselves, being 
informed investors, are perceived to possess informational advantage as compared to the 
general investing public and hence, they become natural candidates for analysis related to 
portfolio performance.  More importantly, the fund managers‟ performance is crucial to 
justify their very own existence.  If the fund managers are not capable of generating 
sufficient return to compensate for the high management fees they charge their clients, or 
if their performance is not able to outperform even the return from a naïve buy-and-hold 
investment strategy, the role of the fund managers will certainly be in serious doubt as 
there will be no justification for engaging the service of such poorly performing fund 
managers.   Although some might argue that fund managers do offer other forms of value 
added fund management services to their investors, the primary yardstick used for 
measuring fund performance is always the excess return generated by the fund managers 
for their clients rather than the other forms of fund management services. Studies on fund 
managers‟ performance also have significant implications on the other popular theories in 
finance such as the modern portfolio theory and the efficient market hypothesis theory. 
 
 Therefore, Jensen‟s (1968) initial findings that fund managers in general do not 
earn superior return over and above the passive strategy has shocked both the academic as 
well as investment communities and stimulated further debates not only on issues 
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pertaining to fund managers‟ underperformance but also on the validity of portfolio 
performance measurement models used to evaluate mutual funds‟ performance.  
Notwithstanding however, it is premature to generalise that all fund managers are not 
performing since, as the following section would reveal, subsequent studies on mutual 
funds performance over the last four decades have yielded rather mixed results with some 
studies appearing to support the Jensen (1968) findings while others found evidence of 
superior performance by fund managers. 
 
 
2.4.1 Analysis of Fund Managers’ Return Performance 
 
Following Jensen (1968), numerous studies examining fund managers‟ return 
performance have been undertaken.  The results however, are far from conclusive.   
Analysis by Henriksson (1984), Elton et al. (1993), Malkiel (1995), Murthi et al. (1997), 
Edelen (1999) and Moskowitz (2000) supported the findings by Jensen (1968) that fund 
managers are unable to outperform either the market index or the naïve buy-and-hold 
strategy.  In fact, the trend is also observed in other countries based on the findings of 
fund managers‟ underperformance in Greece by Sorros (2001) and Artikis (2003), Japan 
(Cai et al., 1997) and Malaysia (Chuan, 1995; Mohamad and Md. Nasir, 1995; Hin and 
Wah, 1997). 
 
 Other studies however, are more favourable to fund managers.  In a commentary 
paper, Renwick (1968) argued that the findings of mutual funds underperformance using 
valuation methods based on the Markowitz‟s mean-variance efficient framework are 
dubious due to possible bias caused by information asymmetries as well as their over 
reliance on ex-post data or historical prices.  The information asymmetries occur when 
„inside information‟ on a specific fund is not available to outside analysts that prevent a 
more accurate analysis on fund performance.  He suggested that the ex-ante performance 
measures used by fund managers which contain „inside information‟ will only be 
confined to in-house application and therefore, not available to outsiders.  Instead, 
accessible to outside analysts are the ex-post performance measures such as the traditional 
portfolio valuation models that depend solely on the return and risk (standard deviation) 
relationship, which have clearly failed to account for the „inside information‟ and hence 
suffer from the bias caused by omitted variables.   Using the discriminant analysis 
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method, he claimed that it is possible to identify and differentiate on a consistent basis the 
performing portfolios with the average or underperforming portfolios.  The superiority of 
fund managers‟ performance over the market portfolio or the passive buy-and-hold 
strategy is also reported by Simon et al. (1969), Ippolito (1989), Grinblatt and Titman 
(1992), Bauman and Miller (1994), Rahman (1994), Daniel et al. (1997), Leong and Lian 
(1998), Bowden (2000), Chen et al. (2000), Wermers (2000), and Khorana et al. (2007).   
 
 Another important issue in fund performance analysis that has captured 
researchers‟ attention is whether or not fund managers‟ performance is persistent over 
time.  The persistence refers to the correlation between year-to-year return of a mutual 
fund.  In this case, a top performing fund in the most recent year is said to exhibit 
persistent performance if it remained the best performing fund in the next consecutive 
year.  Likewise, the reverse is true when a poorly performing fund in the most recent year 
continued to remain inferior in the subsequent year. The observed persistence in mutual 
fund performance has been documented by Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Hendricks et al. 
(1993), Bauman and Miller (1994), Malkiel (1995), Elton et al. (1996), Carhart (1997), 
Bers and Madura (2000), Chen et al. (2000) as well as Droms and Walker (2001).  
 
 Several studies have attempted to explain the persistence phenomenon.   
Hendricks et al. (1993) suggested the presence of „hot hands‟ as the reason for the 
superior year-to-year return and „icy hands‟ as the cause for the consistent poor 
performance by mutual funds.  Elton et al. (1996) argued that the difference between the 
persistent performance of performing and underperforming funds is caused by fund 
managers‟ selection skills and fund expenses.   Bers and Madura (2000) attributed the 
persistence to certain fund characteristics such as fund‟s expense ratio, experience and 
family grouping while Chen et al. (2000) contended that the phenomenon is best 
explained by the momentum effect.  However, the evidence of persistence in mutual fund 
performance does not necessarily imply that investors could reap abnormal profit by 
designing an investment strategy that capitalised on the phenomenon.  Malkiel (1995) and 
Carhart (1997) argued that the observed persistence does not contradict the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH) in view of the insignificant abnormal profit which is just 
sufficient to cover for the fund expenses and transaction costs.   The phenomenon is also 
robust only in a very short-term period and usually fades away in the successive year, and 
is more visible in poorly performing funds than in performing funds.      
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2.4.2 Analysis of Fund Managers’ Investment Skills  
  
The observed variation in mutual fund performances has prompted researchers to 
investigate the sources for the differential performance.  In general, the scope of analysis 
can be divided into three areas related to fund managers‟ skills; namely their forecasting 
or market timing ability, their stock picking talent and their fund management style.  
 
 Jensen (1969: 170) reported that “mutual fund managers on average are unable to 
forecast future security prices” which is consistent with his earlier conclusion in Jensen 
(1968) that fund managers are unable to provide superior return for their investors.   His 
findings were supported by Kon (1983), Chang and Lewellen (1984), Henriksson (1984), 
Chuan (1995), Sorros (2001) and Matallín-Sáez (2006).  Contrary to these findings 
however, Grinblatt and Titman (1994) and Bowden (2000) found that some fund 
managers do possess market timing skill, albeit with limited capability, while Edelen 
(1999) contended that the validity of the negative market timing results as reported by 
past studies are suspicious since the methodologies applied in the studies did not take into 
account the impact of fund flows generated by investors‟ trading activities on fund 
performance.  Therefore, no definite conclusion can be drawn yet, although the bulk of 
the studies have established that mutual fund managers in general do not have forecasting 
or market timing ability.  Nevertheless, the issue would remain central to finance amid the 
remarks by Henriksson (1994: 73) that “the ability to earn superior returns based on 
superior forecasting ability would be a violation of the EMH and would have far-reaching 
implications for the theory of finance”. 
 
 Mutual fund managers are found to possess stock selection ability as revealed by 
Elton et al. (1996), Daniel et al. (1997), Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Chen et al. (2000), 
Wermers (2000), and Avramov and Wermers (2006).  Although their findings appears to 
be less conclusive in view that only a handful of fund managers have stock picking ability 
whilst the amount of the excess return from this trading strategy is rather small, it does 
support the claim that active fund managers do provide value added fund management 
services to their clients, nonetheless.   
 
 It has been suggested that fund managers‟ style could affect their funds‟ 
performance.  Simon et al. (1969) argued that the observed consistency in the 
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performance of six closed-end funds that they studied is not simply due to a random 
occurrence, but instead, is attributed to good portfolio management.  Cai et al. (1997) and 
Edelen (1999) found the adverse impact of fund flows from investors‟ trading activities 
particularly on the performance of open-ended funds.   This certainly does not augur well, 
particularly for open-end mutual funds since the low-cost liquidity service is one of the 
primary facilities provided by these funds to their investors (see Edelen, 1999: 441).   
Khorana et al. (2007) analysed the relationship between fund managers‟ ownership and 
fund performance.  They found evidence of positive correlation characterised by higher 
excess return generated by mutual funds as the ownership stake of their fund managers 
increases.  This finding adds up to the point made earlier by Stracca (2006) on the nature 
of the principal–agent relationship between fund managers and their investors.  A recent 
paper by Thomas et al. (2007) reveals a growing influence of socially responsible 
investment (SRI) among both the fund managers as well as general investors which may 
have direct impact on fund subscription, investment and performance.    
 
 
 
2.5 THE CONVENTIONAL PORTFOLIO MEASUREMENT MODELS: A 
REVIEW 
 
Past studies related to portfolio performance measurement have revealed the dominant 
role of the modern portfolio theory as well as the valuation methods derived from the 
mean-variance framework.  Although popularly used in both academic and real world 
applications, the validity of the valuation methods however, remains under scrutiny.  This 
is obvious from the literatures challenging the Markowitz‟s portfolio theory and the 
CAPM, in particular, as well as the development of alternative portfolio performance 
measures to overcome the weaknesses in the existing mean-variance models so as to give 
a more accurate assessment of fund managers‟ performance.   Many of the significant 
findings from studies related to portfolio performance valuation have been discussed 
above.  This section attempts to summarise and offer further insights on this issue. 
 
 In his comment on the Markowitz‟s portfolio theory, Renwick (1968) suggested 
that the application of the model is too mathematical and is seriously constrained by the 
huge amount of input data required by the model whilst the results might be biased due to 
the over reliance on variance (or standard deviation or coefficient of variation) as the sole 
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measure for risk.  Elton et al. (1977) stressed on the point further when they argued that 
the solution on actual portfolio problems using the Markowitz‟s approach is highly time 
consuming and costly.   In addition, there are difficulties in educating portfolio managers 
to understand the return and risk relationship from the covariance perspective.  These 
factors, they contended, have “brought the application of portfolio theory to a halt” (Elton 
et al., 1977: 329). 
 
  Numerous studies have highlighted the deficiencies in the CAPM and its variant 
models.  The major shortcomings apparently come from the model‟s strict assumptions, 
especially the equal lending and borrowing rates as well as the efficiency of the market 
portfolio.  The CAPM is also arguably prone to mis-specification error due to its 
sensitivity to the benchmark used as proxy.  It has also been proven that beta alone is not 
the single factor that affects securities returns as other variables such as macroeconomics 
data, the characteristics of the securities and various market anomalies may also affect 
return performance.  In regards to this, Renwick (1968), Fama and MacBeth (1973), 
Markowitz (1991) and Sharpe (1994) have questioned the long-established presumption 
that mean and variance are sufficient variables for portfolio performance valuation.  The 
other challenge that seems to keep portfolio theory in a state of limbo is that all tests 
pertaining to portfolio performance within the mean-variance approach are, in fact, a joint 
hypothesis test between the validity of the portfolio performance valuation models used 
and the market efficiency. Notwithstanding however, despite the various shortcomings in 
the mean-variance based models, they remain relevant and are popularly used in the 
portfolio performance analysis.   
 
 Recent studies have shed some new perspectives on the course of portfolio 
performance valuation.  The availability of a more comprehensive database comprising 
individual portfolio‟s stocks and fund characteristics as well as historical price data 
coupled with the use of more sophisticated computer programming might offer new 
insights into portfolio theory which may even challenge the validity of some of the more 
established findings.  For example, Sennetti (1976) has questioned the wisdom of using 
the expected utility theory to solve a financial asset selection problem as undertaken by 
Bernoulli (1738).   In addition, as compared to past studies which have relied heavily on 
return and risk variables and used limited time series data (most studies used monthly 
price data with shorter time period), studies undertaken in recent years have utilised daily 
 48 
price data covering longer time periods and took into account fund characteristics such as 
investment objectives, fund managers‟ profiles and management style, and trading 
microstructure.   The use of a more comprehensive database significantly helps to 
enhance the accuracy of the fund performance analysis.  To conclude, as long as a new 
alternative portfolio valuation model that is acceptable to both academics and 
practitioners alike to replace the current models is not available, the search for a better 
asset pricing model is poised to continue.  In the meantime, the existing portfolio 
performance measures are set to prevail in spite of their various shortcomings.     
 
 
2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  
  
This chapter has highlighted the development of the modern portfolio theory particularly 
with regards to the analysis of mutual fund performance.  Beginning with the works by 
Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958), the modern portfolio theory has expanded further 
into the asset pricing theory through the discoveries of the CAPM and the APT which, in 
turn, paved the way for the development of portfolio performance measures most notably 
the Treynor Index, the Sharpe Index and the Jensen-alpha Index.  Numerous studies have 
attempted to develop alternative measures beyond the mean-variance framework of the 
modern portfolio theory.  Alas, all the fund performance measurement models produce 
rather mixed results thus making the choice of the valuation models and analysis of fund 
performance a more difficult task.  The past four decades of research have also witnessed 
the scope of studies of portfolio performance broadening from analysis of return 
performance to analysis of fund managers‟ investment capabilities.  Despite the extensive 
research however, the truth about fund performance and fund managers‟ ability remain 
elusive due to various theoretical and empirical limitations inherent in the existing 
valuation models.  Notwithstanding however, the traditional portfolio performance 
measurement models derived from the mean-variance framework continue as the 
dominant methods in the valuation of portfolio performance.  The traditional valuation 
models are also widely applied across various types of funds with different investment 
mandates such as ethical- or Islamic-oriented funds.  The following chapter discusses the 
analysis of ethical- and Islamic-based investment portfolios.  
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Chapter 3 
 
UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHY AND PERFORMANCE OF 
ETHICAL FUNDS AND ISLAMIC FUNDS:  
A LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
Ethical issues have long become one of the most debated topics in the economics and 
finance domain.  Since ethics is usually viewed as inconsistent with the pecuniary 
motives of a rational economic agent, embracing it, argued its opponents, would entail 
financial sacrifice due to the presence of „ethical cost‟. On the contrary, the proponents of 
ethical values claimed that incorporating ethical criteria into economic and financial 
decisions would benefit both the business entities concerned as well as the general public 
and the environment by creating higher demand on the products of ethically-oriented 
companies while promoting social stability and improve the quality of life of the society 
involved.  Despite the conflicting views, ethics remain an integral part of the economic 
and finance processes.  Adam Smith (1723–1790), who is popularly known as the father 
of modern capitalism, in his book The Theory of Moral Sentiments promotes altruistic 
behaviour when he suggests that to attain wisdom and virtuousness, an individual should 
be willing to sacrifice his/her own private interest in favour of the greater interest of the 
society, the state and the universe.  Further, he argues that social and moral norms 
encourage social stability which, in turn, contributes to the expansion of human 
civilisation (see Kuran, 2006: 78).  It has also been widely acknowledged that ethical 
values could influence an economic agent‟s decision significantly.  Hence, as eloquently 
phrased by Etzioni (1988, cited in Lewis and Cullis, 1990: 395) that “economics has a 
moral dimension”, it would be rather futile especially for profit-oriented companies to 
completely ignore the importance of ethical criteria when making economic or financial 
decisions amid the growing concern among the contemporary investing public towards 
ethically-related issues as reflected by the increasing demand for companies to show 
higher corporate social responsibility and good governance as well as greater respect for 
human rights, animal rights and environmental sustainability.  In view of the growing 
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interest towards socially-oriented investments, this chapter elaborates on the nature, 
performance and issues surrounding ethical as well as Islamic funds. 
 
 
3.2 REVIEW OF ETHICAL FUNDS  
 
This section provides a comprehensive review of ethical funds including the background 
of the funds, the rationale for investing in ethical funds, the criticisms and the analysis of 
performance and valuation of ethical funds. 
 
 
3.2.1 Background, Definition and Concept 
 
Investment with ethical consideration was initially pioneered by church investors in the 
US in 1926 and in the UK in 1948 (Sparkes, 2001).  Hence, it is hardly surprising when 
Statman (2005: 14) suggests that “the origins of socially responsible investing lie in 
religion”.  The current form of ethical investment however, was emanated by the socio-
political events in the late 1960s and early 1970s following the rise of human rights 
activism, particularly the public campaigns against the Vietnam War and the apartheid 
regime in South Africa, as well as the growing sense of altruisms and greater awareness 
on consumerism, human rights, animal rights and environmental protection.  Once again, 
church investors particularly the UK-based Methodist Church have led the shift towards 
ethical investment when it established funds that shunned investment in companies with 
an interest in armaments, alcohol, gambling, tobacco or South Africa in 1960 (see 
Sparkes, 2001; 2002; Kreander and McPhail, 2004; Bauer et al., 2005; Statman, 2005).   
 
 From its noble beginning, ethical investment in the last four decades has 
registered spectacular growth both in terms of the number of funds created as well as the 
size of its investment value.  It has also expanded beyond its traditional markets of the US 
and the UK when it attracted investors in Australia, Canada, Japan and some other 
European countries.   Despite its tremendous growth however, there is no consensus on 
the actual value of the size of ethical investment worldwide as shown by the varying 
figures reported.  Nevertheless, more reliable data is available for more mature markets 
such as the US and the UK.  In the US, socially responsible investing (or SRI) - the US 
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terminology for ethical investment – has grown by 324 per cent from US$639 billion with 
just 55 funds in 1995 to US$2.7 trillion with a total of 260 funds in 2007 (SIF Report, 
2007).  In 2009, the asset value of SRI investments has increased to US$3.7 trillion.  
Similarly, ethical investment in the UK has also recorded a substantial growth from a 
mere £372 million in 1992 to £6.1 billion by the third quarter of 2010.   Although the 
growth rate appears to be impressive, the market share of ethical investment however, is 
still relatively small when compared to the overall size of the professionally managed 
investment funds.  In the US example, SRI funds account for just 11 per cent of the total 
assets under professional management which stood at US$25.1 trillion in 2007.  Another 
estimate has put the market share of ethical funds at around merely 0.5 per cent (Haigh, 
2006: 268).  Nevertheless, the small but growing market share of the ethical funds proves 
only one thing: that the future potential of ethical investment is indeed enormous!    
  
 One fundamental issue that has yet to be resolved satisfactorily is: what does the 
term „ethical investment‟ really mean?  Although the words „ethical‟ and „investment‟ 
look straightforward, the term „ethical investment‟ however, is rather vague and to define 
it in a way that will give a precise description for its investment requirements, practices 
and performance measures is more difficult, unfortunately.  The vagueness of the term is 
mainly due to the subjective nature and the diversity of ethical considerations whilst the 
investment practices and valuation methods could vary depending on one‟s personal 
values or beliefs (see Sparkes, 1995; 2001; Gregory et al., 1997; Heinkel et al., 2001; 
O‟Rourke, 2003; Jin et al., 2006).  This dilemma is not only faced by professional fund 
managers, even the government finds it difficult to define or specify the legal 
requirements for „ethical investment‟ (Sparkes, 2001: 195).   
 
 The various terminologies used to describe ethically-oriented investment reflect 
this difficulty.  While the term „ethical investment‟ is widely used in the UK, „socially 
responsible investing‟ (or SRI) is the more preferred terminology in the US whilst other 
European countries called it „sustainable investing‟ or „green investing‟ (Kurtz, 2005: 
125).  The choice of terminology is influenced by the historical background and the local 
value of such investment.  In the UK, the term „ethical investment‟ is preferred because 
the investment is strongly associated with religion through the significant role of church 
investors who pioneered ethical investment in the country.  However, the terminology, 
which also indicates restrictive approach in the imposition of certain „positive‟ and 
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„negative‟ ethical criteria in deciding whether to accept or avoid certain stocks or 
industries, is not popular in the US.  Instead, the US investors favour the term „socially 
responsible investing‟ (or SRI) which signifies the pivotal role of investors as the 
shareholders and the ultimate owners of the company to encourage (or force) the 
company in which they invest their money to act in a more socially responsible manner in 
the course of the company pursuing its corporate objective to maximise profit.  Since the 
term SRI gives broader dimension to investors‟ own responsibility, the term is considered 
as more descriptive and is poised to replace the term „ethical investment‟ in the future 
(Sparkes 1995; 2001). Despite the different terminologies however, it is generally 
accepted that ethical companies are those that promote positive social, religious, 
environmental, and internal governance outcomes while non-ethical companies are those 
involved in „sin‟ activities (such as gambling, liquor and pornography), tobacco, military 
armaments, nuclear power and animal testing. 
 
 In defining „ethical investment‟, some authors have contented with a simple but 
direct definition.  Lewis and Cullis (1990: 397) refer ethical investment as “investment 
with attractive or desirable social characteristics”.  Mallin et al. (1995: 484) state that an 
ethical fund is “one which has either stated negative criteria or positive criteria”.5  
Sparkes (1995), Tippet (2001) and Barnea et al. (2005) define it as an investment 
approach that combines both the ethical and financial criteria in the making of investment 
decision.   Perhaps the more elaborate definition yet is the one given by Cowton (2004: 
249) when he describes ethical investment as: 
 
... a set of approaches which include social or ethical goals or constraints in 
addition to more conventional financial criteria in decisions over whether to 
acquire, hold or dispose of a particular asset, particularly publicly traded shares.   
 
 
With regards to SRI, Sparkes (2002) defines it as: 
 
... equity portfolios whose investment objectives combine social, environmental 
and financial goals.  When practised by institutional investors this means 
attempting to obtain a return on invested capital approaching that of the overall 
stock market.   
 
                                                 
5
  Indeed, the terms negative and positive criteria are also vague depending on a fund‟s ethical objectives. 
Some funds may even employ both criteria simultaneously in their decision-making process.   
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A definition by the Social Investment Forum (SIF) states ethical investment as “an 
investment process that considers the social and environmental consequences of 
investments, both positive and negative, within the context of rigorous financial analysis” 
(see Boasson et al., 2006: 838).  The commonality in the concept of ethical investment 
and SRI as reflected from the definitions indicates that the two terminologies are 
practically referring to the same investment approach or style thus prompting some 
researchers to even use the two terminologies interchangeably.     
 
 Although there are many ways to define „ethical investment‟, the essence of 
ethical investment however, is clear.  First and foremost, apart from the fundamental 
objective of pursuing positive future monetary return, ethical investment also attempts to 
achieve certain non-pecuniary rewards that would yield social and environmental 
benefits.  On the implementation side, an ethical investment‟s policy would have a set of 
pre-determined ethical criterion which will be used in the screening and stock selection 
process to determine the admissibility of a particular asset or stock into its portfolio with 
the help of an independent ethical advisory board.   In this respect, ethical investment is 
distinguishable from ordinary or traditional investments especially in terms of their 
investment objectives, policies and practices.  Table 3.1 below highlights the comparison 
between conventional, ethical and Islamic investment.   
 
 In most cases however, it is an individual‟s personal values or the fund‟s ethical 
objectives that determine the securities selection process as well as the final decision 
whether to invest in particular securities, or otherwise.  The imposition of ethical criteria 
would effectively deny ethical investors crucial access to all securities or from investing 
in a company that is deemed to be un-ethical by virtue of the company‟s involvement in 
disapproved activities regardless of whether the potential return from investment in this 
„non-ethical‟ company is huge.  In other words, ethical investors may willingly forego 
positive future monetary return – which is much to the disapproval of a rational economic 
man – in favour of their belief in ethical values.  Hence, one intriguing question arises: 
are ethical investors irrational? The following discussion attempts to investigate the 
motives behind ethical investment. 
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Table 3.1: Comparison between Conventional, Ethical and Islamic Investments 
No Key Areas Conventional Investment Ethical Investment Islamic Investment 
1 Main purpose of investment The investment seeks to maximise 
financial return only. 
The investment seeks financial return 
while pursuing ethical motives.      
The investment seeks financial return 
while conforming to Shariah law. 
2 Investment policy Investment policy does not make any 
specific reference to socially-oriented 
concern. 
Investment policy is guided by a 
clearly stated ethically-oriented or 
socially responsible investment policy.   
Investment policy is guided by the 
Shariah principles. 
3 Securities selection process Securities selection is made solely 
based on the characteristics of the 
securities that suit the objectives of 
the investment but without reference 
to any specific socially-oriented 
considerations.    
Ethical criteria is clearly identified 
which will served as the filtering 
mechanism in securities selection 
process or when deciding whether to 
invest or to avoid a particular asset or 
stock. 
Shariah guidelines are used as the 
screening mechanism in securities 
selection process to ensure only 
halal-approved securities are selected 
whilst non-halal securities are 
avoided.   
4 Asset universe Unlimited.  All securities can be 
selected or admitted into the 
conventional portfolio. 
Limited.  Only securities that fulfil the 
pre-determined ethical criteria will be 
selected.   
Limited. Only the approved Shariah-
compliant securities are allowed for 
investment.  
5 Investment support services  Only requires investment research 
support services to search for 
undervalued securities and monitor 
the investment performance.   
Requires the following services: 
1. Ethical board to screen, monitor and 
make decision on securities 
admissibility or withdrawal. 
2. Research team to search for 
potential securities and monitor 
fund‟s performance. 
Requires the following services: 
1. Shariah advisory board to screen, 
monitor and make decision on 
securities admissibility or 
withdrawal.  May also requires 
Shariah officer to supervise and 
monitor Shariah-compliancy.   
2. Research team to search for 
potential securities and monitor 
fund‟s performance. 
6 Shareholders‟ activism Shareholders/investors do not play 
active role in advising company to 
act ethically or socially responsibly. 
Shareholders/investors play active role 
in ensuring company‟s activities 
remain within ethical boundaries. 
Shareholders/investors do not always 
play active role in advising company 
to act within Shariah principles. 
7 Type of investors Economic rational individuals who 
typically prefer more profit and low 
risk. 
Ethically-concerned or religious 
investors. 
Religious or ethically-concerned 
investors. 
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3.2.2 The Rationale for Investing Ethically   
 
The modern portfolio theory assumes that an individual is an economically endogenous 
agent who always prefers more profit to less and is risk averse.  Consequently, a rational 
economic agent is thought to be only interested with maximising financial return and 
concerned only with over his or her investment risk without any inclination to consider 
ethical or moral values whatsoever when making an investment decision.  Standard 
economic theory however, has never insisted that an individual‟s utility be maximised 
solely through financial return.  Rather, it is the difficulty in measuring non-monetary 
return accurately which led to the cautious acceptance of any performance valuation 
model that attempt to incorporate subjective values.  This also explains why the 
conventional performance valuation models which utilise financial return as the basis for 
performance measurement remain as the preferred and dominant valuation methods.   
 
 Nevertheless, at least in the case of unit trust or mutual fund investment, there are 
burgeoning studies challenging the traditional view of the single-minded, profit 
maximising investor.  Studies by McKenzie (1977), Lewis and Cullis (1990), Cullis et al. 
(1992), Anand and Cowton (1993), Winnett and Lewis (2000), Basso and Funari (2003), 
Beal et al. (2005), and Lydenberg (2007) revealed that there is more than just 
economically rational man around and, in the case of ethical investors, the desire to fulfil 
ethical needs is equally important to these investors as is maximising return from their 
investment.  Cowton (1994, cited in Sparkes, 2001; 196-197) has aptly described the 
motivation of the ethical investor as to: 
 
... care not only about the size of their prospective financial return and the risk 
attached to it, but also its source – the nature of the company‟s goods or 
services, the location of its business or the manner in which it conducts its 
affairs.   
 
Beal et al. (2005) suggested three reasons for ethical investment namely to gain superior 
financial returns, to achieve non-wealth returns and to contribute to social changes.  In a 
more recent study, Lydenberg (2007) argued that contemporary investors can be 
categorised into three groups namely: Universal Investors, Social Investors and Rational 
Investors.  While Rational Investors is representative of traditional investors who merely 
seek to maximise profit, Universal Investors and Social Investors are the two groups of 
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investors who are also concerned about the return to the economy and the society as well.  
It was further argued that with the rising popularity of Universal Investors and Social 
Investors, ethical- or SRI-oriented investment is poised to develop further both in theory 
and practice, thus opening the possibility for non-pecuniary rewards to be properly 
measured and incorporated into the valuation of investment return in the future.   
  
 Another factor that motivates investors to invest ethically is related to religious 
faith.  McKenzie (1977) suggested that the belief in God‟s existence would encourage an 
investor to adopt certain moral values or ethical principles which will be translated into 
his or her behaviour including when making an investment decision.  The influence of 
religion in ethical investment has been documented by Kreander and McPhail (2004), 
Statman (2005), Boasson et al. (2006), Porter and Steen (2006), and Ghoul and Karam 
(2007).  In fact, ethical investment in the UK and the US was historically initiated by the 
church.  Since all religious teachings promote good deeds and virtuous behaviour, 
ethically-oriented investment would become the natural choice for the more pious 
investors to channel their investment regardless of their religious faith.  There are even 
mutual funds established specifically on religious bases such as the Amana Fund and the 
Ave Maria Catholic Values Fund which were created to cater for the investment needs of 
Muslim and Christian investors, respectively.      
 
 The vast interest towards ethical funds is also attributed to investors‟ positive 
personal values which stimulate public demand for socially responsible investment.  
Either being motivated by a growing sense of altruism, religious belief, or influenced by 
social or environmental activist movements, more investors are now incorporating ethical 
values into their decision-making process thus creating substantial demand for ethically-
oriented investments.  Lewis and Cullis (1990) stated that the rise of consumer activism 
and higher consciousness towards corporate social responsibility alter investors‟ value 
preferences which, in turn, encourage the growth of ethical investment.  Sparkes (1995) 
associated the higher demand with the rise in „green consumerism‟ as reflected by the 
increase in consumer awareness on environmental and animal rights issues in the 1990s.  
O‟Rourke (2003: 692) attributed the phenomenal growth of ethical investment to “its 
ability to symbolise and promote „good‟ corporate environmental and social behaviour”.  
Whatever the motivation might be, the spectacular growth of ethical funds both in terms 
of the number of funds launched in the market and the total investment value over the last 
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three decades signifies the prevailing strong interest towards ethical investment and 
indicates the huge prospect awaiting this segment of the market.   
 
 To conclude, rather than thinking of ethical investors as economically irrational 
individuals, past studies proved that in so far that their economic pursuit is concerned, 
ethical investors are actually akin to the rational economic man revered in financial 
economic theory.   It is simply their noble intention to pursue non-pecuniary rewards 
which yield social and environmental benefits and promote greater internal governance 
and corporate social responsibility that differentiate ethical investors from traditional 
investors.   Can the ethical objectives be achieved without additional costs to ethical 
investors?  The following discussion thus ensues.  
 
 
3.2.3 Critics on Ethical Investment 
  
All the noble intentions aside, ethical investment is indeed, not immune to criticisms.  
Barnea et al. (2005) argued that although SRI investors are able to influence polluting 
companies to reform, this also discourages companies from making new investment, thus 
resulting in lower total investment in the economy.  Munnel and Sunden (2005) raised 
doubt about the actual reason for pension funds‟ buying of SRI-based mutual funds, even 
suggesting that political agendas, particularly from ambitious politicians involved in 
pension funds operation with intention to reap political benefits from the rising popularity 
of SRI investments, are behind the pension funds‟ purchases of SRI mutual funds.  More 
significantly, critics have doubted the real motive of ethical investors and assert that 
financial return remain the most significant factor even for ethical investors.  They argue 
that when a trade-off between ethical values and financial return is involved, the former is 
set to give in to the latter as ethical investors are ready to alter their priority by shifting 
their investment from ethical funds to conventional funds upon expecting lower return 
from their investment in ethical funds.  Bernstein (2006) stated that although non-
economic satisfaction can be achieved from ethical behaviour, monetary temptation can 
easily induce finance and corporate practitioners to behave unethically.   In another study, 
Sparkes (1995) reported the outcome of opinion polls conducted among SRI investors 
that reveal only 35 per cent of the investors would continue to invest in SRI funds if the 
anticipated financial return from these funds fell below the non-SRI funds.  His finding is 
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supported by Mackenzie and Lewis (1999), Sparkes (2001) and Bollen and Cohen (2004, 
cited in Kurtz, 2005: 134) who claimed that ethical investors will not hesitate to reduce 
their investment in ethical funds if the potential return is significantly lower than the 
return of non-ethical funds.  However, somewhat coming as a defence to ethical investors, 
Hollingworth (1998, cited in Torres et al., 2004: 203), Webley et al. (2001), and Fischer 
and Khoury (2007) insist that ethical investors are committed investors with genuine 
intention to pursue ethical objectives and they are prepared to accept lower financial 
return from their investment while holding on to their ethical beliefs. 
 
 The willingness to sacrifice ethical values in favour of higher financial return is 
not unique to ethical investors but is also observed in ethical fund managers.  Labelling 
the offer of ethical fund as a mere „camouflage play‟ by fund managers, Haigh (2006) 
argued that the fund managers would rather forego their ethical objectives than risking 
accepting lower investment return.  His claim is based on the fund managers‟ confession 
that pursuing financial return is still the utmost important objective to ensure the survival 
of their funds. Even more surprising, ethical consideration is deemed as just a „secondary 
importance‟ to some fund managers selling ethical investment products (Haigh, 2006: 
274).   Prior to Haigh (2006), the real motive of ethical fund managers has also been 
questioned by Lewis and Cullis (1990), Davis (1996) as well as Cowton (1994) and 
Anderson et al. (1996) (both were cited in Sparkes, 2001: 197) when they contended that 
ethical fund is essentially an innovative marketing tactic for product differentiation by 
fund managers, or used as their strategy to capitalise on the growing demand for 
ethically-oriented investment.  Alas, the findings imply that the sole purpose of fund 
managers offering ethical investment products is to maximise profit rather than for 
genuine intention to promote ethical causes or behaviour.   
 
 Critics have also highlighted two disadvantages of ethical investment which they 
alleged are the roots of ethical fund‟s underperformance.   First, they argued that ethical 
investment incurs higher operational costs due to the need to appoint ethical consultants 
for the fund‟s ethical advisory board as well as to hire investment analysts to search for 
underpriced securities and to monitor the fund‟s portfolio continuously to ensure 
compliance with the fund‟s ethical policies.  Secondly, they argued that ethical screening 
would result in ethical funds holding less efficient portfolio since it denied ethical funds 
access to the entire investment asset universe and restricted their securities‟ selection to 
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certain ethically-approved securities.  In the context of modern portfolio theory, such 
restriction, the critics said, may result in ethical investors holding a suboptimal portfolio 
(see Kurtz, 2005: 127). Schwab (1996) argued that since ethical screening deprives 
ethical portfolio its choice and flexibility, it must bring additional cost to ethical portfolio.  
These shortcomings give rise to the cost-of-discipleship hypothesis which states that “to 
live (and invest) by a set of standards different from those of the surrounding culture 
entails opportunity costs” (see Mueller, 1994).   
 
 One particular outcome of the ethical screening process which becomes a 
common feature of ethically-oriented portfolios as reported by Luther and Matatko 
(1994), Sparkes (1995), Gregory et al. (1997), Wilson (1997) and Scholtens (2005) is the 
high concentration of investment in stocks of smaller size companies.  Similar 
observation was also reported by Marlin (1986), Manchanda (1989) and Luther and 
Matatko (1994) as cited in Tippet (2001).  The high concentration of small-capitalised 
companies means that ethical funds are investing less in large-capitalised stocks. This 
phenomenon can be explained like this:  Large-capitalised companies are usually 
diversified conglomerates with various business interests undertaken through their 
subsidiaries or associate companies.  Consequently, they are more susceptible to being 
excluded from ethically-oriented portfolios due to their indirect involvement in non-
ethical activities through their subsidiaries or associate companies.  In addition, some 
large-capitalised companies are those involved in what is deemed as „sin‟ activities such 
as alcohol, tobacco and gambling, or „harmful‟ activities such as military armaments and 
nuclear power.  However, since these companies are usually heavyweight stocks with 
strong fundamentals and sustainable earnings, their exclusion from ethical funds means 
that the funds are deprived from investing in stable and profitable companies, a point 
stressed by Tippet (2001: 177) when he concluded that: 
 
... if investors screen for companies that offend because of the first type of issue 
(i.e. the nature of the company’s product or service), they are likely to be 
excluding profitable companies and, therefore, to bear a financial cost. 
(clarification is researcher‟s)   
 
Lewis and Cullis (1990), Gregory et al. (1997) and Geczy et al. (2005, cited in Schröder, 
2007) argued that higher operational cost and lack of diversification benefits affect ethical 
funds‟ return adversely.  Sparkes (1995), Sauer (1997) and Schröder (2007) however, 
disagreed.  The following section attempts to examine the issue further by analysing past 
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literatures on ethical fund performance and the valuation techniques used for performance 
measurement purposes.     
 
 
3.2.4 Ethical Fund Performance and Valuation Method 
  
This section examines the ethical fund performance and valuation methods used in past 
studies.  Studies suggesting that ethical funds could outperform conventional funds albeit 
at varying degrees of significance can be found in Luck and Pilotte (1993), Mallin et al. 
(1995), Sauer (1997), Statman (2006), Fisher and Khoury (2007), Luck (1998) and 
Waddock and Graves (1997) (both were cited in Kurtz, 2005) as well as Abramson and 
Chung (2000), D‟Antonio et al. (2000) and Tsoutsoura (2004) (all were cited in Boasson, 
et al., 2006).  It was also observed that the ethical funds‟ superior performance occurred 
mainly during bullish market period and it was highly correlated with the performance of 
smaller capitalised stocks and the market index.  The past studies however, offered no 
convincing explanation apart from attributing the better performance to the growing 
interest in ethically-oriented investments and to the small firm effect.  On the contrary, 
Luther and Matatko (1994), Gregory et al. (1997), Tippet (2001), Farmen et al. (2005) 
and Chong et al. (2006) found that ethical funds generate lower return which they argued 
as caused by higher operational cost and poor diversification.  Meanwhile, studies by 
Statman (2000; cited in Bauer et al., 2006), Bauer et al. (2005), Bello (2005), Kreander et 
al. (2005), Scholtens (2005), Vermeir et al. (2005) and Bauer et al. (2006) found that the 
difference in return between ethical funds and conventional funds is not statistically 
significant.  Similar findings were also reported by Boasson et al. (2006) and Schröder 
(2007) when they compared the performance of ethical funds vis-à-vis the market index. 
 
 With regards to portfolio performance valuation methods, the three standard 
measures namely the Jensen-alpha Index, the Sharpe Index and the Treynor Index have 
been used extensively in the analysis of ethical funds‟ performance.  Either one or more 
of the standard portfolio performance measures were used simultaneously to generate a 
more robust analysis.  Some researchers employed a combination of the traditional 
models with other valuation methods such as the Fama and French (1993) model (see for 
example Vermeir et al., 2005; Boasson et al., 2006; Fisher and Khoury, 2007), the 
Carhart (1997) 4-factor model (see for example Bauer et al., 2005; Scholtens, 2005) or 
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the ARCH model (see for example Chong et al., 2006).  Notwithstanding however, in 
view of the various performance measures available, extra caution should be exercised 
especially when applying more than one methodology since conflicting results might 
emerge.  Scholtens (2005) for instance found that SRI performance is superior when 
using a CAPM index model but the opposite is true i.e. conventional funds outperformed 
ethical funds when the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model is used, instead. 
 
 Since there is general feeling that the traditional portfolio performance measures 
may not be absolutely appropriate for use in evaluating ethical funds‟ performance due to 
the presence of ethical components that are not properly captured or accounted for in the 
standard models, some researchers have proposed alternative valuation techniques such as 
the data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach (see Basso and Funari, 2003) and the 
Value-at-Risk (VaR) model (see Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh, 2007).   Another popular 
valuation technique is the matched pair analysis as adopted by Mallin et al. (1995), 
Gregory et al. (1997), Statman (2000) and Kreander et al. (2005) which allows for direct 
comparison between ethical funds and conventional funds.   
 
 To conclude, results from past studies on ethical funds‟ performance are rather 
mixed and inconclusive.  At present, researchers are divided in their findings with some 
researchers claiming that ethical funds are able to outperform conventional funds and 
even beat the overall market return while other researchers believe otherwise or have a 
view that any difference in return performance between ethical funds and non-ethical 
funds would only be marginal and statistically insignificant.  Notwithstanding however, 
those findings in favour of ethical funds do provide encouraging evidence that ethical 
funds are a viable investment instrument.  The contradictory results were mainly due to 
the different data sets or sampling used by past studies, the market condition during 
which the studies were undertaken and the research methodology applied by the studies.  
The following section discusses certain issues in the valuation of ethical fund 
performance.      
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3.2.5 Issues in the Valuation of Ethical Funds Performance  
 
One salient feature of ethical funds as observed from past studies is the high exposure to 
small-capitalised companies due to restrictions on asset selection caused by ethical 
screening.  Studies by Luther and Matatko (1994), Gregory et al. (1997), Tippet (2001) 
and Bauer et al. (2005) for example revealed that ethical funds‟ portfolio is dominated by 
small-capitalised stocks.  Hence, it was argued that returns of ethical funds may reflect 
what is known in finance literatures as the small firm effect – a return phenomenon which 
is associated with investment characteristics or trading behaviour inherent in small-
capitalised stocks particularly the varying degree of return and risk volatility in different 
market condition – especially considering that ethical funds outperformed conventional 
counterparts only in bullish stock market, but underperformed in bearish stock market.  
Sparkes (1995) however, dismissed this claim. He contended that although ethical 
portfolio exhibits high concentration of investment in small-capitalised companies, the 
superior performance of ethical funds is primarily due to the information and positive 
selection effects.  To substantiate his argument, Sparkes (1995) referred to several of the 
UK large ethical unit trusts that have managed to sustain their performance during 1991 
to 1993 period despite poor performance by small companies-based funds and he 
attributed the success to the ability and skills of these ethical funds to choose quality 
stocks for their portfolio backed by extensive research during the stock selection process.     
 
 The high concentration towards small-capitalised stocks in ethical funds‟ portfolio 
raises two crucial issues related to the optimality of ethical funds‟ diversification and the 
accuracy of the funds‟ performance valuation.    It was argued that ethical screening 
reduces the funds‟ investment asset universe, of which, the exclusion of large-capitalised 
stocks and the high exposure in small companies‟ stocks are allegedly among the 
consequences of the ethical restrictions, thus resulting in ethical funds unable to achieve 
an optimum diversification. It was further argued that the lack of diversification affects 
return from ethical funds adversely.  Some researchers however, contended that the 
claims against ethical screening are somewhat misleading.  Instead, the dismal 
performance of ethical funds is attributed to the inferior asset selection skills on the part 
of the fund managers.  Moreover, the inability to outperform the overall market‟s 
performance is not unique to ethical funds alone.  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
there are numerous studies related to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) that provide 
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evidence of below market performance of unrestricted funds.  Past studies also reveal that 
fund managers, in general, possess limited timing ability and stock selection skills.  
Therefore, it was suggested that it is not the ethical screening or the lack of diversification 
that caused ethical funds to underperform, but rather, all fund managers for that matter – 
whether restricted or not – are generally unable to beat the market on a consistent basis 
(see Sparkes, 1995: 104).  By referring to the data showing positive long-term 
performance of UK ethical charity funds, Sparkes (1995: 111) argued that “the ethical 
investment restrictions had no negative impact.  In fact, they appeared to give a positive 
boost to investment performance”.  Furthermore, Kritzman and Page (2003) asserted that 
the most valuable skill for fund managers is the stock selection skill and not the asset 
allocation skill.   
 
 Though the high concentration towards small company stocks may be viewed as a 
by-product of ethical screening, it should not be construed as a material weakness of 
ethical funds.  As far as the portfolio approach is concerned, ethically-oriented investment 
represents just another type of specialised investment which adopts ethical values as its 
investment policy or mandate.  In this respect, ethical funds are not very much different 
from the other specialised investments such as growth funds, value funds, income funds, 
balance funds or index-linked funds, to name just a few, since all these conventional 
funds also applied certain criteria in their asset allocation strategy and stock selection 
process based upon their respective investment mandate.  Therefore, if the claim that such 
bias in securities selection or concentration in certain types of securities led to portfolio 
underperformance is blindly accepted, one can jump to a conclusion that by imposing 
certain criteria on investment portfolio, all specialised funds will end up holding a poorly 
diversified portfolio, and hence are destined to perform below the market index! 
Fortunately however, past studies have shown that such arguments do not appear to be 
sensible or accurate.     
 
 Another crucial issue concerning ethically-oriented investment is related to the 
valuation of ethical funds‟ performance particularly with regards to the choice of an 
appropriate benchmark for measuring the performance. Except for studies undertaken 
through interviews or survey questionnaires, most of past studies employed secondary 
time series data and empirical modelling to measure performance.  Under this 
methodology, the usual practice is to calculate the return of the ethical funds based on 
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their monthly closing prices, then the return is regressed with a standard asset pricing 
equilibrium model derived largely from the CAPM.  Hence, a key index must be chosen 
to represent the market portfolio which raises a concern on which index is appropriate for 
the ethical funds.  Past studies frequently choose the broader stock market index, such as 
the S&P 500 and the FTSE All-Share Index, as proxy for the market portfolio.  The 
approach however, may not be appropriate in light of Scholten‟s (2005) findings that SRI 
sector indices have more explanatory power to SRI funds‟ performance than conventional 
indices.  Moreover, considering that ethical funds‟ portfolios are dominated by small-
capitalised stocks, the use of the key broader market index comprising of blue-chip 
companies or large-capitalised stocks may result in a downward bias in the form of 
ethical funds‟ underperformance.  To mitigate the problem, Luther and Matatko (1994) 
and Gregory et al. (1997) have proposed the use of both the key broader market index and 
the small-capitalised stocks index when evaluating ethical funds‟ performance.  
 
 
3.2.6 Conclusion  
 
Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that ethical investment is an 
investment approach that combines both financial and ethical considerations into 
investment decision-making process with a noble intention to maximise both the 
monetary rewards as well as non-monetary benefits.   Although past literatures on ethical 
funds‟ performance produce rather inconclusive results, there is clear evidence that the 
interest towards ethical funds will continue in the future on the back of the rising 
altruisms and the growing concerns towards ethically-oriented investment among 
contemporary investors.  Perhaps, rather than looking into ethical investment in isolation, 
it might be more appropriate to consider ethical investment as just another type of 
specialised investment, for which, its performance is also subject to common factors 
inherent in fund management activities that affect return performance.   As of a particular 
interest of this study, this chapter continues with a review of Islamic funds.   
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3.3 REVIEW OF ISLAMIC FUNDS 
 
This section gives a detailed review of Islamic funds including the background, the 
characteristics and the analysis of performance of Islamic funds as well as discussion on 
several important issues related to the funds. 
 
 
3.3.1 Background, Definition and Concept 
 
Whether stimulated by the sincere desire to fulfil religious duty for the Muslim populace 
or simply an ingenious marketing ploy, Islamic finance has somehow emerged 
successfully either as a viable alternative or as a complement to conventional finance.  
Regardless of the true intention however, the development of Islamic finance is crucial 
particularly to the Muslim community in view that Islamic teachings are not merely 
confined to the ritually-oriented relationship between God and human per se but also 
encompass the role of a man as the vicegerent of the God in this world.  Therefore, apart 
from the religious rituals, Islamic teachings have also outlined the relationship between a 
man and his fellow human beings, including their social, economic and political affairs, 
as well as with his environment to ensure the harmonious relationship between all the 
stakeholders of this earthly world.  Central to Islamic teachings are the Islamic laws 
known as the Shariah – literally meaning “a clear path to be followed and observed” – 
which is derived from the two primary sources namely the Holy Quran and the Sunnah 
(the Prophet Muhammad‟s words and deeds).  In addition to the two primary sources, the 
Shariah rulings are also derived from another two independent sources namely the ijma 
(consensus) and the ijtihad/qiyas (individual reasoning by analogy) of the ulama (Muslim 
scholars).  Such a diverse and subjective source of references allows dynamism in the 
Shariah rulings with ability for further adaptation, development and interpretation to 
accommodate the ever changing circumstances (see Hourani, 2004).     
  
 In essence, Islamic finance is a financial system, in which the fundamental aim is 
purportedly “to fulfil the teaching of the Holy Quran as opposed to reaping maximum 
returns on financial assets” (Zaher and Hassan, 2001: 158).  There are three factors 
distinguishing Islamic finance from its conventional counterparts as highlighted by 
Presley and Sessions (1994), Hourani (2004) and Usmani (2005), namely: (1) the strict 
prohibition of riba (interest) in all financial transactions regardless of the percentage of 
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interest rate applied; (2) the profit and loss sharing (PLS) concept as the justified mean 
for return distribution; and (3) the ban on gharrar (uncertainty or speculation) activities.  
Consequently, the type of financing preferred by Islamic finance is the one that is backed 
by tangible asset as compared to debt-based instruments commonly used in conventional 
financing.     
 
 In Shariah perspective, Islamic finance is a tool to achieve the maqasid al-
Shariah, literally means the goals of the Shariah or the vision of Islam (Chapra, 2000: 
58), or the objectives/purposes behind Islamic Shariah rulings (Auda, 2008: 2).   Chapra 
(2000: 118) cited a definition of the maqasid al-Shariah as given by a prominent Islamic 
scholar, al-Ghazali (b.1058 – d.1111), as follows: 
 
The objective of the Shariah is to promote the well-being of all mankind, which 
lies in safeguarding their faith (din), their human self (nafs), their intellect (aql), 
their posterity (nasl), and their wealth (mal). Whatever ensures the safeguard of 
these five serves public interest and is desirable.  
 
 Therefore, reducing hardships and making the life of all individuals more 
comfortable are amongst the important objectives of the Shariah.  By introducing the 
moral values, it helps to strike a balance between individual and social interest, thus 
leading to socio-economic justice and the well-being of all God‟s creatures (Chapra, 
2000: 58).  An individual who embraces the moral (or religious) values is likely to behave 
in the manner envisaged by the Islamic teachings and described by Kuran (2004: 42) as 
the homo Islamicus:   
 
The final distinguishing element of an Islamic economy, according to Islamic 
economists, is that its agents act under the guidance of norms drawn from the 
traditional sources of Islam.  These norms „command good‟ and „forbid evil‟.  
They promote the avoidance of waste, extravagance, and ostentation. They 
discourage activities with harmful externalities. They stimulate generosity.  
They encourage individuals to work hard, charge fair prices, and pay others their 
due.  The intended effect of the norms is to transform selfish and acquisitive 
homo economicus into a paragon of virtue, homo Islamicus.   Homo Islamicus 
acquires property freely, but never through speculation, gambling, hoarding, or 
destructive competition. And although he may bargain for a better price, he 
always respects his trading partner‟s right to a fair deal. 
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 One of the fastest growing areas in Islamic finance is the Islamic fund
6
 
management services.  The tremendous growth of the Islamic fund industry is evident 
from the phenomenal increase in Islamic equity funds from only 29 funds with a total 
assets worth US$800 million in 1996 to 98 funds with nearly US$5 billion worth of assets 
in early 2000 (see Ayub, 2007: 203).  The need for Islamic fund management services 
arises following the Shariah rulings that allow investment in a company‟s shares or 
equity.   However, there is an obvious difference in the definition of company share 
between the Shariah laws and the conventional finance theory.  Elgari (2002) pointed out 
that the Fiqh Academy of the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Countries) had in 1992 
defined a company share as representing an „undivided portion of company assets‟ which 
differs significantly from the conventional finance‟s definition that a company share 
represents “residual claim to future cash flows (dividends and liquidation proceeds) of a 
company”.  Thus, in the Islamic Shariah perspective, the sale of a company share is 
effectively a “sale of this undivided ownership shares of its assets” (Elgari, 2002: 155).  
The definition is in line with the view of Islamic finance that all financial instruments 
should be backed by tangible assets of the issuing company.  Ironically though, the 
definition seems to be applied only for justifying investment in company shares since its 
actual implications, particularly with regards to accounting treatment and shareholders‟ 
rights, is rather unclear.  In fact, even for Shariah-compliant companies, their ordinary 
shares are listed on the liabilities and equity side of the balance sheet whilst their 
shareholders are treated as residual claimants and hence, their claim to the companies‟ 
assets is inferior to creditors, bondholders and preference shareholders, despite their 
holding the supposedly asset-backed shares as assumed by the Shariah definition.       
 
 The Shariah approval for investment in ordinary shares paves the way for the 
establishment of Islamic funds.  Shah (2008: 15) quoted the decision by the Accounting 
and Auditing Organisation of Islamic Financial Institutions (Accounting Standard 14, 
Appendix B) which states that:  
 
Investment funds are permissible by Shariah because funds are a form of 
collective investment that continue throughout their term, the rights and duties 
of participants are defined and restricted by the common interest since they 
relate to third parties‟ rights.  Hence, in cases where the fund is managed on the 
basis of agency the shareholders/unit holders waive their right to management, 
                                                 
6
  For the purpose of this research, an „Islamic fund‟ refers to a Shariah-compliant unit trust or mutual fund.  
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redemption or liquidation except in accordance with the limitations and 
conditions set out in the statutes and bylaws.   
 
A clearer definition is given by Usmani (2005) when he describes Islamic investment 
fund as: 
 
... a joint pool wherein the investors contribute their surplus money for the 
purpose of its investment to earn halal (permissible) profits in strict conformity 
with the precepts of Islamic Shariah.   
 
Hence, in principle, an Islamic fund is a specialised investment that invests only in 
Shariah-compliant or halal-approved securities whilst the operation is undertaken in strict 
compliance to the Shariah principles including the prohibition of interest and the 
avoidance of investment in any haram (forbidden) or gharrar (uncertainty or speculative) 
activities.  
 
 With regards to the contract between unit-holders and fund managers, the Shariah 
prescribes that a unit-holder or an investor of Islamic funds as the rab-ul-amal (capital 
provider) in the contract whilst the fund managers may either be the mudarib 
(entrepreneurs) or agents to the unit-holder.  In the case of the former, the Islamic fund is 
managed under the mudarabah (profit-sharing) concept in which the fund managers as 
mudarib would be entitled to certain amount of profit at a pre-determined rate as a reward 
for their contribution in managing the fund.  Since the reward is calculated based upon the 
fund‟s total return, the fund managers‟ income would vary depending on the performance 
of the fund.  In the latter however, the fund managers act as agents to unit-holders or 
investors of Islamic funds and are given a lump-sum payment in the form of management 
fees as reward for their services.  The fee is fixed at an agreed rate by both parties and 
calculated based upon the net asset value (NAV) of the fund.  Therefore, unlike the first 
type of contract, of which, the Islamic funds‟ profit is distributed based on the profit-and-
loss sharing concept between unit-holders and the fund managers, the management fee is 
not subject to the performance of the Islamic funds (see Usmani, 2005; Ayub, 2007; 
Mian, 2008; Shah, 2008).   Operationally, with exception of the requirements that Islamic 
funds must comply with certain Shariah guidelines, the funds do not differ significantly 
from conventional funds.  The following section discusses the characteristics of an 
Islamic fund that distinguish it from its conventional counterpart and highlights the 
various types of Islamic funds available in the market. 
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3.3.2 The Characteristics and Types of Islamic Funds  
 
Table 3.1 (page 54) shows the basic features of an Islamic investment and its comparison 
to conventional and ethical investments.  One feature unique to Islamic funds is the strict 
compliance to the Islamic Shariah principles.  Hence, as discussed above, Islamic funds 
would avoid investment in companies involved in haram (forbidden) or gharrar 
(uncertainty or speculative) activities including interest-based conventional banking and 
finance, insurance and gambling as well as production of liquor, tobacco, military 
armaments, pork-related products, pornography or any other activities deemed harmful or 
unethical to society or environment.  In view of the Shariah restrictions, Hussein and 
Omran (2005: 107) characterised Islamic investment as “low-debt, non-financial, social-
ethical investments”.  Usmani (2005: 203-204) outlined two basic conditions for Islamic 
funds.  Firstly, return from an Islamic fund should be derived from profit actually earned 
by the fund and must be distributed on a pro-rata basis.  Consequently, there shall be no 
fixed or guaranteed profit from an Islamic fund and, in the case of an Islamic fund 
incurring losses due to normal trading environment, the subscribers or unit-holders of the 
fund will have to share the losses as well.  Secondly, every aspect of Islamic funds‟ 
operation must be carried out according to the Shariah principles.  This is not limited to 
investing in Shariah-compliant or halal-approved securities only, but also includes the 
investment terms and conditions agreed between all parties involved in the Islamic funds, 
so too must the handling of the funds also conform to the Shariah precepts.   
 
 Despite some similarities between Islamic and ethical funds, the two funds are 
different particularly on two grounds: the screening methods and the purification of 
income.  Hardie and Rabooy (1991), Elgari (2002), Usmani (2005), Ayub (2007), Mian 
(2008) and Shah (2008) have all discussed both the screening methods and the income 
purification practices of Islamic funds in great detail.  Like ethical funds, the screening 
process is undertaken as a securities filtering mechanism to ensure that only Shariah-
compliant securities will be included in the Islamic funds‟ portfolio.  Zaher and Hassan 
(2001) define the screening process by Islamic funds as: 
 
... the practice of including or excluding publicly traded securities from 
investment portfolios or mutual funds based on the religious and ethical precepts 
of the Islamic Shariah.   
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The primary responsibility of the screening process rests on the Shariah advisory board of 
Islamic funds. The board, whose members comprises of Islamic Shariah scholars, is 
responsible for advising the fund managers on all matters relating to Shariah-compliancy 
including the formulation of Shariah guidelines, deciding on a company admissibility 
status into the portfolio, and conducting review and monitoring of Islamic funds‟ 
portfolio in response to the ever changing business operations or activities of all 
companies in the portfolio.      
 
 In general, there are two screening methods used by the Shariah advisory board to 
determine for company admissibility status; namely business activity screening and 
financial ratio screening.  The business activity screening is undertaken to determine that 
the company under consideration is not involved in any activities prohibited by the 
Shariah.  However, since it is almost impossible to find a company which is purely 
Shariah-compliant, Islamic scholars have agreed to approve any company where 95 per 
cent of its earnings are derived from halal activities.  Therefore, the remaining 5 per cent 
of the company‟s earnings may come from non-halal sources deemed unavoidable due to 
current business practices.  One popular example of non-halal earnings is interest-based 
income from conventional banking and financing activities.  On the other hand, financial 
ratio screening is carried out to ensure that the financial aspect of the company under 
consideration complies with the Shariah requirements pertaining to leverage, receivables 
and interest income.  For a company to be approved as halal, its total debt obtained from 
conventional financing must not exceed 33 per cent of the company‟s equity, its account 
receivables should be less than 49 per cent of the total assets whilst interest income 
derived from cash and other interest bearing instruments should not accounts for more 
that 5 per cent of the total profit.      
  
 The second aspect distinguishing Islamic funds from ethical funds is the income 
purification.  Since it is practically impossible to find a company which is 100 per cent 
Shariah-compliant, Islamic scholars have agreed to allow investment in a company that 
meets the minimum requirement outlined by both the business activity and the financial 
ratio screening.  Hence, it is the mixture of income between halal and non-halal sources 
that gives the rational for income purification.  Elgari (2002) defines purification as 
“deducting from the returns on one‟s investment those earnings, the source of which is 
not acceptable from a Shariah point of view” and provides an excellent discussion on the 
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process of purification.  Zaher and Hassan (2001) as well as Mian (2008) state that 
purification basically „cleanses‟ Islamic portfolio of income derived from investments in 
prohibited businesses or from interest-based (riba) transactions.  In brief, the purification 
process involves a deduction of a certain amount of profit or dividend payment that 
supposedly represents the non-halal income portion for charity purposes.  It can be 
accomplished either by the Islamic fund managers making the deduction prior to 
distributing the profit or by Islamic fund investors themselves upon receiving the advice 
from the fund managers on the amount that needs to be deducted from their dividend. 
 
 While ethical funds are created based on certain ethical values, Islamic funds are 
created based on religious principles, and hence, are poised to have rather stricter 
conditions. For instance, the adoption of Shariah principles is not only restricted to the 
securities selection process but all aspects of Islamic funds‟ operations must also comply 
with the Shariah precepts starting from the establishment of the funds right until when the 
profit (or loss) is distributed (or shared) between investors and Islamic fund managers.  
Such distinct features of Islamic funds are enough to make the funds attractive especially 
for pious investors who seek to practice their religious beliefs when making an 
investment.  It is also in line with Shah‟s (2008: 15) assertion that the main purpose of the 
creation of Islamic funds is “to attract investors whose investment decision is based on 
the guidance provided by the Islamic Shariah”.  The similarities between religious and 
ethical objectives make Islamic funds equally attractive to ethically-oriented investors. 
Maurer (2001) suggested that the phenomenal growth of Islamic funds is attributed to the 
emerging interest towards ethical investments that “do not invest in unethical practices 
and industries”.  His comment, which is specifically made in reference to the Shariah 
prohibition against derivatives trading including futures and options contracts that was 
largely blamed for economic crises and business scandals, is shared by Hussein and 
Omran (2005) who argued that the Islamic investment approach possesses a unique 
advantage in its ability to detect and remove troubled companies as shown by the 
withdrawals of WorldCom, Enron and Tyco from the list of Dow Jones Islamic Market 
Index and the subsequent selling of these companies‟ shares by Islamic fund managers 
long before the companies were collapsed due to various scandals related to unethical 
corporate practices.  This special ability enables Islamic funds to better safeguard their 
investors‟ interest and makes the funds more attractive to investors. 
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 Although the Islamic fund industry is still in its infancy relative to the more 
established conventional fund industry, Islamic funds have managed to gain a 
considerable market share in the overall fund management industry due to the availability 
of various Islamic fund products to cater for the diverse needs of the general investing 
public.  Usmani (2005) describes six types of Islamic funds, namely equity funds, ijarah 
(leasing) funds, commodity funds, murabahah (cost-plus) funds, bai-al-dain (sale-of-
debt) funds, and mixed funds.  The nature and operations of each type of Islamic funds 
are basically similar to their conventional counterparts except that the Islamic funds are 
required to adhere strictly to the relevant Shariah guidelines.  The bai-al-dain funds 
however, are only traded in Malaysia since the sale of debt instruments is ruled 
permissible by Muslim scholars in the country alone whilst majority of Muslim scholars 
in other Islamic countries have ruled otherwise.  Like other investors, subscribers of 
Islamic funds are also hoping for a positive return from their investment.  Hence, the 
performance of Islamic funds is a subject of interest not only to investors but also to 
industry practitioners and academics alike.  Some of the previous studies on Islamic fund 
performance are discussed in the following section.  
 
 
3.3.3 Islamic Funds’ Performance and Valuation Methods 
 
Despite the overwhelming demand for Islamic funds, Kurtz (2005) admitted that past 
literatures on Islamic funds‟ performance especially in mainstream academic journals 
however, are scarce.  Several studies have reported that Islamic funds could outperform 
conventional funds or the key market index.  A casual observation by Zaher and Hassan 
(2001) on the performance of 37 Islamic mutual funds during the 1997 to 1999 period 
shows that Islamic funds do generate positive return to investors.  Hussein and Omran 
(2005) as well as Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007) analysed the performance of the Dow 
Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIMI) vis-à-vis the performance of conventional 
benchmarks such as the Dow Jones World Index and found that the Islamic index has 
outperformed its conventional counterpart during the 1995 to 2005 period.  Using both 
the parametric and non-parametric tests as well as the three traditional portfolio valuation 
models, Hussein and Omran (2005) argued that the Islamic index achieved positive 
abnormal return especially during a bullish market period but performed poorly during a 
bearish market period.  They attributed the phenomenon to the relatively low gearing 
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level of Shariah-compliant stocks that make up the Islamic index component as well as 
the small firm effect since smaller capitalised stocks are known to perform better during a 
bullish market period.  It is worth mentioning here that this line of argument has some 
similarity with the reason given to account for ethical funds‟ superior performance.  They 
further argued that the poor performance of the Islamic index during the bearish market 
period is caused by the better performance of non-halal stocks such as alcoholic beverage 
firms that help the conventional index to sustain its performance. Similar analysis by Al-
Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007) using the Value-at-Risk (VaR) method found that the 
Islamic index has lower risk exposure as compared to the conventional index and they 
attributed this to the profit and loss sharing (PLS) concept practiced by Shariah-compliant 
stocks that help to reduce investment risk and makes these stocks more attractive to 
investors. 
 
 Studies undertaken in Malaysia by Yaacob and Yakob (2002), Shah Zaidi et al. 
(2004) and Abdullah et al. (2007) revealed that Islamic funds in the country are able to 
achieve superior performance.  Yaacob and Yakob (2002) based their analysis on a 
hypothetical portfolio comprising of five Shariah-approved stocks whilst Shah Zaidi et al. 
(2004) and Abdullah et al. (2007) based their analysis on a sample of Islamic unit trust 
funds available in the market.  Performance is measured primarily by the three standard 
portfolio valuation models.  In contrast, studies by Abdullah et al. (2002; cited in Nik 
Muhammad and Mokhtar, 2008) and Nik Muhammad and Mokhtar (2008) found that 
Islamic funds underperformed conventional funds.  In addition, Shah Zaidi et al. (2004) 
and Abdullah et al. (2007) also found that the Islamic funds in their sample were not well 
diversified, thus indicating a lack of stock selection skills among the Islamic fund 
managers to identify underpriced securities. 
 
 Contrary to the above findings however, Mueller (1994) claimed that the Islamic 
fund, represented by the US-based Amana Income Fund as his only sample, generates 
lower return as compared to the other conventional funds.  He used this finding to support 
the cost-of-discipleship hypothesis which states that ethically-oriented investment suffers 
additional costs that compromise investment return.  Wilson (1997) stated that the 
performance of both ethical and Islamic funds is not significantly different from the 
performance of conventional funds.  His argument is based on the return from certain 
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ethical funds in the UK and the performance of key stock market indices of several 
Muslim countries used in his sample.     
 
 Further review on the literatures however, indicates that the past results should be 
interpreted cautiously in view of the scarcity and constraints in the research methodology 
which may influence the outcome of the studies.  In particular, the findings derived 
simply from casual observations might be less convincing since it merely considers 
nominal return and fails to take into account the risk element as well as the other 
statistical considerations that could affect the accuracy of the return measurement. In 
addition, the robustness of past results is hampered by the limitations inherent in the 
sample used including the crucial choice between Islamic funds or the Islamic stock 
market index as the proxy for Islamic-oriented investment, the time period covered and 
the prevailing market condition during which the past studies were undertaken, and other 
weaknesses associated with the limitations of the conventional mean-variance portfolio 
valuation models when they are employed to measure the performance of unit trust or 
mutual funds whose stated objectives include the attainment of other non-pecuniary 
motives beyond the return-risk framework.  Since Islamic fund is basically a subset of the 
universe of ethical investment, the use of the traditional portfolio valuation models to 
measure Islamic fund performance would have similar implications with the use of the 
traditional portfolio valuation models in the assessment of ethical funds as has been 
discussed in the previous section pertaining to the issues in the valuation of ethical funds‟ 
performance.  The following section examines the issue further by discussing two other 
crucial issues related to Islamic funds.   
 
 
3.3.4 Issues in Islamic Fund Investment 
 
Apart from the portfolio valuation issue, two other issues significant to Islamic 
investment are the existence of various Shariah-screening guidelines and the real motive 
behind fund management companies‟ offering of Islamic funds.  For the first issue, the 
Shariah-screening criteria is certainly a crucial issue particularly during the securities 
selection process as the guidelines are used to determine the admissibility status of assets 
or securities into Islamic funds‟ portfolios.  Despite its crucial role, the Shariah-screening 
guidelines themselves are a matter of interpretative issue.  Hence, with exception of those 
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unambiguous non-Shariah-compliant companies, by virtue of their involvement in 
forbidden (haram) or gharrar (uncertainty) activities, there is no worldwide consensus 
with regards to the Shariah-screening criteria used for companies with a rather vague 
status arising from the mixture of their earnings or business activities between halal and 
non-halal sources, or for newly developed financial instruments especially those with 
asset-leverage hybrid characteristics.  Instead, the permissibility status of such securities 
or financial instruments is largely determined upon a particular Shariah scholar‟s school 
of thoughts who become a member of the Shariah advisory board.  Consequently, there 
are obvious discrepancies in the Shariah-screening guidelines as well as the final list of 
permissible securities produced by differing Shariah advisory boards.   Mian (2008) 
highlighted six different Shariah-screening criteria used by various Islamic equity indices 
namely the Bursa Malaysia Shariah Index, the FTSE Global Islamic Indexes, the Dow 
Jones Islamic Market Indexes, the S&P Shariah Indexes, the Global GCC Islamic Index, 
and the MSCI Islamic Index Series.  Most of the discrepancies in the decision over 
company or securities‟ halal status are due to the way liabilities-based instruments are 
treated by the differing Shariah advisory boards.   
 
 Table 3.2 highlights the Shariah screening guidelines used by the Securities 
Commission of Malaysia (SC), the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index, the FTSE and 
Yasaar Research Inc. and the MSCI Global Islamic Indices.  It appears that, while the 
four screening methods are virtually unanimous on the types of business activities 
deemed non-permissible (haram) with regards to business activities screening, they are 
slightly different in their judgement when it comes to the financial ratio screening or in 
treating companies which are involved in both permissible and non-permissible activities.  
For instance, in respect to interest income obtained from conventional banking, the SC 
would approve a company as a Shariah-complaint if the total interest amount is less than 
10 percent, but the FTSE and Yasaar Research Inc. and the MSCI Global Islamic Indices 
applied a less than 5 percent benchmark.  Similarly, there is a difference in the treatment 
of accounts receivables whereby the cap varies between 33.33 percent (MSCI Global 
Islamic Indices), 45 percent (Dow Jones Islamic Market Index) and 50 percent (FTSE and 
Yasaar Research Inc.).  
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Table 3.2: Comparison between Shariah Screening Methods 
 
No 
 
Screening Criteria 
Screening Method 
Securities Commission of 
Malaysia (the SC) 
Dow Jones Islamic Market 
Index 
FTSE and Yasaar Research Inc. MSCI Global Islamic Indices 
1 Business activities 
screening. 
Exclude companies involved in: 
 Financial services based on riba 
(interest); 
 Gambling and gaming; 
 Manufacture or sale of non-halal 
products or related products; 
 Conventional insurance; 
 Entertainment activities that are 
non-permissible according to 
Shariah; 
 Manufacture or sale of tobacco-
based products or related 
products; 
 Stockbroking or share trading in 
Shariah non-compliant securities; 
 Other activities deemed non-
permissible to Shariah. 
Excludes companies involved in: 
 Alcohol; 
 Tobacco; 
 Pork-related products; 
 Conventional financial services 
(banking, insurance etc.); 
 Weapon and defence; 
 Entertainment (hotels, 
casinos/gambling, cinema, 
pornography, music etc.). 
 
Excludes companies involved in: 
 Interest bearing investments; 
 Forward currency transactions; 
 Manufacture or distribution of 
alcohol or tobacco products; 
 Gaming or gambling; 
 Manufacture or distribution of 
weapons and defence-related 
products; 
 Pork-related products; 
 Conventional banking, 
insurance and other interest-
based financial services; 
 Pornographic materials; 
 Any other activity not permitted 
by the Shariah as determined 
by Yasaar‟s Shariah Board. 
Excludes companies that are 
directly involved in, or derive 5% 
or more of their revenue from: 
 Alcohol; 
 Tobacco; 
 Pork-related products; 
 Financial services; 
 Defence/Weapons; 
 Gambling/Casino; 
 Music; 
 Hotels; 
 Cinema; 
 Adult entertainment. 
2 Benchmarks for a mix 
between both 
permissible and non-
permissible activities, 
or based on the 
financial ratios 
screening. 
Exclude companies that have more 
than: 
 5% contributions from clearly 
prohibited actvities; 
 10% contributions from elements 
affecting most people and 
difficult to avoid e.g. interest 
income from conventional banks; 
 20% contributions from rental 
payment from Shariah non-
compliant activities; 
 25% contributions from generally 
acceptable activities but with 
elements that may affect the 
Shariah status of the activities. 
Exclude companies that have 
more than: 
 33% of Total Debt divided by 
Trailing 12-month Average 
Market Capitalisation; 
 33% of Total Cash and Interest 
Bearing Securities divided by 
Trailing 12-month Average 
Market Capitalisation;  
 45% of Accounts Receivables 
divided by Total Assets. 
Exclude companies that have 
more than: 
 33% debt to total asset ratio; 
 33% cash and interest bearing 
accounts (liquid instruments 
like CDs); 
 50% receivables and cash; 
 5% total interest and non-
compliant activities income. 
Exclude companies that have 
more than: 
 33.33% total debt over total 
assets; 
 33.33% sum of cash and 
interest-bearing securities over 
total assets; 
 33.33% sum of accounts 
receivables and cash over total 
assets. 
 
Source: 1. Securities Commission of Malaysia (SC) at www.sc.gov.my; 2. Dow Jones Indexes at www.djindexes.com; 3) Yasaar Ltd.; 4) www.mscibarra.com   
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 The second issue pertaining to the real motive of fund management companies 
offering Islamic funds originates from Shah‟s (2008: 15) contention that the main purpose 
of the creation of Islamic funds is “to attract investors whose investment decision is based 
on the guidance provided by the Islamic Shariah”.  In light of the findings that fund 
management companies were driven by profit motive, rather than socially-oriented 
motive, when offering ethical funds, it is possible that the same pecuniary motive may 
also entice fund management companies to offer Islamic funds.  The mixture of 
investment products between Islamic and conventional funds, and the manner in which 
fund management companies handle their Islamic funds indicate that fund management 
companies use their Islamic funds mainly as a tool of their marketing strategy by 
diversifying their product lines with the purpose of outwitting their rivals and ensuring 
their own survival in the highly competitive fund management industry. In this case, 
Islamic funds are perceived as just another product of the fund management companies to 
cater for the various needs of the general investing public whilst the offer of Islamic funds 
is merely to capitalise on the market opportunity created by the pious Muslim investors, 
in particular.  Therefore, it is the profit objective, rather than genuine religious causes, 
that becomes the real reason behind the offer of Islamic funds by fund management 
companies. Despite the doubt surrounding the sincerity of fund management companies 
to promote religious causes, by offering Islamic funds the fund management companies 
have nevertheless contributed significantly to the development and expansion of the 
Islamic fund industry.  In addition, this study is neither designed to investigate the real 
motive of fund management companies nor it is intended to examine the actual reason for 
investors to subscribe to Islamic funds. 
 
 
3.3.5 Questioning the Limited Development in the Islamic Funds’ Performance 
Valuation  
 
It is rather unfortunate that the tremendous growth of the Islamic fund industry worldwide 
is not supported by similar enthusiasm to further develop the industry judging from the 
scarcity of academic research in this field.  For instance, due to the absence of alternative 
fund performance valuation models, past studies have no other choice but to use the 
traditional portfolio valuation models in their analysis of Islamic funds performance.  
This situation does not augur well for long-term development of the Islamic finance and 
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banking industry as it could impede the progress of the relatively newly developed 
industry which is fast emerging as a viable alternative to conventional finance and 
banking.   
 
 There are two possible reasons for the lack of research on Islamic funds‟ 
performance valuation.  First, as argued by Lydenberg (2007), the modern portfolio 
theory is so dominant and too influential in finance and investment research to the extent 
that any proposed alternative models, especially those departing away from the mean-
variance framework that have become the pillars of the modern portfolio theory, will be 
viewed sceptically by the mainstream finance community.  The difficulty in measuring or 
rewarding non-financial motives further aggravates the lack of interest towards 
developing an alternative portfolio valuation model exclusive for Islamic funds.  The 
second reason is the limited intellectual capacity particularly among Muslim academic 
scholars as well as Islamic finance and banking (IBF) practitioners.  Since developing 
such an alternative fund performance valuation model is in itself a daunting task that 
requires vast amount of effort, time and intellectual capability, there are few ambitious 
researchers who are committed to develop the alternative valuation model – particularly 
considering the huge challenges that await the alternative model from the mainstream 
finance community and the acceptance level especially from IBF practitioners.  Instead, 
the majority of Muslim scholars and IBF practitioners are merely interested in the 
creation of Islamic finance and banking products which, in most cases, is achieved by 
mimicking conventional products.  Overreliance on Western scholars is perhaps another 
reason for the lack of confidence or innovations by Muslim scholars and IBF 
practitioners.  This is evident from Maurer (2001) when he recounts a confession by a 
London-based IBF practitioner at a conference held in Southern California in the spring 
of 2000 that Middle Eastern states wanted to see “models developed in the West, before 
they would import them back to the Muslim countries”.  Therefore, it is not surprising to 
see the development of Islamic finance and banking industry is actually trailing the 
development of its conventional counterparts with a notable lack of originality, 
particularly in terms of genuine Islamic finance and banking products or their valuation 
methods.     
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3.3.6 Conclusion 
 
Islamic fund is essentially a subset of the ethical investment universe with the Shariah-
compliance as its unique characteristic distinguishing the fund from an ethical or 
conventional fund.  Despite the Islamic fund industry having attracted considerable 
interest from the general investors – judging from its tremendous growth over the past 
three decades – there are various outstanding issues especially related to the differences in 
the Shariah-screening criteria and the proper valuation of the performance of Islamic 
funds that have yet to be resolved satisfactorily.  The limited studies on Islamic funds 
suggest that the existing findings need to be interpreted cautiously.  
 
 
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Contrary to conventional funds in which the primary objective is to maximise monetary 
return, ethical and Islamic funds were principally created to achieve non-pecuniary 
objectives although monetary return is undoubtedly important to these funds to ensure 
that they remain viable to investors.  The ethical and religious motives are translated into 
the screening criteria which distinguish the ethical and Islamic funds from their 
conventional counterparts.  The nobility of their underlying objectives aside, ethical and 
Islamic funds however, suffered certain disadvantages in their quest for righteous causes 
in the form of a reduced investment asset universe and higher operating costs as 
compared to conventional funds.  Despite this however, demand for ethical and Islamic 
funds is poised to grow amid the increase in public altruisms, higher concern towards 
corporate social responsibility and rising religious influence.  At present, the 
measurement of ethical and Islamic funds‟ performance is undertaken by using the 
traditional portfolio valuation models, due largely to the unavailability of an alternative 
model.  However, since the standard models fail to give due consideration to the 
constraints faced by ethical and Islamic funds, the models are likely to be biased against 
ethical and Islamic funds hence, their results should be interpreted with caution. 
Consequently, more serious and thorough analyses are required particularly on Islamic 
funds since research in this area is deemed as still in its infancy judging from the scarcity 
and limited scope of the previous studies.  The need is even more pressing in view of the 
continuing strong growth of the Islamic fund industry worldwide that stimulate the need 
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for more credible analysis on the real investment potential of Islamic funds.  Malaysia, for 
instance, is one of the many countries that have enjoyed considerable success both in its 
conventional and Islamic capital markets as well as its Islamic fund industry.  The 
following chapter provides a review on the growth of the Malaysian stock market and the 
development of the Islamic investment in Malaysia.     
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Chapter 4 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF THE 
MALAYSIAN STOCK MARKET AND ISLAMIC-BASED 
INVESTMENT IN MALAYSIA  
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
  
Although Malaysia may be regarded as a relatively young nation, having celebrated its 
50
th
 year of independence only in 2007, the country can certainly be proud of itself for 
having one of the biggest and most dynamic stock markets, particularly among 
developing countries.  Even more so, Malaysia has established itself as one of the 
pioneers of Islamic-based investment and has, over the years, equipped itself to becoming 
a hub for the global Islamic banking and finance industry.     
 
 This chapter provides an overview of the Malaysian stock market and unit trust or 
mutual fund industry as well as Islamic-based investment in the country. The chapter 
starts with the history and progress of the Malaysian stock market from its earlier set-up 
that resembles more of an exclusive investment club to become one of the biggest stock 
market in the Southeast Asia today both in terms of the size of its market capitalisation 
and the total number of listed securities.  This is followed by the topic on the phenomenal 
growth of the unit trust or mutual fund industry in Malaysia which subsequently helped to 
stimulate the development of Islamic-based investment in the country significantly.  The 
chapter continues with the review of empirical studies pertaining to the performance of 
both the conventional as well as Islamic unit trust funds in Malaysia, and finally ends 
with a conclusion.   
   
4.2 OVERVIEW OF THE MALAYSIAN STOCK MARKET 
 
This section provides an overview of the Malaysian stock market, paying particular 
attention to the history and the rapid growth of stock market investment in Malaysia.  The 
section offers an insight into how the capital market, particularly equity investment, has 
evolved in the country, central to the development of the Malaysian fund management 
and unit trust industry.    
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4.2.1 History, Development and Trends of the Malaysian Stock Market  
 
The history of the Malaysian stock market can be traced back from 1930 when the 
Singapore Stockbrokers‟ Association was established.  In 1937, it was re-registered as the 
Malayan Stockbrokers‟ Association. Prior to 1960 however, securities trading activities 
were exclusively confined amongst the members of the stockbrokers.  The general public 
was able to trade in the stock market from 1960 following the establishment of the 
Malayan Stock Exchange in Kuala Lumpur.  Following Singapore‟s joining the 
Federation of Malaysia in 1963, the Malayan Stock Exchange was renamed the Stock 
Exchange of Malaysia in 1964, later being renamed the Stock Exchange of Malaysia and 
Singapore in 1965 due to the withdrawal of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia 
during that year.  In 1973, the Stock Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore was split into 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Berhad and the Stock Exchange of Singapore 
following the decision by both countries to terminate the interchangeability of their 
currencies.  The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Berhad was transformed into a business 
entity when it was incorporated as a company limited by guarantee on the 14
th
 of 
December 1976 and became known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE).  
 
 In yet another important milestone in the history of the KLSE, the Exchange 
underwent a consolidation exercise in 2002 involving the merger of its three equity-based 
listing boards (the Main Board, the Second Board and the MESDAQ) with derivatives 
and offshore markets, thus producing a single trade exchange for Malaysia in line with 
the objective of the Malaysian Capital Market Masterplan (CMP). Subsequently, the 
KLSE undertook a demutualization exercise and changed its name into Bursa Malaysia 
Berhad (hereinafter known as Bursa Malaysia) on the 14
th
 of April 2004.  The company 
was later listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad on the 18
th
 of 
March 2005.  Compared to its humble beginning with sole focus in equity-based 
securities trading, today Bursa Malaysia has expanded its operations to include trading in 
futures- and other derivatives-related financial products including stock market index 
options, palm oil futures, interest rates futures and government bonds as well as offshore 
market operations.  However, since the subject interest of this study is on the equity-based 
securities trading, in particular, the rest of the discussion will therefore focus on the 
growth of the Malaysian stock market undertaken by Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad, a 
subsidiary of Bursa Malaysia. 
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 Over the past four decades, the Malaysian stock market has experienced 
tremendous growth and contributed significantly to the expansion of the Malaysian 
economy and businesses.  From just one listing board with a total of 262 companies in 
1973, there are currently three listing boards managed by Bursa Malaysia Securities 
Berhad with a total of 982 companies comprising of Main Board (637 listed companies), 
Second Board (221) and MESDAQ Market (124)
7
.  The growing number of new 
companies listed through the initial public offerings (IPOs) reflects the increasing 
popularity of the Malaysian capital market as an important avenue to raise additional 
funds.  On average, there are a total of four new companies listed annually for the period 
from 1973 to 1979 and this number increases to seven new companies listed annually 
during the 1980s.  These however, are substantially lower as compared to the average of 
50 new listings per year during the 1990s and 45 new companies for period from 2000 to 
July 2008.  Consistent with the bullish market performance in the 1996-1997 periods, the 
number of new listings peaked at 92 companies in 1996 and 88 companies in 1997.   
 
 The significant increase in the number of IPOs provides evidence of the growing 
popularity of the capital market as a venue to raise funds for both public and private 
sectors.  The total net funds raised in the capital market in 2007 stood at 45.48 billion 
Malaysian Ringgit (RM) (GB£1 = RM4.90, approximately) representing a 35 per cent 
increase from RM33.74 billion in 1997, and nearly four times the capital raised in 1987 of 
RM9.47 billion.  A closer look into the trend of total funds raised for period from 1975 to 
2009 reveals another interesting phenomenon with regards to the breakdown between the 
funds raised by the public sector against the private sector.  The public sector raised more 
funds as compared to the private sector during 1975 to 1988 averaging at RM4.37 billion 
per year (mainly through the Malaysian Government Securities issues) against RM820 
million per year raised by the private sector.  The huge funds raised by the public sector 
reflects the over reliance on the government‟s expenditures during this period which are 
needed primarily for social and infrastructural developments as well as to stimulate 
economic expansion.  The trend however, reversed during 1989 to 2004 when the bulk of 
the newly raised funds went to the private sector, averaging at RM27.5 billion per annum 
against RM14.6 billion per annum raised by the public sector, thus signifying the 
increasing role of the private sector as the new engine of growth for the Malaysian 
                                                 
7
 As of the 8
th
 of August 2008. 
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economy.  It was during this period that the stock market gained its reputation as a 
popular source of funding since the majority of the funds raised by the private sector were 
either through the issuance of new ordinary shares or private debt securities including 
corporate bonds.  To put this into perspective, the share of the total funds raised by the 
private sector in 1995, 1996 and 1997 accounted for 89.7 per cent, 84.6 per cent and 91.0 
per cent of the entire funds raised during the three years, respectively. However, the 
dismal stock market performance particularly over the last three years has seen a 
significant decrease in the amount of new funds raised through the stock market, 
bottoming out at a mere RM1.92 billion in 2006, although corporate bonds remain an 
attractive source of funding.  The summary of the amount of net funds raised in the 
Malaysian capital market for a 5-year interval from 1975 up to 2009 is shown in Table 
4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Summary of Total Net Funds Raised in the Malaysian Capital Market (in RM mil) 
Sector  1975  1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Public Sector 909 2,311 3,591 3,816 (35) 13,659 15,825 57,766 
 - New MGS  1,086 3,266 4,980 5,441 2,750 19,964 34,688 96,794 
Private Sector 76 157 645 10,779 19,955 25,949 25,894 52,581 
 - New Shares 28 137 645 8,650 11,616 6,013 6,315 26,045 
 - New Debts 48 20 0 2,129 8,339 19,936 19,579 26,536 
Net Funds Raised 985 2,468 4,236 14,595 19,920 39,608 41,719 110,347 
Source: Modified from various issues of Bank Negara Malaysia‟s Monthly Statistical Bulletin  
 
 
 All of the 982 companies listed on the three listing boards of Bursa Malaysia 
Securities Berhad are grouped into several industry classifications according to their 
principal business activities such as Consumer Products, Industrial Products, 
Construction, Hotels, Trading/Services, Technology, Finance, Property, Plantation, and 
Mining.  At present, the stock market performance is measured by 23 indices including 
ten Bursa Malaysia Index Series, which tracked the overall performance of individual 
sectors in Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad; and, 13 FTSE Bursa Malaysia Index Series, 
which comprises of six tradable indices and seven benchmark indices. The current key 
benchmark index is the FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Index (FBMKLCI) which replaced 
the previous Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) on the 6
th
 of July 2009.  The key 
benchmark index is calculated based upon the weighted average market capitalisation of 
their component stocks with the year 1977 serving as the base year for the index 
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calculation. Unlike the KLCI which consists of 100 selected blue-chip stocks, the 
FBMKLCI has 30 selected blue-chips as its component stocks.  Since the FBMKLCI is a 
relatively new index and has only recently replaced the KLCI, this study is therefore 
focused upon the performance of the KLCI.  
 
4.2.2 Review of the KLCI Performance: August 1987 to September 2008 
 
The long run performance of the KLCI shows that the key benchmark index is generally 
moving in an upward trend direction which reflects the future potential of stock market 
investment in Malaysia.  Notwithstanding however, the performance of the stock market 
is continuously influenced by various economic and political factors both domestically 
and internationally.  Therefore, as indicated by the KLCI daily price movement as shown 
in Figure 4.1, the short- and medium-term performance is likely to be characterised by 
market volatility and fluctuation of the key index although the long-term prospect is 
envisaged to remain favourable.   
 
Figure 4.1: KLCI Daily Performance 08/1987 to 09/2008 
 
Source: KLCI data obtained from Innosabah Securities Berhad and Yahoo Finance website. 
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 Figure 4.1 reveals that prior to 1993 the KLCI has been moving steadily in an 
upward trend direction amid less volatility.  The trend however, changed drastically in 
1993 when the benchmark index, supported by substantially heavy trading volume, rose 
dramatically from 643.96 on the 31
st
 of December 1992 to its record high level of 
1,314.46 on the 5
th
 of January 1994, thus giving an impressive 100 per cent increase in 
the index value in just slightly more than a one-year period.  The rally was mainly driven 
by the growing interest towards stock market investment among retail and institutional 
investors as well as the growing popularity of the stock market as an attractive avenue for 
fund raising activities to corporate entities mainly via IPO exercises.  The strong interest 
is indicated by the sharp increase in the daily trading volume from the average of 46 
million shares prior to 1993 to 249 million units during 1993 to 1997 periods.  In value 
terms, the average daily market capitalisation generated by the Malaysian stock market 
rose markedly from RM161.39 billion in 1992 to RM619.64 billion in 1993, representing 
a tremendous 284 per cent increase in just a one-year period.  The market capitalisation 
continued to rise with the highest value recorded for 1996 and 1997 at RM810.13 billion 
(November 1996) and RM888.66 billion (February 1997), respectively.  Numerous 
positive fundamental factors contributed to the strong stock market performance 
including the currency and political stability, strong economic growth, favourable 
monetary and fiscal policies as well as the large inflows of foreign capital particularly 
from international fund managers into the Malaysian stock market, a phenomenon which 
was also visible in other east Asian stock markets such as Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea.   
 
 The 1993 stock market rally however, was short lived; almost immediately heavy 
profit taking activities as investors took the opportunity to realise their gains caused the 
KLCI to fall sharply lower from its record level high.  Subsequently, the KLCI underwent 
a lengthy period of consolidation from 1994 to 1997 but was able to maintain its 
performance by hovering around the 1000-point psychological level as investors‟ interest 
towards the stock market remain favourable as indicated by the relatively high daily 
trading volume.  The market staged another short rally when the index rebounded 377.20 
points (42.20 per cent gains) from the low of 893.80 on the 20
th
 of November 1995 to the 
high of 1,271.00 on the 25
th
 of February 1997.  However, the KLCI took a major beating 
when the Asian financial crisis struck beginning from July 1997 which saw the 
benchmark index retreat to its lowest level of 262.70 on the 1
st
 of September 1998 for a 
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whopping 80.0 per cent loss from its highest level of 1,314.46.  The share prices also 
dropped significantly when the market capitalisation shrank by 50 per cent from 
RM744.47 billion in June 1997 to RM375.80 billion in December 1997.  Various 
economic recovery measures imposed by the Malaysian Government to alleviate the 
impact of the Asian financial crisis – particularly the selective currency exchange control, 
the curb on „hot money‟ by imposing a one-year moratorium on foreign funds invested in 
Malaysian shares, and the cessation of the over-the-counter trading of Malaysian equities 
in Stock Exchange of Singapore‟s CLOB (Central Limit Order Book) – have enabled the 
KLCI to stem the slide and stage a strong rebound from the lowest level back to around 
the pre-rally level
8
.  Unfortunately, the KLCI suffered yet another intense selling pressure 
led particularly by the heavy selling of technology-related stocks following the worldwide 
failure of dot.com companies.  Consistent with the poor performance of the KLCI, 
interest towards the stock market also faded considerably as shown by the shrink in the 
average daily trading volume to 136 million units, almost half of the daily average 
volume recorded prior to the crisis, and the significant drop in the number of new 
companies that opted for listing from 68 companies before the crisis to just 27 companies 
during the crisis. Notwithstanding however, the value of shares traded during the crisis 
period has increased steadily from RM374.52 billion in 1998 to RM552.69 billion in 
1999 and RM444.35 billion in 2000, reflecting a strong performance of the Malaysian 
listed companies as well as the stock market, thus indicating a fairly limited downside 
risk despite the heavy selling pressure. 
 
 The post-crisis period has seen a rather steady increase in the value of the KLCI 
albeit at a lower trading volume averaging at 105 million shares per day which signifies 
investors‟ cautiousness towards stock market investment.  This period has also witnessed 
various regulatory changes and corporate undertakings being implemented to further 
strengthen the Malaysian stock market with the most notable changes being the 
demutualization exercise of the KLSE into Bursa Malaysia Berhad and the expansion of 
its business activities into futures and other derivatives-related trading as well as offshore 
market operation.  Combination factors of the continuing strong macro economic 
performance, political stability, favourable monetary and economic policies, and 
numerous measures implemented to revive the Malaysian capital market and property 
                                                 
8
 Today, almost all of the economic recovery measures introduced to offset the impact of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis have been lifted.  
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sector reignited interest towards the stock market particularly in 2007 as shown by the 
sharp increase in the daily average trading volume to 224 million shares during the year.  
Investors‟ interest was also encouraged by the impending merger of the three biggest 
Malaysian plantation companies as well as the purportedly politically-linked trading in 
the run up to the Malaysian 12
th
 general election that was widely anticipated to be called 
in the early 2008.  The renewed interest pushed the KLCI to its record all time high of 
1,516.22 on the 11
th
 of January 2008 on the back of heavy trading volume of 543 million 
units.  In terms of market capitalisation, the value of Malaysian shares has more than 
doubled during the period from the daily average of RM464.98 billion to RM1,106.15 
billion in 2007.  Marred by the less favourable political climates and the rising fuel and 
food prices which threatened the overall economic outlook, the KLCI performance during 
the second and the third quarter of 2008 however, was rather miserable and unfortunately 
as of the 3
rd
 of September 2008, the KLCI has already lost 430.84 points or 28.4 per cent 
from its record all-time high level.   
 
 For the purpose of this study, the past performance of the KLCI has been divided 
into four periods as outlined in Table 4.2.  Apart from the „All Period‟ which covers the 
entire data available for this study, the individual period is determined by observing the 
major turning point in the benchmark‟s movement.  The turning point can be identified 
from a sharp increase (decrease) in the index level which usually marks the beginning 
(end) of a stock market rally (decline), and this is subsequently followed by a period of 
consolidation as the index is adjusting itself to find a new support level that reflects its 
true fundamental value.   
 
 
4.2.3 Conclusion  
 
The Malaysian stock market has experienced remarkable growth over the past four 
decades both in terms of its operations and trading performance.  The market has evolved 
from a state of lacklustre trading in the 1970s and 1980s to become one of the most 
attractive investment avenues for all types of investors and a major source of fund raising 
for corporate entities particularly in the 1990s.  Notwithstanding however, trading in the 
Malaysian stock market has been pretty volatile as reflected by huge fluctuations as the 
market is continuously influenced by various domestic and international factors that 
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either stimulate buying interest or trigger profit taking or selling activities.  Nevertheless, 
both Bursa Malaysia Berhad and the Malaysian Government through its agencies, 
particularly the Securities Commission of Malaysia (the SC) (a self-funding statutory 
body established on the 1
st
 of March 1993 under the Securities Commission Act, 1993 
with the primary function to regulate and supervise all matters relating to the operations 
of the Malaysian capital market), are committed to creating favourable and efficient 
trading environment, encourage better investment practices and enhance investors 
protection.  Despite its volatile performance, the Malaysian stock market has undoubtedly 
contributed tremendously to the growth and expansion of the Malaysian economy.  One 
type of investment that has benefited largely from the success of the stock market is the 
Malaysian unit trust or mutual fund industry.  The following section looks into the issue 
in greater detail. 
 
 
Table 4.2: The Classification of Period Under Study 
No  Classification Years 
Covered 
Remarks 
1 All Period 1990 to 2008 Gives the long term trend of the historical performance of the 
KLCI for the entire duration covered by the data obtained for 
this study. 
2 Market Rally 
Period  
1990 to 1997 This period is particularly characterised by a bullish market 
trend in 1992 to 1994 and 1996 to 1997 periods.   
3 Crisis Period 1998 to 2003 Shows the KLCI volatility during the bearish market period as 
the Malaysian stock market went through two major crisis 
namely the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 and the collapse 
of dot.com (technology) companies in 2000. This period is 
particularly characterised by the steep market decline at the 
opening period followed by a sharp rebound which was rather 
short lived as the market succumbed to yet another round of 
heavy selling pressure at the end of the period.    
4 Post-Crisis 
Period 
2004 to 2008 This period is characterised by the steady KLCI recovery 
stimulated by favourable Government initiatives particularly 
those targeted at capital markets and property sector, various 
corporate exercises especially the merger of three most 
prominent plantation groups in the country as well as the run up 
to the Malaysian 12
th
 general election anticipated in early 2008. 
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4.3 OVERVIEW OF THE MALAYSIAN UNIT TRUST INDUSTRY 
  
This section provides an overview of the Malaysian unit trust fund industry including the 
growth of unit trust investment in Malaysia.  The understanding of this topic will give a 
better idea of how unit trust investment has evolved and flourished in Malaysia over the 
last four decades.         
 
4.3.1 Definition, Background and Development of Unit Trust Investment in 
Malaysia 
   
Unit trust or mutual fund has emerged as a popular investment instrument amongst 
Malaysian investors particularly for those who are lacking investment resources or skills 
and have limited access to information related to the stock market.  By definition, a unit 
trust refers to “a collective investment scheme which pools the savings of the public into 
a special unit trust fund managed actively by professional fund managers”9.  Another 
similar definition states that a unit trust is “a form of collective investment that allows 
investors with similar investment objectives to pool their funds to be invested in a 
portfolio of securities or other assets”10.  A unit trust fund is constituted according to a 
deed executed by the trustee and the manager on behalf of the unit holders, in which, the 
deed outlines the rights of the unit holders as well as the responsibilities and liabilities of 
the trustee and the manager.  Hence, in principle, there are three parties involved in a unit 
trust scheme namely the unit holders, the fund management company, and the trustee. 
The unit holders are the subscribers or investors who purchased the units.   However, 
since the unit holders do not purchase the securities in the portfolio directly, they become 
the ultimate beneficiary of the scheme and receive their return in the forms of income 
distribution (dividend) and/or capital appreciation.  The fund management company (or 
“the manager”) is the entity that creates and offers the unit trust scheme and is responsible 
for all administrative and marketing activities of the unit trust scheme.  The investment 
function of the unit trust fund however, is handled by fund/investment managers 
comprising of investment experts who are responsible for trading activities including 
buying and selling of securities and asset allocation strategy. The fund/investment 
managers may either be sourced internally or externally by the fund management 
                                                 
9
 Definition by Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB). See http://www.pnb.com.my.   
10
 Definition by Federation of Malaysian Unit Trust Managers (FMUTM).  See http://www.fmutm.com.my.  
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company. The trustee is the registered holder of the assets or securities purchased using 
the unit trust fund by the fund management company on behalf of the beneficiary.  In 
Malaysia, the establishment and operation of unit trust funds is governed by the Capital 
Market and Services Act, 2007 whilst the SC is the regulatory body of the unit trust fund 
industry.
11
      
 
 Although the first unit trust in Malaysia was introduced as early as in 1959 by the 
Malayan Unit Trust Ltd., the development of the unit trust industry during its first two 
decades however, was hampered by the lack of public interest and slow growth in sales of 
the units.  Only 18 unit trust funds were launched by five fund management companies 
during the period.  Unit trust investment suddenly became popular in the 1980s following 
the successful launch of the Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN) Scheme by Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad (PNB) on the 20
th
 of April 1981.  The ASN Scheme which was 
primarily designed to mobilise savings from indigenous Bumiputera (Malays and other 
native ethnics) population received an overwhelming response when more than 170,000 
Bumiputeras participated by subscribing the ASN units during the first week of its launch.  
The following decade witnessed several other significant developments take place in the 
Malaysian unit trust industry including the centralisation of the unit trust industry 
regulation under the SC, the implementation of the Securities Commission (Unit Trust 
Scheme) Regulations in 1996, further deregulation of the industry and greater product 
innovation.    
 
 Reflecting the strong growth of the unit trust industry, the net asset value (NAV) 
of the industry grew by an average of 19.2 per cent per year during the 1992 to 2009 
period as shown by Figure 4.2.  As at end of 2009, the total NAV of the Malaysian unit 
trust industry stood at RM191.7 billion representing 19.2 per cent of the total market 
capitalisation of the Bursa Malaysia exchange.  The steady increase of the NAV since the 
year 2000 was primarily supported by the strong recovery of the Malaysian stockmarket 
after the Asian financial crisis during the 1997 and 1998 period.   
 
  
  
                                                 
11
 See Permodalan Nasional Berhad‟s (PNB) website at http://www.pnb.com.my. 
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Figure 4.2: Total NAV of Unit Trust Funds versus Bursa Malaysia Market Capitalisation 
 
Source: Modified data from Federation of Investment Managers Malaysia (FIMM) 
 
  
  The unit trust industry continued to enjoy strong growth, averaging at 19.2 per 
cent per annum during 2000 to 2007, with the total NAV nearly quadrupling to 
RM169.41 billion at the end of 2007 comprising of 15.32 per cent of the total market 
capitalisation of the Bursa Malaysia.  This was achieved on the back of the strong 
recovery in the Malaysian stock market coupled with aggressive marketing and product 
diversification by fund management companies.  The industry has also benefited largely 
from further liberalisation on rules pertaining to foreign investment that allows numerous 
fund management companies to launch offshore funds aimed at having more than 50 per 
cent exposure in overseas investment.  The drastic increase of offshore funds launched by 
fund management companies from 10 funds in 2005 to 38 funds as at the third quarter of 
2006 clearly indicates the huge interest among fund management companies to diversify 
their investment internationally.            
 
 The summary statistics of the Malaysian unit trust fund industry for the six years 
period from 2004 to 2009 as shown in Table 4.3 provides additional evidence of the 
steady growth of the unit trust fund industry in Malaysia.  Although the number of fund 
management companies has increased only marginally from 36 companies as at end 2004 
to 39 companies as at end 2009, the total number of funds offered nearly doubled from 
273 funds to 541 funds during the same period.  The total units in circulation of 273.88 
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billion as at end 2009 is twice the total units circulated as at end 2004 of 118.63 billion 
whilst the NAV of RM191.71 billion is 119 per cent higher than RM87.39 for the two 
comparative years, respectively.  On an average basis, each of the fund management 
companies in 2004 have eight funds with 3.30 billion units under their management and 
the number increased to 14 funds with 7.02 billion units in 2008.  In terms of value, the 
total NAV rose at an average rate of 17.5 per cent per annum during the period.   
 
 However, the dismal stock market performance, due largely to profit taking 
activities after the market rally in the first-half of 2007 and poorer economic outlook 
particularly during the first six-months of 2008 amid political uncertainties surrounding 
the Malaysian 12
th
 general election, has reduced the per unit NAV significantly from 
RM0.81 as at end 2007 to RM0.55 as at July 2009.  It was the first time that the NAV 
ever registered negative growth in a ten consecutive years period especially considering 
the stronger double digit growth in the total NAV achieved since 2002.  The average 
NAV per unit however, improved to RM0.70 in 2009 as the Malaysian stock market 
recovered starting from the second half of 2008.  The high correlation between the 
Malaysian unit trust industry and the stock market performance is not surprising as a 
substantial portion (more than 35 per cent of the NAV) of the private unit trust funds are 
invested in the equity market.   
 
 Another issue worth mentioning here is that Islamic unit trust funds have 
collectively managed to sustain their value at a time when conventional unit trust funds 
have failed.  Despite the poor stock market performance in the 2007–2008 period, the 
total NAV of Islamic funds has increased by 31.5 per cent from RM16.8 billion as of 
December, 2007 to RM22.1 billion as of December, 2009, thus raising the Islamic funds‟ 
share in the total industry‟s NAV from 10.0 per cent to 11.5 per cent.  In contrast, the 
NAV of conventional funds only increased by 12.2 per cent whilst its share of the total 
NAV reduced to 88.5 per cent during the same period. The ability of Islamic funds to 
maintain their investment value amid the difficult stock market environment reflects the 
quality of assets held by these funds.  
 94 
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of the Malaysian Unit Trust Fund Industry 
  12/2004  12/2005  12/2006 12/2007  12/2008 12/2009 
No. of Management Companies  36  36  38  39  39  39 
No. of Approved Funds
*
 
 Conventional 
 Islamic-based 
 291 
 220 
 71 
 340 
 257 
 83 
 411 
 314 
 97 
 506 
 378 
 128 
 550 
 409 
 141 
 565 
 415 
 150 
No. of Launched Funds 
 Conventional 
 Islamic-based 
 273 
 208 
 65 
 323 
 244 
 79 
 387 
 295 
 92 
 484 
 360 
 124 
 532 
 392 
 140 
 541 
 397 
 144 
Units in Circulation (in billion) 
 Conventional 
 Islamic-based 
 118.627 
 105.472 
 13.155 
 139.386 
 120.762 
 18.624 
 153.719 
 135.245 
 18.474 
 206.835 
 170.563 
 36.272 
 236.392 
 187.535 
 48.857 
 273.879 
 217.031 
 56.848 
No. of Accounts (in ‟000)
#
 
 Conventional 
 Islamic-based 
 10,425 
 9,998 
 427 
 10,861 
 10,221 
 640 
 11,164 
 10,398 
 765 
 12,275 
 11,024 
 1,250 
 13,047 
 11,411 
 1,636 
 14,105 
 12,328 
 1,777 
Total NAV (in RM billion) 
 Conventional 
 Islamic-based 
 87.385 
 80.624 
 6.761 
 98.485 
 89.998 
 8.487 
 121.410 
 112.309 
 9.101 
 168.029 
 151.244 
 16.785 
 130.436 
 114.318 
 16.118 
 191.706 
 169.626 
 22.080 
Bursa Malaysia Market 
Capitalisation (in RM bil) 
 722.04  695.27  848.70  1106.15  663.80  999.45 
       
% of NAV to the Mkt. Cap.  12.10  14.17  14.31  15.19  19.65  19.18 
Ave. funds per FMC  8  9  10  13  14  14 
Ave. units per FMC (in bil)  3.30  3.87  4.05  5.30  6.06  7.02 
Ave. NAV per FMC (in RM bil)  2.43  2.74  3.20  4.31  3.35  4.92 
Ave. NAV per unit (RM)  0.74  0.71  0.79  0.81  0.55  0.70 
Ave. NAV per unit (RM):  
 Conventional 
 Islamic-based 
  
 0.76 
 0.51 
 
 0.75 
 0.46 
 
 0.83 
 0.49 
 
 0.89 
 0.46 
 
 0.61 
 0.33 
 
 0.78 
 0.39 
Note: 
*  - Includes funds approved but not yet launched. 
#  - Not including unit holders account at IUTA that operates nominee account system. 
FMC - Fund management companies 
Source: Modified data from Securities Commission of Malaysia (SC) 
 
   
4.3.2 Conclusion 
 
This section has examined the development of the unit trust fund industry in Malaysia. 
Despite remaining relatively unknown during the first two decades after the first fund was 
launched in 1959, unit trust funds have emerged as a popular investment instrument as is 
evident from the tremendous growth achieved by the industry, particularly in the past 10 
years.  Demand for unit trust funds is expected to grow and more innovative products are 
poised to be introduced into the market amid increasing competition and as fund 
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management companies endeavour to meet demand from more sophisticated investors.  
One noticeable development in the industry is the growing popularity of Islamic unit trust 
funds.  The following section analyses the development of Islamic-based investment in 
Malaysia. 
 
 
4.4 OVERVIEW OF ISLAMIC-BASED INVESTMENT IN MALAYSIA 
   
This section looks into the emergence and development of Islamic-based investment in 
Malaysia, a country in which Islamic finance and banking services have enjoyed strong 
growth while running in parallel with their conventional counterparts.  The section is 
intended to provide a better understanding of how Islamic-based investment has evolved 
in Malaysia initially in the form of Islamic banking products and services which later 
expanded into securities dealing, insurance (takaful), unit trust funds, bonds (sukuk) and 
commodity investments.    
 
4.4.1 History, Development and Trends 
 
Malaysia has long recognised the Islamic finance and banking industry as a niche market 
and has positioned itself well to tap the huge potential offered by this relatively new 
market.  The inception of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) on the 1
st
 of July 1983 as 
the first fully-fledged Islamic bank in the country and arguably one of the earliest Islamic 
banks in the world signifies the Malaysian government‟s commitment to make Malaysia a 
global hub for Islamic finance and investment.  Although BIMB was established 
primarily to cater for the retail banking needs of half of the country‟s Muslim population, 
the bank has over the years transformed itself into a finance conglomerate offering 
various financial products and services including insurance (takaful), stockbroking and 
unit trust management that comply with the Shariah principles in addition to its usual 
consumer and corporate banking products and services.  It was through BIMB that devout 
Muslim clients particularly during the 1980s were able to find alternative investment 
instruments to conventional financial products by subscribing to the bank‟s mudharabah 
type investment account.   In addition, Malaysia has earned the reputation as one of the 
pioneers of Islamic finance and banking industry with comprehensive regulatory 
frameworks and sound infrastructure to ensure successful implementation of the Islamic 
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finance and banking system.  Its status as a liberal and dynamic Islamic country enjoying 
strong relationships with the other Muslim nations gives valuable access to the vast 
capital of wealthier Islamic countries particularly from the Middle East.           
 
 The last three decades has seen a rapid expansion in the Islamic finance and 
banking industry that facilitates the development of the Islamic capital market in 
Malaysia significantly.  Today, a pious Muslim investor in the country has a wider menu 
of Shariah-compliant investment products ranging from equity, insurance, unit trust, bond 
and commodity that meets with his/her investment needs.  The availability of diverse 
Islamic financial instruments was made possible through product innovation following 
extensive research and development in this area by industry players and the SC, in 
particular.  For instance, Bursa Malaysia alone offers more than 800 Shariah-approved 
stocks, two listed Islamic real estate investment trusts (REITs), one tradable Islamic stock 
market index, two Islamic derivative products, and an Islamic debt (Sukuk) market 
through the Labuan International Financial Exchange (LFX), its wholly-owned subsidiary 
company.  In August 2009, Bursa Malaysia launched the Commodity Murabahah House 
(CMH), a commodity exchange using the murabahah (cost-plus) principle, which is 
primarily a national project undertaken together with Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), the 
Securities Commission (SC) and the palm-oil industry players under the leadership of 
Malaysia International Islamic Financial Center (MIFC).  The new commodity exchange 
was later known as Bursa Suq al-Sila’. 
 
  Indeed, Bursa Malaysia provides considerable opportunity for those investors 
seeking Islamic-based investment products.  In the equity market, from the total 980 
securities listed on Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad, 855 securities or 87.2 per cent are 
approved as halal (permissible for investment) or Shariah-compliant by the Shariah 
Advisory Council (SAC) of the SC as at 28
th
 November 2008.  Collectively, the market 
capitalisation of the halal-approved stocks is valued at RM627.84 billion, or 64 per cent 
of the total market capitalisation of RM971.28 billion.  With exception of those 
companies listed in mining, hotels and closed-end fund sectors, investors would be able to 
find and choose Shariah-compliant stocks in any other sectors including finance, 
technology and trading/services sectors.  Even more encouraging is that nine in every ten 
companies listed in Consumer Products, Industrial Products, Construction and 
Technology sectors are Shariah-compliant.  Table 4.4 gives the fraction of the halal-
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approved companies listed on Bursa Malaysia whilst a complete list of the Shariah-
approved securities released by the Shariah Advisory Council of the SC as of 28
th
 
November 2008 is given in Appendix I.  In addition, investors who wish that their 
securities trading and transaction activities are undertaken in accordance with the Shariah 
principles can opt to trade either through a fully-fledged Islamic stockbroking firm or 
through any conventional stockbroking firms which are also offering Islamic share 
trading services through Islamic window concept.   
 
Table 4.4: Shariah-Compliant Securities on Bursa Malaysia 
 Main Board/Second 
Board/MESDAQ Market 
Shariah-Compliant 
Securities 
Total 
Securities 
Percentage of Shariah-
Compliant Securities 
    
Consumer Products 123 133 92 
Industrial Products 286 297 96 
Mining Nil 1 Nil 
Construction 51 54 94 
Trading/Services 171 205 83 
Properties 75 91 82 
Plantation 39 44 89 
Technology 100 102 98 
Infrastructure (IPC) 5 7 71 
Finance 5 41 12 
Hotels Nil 4 Nil 
Closed-end Fund Nil 1 Nil 
TOTAL 855 980 87 
Source: Securities Commission (SC) of Malaysia 
 
 The overall performance of the Shariah-approved stocks is monitored by a 
dedicated index, the FTSE Bursa Malaysia EMAS Shariah Index (FBMSHA), which 
comprises of Shariah-compliant stocks listed in the FTSE Bursa Malaysia EMAS Index 
(FBMEMAS).
12
  In order to provide more trading opportunity by capitalising on the stock 
market movement, Bursa Malaysia has also introduced a tradable Shariah index namely 
the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Hijrah Shariah Index (FBMHIJRAH), which comprises the 30 
largest Shariah-approved stocks in the FBMEMAS index that meets all three of the 
following screening processes: the FTSE‟s global standards of free float, liquidity and 
                                                 
12
 FBMEMAS comprises both the FTSE Bursa Malaysia 100 Index and the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Small 
Cap Index component stocks.  The former constitutes mainly the 100 largest stocks measured by market 
capitalisation whilst the latter is composed of the top 98 per cent of the Bursa Malaysia Main Board 
excluding constituents of the FTSE Bursa Malaysia 100 Index. 
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investability; the Yassar‟s International Shariah screening methodology; and the 
Malaysian SC‟s Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) screening methodology.  Figure 4.3 
illustrates the performance of both the Shariah stock market indices (FBMSHA and 
FBMHIJRAH) vis-à-vis the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) for period from 
January 2007 to March 2008.    
  
 
Figure 4.3: Performance of KLCI versus Shariah Indices (January 2007 – March 2008) 
 
Source: Bursa Malaysia Berhad  
  
 
 A casual observation on the price chart reveals that the performance of Shariah-
approved stocks as represented by the broader FBMSHA index is positively correlated 
with the performance of the KLCI with the former moving closely in tandem with the 
fluctuation in the latter. Similar performance is also observed with the tradable 
FBMHIJRAH index.  The positive correlation between the two Shariah indices and the 
KLCI is attributed to both the Shariah indices being partially made up of the same 
KLCI‟s component stocks.  Therefore, the positive correlation implies that the KLCI has 
significant influence over the performance of the Shariah indices particularly on 
FBMHIJRAH.  Consequently, any trading strategy intended to capitalise on the 
movement of the tradable FBMHIJRAH index should take into consideration the strong 
correlation between the Shariah index and the key market benchmark index. 
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 On the derivative market, two out of nine products traded on Bursa Malaysia 
Derivative Berhad are Shariah-compliant namely the Crude Palm Oil Futures (FCPO) 
and the Single Stock Futures (SSF).  The availability of derivative products allows 
investors to diversify their investment into the futures market either as a risk management 
tool in their hedging strategy or simply for trading purposes.  Unfortunately however, 
derivative trading is still largely unpopular among retail Muslim investors due to the 
small number of investors involved in large-scale commodity-related business, the lack of 
knowledge and required skill necessary for trading in the derivative market as well as the 
inadequate number of Shariah-approved derivative instruments currently available.  
Despite the rather limited success, the availability of the two futures derivative products 
does indicate the potential of the Shariah-compliant derivative market, nonetheless.  
 
 Another investment instrument which is readily available for Muslim investors in 
Malaysia is Islamic-based private debt securities.  Interestingly, as shown in Figure 4.4, 
Islamic bonds, virtually unknown prior to 1990, has emerged as a viable financing option 
particularly in the 2000s.  The strong interest towards Islamic bonds is apparently 
stimulated by the growing popularity of private debt securities especially corporate bonds 
as an alternative source of financing beginning from the mid-1990s due to the higher 
interest rates of conventional loans as well as the high volatility of the Malaysian stock 
market during that period.  Notwithstanding however, although the value of Islamic bonds 
is still far below conventional bonds‟ value, it is gaining importance as reflected by the 
double-digit growth of the Islamic bond‟s share in the total new debt issues from the 
yearly average of 8.9 per cent in the 1990s to 21.6 per cent in 2000 to 2009 period.  This 
certainly provides a clear evidence of the increasing popularity of Islamic bonds among 
corporate issuers and signifies the huge potential of this segment of the Malaysian bond 
market. 
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 Figure 4.4: Islamic Bond Issues and the Total New Issues of Debt Securities 
 
 Source: Modified from various issues of Bank Negara Malaysia‟s Monthly Statistical Bulletin 
 
 
 Apart from the success in the domestic Islamic bond market, Malaysia has also 
established a well developed offshore market for Islamic debt instruments or Sukuk 
through the Labuan International Financial Exchange (LFX).  Performance is impressive 
with RM7.1 billion or 88 per cent from the total RM8.1 billion worth of new listings for 
debt capital market instruments on LFX in 2007 actually comprising of new Sukuk issues 
structured based upon the musharakah (profit sharing) or ijarah (leasing) concepts.  For 
the period from 2001 to 2007, Malaysia ranked second after the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) with 32.1 per cent share of the global Sukuk market as compared to 36.2 per cent 
for UAE.  Malaysia however, has the largest number of Sukuk issues totalling 137 against 
UAE‟s 29.   The success of the Sukuk issues within a short span of time implies a strong 
domestic and international interest towards Islamic debt instruments as a viable financing 
alternative to conventional debt instruments.  
    
 Compared to the various investment instruments discussed above, the Islamic unit 
trust fund is arguably the most popular among the general investing public seeking 
Shariah-compliant investment instrument. The huge interest towards unit trust investment 
is easily understandable in view of the numerous benefits offered by this type of 
investment particularly in terms of price stability, reasonable return with less risk 
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exposure, and convenience especially for individual investors having limited investment 
resources and skills. Although the size of the Islamic fund industry is still relatively small 
compared to its conventional counterpart, its growth has exceeded that of conventional 
fund industry over the past four years as is evident from Table 4.3 (page 94).  As of 31
st
 
of July 2008, the SC has approved 144 Islamic unit trust funds representing 25 per cent of 
the total approved funds, and more than double the 71 Islamic funds approved in 2004.   
During the same period, the number of Islamic funds launched also doubled from 65 
funds to 138 funds whilst both the total units circulated and the total number of unit trust 
accounts grew three-fold from 13.2 billion to 46.2 billion and from 427,000 accounts to 
1.57 million accounts, respectively.  Indeed, the figures clearly demonstrate the growing 
interest and huge prospects of Islamic unit trust funds among Malaysian investors.   
 
 
4.4.2 Actual Performance of Islamic Unit Trust Funds in Malaysia 
 
The actual performance of unit trust funds in Malaysia, shown in Table 4.5, reveals that 
Islamic funds generally underperform in comparison to conventional funds particularly 
on a long-term basis.  The five-year average annual return of 2.92 per cent for Islamic 
funds is about half the 4.96 per cent average annual return of Malaysia equity funds.  The 
performance of Islamic smaller capitalised equity funds and Islamic money market funds 
are even more disappointing as each posted average annual losses of 1.13 per cent and 
5.58 per cent, respectively.  Islamic bond funds however, did particularly well registering 
an average of 1.79 per cent return per annum for the five-year period as compared to 
negative 0.12 per cent losses per annum by conventional bond funds.  The impressive 
performance is in line with the substantial increase in the total Islamic bond issues during 
2001 to 2005 period as highlighted previously in Figure 4.4. 
 
 Interestingly, Islamic-based small-capitalised stock funds are the best performing 
funds on a short-term basis with its 3-month and 6-month cumulative return of 20.08 per 
cent and 21.20 per cent, respectively, far exceeding the performance of other types of unit 
trust funds either Islamic or conventional.  The encouraging performance is partly due to 
the strong recovery in the Malaysian stock market during the first six months of 2009 
after a rather dismal performance in 2008.  The superior performance of small-capitalised 
stock funds suggests the presence of the small firm effect since the majority of Shariah-
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compliant equities as well as the FTSE BM Emas Index and the FTSE BM 2
nd
 Board 
Index component stocks comprise of companies with small market capitalisation, albeit it 
may be rather premature to attribute the strong performance to the small firm effect at this 
stage without further analysis.  It is worth mentioning here that Islamic-based small-
capitalised stocks funds substaintially outperformed the Second Board Index in all period 
classifications.    Notwithstanding however, the actual data also indicates the high 
volatility of smaller size stocks as reflected from the substantial one-year cumulative 
losses incurred by the Islamic small-capitalised stocks funds and the small stocks index 
funds.   On the other hand, the data indicates the stability of investment in large 
capitalised stocks as reflected from the consistent performance of the KLCI as well as the 
Malaysia equity and Malaysia Islamic equity funds.   
 
  Table 4.5: Average Performance of Malaysian Unit Trust Funds as at 9
th
 of July, 2009
 
 Source:  The Edge Malaysia, 13
th
 July 2009  
 
 
4.4.3 Conclusion 
 
Islamic-based investment has achieved remarkable performance over the past three 
decades while operating in parallel with conventional investment instruments.  The 
success was encouraged by the strong commitment of the Malaysian Government 
particularly through the SC in line with the aspiration to make Malaysia a global Islamic 
Fund Name Cumulative Performance 5-yr 
annual 
return
3-mths 6-mths 1-year 3-years 5-years
Malaysia Equity 15.08 16.77 -3.27 24.15 29.60 4.96
Malaysia Islamic Equity 11.75 14.27 -4.71 19.37 17.06 2.92
Malaysia Equity – Smallcap:
KLSE Composite Index
FTSE BM Emas Index
FTSE BM 2nd Board
16.10
19.09
17.84
15.95
19.29
18.13
-6.50
-5.32
-12.10
15.14
18.90
-24.25
24.78
22.82
-40.11
4.53
4.20
-9.75
Malaysia Islamic Equity – Smallcap 20.08 21.20 -7.58 29.36 -5.42 -1.13
Malaysia Bond 1.34 1.82 1.82 6.99 8.35 -0.12
Malaysia Islamic Bond 1.20 2.14 5.53 7.95 9.84 1.79
Malaysia Money Market 0.34 -3.38 -2.61 -0.57 -0.37 -0.42
Malaysia Islamic Money Market 0.16 0.47 1.13 1.87 -4.24 -5.58
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financial centre, the continuous support from general investors towards Islamic banking 
and finance products and services, as well as the appeal of Shariah-compliant investment 
instruments as viable alternatives to conventional investment instruments.  Malaysia 
currently has a fully developed Islamic capital market which gives investors a wider 
menu of Shariah-approved investment instruments including equities, derivatives, bonds 
(Sukuk), insurance (takaful) and unit trust funds.  The impressive growth of the Islamic 
fund industry has attracted interest not only among the general investing public but also 
among academia to examine the true performance of Islamic funds.  This chapter 
continues with a review of past literatures analysing the performance of conventional and 
Islamic-based unit trust funds in Malaysia. 
 
 
4.5 SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE PERFORMANCE OF 
CONVENTIONAL AND ISLAMIC UNIT TRUST FUNDS IN MALAYSIA  
  
Unit trust or mutual fund is arguably one of the most popular types of investment 
instrument in Malaysia, particularly among investors with limited investment skills or 
resources.  This is reflected by Table 4.3 (page 94) which reveals that both conventional 
and Islamic unit trust funds have enjoyed considerable growth over the last four years.  In 
view of the large subscription by general investors and the sizeable amount of capital 
pooled by fund management companies, several studies have attempted to analyse the 
funds‟ return performance in order to determine the investment worthiness and to gauge 
fund managers‟ investment skills and ability to generate above-the-market return for unit 
trust investors.  However, since unit trust funds are considered a relatively new 
investment, past studies especially those undertaken in the 1990s are rather scarce whilst 
the robustness of their findings is constrained by the lack of sample of unit trust funds and 
price data. Nevertheless, some empirical studies pertaining to the performance of both the 
conventional and Islamic unit trust funds in Malaysia are discussed below.  
 
 
4.5.1 Review of the Performance of Conventional and Islamic Unit Trust Funds in 
Malaysia 
   
It is somewhat unfortunate when the majority of past studies such as by Chuan (1995), 
Shamser and Annuar (1995), Taib and Isa (2007), Huson Joher (2007) and Low (2007) 
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have concluded that Malaysian unit trust funds were generally unable to outperform both 
the market portfolio and the simple buy-and-hold strategy.  Their sample consists of a 
group of local unit trust funds whilst return is calculated using monthly NAV for each 
fund in their sample.  Most studies employed the three traditional portfolio performance 
measures namely the Sharpe Index, the Treynor Index and the Jensen-alpha Index, or 
their variants to evaluate the funds‟ performance.  Apart from the underperformance, the 
studies also argued that fund managers are generally lacking both the timing and stock 
selection skills and are unable to forecast security prices accurately which, in turn, 
significantly contributes to the poor performance.  A recent study by Low and Noor 
Azlan (2007) analysing the relationship between index fund and the tracked market 
benchmark index (KLCI) found that the long-run price performance of the index funds 
does not co-integrate with the KLCI performance.  In view that index funds are 
supposedly designed to replicate the performance of the KLCI to give their investors the 
opportunity to enjoy similar return to the market, their finding is rather unfortunate since 
it raises serious concern on whether index funds can actually generate return performance 
comparable to the market index. 
 
 Contrary to the negative findings, a study by Leong and Lian (1998) on 34 unit 
trust funds found that the funds produce superior return when compared with the market 
portfolio, thus suggesting that fund managers are able to outperform the market.  They 
employed the three standard portfolio valuation models and used weekly, instead of 
monthly, NAV covering period from January 1991 to June 1997.  The reduced time gap 
in the weekly NAV allows them to better capture price fluctuations, and hence, the 
volatility of the return.  However, although their finding provides some relief over the 
concern over fund managers‟ ability, being the only study that stands in favour of fund 
managers amid the abundant studies that claim otherwise, the outcome cannot be used to 
generalise the entire industry.  In addition, their finding that growth funds are the best 
performing funds as compared to both income and balanced funds signifies that there 
could be selection bias favouring growth-oriented funds since the 1991 to 1997 period 
coincides with the stock market rally in which growth stocks are the main beneficiaries.  
Amid the controversial issue surrounding fund managers‟ performance and ability, Chuan 
(1995), Leong and Lian (1998), and Huson Joher (2007) claimed that most unit trust 
funds have a well diversified portfolio, indicating that fund managers do possess some 
valuable investment skill, nonetheless.   
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 Unfortunately, with regards to Islamic unit trust funds‟ performance, again past 
literatures are rather scarce.  A casual observation on the performance of the key 
benchmark index of several world major stock markets including the Kuala Lumpur 
Composite Index (KLCI) for Malaysia during 1993 to 1996 period led Wilson (1997) to 
conclude that ethical funds and Islamic funds are not much different from conventional 
funds.  Empirical studies by Yaacob and Yakob (2002), Shah Zaidi et al. (2004) and 
Abdullah et al. (2007) found that Islamic funds outperformed the market portfolio or 
conventional funds.  A recent study by Nik Muhammad and Mokhtar (2008) however, 
refuted the claim of Islamic funds‟ superiority.  The contradictory findings are attributed 
to the different methodology and samples used by past studies.  Islamic funds are able to 
outperform the overall market when Shariah index is used as proxy for the market 
portfolio, but instead, underperform the overall market when the KLCI is used as the 
proxy for the market portfolio.  In brief, the analysis by Yaacob and Yakob (2002) is 
based on the performance of a simulated optimal portfolio consisting of five stocks 
created from a sample of 156 Shariah-approved securities using the Cut-Off Rate Model 
by Elton et al. (1976) with the data comprises of daily closing prices from April 1999 to 
October 2001.  Shah Zaidi et al. (2004) compared the performance of 12 Islamic unit trust 
funds against two benchmark indices namely the KLCI and the KL Shariah Index 
(KLSI)
13
 using weekly closing prices from May 1999 to May 2003.  Abdullah et al. 
(2007) analysed the performance of 65 funds including 14 Islamic funds using the NAV 
returns calculated on a monthly basis whilst the time period is divided into three sub-
periods to account for the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  Nik Muhammad and Mokhtar 
(2008) examined the weekly NAV return of nine Islamic equity funds against the market 
portfolio represented by the KLSI from 2002 to 2006 period.   
  
 Collectively, the differences in methodologies enabled the issue of Islamic funds‟ 
performance to be investigated from various perspectives that help enhance the credibility 
of the findings.   Another significant observation is the tendency of Islamic funds to 
outperform conventional funds only during a bearish market period but underperform 
during a bullish market period as reported by Abdullah et al. (2007) and Abdullah et al. 
(2002; cited in Nik Muhammad and Mokhtar, 2008).  The superior performance of 
Islamic funds particularly during a market downtrend reflects the quality of Shariah-
                                                 
13
 The KLSI index was replaced by the FBMSHA index as the official stock market index that tracks the 
performance of Shariah-approved stocks listed on Bursa Malaysia.  
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compliant funds‟ component stocks which normally avoid companies with excessive 
leverage or companies involved in finance, banking, gambling or other prohibitive 
activities which are sensitive to the changes in economic and business cycles.  
Nevertheless, in view of the limited number of studies that have been undertaken in the 
past, it may be premature to conclude that Islamic funds are superior to conventional or 
market portfolio, or otherwise. 
 
4.5.2 Conclusion 
 
Past studies have reported that the return of professionally managed, conventional unit 
trust funds are generally below the market portfolio or even lower than a naïve portfolio 
that adopts the simple buy-and-hold investment strategy.  The dismal performance led to 
the claim that fund managers generally are lacking the crucial investment skills 
particularly the stock selection and market timing abilities. While the findings of fund 
managers‟ underperformance are consistent with the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
theory, it casts serious doubt to the real benefit of investing in unit trust funds as it 
appears that professional fund managers, who have been entrusted to manage the pooled 
funds wisely in order to generate sufficient profit for unit holders in return for a 
considerable sum of fund management fees, have failed to fulfil their essential duty.  
Meanwhile, findings on Islamic funds‟ performance are deemed inconclusive in view of 
the limited numbers of studies conducted in the past whilst their contradictory findings is 
attributed to the difference in methodology employed by each study particularly with 
regards to the benchmark index used as proxy for the market portfolio as well as the 
sample funds and the price dataset.  Therefore, further studies are required in order to 
improve the quality of the analysis of Islamic funds‟ performance, in particular. 
 
 
4.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter has discussed at length the growth and the development of the Malaysian 
stock market and Islamic-based investment in Malaysia.  Historical data pertaining to the 
performance of the stock market both in terms of the value and trading volume as well as 
the market size and the number of listed companies clearly indicate that the Malaysian 
stock market has performed exceptionally well. The majority of the significant 
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developments in the Malaysian stock market however, were implemented during the last 
two decades particularly after the 1993 market rally.  The two most significant 
developments are the establishment of the Securities Commission (SC) in 1993, and the 
consolidation of various exchange bourses into a single trade exchange for Malaysia 
followed by the demutualization exercise of Bursa Malaysia Berhad.  The establishment 
of the SC has greatly improved the market supervision and regulation, thus increasing 
efficiency and ensuring an orderly development of the Malaysian capital market in line 
with the objectives of the Malaysian Capital Market Masterplan (CMP).  The merger of 
all the different exchanges that trade in equity, commodity, financial derivatives and 
offshore market operations into a single trade exchange under the Bursa Malaysia Berhad 
has further strengthened the Malaysian capital market.  Despite the high market volatility 
as witnessed during and after the crisis period, the Malaysian stock market has 
nevertheless remained an attractive investment avenue for individual and institutional 
investors as well as for fund raising activities for both private and public sectors.   
 
 As Malaysia aspired to become a global Islamic financial and investment centre, 
the country has positioned itself well by developing a comprehensive infrastructure and 
regulatory framework to cater for the needs of Islamic finance and banking industry.  
Malaysia is among several countries that have a dual financial system in which its Islamic 
finance and banking system is running successfully in parallel with conventional finance 
and banking.  Hence, a devout Muslim investor in the country who seeks Shariah-
compliant investment instruments shall be able to find halal-approved investment 
instruments including equities, commodity, derivatives, fixed income securities, insurance 
or other Shariah-approved financial products that suits his/her investment needs without 
much difficulty.  In this regards, Bursa Malaysia offers a wide range of Shariah-
compliant instruments such as listed companies‟ common stocks, commodity futures 
derivatives, and Sukuk bond issues.  
 
 The success of the Malaysian stock market has provided the impetus for the 
growth and development of the unit trust fund industry in the country.  At present, unit 
trust investment is arguably one of the most popular types of investment instruments 
particularly among investors with limited investment resources or skills.  Ironically 
however, past studies have revealed that the performance of professionally managed 
conventional unit trust funds in general is below the market return or even lower than the 
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naïve buy-and-hold strategy.  This finding, although consistent with the EMH theory, 
raises serious doubt about the true value of investment in unit trust funds, and the actual 
capability of the fund managers who have been entrusted to manage the funds.  Similar 
studies on the performance of Islamic unit trust funds in Malaysia found that Islamic 
funds could outperform the market when the Shariah index is used as proxy to the market 
portfolio instead of the KLCI.  However, when the KLCI is used to represent the market 
portfolio, Islamic funds underperform the market.  The different key benchmark indices 
used together with the limited number of studies conducted in the past and the differences 
in the sample and methodology employed by previous studies has contributed to 
inconsistencies in the findings related to Islamic funds‟ performance, thus rendering the 
findings to be rather inconclusive.  Therefore, a more comprehensive study is needed to 
further explore the issues pertaining to the characteristics and performance of Islamic 
funds, which this study endeavours to do.  The next chapter will explain the research 
methodology used in this study. 
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Chapter 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
It is reasonable to assume that the accuracy of the findings of a study depends heavily on 
how in-depth the research problems are investigated and how comprehensive the analysis 
is undertaken.  A thoroughly planned and well executed research would likely yield less 
dubious results that can be used to generate meaningful inferences and hence, reliable 
findings and conclusion. Therefore, realising the significance of a properly constructed 
research, this study endeavours to examine the issues related to Islamic funds‟ 
characteristics, operations and performance comprehensively by employing both 
quantitative and qualitative analytical tools.     
 
 This chapter elaborates the research methodology employed in this study. The 
chapter begins with a definition of selected terminologies used in this study that specify 
the intended scope of the analysis as well as a brief description of the levels of analysis 
involved.  Subsequently, the general plan of the study is explained in the research design 
followed by a discussion on the analysis framework in the research strategy section.  The 
chapter continues with elaboration of the two research methods used in this study, 
including the purpose of the methods, the research tools used, the research modelling and 
the data analysis approach.  The chapter then ends with a conclusion.        
 
 
5.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LEVEL OF ANALYSIS  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the primary purpose of this study is to investigate the return 
and risk characteristics of Islamic and conventional funds in order to identify the main 
factors that contribute to the differences between the performances of the two types of 
funds.  The study also attempts to examine the actual fund management practice and 
operation of Islamic funds as such input is expected to be highly valuable to this study.  
The findings are crucial in order to achieve the ultimate aim of this study which is to 
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contribute positively to the development of the Islamic fund industry by exploring the 
possibility of improving the assessment method of Islamic funds.  Two research 
methodologies are used in this study namely quantitative analysis and qualitative 
analysis.  For the quantitative analysis method, the scope of the analysis is focussed upon 
determining the salient features in return and risk characteristics of Islamic funds as 
compared to conventional funds.  The scope of the qualitative analysis method is confined 
to obtaining information from Islamic fund managers on issues pertaining to the 
operation, performance and valuation of Islamic funds.  To ensure that the study will 
remain within the scope so outlined, some of the important terminologies used in this 
study are explained below. 
 
 „Hypothetical portfolios‟ refers to three price-weighted portfolios, comprising 
entirely of the equities of Malaysian listed companies, which were created specifically for 
the purpose of this study.  The three hypothetical portfolios are: (1) „Conventional 
Portfolio‟ (acronym: CP) to represent conventional or unrestricted funds, of which, its 
component consists of both Shariah-compliant and non-Shariah-compliant stocks; (2) 
„Shariah-Approved Portfolio‟ (acronym: SAP) to represent Islamic funds, of which, its 
component comprises only  Shariah-compliant stocks; and, (3) „‟Non-Shariah-Approved 
Portfolio‟ (acronym: NSAP) to represent the haram or „sin‟ funds, of which, its 
component consists only haram (forbidden) stocks according to Islamic Shariah law.  
Each of the portfolios is divided into four sub-portfolios based on the size of their market 
capitalisation with the Group 1 portfolio (CP1, SAP1, NSAP1 series) comprising of 
stocks with the largest market capitalisation whilst the Group 4 portfolio (CP4, SAP4, 
NSAP4 series) consists of stocks with the smallest market capitalisation.  It is worth 
mentioning here that while both conventional and Islamic funds are readily available in 
the market, there is no equivalent of a „sin‟ fund available in Malaysia.  Therefore, the 
rationale of creating the NSAP portfolio is primarily for comparative analysis purposes.     
 
 „Shariah-compliant stocks‟ refers to Malaysian listed securities which are 
approved as halal (permissible) by the Shariah Advisory Board of the Securities 
Commission of Malaysia (the SC).  The study uses the Shariah-compliant list as at the 
28
th
 of November 2008 in which 855 stocks were endorsed as Shariah-compliant 
representing 87 per cent of the total 980 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia Securities 
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Berhad.  Throughout the study, the term „Shariah-compliant‟ is used interchangeably 
with „Shariah-approved‟ or „halal-approved‟ and carries similar meaning.   
 
 „Non-Shariah-compliant stocks‟ refers to Malaysian listed securities which are 
regarded as non-permissible or haram (forbidden) under the Islamic Shariah guidelines.   
Since the list of Shariah-compliant securities issued by the SC only shows halal-approved 
stocks, securities which are not included in the list are therefore considered as non-
Shariah-compliant stocks. Throughout the study, the term „non-Shariah-compliant‟ is 
used interchangeably with „non-Shariah-approved‟ or „non-halal‟ and carries similar 
meaning. 
 
 „Fund management companies‟ refers to the business entities that create and offer 
unit trust or mutual funds to the general investing public.  The fund management 
companies are responsible for the operations of the funds including the administrative, 
marketing and fund management activities of the funds.   
 
 „Fund/investment managers‟ refers to portfolio managers whom are regarded as 
the investment experts hired by fund management companies to manage the pooled 
investment based on certain portfolio mandates.  The fund/investment managers may be 
hired internally or outsourced from a third party offering such services.   
 
  In general, there are seven levels of analysis which summarise the entire research 
process of this study as depicted in Figure 5.1 (page 113).  The basic theoretical 
framework of this study is derived based on the modern portfolio theory and the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH).  The modern portfolio theory provides the framework for 
portfolio construction and valuation including portfolio return and risk analysis as well as 
portfolio performance measurement.  The EMH theory provides the framework for 
discussion of fund performance and fund managers‟ investment skills.  Based on inputs 
from literature review on modern portfolio theory and past empirical studies related to the 
performance of mutual funds, several hypotheses are made and the research methodology 
is formulated to address the hypotheses.  In this respect, the main advantage of this study 
which makes it essentially different from previous studies is the combination of both the 
quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis methods.  The quantitative analysis will give 
the general profile of Islamic funds‟ return and risk characteristics whilst the qualitative 
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analysis, undertaken primarily to complement the quantitative analysis, will reveal the 
current Islamic funds‟ operation as well as Islamic fund managers‟ perception towards the 
impact of Shariah restrictions on Islamic funds‟ performance. By conceptualising the 
results obtained from both the quantitative and qualitative analysis methods, it would be 
possible to derive more comprehensive findings than ever achieved by previous studies, 
and paves the way for the formulation of practical means of improving the assessment 
method of Islamic funds. This rare combination will further enhance the reliability of the 
findings of this study and avoid the study from merely becoming a pure academic 
exercise.  
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Figure 5.1: Levels of Analysis 
 
  
Source: Adapted from Asutay (2007)  
4. Hypotheses 
5. Methodology 
1. This study revolves around the modern portfolio theory which has 
benefited largely from the work of Markowitz (1952), in 
particular. 
2. This study is based on the concepts of the modern portfolio theory 
and the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) by Fama (1970). The 
concept of modern portfolio theory provides the framework for the 
construction and valuation of hypothetical portfolios whilst the 
concept of EMH provides a framework for discussion of Islamic 
fund performance and Islamic fund managers‟ investment skills. 
3. The general theoretical framework of this study is derived based 
on the already established theories pertaining to portfolio 
performance valuation including the traditional portfolio 
performance measures developed by Treynor (1965), Sharpe 
(1966) and Jensen (1968), as well as studies on fund‟s 
characteristics such as the firm size effect by Banz (1981) and fund 
managers‟ abilities e.g. Jensen (1969), Elton et al. (1996), and 
Avramov and Wermers (2006). 
4. At this stage, several testable hypotheses were developed as the 
basis for empirical analysis to enhance the reliability and 
robustness of the findings and inferences made from the analysis. 
The hypotheses include the test for the difference in the portfolios‟ 
mean return, correlation test and the test for the impact of firm 
sizes on portfolio return.   
5. This study is designed as a case study analysis with both 
descriptive and explorative research purposes, and uses a 
triangulation technique of data analysis of Collis and Hussey 
(2003) and Saunders et al. (2007). The research strategy is based 
on the hypothetico-deductive approach that combined both the 
deductive and inductive methods adapted from Sekaran (2003). 
The study is conducted in Malaysia and employs hypothetical 
portfolios based on studies by Yaacob and Yakob (2002), Cowell 
(2002) and Abd Karim and Kogid (2004). 
6. Two research methods are used namely quantitative analysis, 
which involves econometric modelling and empirical analysis on 
hypothetical portfolios created from secondary data of historical 
stock prices and other time series data, as well as qualitative 
analysis based on primary data obtained from semi-structured 
interviews with Islamic fund managers in Malaysia. 
7. The empirical results will give a comprehensive description on the 
return and risk characteristics of Islamic and conventional funds.  
The qualitative analysis will reveal the actual operation of Islamic 
funds and Islamic fund managers‟ perception towards the impact 
of Shariah restrictions on Islamic funds‟ performance.  Results 
from the quantitative and qualitative may shed a light of how to 
improve the assessment method of Islamic funds.  
1. Model 
2. Concepts 
3. Theories 
6. Methods 
7. Findings 
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5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
Research design is basically a general plan on how research questions will be answered. It 
outlines the objectives of a study clearly, specifies the sources of data to be collected, and 
identifies possible constraints that may affect the study (Saunders et al., 2007: 131).  
According to Sekaran (2003), the purpose of a study can either be based on exploratory, 
descriptive, hypothesis testing, or case study analysis.  Saunders et al. (2007) however, 
propose a narrower classification when they state that a research purpose can either be 
exploratory, descriptive or explanatory, or any combination of the three. 
 
 In brief, a descriptive study is suitable if the purpose of the study is to give an 
accurate description of the profile or characteristics of variables of interest in a situation.  
A descriptive study is different from an exploratory study in terms of the depth of the 
research since the latter is particularly useful if there is only limited knowledge or 
research available on the subject matter, issue or phenomenon of interest.  Therefore, an 
exploratory study involves extensive preliminary works in order to build a comprehensive 
understanding on what is going on followed by rigorous analysis to explain and address 
the impending situation.  A hypothesis testing study or explanatory study is mainly 
interested in explaining the interaction or causal relationships among differing variables 
in a situation that contribute to, or result in, a particular observed phenomenon or 
outcomes.  On the other hand, a case study is a research approach that involves an “in-
depth, contextual analyses of matters relating to similar situations in other organisations” 
(Sekaran, 2003: 125).  This strategy is especially useful if a researcher intends to obtain 
greater insights and understanding of the context of a particular situation. To achieve this, 
a case study essentially requires the use of a specific data collection and analysis process 
called triangulation technique in which data is obtained from multiple sources using 
various data collection techniques to ensure that the data accurately reveals what the 
researcher thinks it reveals (Saunders et al., 2007: 139). 
 
 A triangulation technique is defined by Denzin (1970: 297, cited in Collis and 
Hussey, 2003: 78) as “the combination of methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon”.  He argued that if several researchers studied the same phenomenon using 
various different methods but eventually arrived at similar conclusions, such results 
would have greater validity and reliability as compared to results obtained using a single 
 115 
research method.  There are four types of triangulation technique identified by Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1991, cited in Collis and Hussey, 2003: 78) namely data 
triangulation, investigator triangulation, methodological triangulation and triangulation 
of theories.   
 
 Based on the nature of the subject interest being investigated and the research 
process involved, this study can be categorised as a case study analysis with a combined 
research purpose of descriptive, exploratory and analytical.  Taking Malaysia as the case 
study, this study attempts to determine the return and risk characteristics of both Islamic 
and conventional investment portfolios, and examines the actual practice of Islamic fund 
management, particularly the handling of Islamic funds, the impact of Shariah-
compliance requirements on securities selection as well as operational costs, and the 
current valuation methods used by Islamic fund managers to measure Islamic fund 
performance. To enhance the robustness of the analysis, this study employs data 
triangulation and methodological triangulation techniques since two types of data will be 
collected at different times and from different sources namely time series data (historical 
stock prices) and primary data (semi-structured interviews) whilst two types of analyses 
will be undertaken to examine the data namely quantitative analysis and qualitative 
analysis, respectively.  This chapter continues with the research strategy of this study in 
the following section. 
 
 
5.4 RESEARCH STRATEGY  
 
For a study that involves the use of a specific theory, there are two types of research 
strategy that can be employed either singly or collectively, namely deductive process and 
inductive process.  Collis and Hussey (2003: 15) define deductive research as “a study in 
which a conceptual and theoretical structure is developed and then tested by empirical 
observation; thus particular instances are deduced from general inferences” whilst 
inductive research is defined as “a study in which theory is developed from observation of 
empirical reality; thus general inferences are induced from particular instances”. Saunders 
et al. (2007: 117) provide a concise explanation on the basic processes involved in the 
two research strategies. They state that a deductive approach begins with a theory or 
hypothesis being developed first followed by designing a research strategy suitable for 
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testing the hypothesis, whilst an inductive approach requires data to be collected first and 
subsequently a theory or hypothesis is developed based upon the analysis on the data.  
Therefore, the main difference between the two approaches is basically on how a theory 
or hypothesis is arrived at and how the data is treated.  Although a research strategy may 
be classified into the two philosophical approaches, the different classification has no 
significant meaning since neither approach can actually be considered as superior to the 
other.  In this respect, Saunders et al. (2007: 117) wrote: 
 
Insofar as it is useful to attach these research approaches to the different research 
philosophies, deduction owes more to positivism and induction to interpretivism, 
although we believe that such labelling is potentially misleading and of no real 
practical value. 
  
Therefore, the selection of either strategy is not mutually exclusive but depends on 
research questions or subject matter being investigated.  In fact, as argued by Saunders et 
al. (2007), it would be more beneficial for a researcher to integrate both the deductive and 
inductive approaches within the same piece of research rather than to choose and adopt 
any single strategy rigidly due to the sophisticated and research methodological 
complexity of this study.  Hence, this study intends to use both strategies by adopting the 
seven-step process known as hypothetico-deductive method explained in Sekaran (2003) 
as shown in Figure 5.2.  It is rather clear from the figure that the method uses an inductive 
research approach at the early stage of the study to gain better understanding on the 
subject of interest but draws its conclusion by using a deductive approach at the end of 
the research process.   
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Figure 5.2: The Hypothetico-Deductive Method of this Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Sekaran (2003: 29) 
 
 
A brief explanation on how each of the seven steps in the hypothetico-deductive method 
is applied in this study is presented as follows: 
 
5.4.1 Observation 
 
As elaborated in the previous chapters, this study is stimulated by the tremendous growth 
of Islamic finance and banking industry in the global market, in general, and in Malaysia, 
in particular.  One segment of the industry which has benefited largely from the 
increasing demand for Islamic-based financial products and services is the Islamic unit 
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trust or mutual fund.  In addition to religious reasons, the growth of the Islamic fund 
industry is also encouraged by a greater awareness towards ethical or socially responsible 
investment.  Despite the continuing investors‟ interest however, there is evidence from 
published data and empirical studies that return on Islamic funds is generally lower than 
conventional funds and the market index.  The underperformance is argued to be caused 
by Shariah restrictions on securities selection that render Islamic portfolio to become sub-
optimal, and hence, unable to outperform conventional portfolio or the market index.  The 
other argument states that Shariah-compliance requirements brings an additional cost to 
Islamic funds, thus resulting in relatively lower return which makes it difficult for Islamic 
funds to outperform conventional funds.  However, although there may be some 
credibility to the arguments, there are other reasons that may contribute to Islamic funds‟ 
underperformance such as fund managers‟ skills or misspecification error in the 
traditional portfolio performance valuation models used to evaluate Islamic funds.  Since 
the standard models do not give due consideration to the disadvantages of Islamic funds, 
any valuation based on the traditional models may produce a biased result against Islamic 
funds.  Therefore, on the back of this observation, the study was conceived with the 
purpose to examine the return and risk characteristics as well as the operations of Islamic 
funds in the hope that better understanding of the funds will pave the way for devising 
new assessment method for Islamic funds.     
 
5.4.2 Preliminary Information Gathering 
  
To provide a solid understanding on issues surrounding Islamic funds‟ performance, 
preliminary information related to the modern portfolio theory, relevant statistical data 
pertaining to Malaysian unit trust and stock market industry, and findings from previous 
empirical studies on the performance of conventional, ethical as well as Islamic funds was 
obtained.  The bulk of the information came from literature reviews, statistical 
publications from various authorised sources such as the Bank Negara Malaysia (the 
Central Bank of Malaysia), the SC, the Federation of Investment Managers Malaysia 
(formerly known as Federation of Malaysian Unit Trust Managers), unit trust fund 
management companies as well as finance-related magazines and newspapers as has been 
explained in great detail in Chapter 2 to Chapter 4 previously.  In general, previous 
findings of Islamic funds‟ performance have shown rather mixed results but studies 
undertaken in Malaysia indicate that such analysis is also sensitive to the benchmark used 
 119 
as proxy for the market portfolio.  In addition, past studies have conveniently employed 
the traditional risk-adjusted portfolio performance measures, namely the Sharpe Index, 
the Treynor Index and the Jensen-alpha Index, which are used widely in the valuation of 
conventional funds without giving due consideration to the disadvantages of Islamic 
funds caused by various Shariah-compliance requirements.  In doing so, past studies have 
deliberately ignored the uniqueness of Islamic funds and the fact that Islamic funds would 
have different investment philosophies than conventional funds.   
 
 The information gathered indicates that there is a strong case that makes this study 
worth pursuing.  Two reasons may be cited here: First, Islamic funds are clearly in a 
disadvantaged position when their performance is compared directly with conventional 
funds.  Therefore, further study is needed to investigate the portfolio composition of 
Islamic funds which has a direct impact on the performance of the funds.  Secondly, this 
study will contribute positively to the development of the Islamic fund industry 
particularly by enriching the body of knowledge of Islamic fund management and 
assessment technique.  It is also interesting to investigate why past studies as well as 
Islamic fund managers continue to rely on the traditional portfolio valuation models to the 
extent that no alternative measurement model that could cater for the specific needs of 
Islamic funds have ever been developed or attempted.      
 
5.4.3 Theory Formulation 
 
All the preliminary information collected in the previous process is then integrated in 
logical manner in order to identify the critical factors or issues in Islamic funds‟ 
performance.  In this study, the theoretical framework is derived based on the modern 
portfolio theory and the existing portfolio valuation methods to ensure that the 
methodologies used are in line with already established theory (this process is explained 
in Section 5.5.1 and Chapter 6 for the quantitative analysis method, and Section 5.5.2 for 
the qualitative analysis method).  Therefore, this study will not be suggesting any new 
theory, but rather, will utilise the existing established methods of fund performance 
valuation while it explores how Islamic funds‟ assessment can be improved.    
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5.4.4 Hypothesizing 
  
In this process, several hypotheses are generated to allow for statistical tests to be 
conducted in order to determine the robustness of the observed differences in the 
portfolios‟ performance and the relationship between Islamic-based portfolios with 
conventional portfolios and the market index.  The hypotheses generated are designed to 
test the difference in the mean return of the portfolios, their risk level, their return 
correlation, and whether the performance of the portfolios exhibits the firm size effect 
anomaly.       
 
5.4.5 Further Scientific Data Collection  
 
At this stage, a data triangulation technique involving the collection of two types of data 
is used.  Firstly, secondary data in the forms of historical stock prices and other related 
economic time series data were collected from the Datastream for the quantitative 
analysis method.  The data is used to construct the hypothetical Islamic and conventional 
portfolios from which their return and risk characteristics are identified and their 
performance analysed.  Secondly, primary data is collected through semi-structured 
interviews with Islamic fund managers in Malaysia to obtain inputs pertaining to the 
actual operation of Islamic funds and their perception towards several issues relating to 
Islamic funds‟ performance and valuation.    
 
5.4.6 Data Analysis 
 
A methodological triangulation technique is carried out involving two types of data 
analysis in this process namely quantitative analysis (for the secondary time series data) 
and qualitative analysis (for the primary data).  The quantitative analysis (to be explained 
in Chapter 7) involves both the descriptive analysis and regression analysis on the 
hypothetical portfolios‟ performance.  In addition, performance analysis using the 
traditional valuation models is also conducted to measure and rank the hypothetical 
portfolios‟ performance on a risk-adjusted basis.  For the qualitative analysis (to be 
explained in Chapter 8), the primary data obtained from semi-structured interviews is 
analysed using both the coding analysis and content analysis methods.  The coding 
analysis is used to analyse the interview transcripts whilst the content analysis is used to 
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analyse fund prospectuses, brochures, newsletters, magazines, newspapers and other 
relevant publications.   
 
5.4.7 Deduction 
  
This final step involves the interpretation of the meaning from results obtained from both 
the quantitative and qualitative data analyses to generate findings for the study.  At this 
stage, the empirical results from the quantitative analysis are used to make inferences on 
the general return and risk characteristics of Islamic and conventional funds.  Results 
from the qualitative analysis are used to determine the actual Islamic fund management 
practices particularly with regards to Islamic fund operation and performance valuation.  
All results obtained from the preliminary information, quantitative analysis and 
qualitative analysis are contextualised to allow an in-depth analysis of Islamic fund 
performance (this process is discussed in Chapter 9).  Based on the inferences made, the 
study attempts to propose a practical way to further improve the assessment method of 
Islamic funds.   
 
The seven-step process of hypothetico-deductive method described above has outlined the 
research strategy of this study.  The next section elaborates the research method of this 
study in greater detail.  
 
 
5.5 RESEARCH METHOD  
  
This study employs the methodological triangulation technique of data analysis in which 
two different analysis methods are used to analyse the two different data sets collected.  
The two methods are quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis.  Each method is 
discussed as follows.   
 
5.5.1 The Quantitative Analysis Method 
 
 
The main purpose of the quantitative analysis method is to determine the return and risk 
characteristics of Islamic funds and examine whether they are significantly different from 
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the return and risk characteristics of conventional funds.  The other purpose of the 
quantitative analysis is to investigate the performance trend of Islamic funds in 
comparison to conventional funds.  The research tool, modelling and data analysis 
techniques used in the quantitative analysis are discussed as follow. 
 
5.5.1.1 Research Tool in Quantitative Analysis Method  
 
The quantitative analysis is undertaken based on samples of three hypothetical portfolios 
specifically created for the purpose of this study.  Three groups of hypothetical portfolios 
were constructed, namely Conventional Portfolios (CP), Shariah-approved Portfolios 
(SAP), and Non-Shariah-approved Portfolios (NSAP), respectively.  For the purpose of 
this study, CP is regarded as the proxy for „conventional‟ or „unrestricted‟ funds since it 
invests in both Shariah-compliant and non-Shariah-compliant stocks, SAP represents 
Islamic funds as it contains only Shariah-compliant stocks whilst NSAP symbolises 
haram (forbidden) or „sin‟ funds since it comprises entirely of non-Shariah-compliant 
stocks.  The existing unit trust or mutual funds in Malaysia (including ethically-oriented 
funds) take the form of either CP or SAP but there is no funds equivalent to NSAP 
available in the Malaysian market as yet. Hypothetical portfolios or portfolio simulations 
have been used in past studies such as by Draper and Paudyal (1997), Cowell (2002), 
Yaacob and Yakob (2002) and Abd Karim and Kogid (2004).  The use of hypothetical 
portfolios offers several important advantages as compared to using actual funds as 
follows: 
 
(i)   All unit trust funds currently available in the market have been established based 
upon specific investment philosophies or objectives and managed by 
fund/investment managers appointed by fund management companies.  Therefore, 
there could be systematic bias in the observed performance of the actual unit trust 
funds since it will be difficult to ascertain whether any outperformance or 
underperformance of a fund was due to the fund‟s portfolio composition 
(provided, of course, that the securities in which the fund has invested in have 
been rightly chosen in line with the fund‟s stated investment objectives); or it may 
be attributed to the fund manager‟s superior investment and trading skills; or it 
may simply be due to the prevailing market condition as the fund is likely to 
perform favourably during a bullish stock market but perform badly during a 
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bearish stock market.  The hypothetical portfolios on the other hand, are not 
affected by this type of systematic bias, and since the portfolios are not subject to 
any specific, pre-stated investment objectives, it will be more feasible to identify 
the general characteristics of Islamic and conventional funds accurately which is 
almost impossible to determine if using the actual unit trust funds.  
 
(ii) Past studies based on actual unit trust funds have indicated that the performance of 
the actual funds is generally less encouraging.  This is supported by casual 
observation on the market price of the actual unit trust funds which shows that the 
current NAV for the majority of the funds is below their original NAV at the time 
of their launching, unfortunately.  Taken as a whole, this implies that any fund 
performance analysis made by using the actual unit trust funds may result in 
below-average performance which may create unnecessary prejudice to the future 
outcome of the study. The use of hypothetical portfolios however, will not suffer 
from such prejudice.   
 
(iii) There are various types of unit trust funds for both conventional and Islamic funds 
available in the market.  In addition, there are other complications resulting from 
cross relationship of funds such as one fund management company may have 
several funds launched under its umbrella or a situation in which a 
fund/investment manager is responsible for several unit trust funds belonging to 
different fund management companies albeit in a different proportion.  Another 
tricky situation that needs to be dealt with if employing actual unit trust funds is 
possible differences in ownership structure as some funds belong to private fund 
management companies whilst others belong to government-backed fund 
management companies.  The different ownership structures may have a direct 
impact on the funds‟ cost structure, investment philosophy or fund management 
strategy, and ultimately, the funds‟ return performance.  For instance, casual 
observation indicates that, based on their current NAV, unit trust funds managed 
by private fund management companies performed better than unit trust funds 
managed by state-owned fund management companies.  Such diversity makes it 
rather difficult to create a proper sampling in order to make meaningful 
comparison or to set a benchmark for a performance standard.  Such complexities 
however, do not affect the hypothetical portfolios.  
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 The quantitative analysis method begins with the collection of time series data 
comprising yearly historical stock prices of all Malaysian listed companies, the 
benchmark Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI), the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Shariah 
Index (FBMSHA), the Malaysian 12-months Treasury bills (T-bills) rates as proxy for 
risk-free rate investment instrument, and 12-months mudharabah investment account 
rates as proxy for Islamic risk-free investment instrument.   The share prices and stock 
market indices were obtained from Datastream whilst the interest rates were sourced 
from Bank Negara Malaysia, the country‟s central bank.  The Shariah-compliant stocks 
were then identified based on the list of Shariah-approved securities provided by the 
Shariah Advisory Council of the Securities Commission (SACSC) issued on the 28
th
 of 
November 2008 consisting of 855 stocks or 87 per cent from the total of 980 securities 
listed on Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.   
 
 As mentioned previously, the three hypothetical portfolios used in this study 
namely CP, SAP and NSAP would represent conventional funds, Islamic funds, and „sin‟ 
funds, respectively.  The three different classifications of hypothetical portfolios are 
required to determine if any salient features exist in each of the portfolio‟s traits that 
influence their performance and to establish the cross relationship and performance 
ranking between the different types of portfolios.  The hypothetical portfolios are 
constructed based on the following assumptions: 
 
(i) The hypothetical portfolios invest only in a single type of asset, namely Malaysian 
listed companies‟ stocks and buy one unit of share of every listed company.  
Therefore, the hypothetical portfolios are essentially equity-based, price-weighted 
portfolios.  Only one stock is held for every company throughout the period and 
no additional stock arising from rights issue, bonus issue, private placement or 
stock split for the same company is considered.   
 
(ii) There is no limit on the size of investment of the hypothetical portfolios and the 
portfolios could buy any stock regardless of the price level.  For a newly listed 
stock, it will be purchased in the subsequent year after it was listed and included 
immediately in the portfolio.  For example, a company which is listed in 2005 will 
be purchased in 2006 and its first return is calculated based on the difference 
between the closing price in 2007 and the closing price in 2006.  This will ensure 
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price stability and accurately reflect a holding period return for a full calendar 
year. 
 
(iii) The hypothetical portfolios adopt the buy-and-hold policy, in which, the portfolios 
will continue to keep all stocks in their portfolio from the first year they were 
purchased until the end of the study period.  The total holding or study period is 
19 years from end-1989 to end-2008.   
 
(iv) Return of the hypothetical portfolios is calculated on a year-to-year basis.  The 
hypothetical portfolios generate their return either through capital appreciation or 
yearly share price difference.  There is no other type of return including dividend 
income earned by the hypothetical portfolios.  Trading is based on the simple buy 
and sells activities.  No short selling, derivatives trading or hedging activities are 
allowed. 
 
(v) A stock in which its listing status is subjected to a prolonged period of trading 
suspension or is revoked during a particular year will be withdrawn or excluded 
from the hypothetical portfolios beginning from the year its listing status is 
suspended or invalidated.  However, the stock can be readmitted into the 
hypothetical portfolio in the following year after its listing status has been 
officially reinstated.  
 
(vi) The Shariah-compliant status of each stock is determined based on the list of 
Shariah-approved securities issued by the SC‟s Shariah Advisory Council issued 
on the 28
th
 of November 2008.  Shariah-compliant securities are marked as „H‟ 
whilst non-Shariah-compliant securities are denoted by „N‟. 
 
 For each of the three portfolio groupings, five sub-portfolios were created based 
on the size of their end-of-year market capitalisation.  The portfolios are the All Stocks 
(comprising of all companies in the portfolio) as well as Portfolio 1 (comprising the 
largest size stocks) to Portfolio 4 (comprising the smallest size stocks).  The classification 
based on the size of the market capitalisation is required to investigate the presence of the 
firm size effect which has been extensively documented in past studies pertaining to 
portfolio performance analysis.  The range of the size of market capitalisation for each 
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sub-portfolio is determined based on the percentile method generated by SPSS. Table 5.1 
summarises the time period and the number of securities in each portfolio. 
 
Table 5.1: Summary of Time Period and the Number of the Portfolios’ Component Stocks 
Hypothetical 
Portfolios 
All Period 
s.1990 – e.2008 
Market Rally  
s.1990 – e.1997 
Crisis Period 
s.1998 – e.2003 
Post Crisis  
s.2004 – e.2008 
 
CP 
- All Stocks 
- Portfolio 1 (CP1) 
- Portfolio 2 (CP2) 
- Portfolio 3 (CP3) 
- Portfolio 4 (CP4) 
 
  
 s.159  -  e.890 
 s.39 - e.223 
 s.40 - e.219 
 s.40 - e.230 
 s.40 - e.218 
 
 
s.159  -  e.401 
 s.39 - e.94 
 s.40 - e.98 
 s.40 - e.99 
 s.40 - e.110 
 
 
s.472  -  e.631 
s.118 - e.152 
s.118 - e.156 
s.118 - e.157 
s.118 - e.166 
 
 
s.688  -  e.890 
s.170 - e.223 
s.168 - e.219 
s.171 - e.230 
s.179 - e.218 
 
SAP 
- All Stocks 
- Portfolio 1 (SAP1) 
- Portfolio 2 (SAP2) 
- Portfolio 3 (SAP3) 
- Portfolio 4 (SAP4) 
 
 
 s.109 - e.770 
 s.27 - e.192 
 s.27 - e.188 
 s.28 - e.200 
 s.27 - e.190 
 
 
s.109 - e.314 
 s.27 - e.79 
 s.27 - e.78 
 s.28 - e.79 
 s.27 - e.78 
 
 
s.377 - e.525 
 s.94 - e.127 
 s.94 - e.128 
 s.95 - e.130 
 s.94 - e.140 
 
 
s.579 - e.770 
s.141 - e.192 
s.142 - e.188 
s.144 - e.200 
s.152 - e.190 
 
NSAP 
- All Stocks 
- Portfolio 1 (NSAP1) 
- Portfolio 2 (NSAP2) 
- Portfolio 3 (NSAP3) 
- Portfolio 4 (NSAP4) 
 
 
 s.50 - e.120 
 s.12 - e.30 
 s.12 - e.30 
 s.13 - e.30 
 s.13 - e.30 
 
 
 s.50 - e.87 
 s.12 - e.21 
 s.12 - e.22 
 s.13 - e.22 
 s.13 - e.22 
 
 
 s.95 - e.106 
 s.23 - e.25 
 s.24 - e.28 
 s.24 - e.27 
 s.24 - e.26 
 
 
s.109 - e.120 
 s.26 - e.30 
 s.29 - e.30 
 s.27 - e.30 
 s.27 - e.30 
Note:  
CP  -  Conventional Portfolio 
SAP  -  Shariah-Approved Portfolio (SAP) 
NSAP  -  Non-Shariah-Approved Portfolio 
s - Starts of period 
e - End of period 
 
 
 The yearly historical data used for this study covers a period as far back as end-
December 1989 to end-December 2008.  The extended period enables for a more 
thorough analysis on the performance of the hypothetical portfolios in relation to the 
continuous changing in business and economic cycles as well as fluctuation in the 
Malaysian stock market performance throughout the period under review.  To properly 
investigate the impact of the broader economic performance, the study period is divided 
into four sub-periods namely All Period (1990 to 2008), Market Rally Period (1990 to 
1997), Crisis Period (1998 to 2003) and Post Crisis Period (2004 to 2008).  With 
exception of All Period which tracks the price performance of the stocks throughout the 
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study period, the cut-off-year for the other sub-periods is determined based on a major 
turning point in the KLCI performance which normally indicates the beginning or the 
ending of a specific trading trend.  The KLCI‟s performance trend is shown in Figure 5.3 
and Figure 5.4.  
 
 Figure 5.3 reveals that the KLCI moved in an upward trend albeit a volatile 
performance throughout 1989 to 2008 period.  The sub-period classification was 
determined based on the significant turning point in the market trend.  For the market 
rally period, the trend started in 1989 (the first collected data) and ended in 1997 
following the sharp drop in share prices which was triggered by the Asian financial crisis.  
The crisis period occurred between 1998 to 2003 during which the performance was 
volatile amid poor market sentiment and intermittent technical corrections.  The market 
staged an impressive rebound in 2003–2004 period which marked the start of the post-
crisis period and continue to move in an upward trend until 2008 (the end of the study 
period).  Figure 5.4 shows the benchmark‟s return performance superimposed on its price 
movement.  The figure indicates that the KLCI‟s return exhibits a strong mean reversion 
trend throughout the period.  Consistent with its volatile prices, return of the benchmark 
index swing wildly during the market rally and crisis periods.  This is reflected from the 
huge fluctuation between the losses of 16.4 per cent to profits of 56.6 per cent in the 
market rally period, and between the losses of 52.5 per cent to gains of 61.5 per cent in 
the crisis period.  During the post crisis period however, the return was between 2.7 per 
cent to 29.8 per cent levels which is deemed moderate as compared to the previous two 
sub-periods.  This indicates that the KLCI‟s prices moved in a rather smaller price trading 
band during the post-crisis period which implies a positive but rather cautious stocks 
market sentiment. 
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 Figure 5.3: KLCI Yearly Performance 1989 to 2008 
 
 Source: Datastream 
 
 
 
 Figure 5.4: KLCI Price and Return Performance 1989 to 2008 
 
 Source: Datastream 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
P
ri
ce
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
Year
R
et
u
rn
Price Return
 Crisis Period Post Crisis PeriodMarket Rally Period
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
1000 
1200 
1400 
1600 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Year 
Price 
 Crisis Period  Post Crisis Period Market Rally Period 
 129 
5.5.1.2 Data Analysis and Modelling of Quantitative Analysis Method 
 
The data analysis can be categorised into two parts: (1) descriptive analysis which is 
undertaken to examine the portfolios‟ return and risk characteristics; and, (2) analysis of 
portfolio performance and ranking based on the traditional risk-adjusted portfolio 
valuation models.  To investigate the statistical significance of the portfolios‟ return and 
risk, four types of hypothesis testing are conducted namely the test of mean difference (t-
test), the correlation test, the test of firm size effect and the test of portfolio volatility 
(beta).  The analysis of portfolio performance and ranking is based on the Sharpe Index, 
the Treynor Index and the Jensen-alpha Index. The empirical models used in the 
quantitative analysis are explained in Chapter 6.  
 
 The quantitative analysis starts with descriptive analysis of each of the 
hypothetical portfolios.  The descriptive analysis can be used to identify the general return 
and risk characteristics of the hypothetical portfolios with a main objective to determine 
whether there is any significant difference between the return and risk of Islamic 
portfolios as compared to the return and risk of conventional portfolios.  Briefly, this is 
achieved by testing the following groups of null hypotheses: 
 
(i) Return of Shariah-Approved Portfolio (SAP) is not significantly different from 
return of Conventional Portfolio (CP) and Non-Shariah-Approved Portfolio 
(NSAP); 
 
(ii) Return of Shariah-Approved Portfolio (SAP) is not correlated with return of 
Conventional Portfolio (CP) and Non-Shariah-Approved Portfolio (NSAP); 
 
(iii) Return of large-capitalised stocks portfolio is not significantly different from 
return of small-capitalised stocks portfolio.   
 
 With regards to portfolio performance, this study employs the three standard 
portfolio performance measures namely the Sharpe Index, the Treynor Index and the 
Jensen-alpha Index as outlined in Chapter 6.  For the purpose of calculating the Jensen-
alpha Index, this study uses the FBMSHA as the proxy for Islamic market portfolios 
when evaluating Islamic portfolios (SAP) in view that the Shariah index is arguably a 
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better proxy for the universe of halal-approved (permissible) securities as compared to 
conventional index.  The FBMSHA was launched on the 22
nd
 of January 2007 and 
replaced the KL Shariah Index (KLSI) as the official Shariah index of Bursa Malaysia.  
Regression results obtained from the analysis are used to make inference on the 
performance of Islamic portfolios vis-à-vis conventional portfolios and to generate a 
portfolio ranking. The overall process involved in the quantitative analysis including the 
hypothesis testing, interpretation and analysis of the results is discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
 
5.5.2 The Qualitative Analysis Method 
 
The qualitative analysis attempts to explore the Islamic fund management operation and 
valuation practice.  The analysis is primarily intended to complement the quantitative 
analysis by providing inputs from industry practitioners.  For the current operation of 
Islamic funds, the qualitative analysis is particularly focused on the administration of 
Islamic funds, the structure and investment practice of the funds as well as the Shariah 
supervision and monitoring activities.  With regards to Islamic fund performance and 
valuation, the qualitative analysis focuses on the securities selection, return performance, 
the impact of Shariah-compliance requirements and fund valuation techniques used by 
Islamic fund managers.  Inputs obtained from industry practitioners especially those 
related to their actual handling and experience in managing Islamic funds are very 
valuable to this study as the inputs can be used to validate the findings from quantitative 
analysis.  More importantly, some issues pertaining to Islamic fund operation such as the 
Shariah-related matters and fund valuation techniques cannot be explained by merely 
analysing the secondary data. Instead, such information can only be acquired by directly 
approaching Islamic fund managers, this is what the qualitative analysis of this study is 
designed for.  By triangulating the findings from quantitative analysis, qualitative analysis 
and literature reviews, a comprehensive study pertaining to Islamic fund operation and 
performance offering credible conclusions can be accomplished. 
 
5.5.2.1 Research Tool in Qualitative Analysis Method 
 
This analysis uses semi-structured, face-to-face interview with Islamic fund managers in 
Malaysia as its research tool.  By definition, an interview is “a purposeful discussion 
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between two or more people” (Kahn and Cannell, 1957) that “involves questioning or 
discussing issues with people” (Blaxter et al., 2001).   The face-to-face interview method 
is selected in favour of other research tools such as telephone interview, survey 
questionnaire, personal observation or internet survey due to the following reasons: 
 
(i) Face-to-face interviews provide direct access with the main subject of this 
research namely the Islamic fund managers themselves; 
 
(ii) Since the issue being investigated in this study i.e. Islamic fund management 
operation involves a broad and practical area, a more flexible format of questions 
or style of questioning is needed in order that the issue can be discussed more 
thoroughly with the respondents.  This includes the ability to modify, alter or vary 
the interview questions immediately (during the interview session) or to post 
impromptu questions in order to adapt to the fund managers‟ responses. A survey 
using questionnaires, for example, is lacking this important flexibility; 
 
(iii) The interview will allow the researcher to detect nonverbal cues by observing the 
body language of the respondents when they answer a particular question.  The 
body language is crucial since it may contain implicit messages that may not be 
revealed verbally.  Therefore, equal emphasis should be given to respondents‟ 
verbal answers and body language in order that any meaningful message 
conveyed through the body language may be revealed.  This is to ensure that the 
respondents are replying to each of the interview questions clearly and honestly, 
thus minimising any potential errors when the message from the response is 
extracted and analysed later.  Surveys using telephone interviews or internet, for 
example, are unable to detect body language; and 
 
(iv) The interview will help to minimise potential errors resulting from 
misunderstanding or confusion as it allows the researcher to repeat, rephrase or 
elucidate an interview question whenever necessary in order to ensure that the 
respondents fully understand the question.  This gives a significant advantage of 
interview over other modes of data gathering methods such as questionnaires or 
internet survey.  
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 The interview process begins with the selection of all 23 fund management 
companies offering Islamic funds in Malaysia out of the total 31 fund management 
companies operating in the country as at 30
th
 of June 2008.  The list of the fund 
management companies is given in Appendix II.   Considering that the population of 
Islamic fund managers is relatively known and geographically they are mainly 
concentrated in Kuala Lumpur, it is therefore possible to conduct face-to-face interviews 
involving the majority of the fund managers.  Out of the 23 respondents identified and 
sent a letter inviting them to take part in the interview, eight agreed initially for an 
interview but only seven interviews were eventually conducted after one respondent 
withdrew at the very last minute before the interview was scheduled to start.  This gives a 
success rate of 30 per cent which is deemed acceptable in view of the limited number of 
fund management companies willing to take part in the study.  It is worth mentioning here 
that all the seven funds managers are Muslims hence there is potential bias in the 
outcomes of the interview analysis. Unfortunately, every attempt to obtain participation 
from non-Muslim fund managers was unsuccessful.   
 
 Prior to conducting the interview, respondents were reminded of the purpose of 
the interview and were given the assurance that information obtained from the interview 
would be treated as confidential and be used solely for the purpose of the study.  In 
addition, the confidentiality terms were also stated in the invitation letter and again at the 
opening of the interview session where respondents were reminded of their right not to 
answer any questions in unlikely event that the question may have compromised their 
interest.  Therefore, it is assumed that the willingness of respondents to take part in the 
interview signified their consent. Each interview session lasted between 45 to 90 minutes 
and the interview was recorded using a digital audio tape recorder to ensure that 
respondents‟ replies were fully recorded and to help minimise any possible loss of data 
during data transcription process.  To safeguard the respondents‟ interest, the full 
transcript of the interviews was kept confidential and coded.    
 
5.5.2.2 Data Analysis and Modelling in Qualitative Analysis Method 
 
The design of the research model of the qualitative analysis is based on the analysis 
framework adapted from Sekaran (2003) which depicts the relationship between 
independent variables and dependent variables.  Three types of variable categories have 
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been identified namely dependent variables, independent variables and moderating 
variables. The relationship between all the variables is illustrated in Figure 5.5 whilst a 
detailed explanation is given in Chapter 8. 
 
Figure 5.5: Typical Relationship Structure in Fund Management Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5.5 suggests that Islamic funds‟ performance and valuation techniques are 
dependent variables, for which, the outcomes are subject to Islamic fund managers‟ skills 
as the independent variables.  During the process however, the eventual performance of 
Islamic funds and the selection of the fund valuation techniques is influenced by several 
factors inherent in the individual fund‟s characteristics (such as its investment objectives, 
types and structure), the fund manager‟s traits (including their experience, skills, 
education background and decision making process), the readily available performance 
measurement techniques and some other external factors (such as the impact of business 
and economic cycles, political stability and changes in government regulations).  
Therefore, the qualitative analysis attempts to investigate some important issues related to 
the creation and structure of the existing Islamic funds, to tripartite contract between unit 
holders–fund management companies–fund/investment managers, the handling and 
management of Islamic funds especially with regards to Shariah-related matters and the 
role of the Shariah advisory board, factors affecting the performance of Islamic funds 
particularly the impact of Shariah-compliance requirements and comparison between the 
Source: Adapted from Sekaran (2003: 92) 
 
Fund Management Company 
Fund/Investment Managers 
Unit Trust Fund Investors/Unit Holders 
(A) Subscription (B) Pooled Investment 
(D) Performance (E) Return 
(C)  
Moderating Factors: 
Fund‟s characteristics. 
Fund managers‟ skills. 
Valuation methods used. 
External factors. 
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performance of Islamic funds against conventional funds as well as the performance 
valuation techniques used by Islamic fund managers.  
 
 Since this study uses a semi-structured interview approach, a set of questions was 
prepared to stimulate discussion and to ensure that the interview process would collect all 
information required and would not go astray.  A sample of the interview questions is 
shown in Appendix III.  In brief, the respondents were asked specific questions revolving 
around the following issues: 
 
(i) The corporate structure of their fund management company, their investment 
products especially unit trust or mutual funds and the pool of their investment 
personnel entrusted to manage the funds; 
 
(ii) The characteristics and operation of their Islamic funds including the securities 
selection approach, investment strategy and the use of derivative financial 
instruments such as options and futures contract;  
 
(iii) Their perception towards the impact of Shariah-compliance requirements on 
Islamic funds‟ operations and performance as well as their investment decision 
making process; 
 
(iv) The performance of their Islamic funds against the performance of other 
conventional unit trust funds (if any) under their management, and their level of 
satisfaction over the performance of their Islamic unit trust funds after taking into 
consideration the restrictions imposed by the Shariah-compliance requirements; 
 
(v) The valuation methods of their Islamic funds‟ performance and their perception of 
the compatibility of the traditional portfolio performance measures for evaluating 
Islamic funds; and 
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(vi)  Their opinion on whether their Islamic funds require an alternative valuation 
model which is distinctively different from the traditional portfolio models and 
will supposedly produce an unbiased and accurate measure of performance for 
Islamic funds.  
 
 The qualitative data in the forms of interview transcripts or observation notes 
obtained from the interviews were analysed using the coding analysis based on the 
template analysis method. Saunders et al. (2007) provide a brief explanation on the steps 
involved in template analysis.  Under this approach, the original data is transcribed into 
written format which is then categorised and coded for analysis to identify and explore 
themes, patterns and relationships. The template approach allows categories and codes to 
be arranged hierarchically in order of their importance to help in the analytical process.  
The key themes or topics that made up the main interview questions are given the higher-
order codes (written in upper case) whilst subsidiary questions which indicate the depth 
of the analysis are given lower-order codes (shown in lower case and italic script).  One 
of the main advantages of this method is its flexibility whereby all the codes in the 
template hierarchy would be subjected to further revision or modification, if necessary, as 
the analysis progresses until all the data have been coded and analysed carefully.  
According to King (2004, cited in Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2007: 497) a template 
may be revised or altered to facilitate for insertion of a new code not previously 
identified; to delete an existing code that is not needed; to change the scope of a code; or 
to reclassify a code into a different category.  The other step involved in this analysis is 
unitising data which is essentially a verification process to justify for any template 
modification and to examine its implications towards the previous coding activity.  The 
method utilises both deductive and inductive approaches to qualitative analysis since the 
method requires „codes‟ to be determined prior to the analysis which will then be revised 
or amended as data are being collected and analysed.     
 
 Template analysis is chosen for this study since the method has the following 
advantages over the other qualitative data analysis techniques:  
 
(i) As compared to a more rigid method such as repertory grid technique or grounded 
theory approach, template analysis offers more flexibility in the sense that the 
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coding units can be modified or altered, whenever necessary, as the analysis 
progresses.  This will help ensure that no data will be discarded and every aspect 
of newly observed phenomena or new issues discovered during the data analysis 
will be treated appropriately.  Hence, the findings deduced from this analysis 
would have high reliability and validity;   
 
(ii) Considering the time constraint and budget limitation of this study, template 
analysis is arguably a convenient and straightforward analysis technique since it 
does not necessarily require the use of computer aided qualitative data analysis 
software (CAQDAS) (which is needed particularly when using the cognitive 
mapping method), or the use of complicated drawings or matrices (such as when 
using the data display and analysis approach), or require an extensive data 
collection before the data analysis can be carried out (as in the case of analytic 
induction method); and 
 
(iii) Since semi-structured interviews are expected to generate a huge amount of verbal 
transcripts, the analysis method chosen to analyse data from the interviews must 
be able to deal with the non-standardised or complex responses contained in the 
verbal transcripts.  In this respect, a template analysis method is preferred to a 
content analysis approach as the latter is more suitable for analysis involving 
public documents, meeting minutes, reports and other forms of archival data.    
 
The overall process involved in the qualitative analysis including the coding procedure, 
interpretation and analysis of the results is discussed in Chapter 8. 
 
 
5.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
To summarise, this chapter explains the research methodology used in this study.  Based 
on the nature of the subject of interest being investigated and the research processes 
involved, this study can be categorised as a case study analysis with combined research 
purposes of both the descriptive and exploratory.  The research strategy used in this study 
combined both the deductive and inductive approaches through a seven-step process 
known as the hypothetico-deductive method.  This study employs a data triangulation 
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technique in which two types of data are collected at different times and from different 
sources namely secondary time series data (historical stock prices and other economic 
data) and primary data (obtained from semi-structured interview).  Due to the availability 
of two different types of data, the data analysis is undertaken using a methodological 
triangulation technique whereby the secondary data is analysed using quantitative 
analysis whilst the primary data is analysed using qualitative analysis.   
 
 The quantitative analysis is undertaken based on samples of three hypothetical 
portfolios comprising entirely of Malaysian listed companies‟ stocks. The analysis 
attempts to determine the distinguishing features in return and risk characteristics of 
Islamic funds that make them significantly different from their conventional counterparts.  
The method is also used to investigate the performance of Islamic funds as compared to 
conventional funds by using the traditional portfolio performance measures namely the 
Sharpe Index, the Treynor Index and the Jensen-alpha Index.  The qualitative analysis is 
undertaken to complement the quantitative analysis in order to gain greater insight into 
the issues pertaining to Islamic funds handling by fund management companies.  The 
analysis attempts to explore the actual operation of Islamic funds especially with regards 
to Shariah-compliance requirements and examines the existing Islamic funds‟ 
performance.  Also, of a particular interest to this study is how the Islamic funds‟ 
performance and valuation are influenced by other factors such as fund characteristics, 
fund managers‟ capabilities and other external factors beyond the control of the Islamic 
fund managers.  The analysis employed semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with a 
sample of seven respondents comprising Islamic fund/investment managers and the data 
was analysed using the coding analysis of the template analysis method.   
 
 The results obtained from both the quantitative and qualitative analyses are used 
for making inferences on the general characteristics of Islamic funds and the current fund 
valuation techniques used by fund managers.  Subsequently, the inferences are used in the 
deduction process to determine whether Islamic funds require an alternative portfolio 
valuation model which is distinctly different from the existing risk-adjusted traditional 
portfolio valuation models.  At the very least, the study intends to propose a practical 
approach to improve the assessment of Islamic funds.  Hence, it is expected that this 
study will contribute positively to the development of the Islamic fund industry.  The next 
chapter elaborates the empirical modelling used in this study.   
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Chapter 6 
 
EMPIRICAL MODELLING IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE 
HYPOTHETICAL PORTFOLIOS’ PERFORMANCE  
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
This chapter elaborates the empirical modelling used in the quantitative analysis of the 
hypothetical portfolios‟ performance.  The primary aims of the quantitative analysis are to 
thoroughly examine the return and risk characteristics of the hypothetical portfolios and 
to measure their performance.  The analysis intends to identify the distinguishing features 
in the return and risk characteristics between Islamic portfolios and conventional 
portfolios and makes a comparative performance between returns of the two types of 
portfolio.         
 
The chapter is organised as follows. The research hypotheses and the statistical 
method used to test the hypotheses are explained in the next section.  The section starts 
with the explanation of the methodologies used in the descriptive analysis particularly the 
methods of calculating the portfolios‟ return and risk followed by correlation test, the 
analysis of the firm size effect, the portfolio volatility analysis and the portfolio 
performance valuation analysis.  The chapter then ends with a conclusion.    
 
 
6.2 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY  
 
This section explains the research hypotheses and methodology used to test the 
hypotheses. The descriptive analysis starts with the basic calculations of the return and 
risk of individual assets and the hypothetical portfolios.  From the outcomes of the 
descriptive analysis, further analysis can be carried out to achieve the first objective of the 
study.    
  
  
 139 
6.2.1 Analysis of the Hypothetical Portfolios’ Return and Risk   
 
The hypothetical portfolios‟ return and risk characteristics are determined from the 
descriptive analysis which examines their return and risk levels, their return correlation 
and their beta.  The method of calculating the return and risk of individual stock is 
explained in virtually all finance and investment related textbooks such as Fabozzi 
(1999), Haugen (2001), Elton et al. (2003), Strong (2003), Levy and Post (2005), Reilly 
and Brown (2006), and Bodie et al. (2008). For the purpose of this study, the individual 
stock‟s return in the hypothetical portfolios is calculated as follows: 
 
                     (6.1) 
 
where Rit is the return of stock i at time t. The risk of an individual stock is computed 
based on its variance and standard deviation.  The variance is essentially the measure of 
dispersion of the actual value (price) around the mean, or average, value. The variance is 
estimated as follows: 
     
  
             
  
    (6.2) 
 
where   
  is the variance of the stock i, Pi is the probability of the return, and     is the 
mean return of the stock i.  If all possible outcomes are equally likely, Equation 6.2 can 
be rewritten as: 
 
  
  
 
 
         
  
       (6.3) 
 
where n is the number of observation or the sample size. The standard deviation of the 
individual stock is the square root of the variance as follows: 
 
      
   (6.4) 
 
Another proxy for risk is the beta which measure the risk of an asset relative to that of the 
market portfolio (Levy and Post, 2005: 882).  Specifically, beta is defined as “a 
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standardized measure of systematic risk based upon an asset‟s covariance with the market 
portfolio” (Reilly and Brown, 2006: 1133) which can be calculated as follows:   
 
   
           
  
  (6.5) 
where    is the beta of the asset i,     is the return on asset i,     is the return on the 
market portfolio, and   
  is the variance of the market returns.  The covariance of the 
returns between two assets, i and j, is computed as follows: 
 
                          (6.6) 
 
Under the CAPM theory, the beta of an individual asset can be estimated from the 
security market line (SML) of the single index model as follows:
14
 
 
                   (6.7) 
 
where     is the return on the asset i in time t,    is an intercept term,    is the beta for the 
asset i,     is the return of the market portfolio at time t, and     is the error term. 
 
 Having calculated the return and risk of individual assets, the analysis proceeded 
with the calculation of the return and risk of the hypothetical portfolios.  Returns of the 
hypothetical portfolios were computed based on the weighted average of the returns of 
their component stocks as follows:  
 
       
 
                     (6.8)  
 
where    is the portfolio return,    is the weighted average of the asset i in the portfolio, 
and    is the return on the asset i.  The total portfolio weights must add up to one, or 100 
per cent: 
 
       
 
          (6.9) 
                                                 
14
 For reference, see Strong (2003:161) and Reilly and Brown (2006: 244) 
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Unlike the portfolio return which can be calculated based on the return contribution of the 
individual assets in the portfolio, the calculation of portfolio variance is not 
straightforward.  Instead, the portfolio variance is calculated based on the weighted 
average of the individual asset‟s variance and the correlation between the returns of all 
assets in the portfolio.  The variance for an n-security portfolio can be estimated as 
follows:
15
 
 
  
               
 
   
 
        (6.10) 
 
where   
  is the portfolio variance,      is the portfolio weight for each of the assets i and 
j,     is the correlation coefficient (to be explained in Section 6.2.3) between asset i and 
asset j, and      is the standard deviation of the assets i and j, respectively. The portfolio 
standard deviation therefore, is computed as follows: 
 
        (6.11) 
 
 However, for the purpose of this study, the portfolio risk is estimated based on the 
beta of the hypothetical portfolios.   This method is chosen because of its practicality and 
simplicity as compared to the method proposed by the Markowitz (1952) model which 
calculates portfolio beta based on the covariance matrix containing the pair-wise 
comparison of all stocks in a portfolio as in Equation 6.10.  For instance, to calculate the 
beta for the hypothetical portfolio CP which has a total of 890 stocks in 2008 will require 
the computation of 395,605 pair-wise covariances to estimate the portfolio variance for 
that year alone!
16
 Due to the limited resources, such voluminous calculation is not 
practical for this study as it may easily expose the study to error in the process of 
calculating all the hypothetical portfolios‟ beta. Alternatively, Strong (2003: 134), Levy 
and Post (2005: 246), Reilly and Brown (2006: 219), and Bodie et al. (2008: 320) suggest 
that portfolio beta can be estimated using the single index model as per Equation 6.7 since 
by comparing all securities in the portfolio to a similar benchmark value, the single index 
model could provide an indication of how the securities in the portfolio would behave 
relative to each other.  As a result, to calculate the portfolio beta for CP requires only 890 
                                                 
15
 See Strong (2003: 128-131) 
16
 The estimated number of pair-wise covariances needed is calculated by: (n
2
 – n)/2 
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betas against 395,605 pair-wise covariances needed if using the Markowitz model. Under 
this approach, the portfolio beta is computed based on the weighted average of the 
component betas as follows: 
 
        
 
    (6.12) 
 
 
6.2.2 Analysis of the Difference in the Portfolios’ Mean Return  
 
The purpose of the analysis is to determine whether the difference in the mean return of 
the hypothetical portfolios is statistically significant. The test is conducted using the 
paired sample t-test which compares mean returns of two portfolios.  The procedure of 
performing the paired sample t-test involving two assets X and Y is as follows:
17
 
 
           
 
    (6.13a) 
 
           
 
    (6.13b) 
 
where    is the mean value for X and    is the mean value for Y,    is the weight for case 
i, and W is the sum of the weights.  The difference, D, between the two means is:  
 
          (6.14) 
 
The standard error, SD, of the difference is: 
 
        
     
          (6.15) 
 
where   
  and   
  are the variances of asset X and Y whilst     is the covariance between 
asset X and Y.   The t-statistics for equality of means is calculated as follows: 
 
       (6.16) 
 
                                                 
17
 Blalock (2006; cited in SPSS 15.0 Algorithms, pg. 677) 
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with (W-1) degrees of freedom and two-tailed significance level is used.  The analysis of 
the difference in the hypothetical portfolios‟ mean return involved the testing of the 
following null hypotheses:   
 
Ho1   :  The mean return of the Shariah-Approved Portfolio (SAP) is not 
significantly different from the mean return of the Conventional 
Portfolio (CP). 
 
Ho2   :  The mean return of the Shariah-Approved Portfolio (SAP) is not 
significantly different from the mean return of the Non-Shariah-
Approved Portfolio (NSAP). 
 
Ho3   :  The mean return of the Conventional Portfolio (CP) is not 
significantly different from the mean return of the Non-Shariah-
Approved Portfolio (NSAP). 
 
The paired sample t-tests are conducted for all portfolio sizes and sub-periods to see 
whether the observed difference in return performance based on the different portfolio 
sizes and sub-periods is statistically significant, or otherwise.  
 
 
6.2.3 Analysis of the Hypothetical Portfolios’ Return Correlation   
 
The purpose of the correlation analysis is to determine the relationship between returns of 
two assets or portfolios (i and j).  The correlation value is obtained by calculating the 
covariance of the two assets based on Equation 6.6 as follows: 
 
                          (6.17) 
 
Subsequently, the correlation coefficient,  , between the assets i and j can be estimated as 
follows:
18
 
 
    
     
    
  (6.18) 
 
                                                 
18
 For
 
reference, see Strong (2003:49) and Reilly and Brown (2006: 207-209) 
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The correlation coefficient take a value between −1 (perfect negative correlation) and +1 
(perfect positive correlation).  A +1 correlation coefficient implies that returns of the two 
assets are moving in the same linear direction whilst a −1 correlation signifies that returns 
of the two assets are moving in opposite directions meaning that when the return of one 
asset is higher than its mean, the return of the other asset will be lower than its mean albeit 
in comparable amount.  A zero correlation value indicates no correlation between returns 
of the two variables.   
 
 To determine the relationship between the hypothetical portfolio groups 
particularly on how one portfolio influence the performance of the other portfolios, 
correlation tests are conducted based on the following null hypotheses:  
 
Ho4  :  Return of the Shariah-Approved Portfolio (SAP) is not correlated 
with return of the Conventional Portfolio (CP). 
 
Ho5  : Return of the Shariah-Approved Portfolio (SAP) is not correlated 
with return of the Non-Shariah-Approved Portfolio (NSAP). 
 
Ho6   :  Return of the Conventional Portfolio (CP) is not correlated with 
return of the Non-Shariah-Approved Portfolio (NSAP). 
 
Ho7   :  Return of the Shariah-Approved Portfolio (SAP) is not correlated 
with return of the KLCI (KLCI). 
 
 
 The correlation analysis is also conducted for different portfolio sizes and sub-
periods to examine the impact of the different portfolio sizes and market conditions on the 
hypothetical portfolios‟ return correlation. For comparison purposes, correlation analysis 
using the Shariah-compliant stock market index (FBMSHA) is also conducted to examine 
the relationship between the Shariah-compliant index and the hypothetical portfolios as 
well as the benchmark KLCI by testing the following null hypotheses:       
 
Ho8  : Return of the FBMSHA is not correlated with return of the 
Conventional Portfolio (CP).   
 
H09  :  Return of the FBMSHA is not correlated with return of the 
Shariah-Approved Portfolio (SAP). 
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H09  :  Return of the FBMSHA is not correlated with return of the Non-
Shariah-Approved Portfolio (NSAP). 
 
H010  :  Return of the FBMSHA is not correlated with return of the KLCI. 
 
 
6.2.4 Analysis of the Impact of Different Portfolio Sizes on the Hypothetical 
Portfolios’ Return 
 
The primary aim of this analysis is to examine whether the Islamic-based portfolio, in 
particular, exhibits the firm size effect, or otherwise.  The presence of the firm size effect, 
in which return of a portfolio is influenced by the size of the market capitalisation of its 
component stocks, in ethical-based portfolio has been reported by Luther and Matatko 
(1994), Sparkes (1995), Gregory et al. (1997), Wilson (1997) and Scholtens (2005) based 
on their findings that ethical funds generally have a high concentration of investment in 
small-capitalised stocks. For the purpose of the study, all stocks in each of the 
hypothetical portfolios are grouped into four categories based on the size of their market 
capitalisation with Portfolio 1 representing stocks with the largest market capitalisation 
whilst Portfolio 4 comprises of stocks with the smallest market capitalisation. The 
analysis of the firm size effect is carried out using ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
model incorporating dummy variables as well as by regressing the hypothetical 
portfolios‟ return directly with the return from each category of market capitalisation in 
the portfolios.  Since the analysis involves time series data, the data were tested for their 
stationarity using the ADF unit root test prior to running the OLS regression.   
 
6.2.4.1 The ADF Unit Root Test 
 
The stationarity or unit root test is conducted using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) 
unit root test.  According to Pesaran and Pesaran (1997: 53, 212), Microfit computes two 
types of ADF test statistics each with and without a time trend.  For a model with no 
trends, the ADF test statistic is computed as the t-ratio of   in the ADF( ) regression as 
follows:     
 
                             
 
    (6.19a) 
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where            , and   is the order of augmentation of the test.  For a model with 
a trend, the pth order ADF test statistic is given by the t-ratio of   in the ADF regression: 
 
                                  
 
    (6.19b) 
 
where    is a linear time trend.  The null hypothesis of the test states that H0:   = 1 i.e. the 
time series has unit root (or, is nonstationary) against the alternative hypothesis of H1:   < 
1 i.e. the time series has no unit root (or, is stationary). 
 
6.2.4.2 Analysis of the Firm Size Effect  
 
The analysis of the firm size effect is undertaken based on the studies of stock market 
anomalies such as by Banz (1981), Draper and Paudyal (1997), and Abd Karim and 
Kogid (2004) as well as procedures of OLS regression analysis using dummy variables as 
explained by Gujarati (1999), Seddighi et al. (2000) and Asteriou and Hall (2007).  For 
the purpose of this study, the firm size effect is initially analysed using OLS regression 
model incorporating dummy variables as follows: 
 
Rit = β1 + β2D2it + β3D3it + β4D4it + uit (6.20) 
 
where Rit is the return of portfolio i at time t whilst the dummy variables take the 
following values: 
 
D1 =   
                                                                      
                                                                                                                     
  
 
D2 =    
                                                                     
                                                                                                                       
  
 
D3 =    
                                                                     
                                                                                                                  
  
 
D4 =    
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The intercept term, β1, represents the mean return for the large capitalised stocks while 
the coefficient β2, β3, and β4 of the dummy variables represents the difference between 
return of the large capitalised stocks portfolio with return of the medium, small and 
smallest- capitalised stocks portfolios, respectively. The null hypothesis assumes that all 
dummy variable coefficients are equal to zero.  Equation 6.20 indicates that not all four 
dummy variables are used in the regression.  This is to avoid the dummy variable trap 
which is a multicollinearity condition created by an exact linear relationship between the 
dummy variables and the constant β1 when all four dummy variables are used in the 
regression since D1 + D2 + D3 + D4 will always equal 1.  Therefore, the number of 
dummy variables used should always be one less than the total number of possible 
categories.
19
  In this case, only three categories of portfolio size will be used at any one 
regression. A positive dummy coefficient indicates that the respective portfolio has higher 
mean return than the large capitalised portfolio whilst a negative dummy coefficient 
implies that the respective portfolio has lower mean return than the large capitalised 
portfolio.  Hence, a negative dummy coefficient would provide evidence of size effect 
favouring large capitalised stocks.   
 
 The size effect is further analysed by directly regressing the hypothetical 
portfolios‟ return with return from different categories of equity size in the portfolios as 
follows:   
 
Rit = β1 + β2XLargest2it + β3XMedium3it + β4XSmall4it + β5XSmallest5it +  uit (6.21) 
 
where β2, β3, β4 and β5 represent the coefficient of return of the largest, medium, small 
and smallest size stocks, respectively.  Equation 6.21 will reveal the direct relationship 
between the total portfolios‟ return with return from their each categories of equity size.   
 
 
6.2.5 Analysis of the Hypothetical Portfolios’ Return Volatility  
 
The main objective of this analysis is to investigate the level of return volatility of the 
hypothetical portfolios, especially the Islamic-based portfolio. The analysis will give 
                                                 
19
 See Asteriou and Hall (2007: 193) 
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indication of the return volatility of Islamic-based portfolio relative to conventional 
portfolio.  For the purpose of this study, the return volatility of the hypothetical portfolios 
is measured by their beta calculated based on the single index regression model as per 
Equation 6.7. Taking the KLCI as proxy for the market return, the equation is rewritten as 
follows:
20
 
 
Rit = β1 + β2KLCI2it + uit (6.22) 
 
where the coefficient β2 represents the portfolio‟s beta relative to the market portfolio 
represented by the benchmark KLCI.  Since beta signifies the portfolio‟s volatility against 
the overall market, the beta is assumed to be influenced by the overall market condition 
hence different beta is expected for different market condition. 
 
 
6.2.6 Analysis of the Hypothetical Portfolios’ Risk-Adjusted Return Performance  
 
The purpose of this analysis is to examine the risk-adjusted return performance of the 
Islamic-based portfolio against the conventional portfolio.  This is achieved by measuring 
the hypothetical portfolios‟ performance using the traditional portfolio valuation models 
namely the Sharpe Index, the Treynor Index and the Jensen-alpha Index.  These models 
are chosen because the theories underlying the models have been well established whilst 
the models themselves have been subjected to rigorous empirical tests in the past.  The 
Sharpe Index and the Treynor Index are arguably the most popular risk-adjusted return 
valuation models amongst both practitioners and academics alike due to the simplicity of 
the models while the popularity of the Jensen-alpha Index is attributed to its direct 
application from the CAPM equilibrium. The traditional portfolio performance measures 
have been used in past studies on ethical fund performance such as by Sauer (1997), 
Mallin et al. (1995), Bello (2005), Kreander et al. (2005), Chong et al. (2006), Statman 
(2006) and Schröder (2007) as well as on Islamic fund performance such as by Yaacob 
and Yakob (2002), Shah Zaidi et al. (2004), Hussein and Omran (2005), and Abdullah et 
al. (2007).  Therefore, by using the same analytical approach, the results of this study can 
                                                 
20
 See Strong (2003: 134), Levy and Post (2005: 246), Reilly and Brown (2006: 219) and Bodie et al. 
(2008: 320) 
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be compared with the findings of similar studies undertaken in the past in a more 
meaningful fashion.   
 
 
6.2.6.1 The Sharpe Index 
 
Sharpe (1966) measures a portfolio‟s equity risk premium per unit of total risk as follows: 
 
Si = 
     
  
  (6.23) 
 
where    is the return of the portfolio,    is the risk free rate return as represented by the 
Malaysian T-Bills or the mudarabah investment rate for Shariah-compliant instrument, 
and σi is the portfolio‟s standard deviation or total risk. For a benchmark, the Sharpe 
Index uses a capital market line (CML) which is a straight line connecting a risk free rate 
instrument with the market portfolio (represented by the index).  If the CAPM theory 
holds, the CML will represent the set of all efficient portfolios.  Hence, a portfolio which 
lies above the CML is considered to outperform the market whilst a portfolio that lies 
below the CML is deemed to underperform the market.  The index is a pure value and a 
higher Sharpe Index is preferred over a lower Sharpe Index.    
 
 
6.2.6.2 The Treynor Index 
 
Treynor (1965) developed a portfolio performance measure which is similar to the Sharpe Index 
but uses the systematic risk or beta, βi, of the portfolio as the denominator instead of standard 
deviation.  The index measures a portfolio‟s equity risk premium per unit of systematic 
risk as follows:  
 
Ti = 
     
  
 (6.24)  
 
where    is the return of the portfolio,    is the risk free rate return as represented by the 
Malaysian T-Bills or the mudarabah investment rate for Shariah-compliant instrument, 
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and βi is the portfolio‟s beta or systematic risk.  For a benchmark, the Treynor Index uses 
a security market line (SML) which is a straight line connecting a risk free rate instrument 
with the market portfolio (represented by the index).  The CAPM states that the SML 
represents a linear relationship between the expected return of a portfolio and its beta.  If 
the CAPM theory holds, the SML will represent the set of all efficient portfolios.  Hence, 
a portfolio which lies above the SML is considered to outperform the market whilst a 
portfolio that lies below the SML is deemed to underperform the market.  The index is 
given in percentages and a higher Treynor Index is preferred over a lower Treynor Index.    
 
 
6.2.6.3 The Jensen-Alpha Index 
 
While the Sharpe Index and the Treynor Index can be used to rank a group of portfolios 
based on their historical performance, neither of the two measures however, is able to 
provide an indication of how much (in terms of percentage return) has a portfolio 
outperformed or underperformed its market index.  Hence, the other popular traditional 
portfolio performance measure that can do just that is the Jensen-alpha Index derived by 
Jensen (1968) based on the Capital Asset Pricing Theory (CAPM) as follows: 
 
Ji =                       (6.25) 
 
where    is the return of the portfolio,    is the return of the KLCI and    is the risk free 
rate return as represented by the Malaysian T-Bills or the mudarabah investment rate for 
Shariah-compliant instrument.  The αi indicates the difference between the portfolio‟s 
actual return [  ] and its expected return as predicted by the CAPM               .  
Since CAPM suggests that the excess return on the portfolio          and the excess 
return on the market portfolio         are directly related to the beta, βi, of the 
portfolio, a portfolio with a beta of zero should have an excess return of zero as well.  
Therefore, the constant term αj should be zero for the CAPM to be in equilibrium.  
However, if α is greater than zero, the expected return of the portfolio is larger than return 
anticipated by the CAPM equation, thus indicating an undervalued position.  Likewise, if 
αj is less than zero, the expected return of the portfolio is lower than return anticipated by 
the CAPM equation, thus implying an overvalued position.  Jensen (1968) argued that the 
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constant term αj in Equation 6.25 can be used to measure a portfolio‟s performance since 
a portfolio manager who possesses a superior stock selection skill will be able to select 
undervalued securities, thus enabling him to generate return consistently higher than 
return predicted by the beta.  In this instance, the alpha value in the equation would be 
positive. The index is given in percentages and, since a portfolio is said to be 
outperforming if the αi > 0, or otherwise, underperforming if the αi < 0, a higher Jensen-
alpha Index is preferred over a lower Jensen-alpha Index.    
 
 Despite the more intuitive meaning however, the Jensen-alpha index cannot be 
used to rank a group of portfolios in its original form.  Instead, to make the index 
appropriate for portfolio ranking purposes, the portfolio‟s Jensen-alpha Index should be 
divided with their portfolio beta in order to adjust the alpha for the differences in the 
systematic risk of the individual portfolios (Haslem, 2003: 252).  Therefore, if the betas 
of the portfolios are approximately the same, the portfolio ranking given by the adjusted 
Jensen-alpha Index will be similar to the ranking suggested by the original Jensen-alpha 
Index.  The adjusted Jensen-alpha Index is calculated as follows:  
 
Adj. Ji = 
  
  
 (6.26) 
 
 
6.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter has explained the statistical methods used in the quantitative analysis.  The 
ultimate aims of the quantitative analysis are to identify the salient features in the return 
and risk characteristics of Islamic funds in comparison to conventional funds, and to 
determine the performance of Islamic funds relative to conventional funds.   This is 
achieved through analysis of three hypothetical portfolios comprising entirely of 
Malaysian listed equities, namely Conventional Portfolio (CP), Shariah-Approved 
Portfolio (SAP) and Non-Shariah-Approved Portfolio (NSAP), which are created solely 
for the purpose of this study to represent the actual unit trust or mutual funds available in 
the market. The analysis begins with descriptive analysis which examines the general 
characteristics of the return and risk of the hypothetical portfolios. This is followed by in-
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depth analysis on the behaviour of the hypothetical portfolios‟ return in terms of their 
correlation, volatility and the impact of the different equity sizes on the hypothetical 
portfolios‟ return.  The final part of the quantitative analysis measures the performance of 
the hypothetical portfolios based on their risk-adjusted return using the three traditional 
portfolio performance valuation models.  Based on the research methodology employed 
by this study, it is obvious that the quantitative analysis is designed to investigate the 
structure and performance of Islamic funds thoroughly in order to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the behaviour of their return and risk performance.  The 
next chapter discusses the application of the statistical methods and the outcomes of the 
quantitative analysis.             
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Chapter 7 
 
EVALUATING THE PERFORMANCE OF 
CONVENTIONAL AND ISLAMIC-BASED INVESTMENT 
PORTFOLIOS IN MALAYSIA: QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS  
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
This chapter provides the discussion of the methods and results of the quantitative 
analysis undertaken in this study.  The primary objective of the quantitative analysis is to 
examine the return and risk characteristics of Islamic-based portfolio and to determine if 
the return and risk of Shariah-compliant portfolio is significantly different from the return 
and risk of conventional portfolio.  The analysis is based on a sample of three 
hypothetical portfolios, namely Conventional Portfolio (CP), Shariah-Approved Portfolio 
(SAP), and Non-Shariah-Approved Portfolio (NSAP), each comprising entirely of 
Malaysian listed equities. The construction of the portfolios is explained in Chapter 5.  
 
 This chapter is organised as follows.  First, the descriptive analysis of the 
characteristics and performance of each portfolio is discussed.  The chapter continues 
with empirical analysis of the portfolios‟ performance, in which, various statistical tests 
were conducted on the portfolios‟ return including test of mean return, correlation test, 
unit root test and regression analysis to investigate the firm size effect, volatility analysis, 
and valuation of portfolio performance and ranking based on risk-adjusted return. All 
findings from the descriptive and empirical analyses are discussed in the results 
discussion section, after which, the chapter ends with a conclusion.      
 
7.2 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF RETURN AND RISK 
CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF THE HYPOTHETICAL 
PORTFOLIOS  
 
This section provides the descriptive analysis of the performance of the hypothetical 
portfolios during the study period from 1990 to 2008.  The growth of the portfolios both 
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in terms of value and return as well as the number of securities in each portfolio is shown 
in Table 7.1 whilst Table 7.2 gives the statistical summary of the portfolios‟ performance.  
In general, the hypothetical portfolios‟ performance is in line with the performance of the 
benchmark Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) as depicted in Figure 4.1 previously 
(see page 85).  The investment value of the portfolios reached their highest level during 
the market rally period before succumbing to profit taking activities and the adverse 
impact from the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  Several structural and regulatory changes as 
well as improvements in trading rules and practices imposed by Bursa Malaysia brought 
stability to the stock market and hence, portfolio performance in the post-crisis period. 
 
 For Conventional Portfolio (CP), which in this study represents conventional or 
unrestricted funds that invest in both halal-approved and non-halal-approved securities, 
the number of stocks in the portfolio increased markedly from 159 stocks in 1990 to 890 
stocks in 2008.  The number of stocks in the Shariah-Approved Portfolio (SAP), which in 
this study represents Islamic-based or Shariah-compliant funds, rose substantially from 
109 stocks in 1990 to 770 stocks in 2008.  On the other hand, the number of stocks in the 
Non-Shariah-Approved Portfolio (NSAP), which in this study represents non-permissible 
(haram) or “sin” funds, increased moderately from 50 stocks to 120 stocks.  The 
portfolios‟ composition clearly indicates that, as at end-2008, Shariah-compliant stocks 
have overwhelmingly outnumbered non-Shariah-compliant stocks at a ratio of 6:1 based 
on the 770 stocks approved as halal against 120 stocks which are not.     
 
 Table 7.1 also reveals that the nominal value of the sample portfolios has 
fluctuated tremendously throughout the 19-year period, thus suggesting very volatile 
trading in the Malaysian stock market.  The portfolio value for both CP and SAP was 
impressively higher during the market rally period but at the end of the period eventually 
ended-up below their initial value.  The CP was originally valued at RM1776.39 (£1.00 = 
RM4.90, approximately) in 1990 but worth RM1384.98 in 2008.  Subsequently, its 
average value per stock reduced from RM11.17 to RM1.56.  The value of SAP also 
declined from RM1674.53 to RM1078.21 whilst its average value per stock dropped from 
RM15.36 to RM1.40.   On the contrary, portfolio value of NSAP increased from 
RM101.86 in 1990 to RM306.77 in 2008, resulting in the rise of its average per unit price 
from RM2.04 to RM2.56 during the period.   
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Table 7.1: Portfolio Performance, 1990-2008  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
PORTFOLIO VALUE (RM)
1 CP 1776.39 1626.43 1960.21 7113.79 17568.97 10797.01 5497.72 7363.11 2219.50 1539.98 2692.80 1110.55 1070.97 904.57 1219.71 1141.81 1044.27 1407.40 1384.98
N 159 169 193 230 260 299 357 401 472 534 555 574 609 631 688 759 830 890 890
%chg y-o-y -8.44 20.52 262.91 146.97 -38.55 -49.08 33.93 -69.86 -30.62 74.86 -58.76 -3.56 -15.54 34.84 -6.39 -8.54 34.77 -1.59
AVE 11.17 9.62 10.16 30.93 67.57 36.11 15.40 18.36 4.70 2.88 4.85 1.93 1.76 1.43 1.77 1.50 1.26 1.58 1.56
2 SAP 1674.53 1530.93 1859.72 6883.35 17034.40 10356.60 5024.25 6639.09 1943.55 1336.94 2338.42 907.56 857.42 718.06 956.95 875.59 802.39 1073.80 1078.21
N 109 116 133 163 186 222 277 314 377 435 456 471 503 525 579 645 714 770 770
%chg y-o-y -8.58 21.48 270.13 147.47 -39.20 -51.49 32.14 -70.73 -31.21 74.91 -61.19 -5.52 -16.25 33.27 -8.50 -8.36 33.83 0.41
AVE 15.36 13.20 13.98 42.23 91.58 46.65 18.14 21.14 5.16 3.07 5.13 1.93 1.70 1.37 1.65 1.36 1.12 1.39 1.40
3 NSAP 101.86 95.50 100.49 230.44 534.57 440.41 473.47 724.02 275.95 203.04 354.38 202.99 213.55 186.51 262.76 266.22 241.88 333.60 306.77
N 50 53 60 67 74 77 80 87 95 99 99 103 106 106 109 114 116 120 120
%chg y-o-y -6.24 5.23 129.32 131.98 -17.61 7.51 52.92 -61.89 -26.42 74.54 -42.72 5.20 -12.66 40.88 1.32 -9.14 37.92 -8.04
AVE 2.04 1.80 1.67 3.44 7.22 5.72 5.92 8.32 2.90 2.05 3.58 1.97 2.01 1.76 2.41 2.34 2.09 2.78 2.56
PORTFOLIO RETURN 
1 CP 0.4654 -0.0927 0.1630 1.3572 0.8986 -0.4840 -0.4437 0.3071 -1.1755 -0.3408 0.7663 -0.7327 -0.0094 -0.1282 0.3747 -0.0701 -0.0704 0.3357 0.0629
N 159 169 193 230 260 299 357 401 472 534 555 574 609 631 688 759 830 890 890
%chg y-o-y -119.93 -275.78 732.48 -33.79 -153.86 -8.33 -169.22 -482.71 -71.01 -324.85 -195.62 -98.72 1269.33 -392.28 -118.72 0.34 -576.97 -81.26
AVE 0.0029 -0.0005 0.0008 0.0059 0.0035 -0.0016 -0.0012 0.0008 -0.0025 -0.0006 0.0014 -0.0013 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0001
2 SAP 0.4521 -0.0951 0.1687 1.3893 0.8954 -0.4971 -0.4942 0.2954 -1.2188 -0.3444 0.7855 -0.7999 -0.0279 -0.1366 0.3763 -0.0944 -0.0712 0.3317 0.0809
N 109 116 133 163 186 222 277 314 377 435 456 471 503 525 579 645 714 770 770
%chg y-o-y -121.03 -277.42 723.35 -35.55 -155.52 -0.59 -159.78 -512.58 -71.74 -328.08 -201.82 -96.52 390.29 -375.53 -125.07 -24.49 -565.50 -75.61
AVE 0.0041 -0.0008 0.0013 0.0085 0.0048 -0.0022 -0.0018 0.0009 -0.0032 -0.0008 0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0001
3 NSAP 0.6841 -0.0549 0.0573 0.3972 1.0034 -0.1761 0.0919 0.4147 -0.8700 -0.3170 0.6393 -0.4327 0.0649 -0.0959 0.3687 0.0095 -0.0675 0.3485 -0.0004
N 50 53 60 67 74 77 80 87 95 99 99 103 106 106 109 114 116 120 120
%chg y-o-y -108.02 -204.45 592.81 152.62 -117.55 -152.22 351.01 -309.81 -63.56 -301.64 -167.68 -115.00 -247.82 -484.42 -97.42 -808.51 -616.53 -100.10
AVE 0.0137 -0.0010 0.0010 0.0059 0.0136 -0.0023 0.0011 0.0048 -0.0092 -0.0032 0.0065 -0.0042 0.0006 -0.0009 0.0034 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0029 0.0000
BENCHMARK RETURN
1 KLCI 0.4031 -0.0551 0.0681 0.0606 0.5661 -0.1643 0.1218 0.1562 -0.5246 -0.3182 0.6147 -0.3433 -0.0104 -0.0759 0.2983 0.0272 0.0275 0.2868 0.1069
%chg y-o-y -113.66 -223.57 -10.97 834.07 -129.02 -174.12 28.25 -435.84 -39.34 -293.19 -155.85 -96.97 629.16 -492.83 -90.87 0.83 944.48 -62.73
2 FBMESI -0.2026 0.0160 -0.0725 0.1817 0.0879 -0.0913 0.2352 0.1298 0.1989
%chg y-o-y -107.89 -553.81 -350.54 -51.63 -203.95 -357.53 -44.84 53.27
MARKET RALLY PERIOD CRISIS PERIOD POST CRISIS PERIOD
 
Note: 
CP - Conventional/Unrestricted Portfolio AVE - Average 
SAP - Shariah Approved Portfolio KLCI - Kuala Lumpur Composite Index 
NSAP - Non-Shariah-Approved Portfolio FBMESI - FT Bursa Malaysia Emas Shariah Index (FBMSHA) 
N - Total companies RM - Ringgit Malaysia (£1.00 = RM4.66 approx.) 
% chg y-o-y - Yearly percentage changes  
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 The decline in the portfolio value of CP and SAP is largely attributed to the sharp 
fall in share prices during the crisis period coupled with the slow recovery in the post-
crisis period and the significant increase in the number of new stocks included in the 
portfolios.  Since the 1992–1993 market rally was driven mainly by speculative trading 
concentrating on medium and small-capitalised stocks, the strong performance of these 
stocks enabled CP and SAP portfolios to outperform NSAP both in terms of value and 
return.  Unfortunately however, these stocks suffered heavy losses due to profit taking 
activities that coincided with the 1997 Asian financial crisis whilst recovery in the 
aftermath of the crisis was insufficient to push the prices back to their pre-crisis level.  On 
the other hand, the ability of NSAP portfolio to maintain its performance despite the 
volatile market condition signifies the superior investment quality of its component stocks 
despite the portfolio having the lowest number of stocks.  Notwithstanding this, SAP was 
able to outperform CP and NSAP as well as the benchmark KLCI in 2008 supported by 
the strong performance of plantation stocks amid poorer performance of other sectors, 
particularly finance-related stocks.   With regards to benchmark performance, both the 
KLCI and the FT Bursa Malaysia Emas Shariah Index (FBMSHA) posted positive 
returns during their respective period.  The KLCI gained a cumulative 124.55 per cent 
return throughout the 19-year period, thus outperforming both the CP and SAP portfolios 
but underperformed the NSAP portfolio.  For FBMSHA however, its cumulative return of 
48.29 per cent for the 10-year period from 1999 to 2008 is below the return achieved by 
any of the portfolios or the KLCI arguably because majority of the Shariah index 
components are medium and small-capitalised stocks.  The descriptive statistics of the 
portfolio performance is shown in Table 7.2.   
 
Table 7.2: Selected Descriptive Statistics of the Sample Portfolios’ Performance, 1990-2008 
 Portfolio Value (RM) Portfolio Return 
CP SAP NSAP CP SAP NSAP 
Mean  3654.75  336.72  292.02  0.0628  0.0524  0.1087 
Median  1626.43  1530.93  262.76  -0.0094  -0.0279  0.0573 
Std. Deviation  4356.83  4253.34  159.67  0.5739  0.5917  0.4202 
Skewness  2.251  2.288  1.212  0.141  0.121  0.186 
Kurtosis  5.217  5.426  1.720  0.614  0.620  0.672 
Minimum  904.57  718.06  95.50  -1.1755  -1.2188  -0.8700 
Maximum  17568.97  17034.40  724.02  1.3572  1.3893  1.0034 
No. of Stocks: 
Start Period - 1990 
End Period - 2008 
  
 159 
 890 
  
 109 
 770 
 
 50 
 120 
  
 159 
 890 
  
 109 
 770 
 
 50 
 120 
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 Table 7.2 reveals that NSAP has outperformed both CP and SAP over the 19-year 
period since its mean return of 10.87 per cent is the highest amongst the three portfolios 
as compared to 6.28 per cent and 5.24 per cent return posted by CP and SAP, 
respectively.  NSAP also has the lowest risk based on its standard deviation of 42.02 per 
cent against 57.39 per cent for CP and 59.17 per cent for SAP.  The considerably high 
standard deviation in comparison to the mean return during the full sample period was 
due to the wild swing in share prices as reflected by the huge spread between the 
minimum and the maximum level of the portfolios‟ value and return.  Notwithstanding 
however, NSAP has the lowest volatility as compared to CP and SAP.   The table also 
indicates that SAP generated the lowest mean return but have the highest risk which is 
clearly an unfavourable situation as it could seriously undermine any competitive 
advantage that the Islamic-based portfolio might have.  Figure 7.1a suggests that the SAP 
is tracking the CP‟s performance very closely which is due to the similarities in their 
component stocks, as 86 per cent of the securities listed on Bursa Malaysia are halal-
approved stocks.  The figure reveals that both portfolios reached their highest value in 
1993–1994 periods in a rather dramatic style driven by the bullish market sentiment but 
the rally was short-lived by intense profit taking activities in 1995, followed by the Asian 
financial crisis which started in mid-1997.  Trading activities however, were generally 
lacklustre after the crisis was over and with exception of the one final push in 2000 to 
revive the market, there was no significant recovery in share prices, hence the portfolios‟ 
value slide below their pre-market rally levels.      
 
Figure 7.1a: Portfolio Value Trend 
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 On the contrary, the NSAP enjoyed stronger performance as compared to CP and 
SAP as shown by Figure 7.1b below.  The portfolio reached a higher value twice each in 
1994 and 1997, respectively supported particularly by its finance-related stocks before it 
was subdued by profit taking activities and poor market condition in both crisis and post-
crisis periods.  Nevertheless, NSAP was able to sustain its performance as reflected by the 
portfolio‟s value which remains above its pre-market rally level.    
 
Figure 7.1b: NSAP Portfolio Value Trend 
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 Figure 7.2 shows the return trend of the three hypothetical portfolios.  The figure 
indicates that the portfolios‟ returns are positively correlated especially for CP and SAP.  
SAP also outperformed NSAP considerably well during the market rally period 
particularly in 1992–1994 but underperformed during the remaining periods.  One 
plausible reason is because the medium and small-capitalised stocks which form the 
majority of the Shariah-compliant portfolios‟ component stocks suffered heavy losses 
during the bearish market.  The SAP however, managed to outperform the NSAP in 2008 
on the back of a strong performance of its plantation-related stocks. The figure, which 
also gives a graphical evidence of the level of volatility in the portfolios‟ return, reveals a 
strong mean reversion trend, thus implying a significantly high volatility in the portfolios‟ 
long-term return performance.  This suggests that an actual unit trust or mutual fund in 
Malaysia should adopt an active fund management strategy in view of the potentially 
greater risk if the unit trust or mutual fund simply relies on the passive buy-and-hold 
strategy while investing for a considerably long-term period.  
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Figure 7.2: Portfolio Return Trend 
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 To conclude, the descriptive analysis thus far has established that the performance 
of CP, SAP and NSAP are positively correlated and substantially influenced by the 
general market performance.  The CP and SAP portfolios performed exceptionally well 
during the market rally period but considerably underperformed the NSAP in the crisis as 
well as post-crisis period.  However, there is a potential bias if conclusion is to be made 
solely from the full period sample in view that the huge differences in the volatility of the 
portfolio values and return performance in the different sub-periods might skew the long-
run performance, thus affecting the accuracy of the results based on the full period 
sample.  Likewise, it is also premature to assume that NSAP is superior to CP and SAP 
without analysing each of the portfolio‟s return thoroughly.  Therefore, the following 
section will focus on the analysis of the portfolios‟ characteristics in an attempt to 
establish their return and risk profiles. 
 
7.2.1 General Characteristics of the Conventional Portfolio (CP)   
 
Performance of the Conventional Portfolio (CP) for both full and sub-period samples 
together with their relevant statistics is shown in Table 7.3 and Figure 7.3.  Table 7.3 
reveals that CP posted positive cumulative return of 118.34 per cent over the 19-year 
period with its yearly return increasing by an average of 6.23 per cent.  The standard 
deviation however, is high at 57.39 per cent. Therefore, the total return is arguably 
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unimpressive in view of the long holding period and substantially high portfolio‟s risk 
level.  This was particularly due to the significant rise in stock prices during the market 
rally period which was followed almost immediately by the sharp decline in stock prices 
during the crisis period as well as the lengthy but slow recovery in the post-crisis period.  
As return performance was significantly skewed during the market rally and crisis 
periods, this could explain for the unsatisfactory return level despite the considerably high 
standard deviation in the full sample period.  Therefore, further examination on the return 
performance within the different sub-period is necessary. 
 
 The conventional portfolio performed remarkably well during the market rally 
period accumulating a total return of 217.09 per cent or a mean return of 27.14 per cent 
per year.  The portfolio‟s risk however, is high based on the portfolio‟s standard deviation 
of 59.56 per cent but the excessive risk corresponds to the period‟s impressive gains, 
nevertheless.  During the period, CP outperformed SAP and KLCI but underperformed 
the NSAP.  Its beta of 1.41 times indicates that trading in this portfolio is fairly volatile in 
comparison to the benchmark KLCI‟s performance.  In the crisis period however, the 
portfolio posted negative return averaging at 27.00 per cent loss per annum amid high 
standard deviation and volatile trading. The return and risk were more stable in the post-
crisis period with the portfolio posting a cumulative return of 63.27 per cent on the back 
of 12.65 per cent average annual return and standard deviation of 19.33 per cent. The 
return is higher than SAP but smaller than NSAP and the KLCI which gained 74.67 per 
cent accumulative return during the same period.   
 
 Figure 7.3 shows CP‟s return distribution on yearly basis throughout the 19-year 
period.  The bulk of the portfolio‟s return was accumulated during the market rally period 
particularly at the peak of the rally in 1993 and 1994.  Unfortunately however, the 
portfolio lost most of its gains when it succumbed to profit taking activities in 1995 and 
1996.  The market staged a rebound in late-1996 and early-1997 periods which enabled 
the portfolio to earn positive return in 1997 but the rebound was cut short by the Asian 
financial crisis that started in mid-1997. The portfolio‟s return remained volatile during 
the crisis period especially in 2000 and 2001 before trading became more stable following 
various improvements in the Malaysian stock market which were undertaken to enhance 
the efficiency of the market and to curb excessive speculation, thus ensuring a more 
orderly development of the stock market industry.   
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Table 7.3: Return of the Conventional Portfolio (CP)  
Year Return Statistics Sub-Period
1990 0.4654 TOTAL 2.1709
1991 -0.0927 MEAN 0.2714
1992 0.1630 STD DEV 0.5956
1993 1.3572 COVAR 0.0693
1994 0.8986 BETA 1.4094
1995 -0.4840
1996 -0.4437
1997 0.3071
1998 -1.1755 TOTAL -1.6203
1999 -0.3408 MEAN -0.2700
2000 0.7663 STD DEV 0.6057
2001 -0.7327 COVAR 0.2133
2002 -0.0094 BETA 1.5881
2003 -0.1282
2004 0.3747 TOTAL 0.6327
2005 -0.0701 MEAN 0.1265
2006 -0.0704 STD DEV 0.1933
2007 0.3357 COVAR 0.0233
2008 0.0629 BETA 1.6027
TOTAL 1.1834
MEAN 0.0623
STD DEV 0.5739
VAR 0.3294
COVAR 0.1294
BETA 1.5957
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Figure 7.3: Return Trend of the Conventional Portfolio (CP) 
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 Figure 7.4 gives the breakdown of return based on contribution from individual 
industries. Construction sector is the single largest contributor followed by plantation, 
industrial engineering, finance, oil, tobacco, automobile, telecommunication and 
properties sectors.  Construction contributed 71.61 per cent in cumulative return 
throughout the period which accounts for 60.51 per cent of the total portfolio‟s earnings.  
Despite the impressive profit however, the sector is also the riskiest since its standard 
deviation was the highest among the various industries in the portfolio.  In fact, the 
construction sector‟s profit was accumulated almost entirely during the market rally 
period but it became the worst performing industry in the portfolio during the crisis 
period.  Fortunately, strong performance by its finance and plantation stocks in the post-
crisis period helped the portfolio to maintain its profitability.  Based on a risk-adjusted 
return, CP‟s two best performing industries are its plantation and tobacco sectors but 
further examination on the portfolio‟s performance indicates that its return was mainly 
supported by large-capitalised stocks amid poorer performance by medium and small-
capitalised stocks in the crisis and post-crisis periods.  
 
Figure 7.4: Return of the Conventional Portfolio (CP) Based on Sectors, 1990-2008 
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 Table 7.4 reveals the return correlation amongst various industries in the 
conventional portfolio. Construction sector has positive but low and insignificant 
correlation with the other industries except with automobile, beverages, chemical and the 
benchmark KLCI which partly explain its superior performance. Tobacco sector, one of 
the portfolio‟s major profit contributors, is uncorrelated with construction, plantation and 
industrial engineering, and is also not significantly correlated with the KLCI, thus making 
it a favourable industry. 
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Table 7.4: Industry Return Correlation – Conventional Portfolio (CP)  
AUTOM BEVER CHEMI CONST ELECT FINAN PLANT FORES GENER HEALT HOUSE INENG INMET LEISU LOGIS MEDIA MININ OILEQ PHARM PROPE PERSO TECHN TELEC TOBAC TRAVE TVGAM UTILI KLCI
Pearson Correlation 1
Sig. (2-tailed)
N 19
Pearson Correlation .680
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001
N 19 19
Pearson Correlation .766
**
.698
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.001
N 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation 0.061 0.235 0.224 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.804 0.332 0.356
N 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .912
**
.713
**
.810
** 0.222 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.361
N 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .785
**
.736
**
.868
** 0.277 .927
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.251 0.000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .605
**
.677
**
.864
** 0.263 .664
**
.755
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.277 0.002 0.000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .684
**
.716
**
.898
** 0.317 .846
**
.957
**
.793
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .802
**
.763
**
.924
** 0.393 .864
**
.884
**
.868
**
.875
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .772
**
.770
**
.832
** 0.353 .869
**
.947
**
.735
**
.902
**
.839
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .849
**
.741
**
.946
** 0.306 .855
**
.879
**
.830
**
.856
**
.950
**
.882
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.203 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .871
**
.689
**
.623
** 0.175 .885
**
.727
**
.507
*
.593
**
.730
**
.728
**
.724
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.473 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .611
**
.668
**
.756
** 0.240 .776
**
.882
**
.689
**
.865
**
.826
**
.779
**
.780
**
.596
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.322 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .862
**
.587
**
.664
** 0.103 .915
**
.779
**
.497
*
.627
**
.718
**
.718
**
.732
**
.915
**
.624
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.008 0.002 0.676 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .796
**
.764
**
.872
** 0.205 .855
**
.887
**
.795
**
.861
**
.887
**
.884
**
.891
**
.676
**
.796
**
.740
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .911
**
.610
**
.686
** 0.123 .943
**
.794
**
.537
*
.654
**
.779
**
.733
**
.764
**
.934
**
.638
**
.959
**
.757
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.615 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .674
**
.913
**
.620
** 0.237 .656
**
.646
**
.546
*
.605
**
.710
**
.695
**
.688
**
.763
**
.613
**
.561
*
.603
**
.612
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.329 0.002 0.003 0.016 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.013 0.006 0.005
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation 0.401 .761
**
.623
** 0.358 0.388 .528
*
.634
**
.586
**
.668
**
.608
**
.670
** 0.358 .579
** 0.153 .517
* 0.256 .793
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.089 0.000 0.004 0.132 0.101 0.020 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.132 0.009 0.531 0.024 0.291 0.000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation 0.136 0.188 0.232 0.023 0.224 0.281 0.114 0.209 0.198 0.259 0.253 0.040 0.198 0.234 0.339 0.207 0.017 0.050 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.579 0.440 0.339 0.926 0.357 0.245 0.641 0.390 0.415 0.283 0.297 0.871 0.416 0.335 0.156 0.395 0.944 0.838
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .771
**
.800
**
.944
** 0.319 .865
**
.928
**
.892
**
.923
**
.978
**
.884
**
.946
**
.722
**
.865
**
.717
**
.894
**
.755
**
.737
**
.690
** 0.220 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.183 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.365
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .786
**
.749
**
.973
** 0.289 .838
**
.895
**
.882
**
.901
**
.967
**
.859
**
.956
**
.655
**
.787
**
.698
**
.923
**
.738
**
.648
**
.637
** 0.251 .970
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.301 0.000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .914
**
.724
**
.799
** 0.205 .988
**
.899
**
.665
**
.803
**
.871
**
.843
**
.854
**
.927
**
.750
**
.940
**
.837
**
.968
**
.695
** 0.396 0.216 .870
**
.837
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.399 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.093 0.373 0.000 0.000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation 0.439 0.437 .461
* 0.039 .621
**
.679
**
.571
*
.623
**
.477
*
.590
** 0.399 .489
*
.617
**
.538
*
.524
*
.488
* 0.326 0.128 -0.081 .556
*
.467
*
.577
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.060 0.062 0.047 0.875 0.005 0.001 0.011 0.004 0.039 0.008 0.090 0.034 0.005 0.017 0.021 0.034 0.173 0.603 0.741 0.013 0.044 0.010
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation -0.106 0.044 -0.074 -0.045 0.049 0.062 -0.130 0.047 -0.053 0.002 -0.069 -0.012 0.198 -0.065 -0.032 0.029 0.059 0.124 0.396 -0.017 -0.096 0.020 -0.021 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.666 0.857 0.763 0.854 0.843 0.800 0.596 0.849 0.831 0.994 0.780 0.960 0.415 0.792 0.897 0.907 0.810 0.613 0.093 0.944 0.695 0.937 0.931
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .636
**
.786
**
.788
** 0.349 .801
**
.915
**
.854
**
.911
**
.855
**
.873
**
.789
**
.642
**
.865
**
.609
**
.799
**
.639
**
.693
**
.642
** 0.088 .911
**
.833
**
.782
**
.763
** 0.046 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.721 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.852
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .730
**
.765
**
.812
** 0.356 .849
**
.892
**
.849
**
.895
**
.850
**
.889
**
.822
**
.646
**
.704
**
.650
**
.864
**
.703
**
.593
**
.539
* 0.210 .873
**
.863
**
.818
**
.628
** -0.030 .900
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.017 0.388 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.904 0.000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .467
*
.521
*
.594
** 0.113 .645
**
.756
**
.709
**
.690
**
.644
**
.627
**
.570
* 0.420 .732
**
.544
*
.638
**
.517
* 0.352 0.294 0.416 .705
**
.629
**
.619
**
.791
** 0.129 .797
**
.695
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.044 0.022 0.007 0.644 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.011 0.074 0.000 0.016 0.003 0.023 0.139 0.223 0.076 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.598 0.000 0.001
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .728
**
.806
**
.741
**
.461
*
.809
**
.845
**
.737
**
.782
**
.836
**
.901
**
.853
**
.762
**
.749
**
.655
**
.757
**
.717
**
.787
**
.743
** 0.154 .856
**
.789
**
.807
**
.494
* 0.147 .863
**
.840
**
.571
* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.530 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.549 0.000 0.000 0.011
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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 To conclude, CP is characterised by volatile performance in which its return and 
risk level is substantially influenced by the overall market performance.  This is evident 
from the varying performance in different market conditions in the sub-period samples.  
Although the portfolio was able to generate positive cumulative return throughout the 
period, its performance was volatile as indicated by the high standard deviation and 
portfolio beta.  The portfolio achieved its highest return in the market rally period which 
even exceeded the KLCI‟s return but suffered heavy losses in the crisis period.  CP‟s 
return was mainly supported by large-capitalised stocks especially those in construction, 
finance, plantation, industrial engineering, oil and tobacco sectors.  Since several of its 
major income generating sectors such as construction and tobacco are not significantly 
correlated with the other industries in the portfolio, CP was able to maximise the benefit 
from its industry diversification. 
 
 
7.2.2 General Characteristics of the Shariah-Approved Portfolio (SAP)   
 
The characteristics of the Shariah-Approved Portfolio (SAP) in different sub-periods is 
summarised in Table 7.5 and Figure 7.5.  Table 7.5 reveals that the Islamic-based 
portfolio accumulated 99.58 per cent return over the 19-year period which is the lowest 
cumulative return as compared to CP (118.34 per cent), NSAP (206.51 per cent) and the 
KLCI (124.55 per cent), unfortunately.  On a year-to-year basis, SAP posted an average 
return of 5.24 per cent per annum but its standard deviation of 59.17 per cent and beta of 
1.64 times makes it the most risky among the portfolios.  The highest return was achieved 
during the market rally period with cumulative profit of 211.45 per cent or an average of 
26.43 per cent per year.  The risk however, is high at 61.17 per cent standard deviation 
and beta of 1.40 times.  During the crisis period, the portfolio generated a total loss 
averaging at 29.03 per cent per year, the worst among the three portfolios, despite having 
the highest standard deviation of 62.91 per cent and beta of 1.65 times.  In the post-crisis 
period, the portfolio made the most recovery relative to CP and NSAP with a total profit 
of 62.32 per cent or 12.46 per cent per annum amid more stable share prices and market 
performance.  Although the portfolio‟s risk was reduced substantially as compared to the 
crisis period, SAP remained the riskiest portfolio with a standard deviation of 19.72 per 
cent and beta of 1.63 times. Figure 7.5 indicates that SAP return was in accordance with 
CP as both portfolios enjoyed their highest profit during the market rally period.  
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Table 7.5: Return of the Shariah-Approved (SAP) Portfolio  
Year Return Statistics Sub-Period
1990 0.4521 TOTAL 2.1145
1991 -0.0951 MEAN 0.2643
1992 0.1687 STD DEV 0.6117
1993 1.3893 COVAR 0.0690
1994 0.8954 BETA 1.4033
1995 -0.4971
1996 -0.4942
1997 0.2954
1998 -1.2188 TOTAL -1.7420
1999 -0.3444 MEAN -0.2903
2000 0.7855 STD DEV 0.6291
2001 -0.7999 COVAR 0.2210
2002 -0.0279 BETA 1.6454
2003 -0.1366
2004 0.3763 TOTAL 0.6232
2005 -0.0944 MEAN 0.1246
2006 -0.0712 STD DEV 0.1972
2007 0.3317 COVAR 0.0237
2008 0.0809 BETA 1.6300
TOTAL 0.9958
MEAN 0.0524
STD DEV 0.5917
VAR 0.3502
COVAR 0.1327
BETA 1.6359
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Figure 7.5: Return Trend of the Shariah-Approved Portfolio (SAP) 
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 Figure 7.6 highlights the breakdown of return based on individual sectors in the 
SAP.  Most of its income was generated by the construction, plantation, industrial 
engineering, oil, automobile and telecommunication sectors.  However, with the 
construction sector generating 61.90 per cent in cumulative profit which accounts for 
62.16 per cent of the total SAP‟s return, this implies an overreliance towards a single 
sector for the portfolio‟s income.  This certainly does not augur well for SAP considering 
that the construction sector is also the riskiest industry in the portfolio based on the 
sector‟s high standard deviation.  Therefore, when construction-related stocks incurred 
heavy losses during the crisis period, performance of SAP was also severely affected.  
Instead, the best performing industry in SAP was the plantation sector, but with a 15.07 
per cent cumulative return, its share of profit is still far below that of the construction 
sector. Nevertheless, the plantation sector emerged as the largest profit contributor to SAP 
during the post-crisis period amid a relatively low standard deviation, thus providing the 
portfolio with a good income support.    
 
Figure 7.6: Return of the Shariah-Approved Portfolio (SAP) Based on Sectors, 1990-2008 
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 Table 7.6 provides the return correlation between all sectors in SAP‟s portfolio. 
Construction industry has positive but low and insignificant correlation with the other 
industries except with automobile, beverages, chemical and the benchmark KLCI that 
partly explain its superior performance.  Unfortunately however, none of the industries 
has negative correlation, which implies that SAP may not be able to maximise the benefit 
from industry diversification since all sectors in the portfolio are likely to move in similar 
direction.   
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Table 7.6: Industry Return Correlation – Shariah-Approved Portfolio (SAP)  
AUTOM BEVER CHEMI CONST ELECT FINAN PLANT FORES GENER HEALT HOUSE INENG INMET LEISU LOGIS MEDIA MININ OILEQ PHARM PROPE PERSO TECHN TELEC TRAVE UTILI KLCI FBMESI
Pearson Correlation 1
Sig. (2-tailed)
N 19
Pearson Correlation .620
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .005
N 19 19
Pearson Correlation .744
**
.537
* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .018
N 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .062 .270 .239 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .801 .263 .324
N 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .881
**
.582
**
.806
** .222 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .009 .000 .361
N 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .670
**
.464
*
.959
** .214 .667
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .045 .000 .380 .002
N 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .577
** .450 .845
** .263 .637
**
.775
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .053 .000 .277 .003 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .635
**
.480
*
.892
** .323 .851
**
.796
**
.760
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .037 .000 .178 .000 .000 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .821
**
.616
**
.862
** .250 .945
**
.735
**
.755
**
.862
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .005 .000 .301 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .758
**
.602
**
.842
** .350 .880
**
.725
**
.722
**
.907
**
.868
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .006 .000 .142 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .835
**
.612
**
.944
** .313 .841
**
.902
**
.800
**
.833
**
.902
**
.870
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .005 .000 .192 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .884
**
.716
**
.631
** .181 .879
**
.521
*
.496
*
.589
**
.809
**
.724
**
.730
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .004 .459 .000 .022 .031 .008 .000 .000 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .539
* .435 .739
** .244 .772
**
.646
**
.644
**
.855
**
.852
**
.765
**
.752
**
.573
* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .017 .063 .000 .313 .000 .003 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .010
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .860
**
.574
*
.680
** .116 .913
**
.536
*
.489
*
.631
**
.872
**
.727
**
.748
**
.916
**
.620
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .010 .001 .638 .000 .018 .034 .004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .005
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .804
**
.574
*
.914
** .245 .859
**
.822
**
.830
**
.848
**
.935
**
.882
**
.940
**
.714
**
.807
**
.774
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .010 .000 .313 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .906
**
.576
**
.658
** .120 .904
**
.553
*
.497
*
.593
**
.851
**
.691
**
.747
**
.936
**
.551
*
.947
**
.755
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .010 .002 .626 .000 .014 .030 .007 .000 .001 .000 .000 .014 .000 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .688
**
.910
**
.637
** .252 .672
**
.606
**
.547
*
.621
**
.692
**
.708
**
.702
**
.772
**
.598
**
.589
**
.653
**
.620
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .003 .298 .002 .006 .015 .005 .001 .001 .001 .000 .007 .008 .002 .005
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .376 .674
**
.610
** .373 .360 .672
**
.612
**
.564
*
.479
*
.580
**
.652
** .345 .540
* .151 .553
* .220 .779
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .113 .002 .006 .116 .131 .002 .005 .012 .038 .009 .002 .148 .017 .538 .014 .365 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .138 .092 .258 .029 .259 .170 .115 .218 .312 .278 .282 .050 .197 .256 .305 .177 .015 .018 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .573 .708 .286 .906 .284 .487 .639 .370 .193 .249 .242 .840 .419 .291 .203 .470 .951 .943
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .751
**
.599
**
.957
** .315 .862
**
.880
**
.884
**
.909
**
.946
**
.874
**
.950
**
.712
**
.839
**
.735
**
.951
**
.725
**
.707
**
.642
** .245 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .007 .000 .189 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .003 .311
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .758
**
.579
**
.973
** .307 .830
**
.922
**
.858
**
.891
**
.910
**
.869
**
.956
**
.663
**
.770
**
.709
**
.960
**
.712
**
.675
**
.636
** .270 .978
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .009 .000 .201 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .001 .000 .001 .002 .003 .264 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .899
**
.650
**
.795
** .215 .984
**
.667
**
.635
**
.793
**
.946
**
.844
**
.848
**
.930
**
.725
**
.943
**
.856
**
.950
**
.715
** .376 .231 .863
**
.831
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .003 .000 .377 .000 .002 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .113 .341 .000 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .403 .251 .469
* .049 .617
** .272 .596
**
.638
**
.599
**
.601
** .379 .461
*
.622
**
.504
*
.530
* .401 .336 .131 -.093 .555
*
.465
*
.554
* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .087 .299 .043 .844 .005 .259 .007 .003 .007 .007 .109 .047 .004 .028 .020 .088 .160 .594 .705 .014 .045 .014
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .725
**
.580
**
.881
** .358 .860
**
.806
**
.806
**
.907
**
.914
**
.895
**
.893
**
.711
**
.838
**
.731
**
.931
**
.735
**
.704
**
.614
** .133 .943
**
.946
**
.857
**
.574
* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .009 .000 .132 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .005 .587 .000 .000 .000 .010
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .429 .294 .611
** .116 .667
** .426 .722
**
.699
**
.765
**
.639
**
.567
* .414 .736
**
.547
*
.678
** .451 .357 .267 .403 .720
**
.633
**
.616
**
.796
**
.637
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .067 .222 .005 .636 .002 .069 .000 .001 .000 .003 .011 .078 .000 .015 .001 .053 .133 .269 .087 .001 .004 .005 .000 .003
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .713
**
.699
**
.738
**
.475
*
.793
**
.666
**
.711
**
.764
**
.807
**
.881
**
.842
**
.759
**
.718
**
.654
**
.780
**
.684
**
.801
**
.739
** .154 .828
**
.790
**
.799
**
.470
*
.852
**
.550
* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .001 .000 .040 .000 .002 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .002 .000 .001 .000 .000 .530 .000 .000 .000 .043 .000 .015
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation -.258 -.138 -.053 -.022 -.268 -.123 .278 -.040 -.214 -.078 -.140 -.390 -.214 -.405 -.116 -.455 -.228 .023 .097 -.082 -.122 -.324 .157 -.237 .214 -.157 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .287 .572 .830 .930 .268 .616 .249 .870 .378 .750 .568 .099 .378 .086 .636 .050 .348 .924 .692 .738 .619 .177 .521 .330 .378 .521
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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 To conclude, the Shariah-compliant portfolio is characterised by return and risk 
performance that closely resembles the conventional portfolio‟s performance. The 
identical performance is due to both portfolios being likely to have similar stocks in their 
portfolios albeit in different proportion of weight.  SAP derived most of its profit during 
the market rally period with construction, plantation, industrial engineering and oil-
related stocks as its major income earners.  Although SAP‟s return is lower than CP and 
NSAP in the post-crisis period, the portfolio made the most recovery from the losses 
incurred in the crisis period.  Unfortunately however, returns of all sectors in SAP are 
positively correlated, thus depriving the portfolio from enjoying maximum benefit from 
its industry diversification.  SAP‟s return is also heavily influenced by the overall market 
condition since all sectors in the portfolio are likely to move in a similar direction as 
observed in the sub-periods performance.  It also appears that the portfolio depends on 
defensive sectors such as plantation and oil-related stocks to sustain its earnings.  
Notwithstanding however, although the results show that SAP has underperformed both 
CP and NSAP, it is still premature to assume that return from Islamic-based portfolio is 
inferior to conventional portfolio.  Hence, further examination on the portfolios‟ 
components is necessary particularly with regards to the impact of different equity sizes 
on a portfolio‟s return. 
 
 
7.2.3 General Characteristics of the Non-Shariah-Approved Portfolio (NSAP) 
 
Performance of the Non-Shariah-Approved Portfolio (NSAP) is summarised in Table 7.7 
and Figure 7.7.  Despite having the smallest number of stocks, NSAP was able to 
accumulate 206.51 per cent return throughout the 19-year study period with a mean 
yearly return of 10.87 per cent, the highest amongst the three portfolios.  In addition, its 
standard deviation of 42.02 per cent and beta of 1.40 times signifies that NSAP is the 
least risky portfolio.  During the market rally period, NSAP gained 241.76 per cent return 
with a mean return of 30.22 per cent per annum whilst its standard deviation of 37.41 per 
cent is about half the risk of the other two portfolios.  The portfolio‟s beta of 1.60 times 
however, implies that trading in this portfolio is more volatile. In the crisis period, NSAP 
suffered the lowest losses comparatively, losing an average of 16.86 per cent annually 
with standard deviation of 46.48 per cent and beta of 1.23 times.  In the post-crisis period, 
NSAP posted the highest return albeit just slightly more than CP and SAP, accumulating 
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65.90 per cent or 13.18 per cent on a yearly basis while having the lowest standard 
deviation of 18.72 per cent and beta of 1.51 times, thus making NSAP the best 
performing portfolio throughout. 
 
Table 7.7: Return of the Non-Shariah-Approved (NSAP) Portfolio  
Year Return Statistics Sub-Period
1990 0.6841 TOTAL 2.4176
1991 -0.0549 MEAN 0.3022
1992 0.0573 STD DEV 0.3741
1993 0.3972 COVAR 0.0788
1994 1.0034 BETA 1.6014
1995 -0.1761
1996 0.0919
1997 0.4147
1998 -0.8700 TOTAL -1.0115
1999 -0.3170 MEAN -0.1686
2000 0.6393 STD DEV 0.4648
2001 -0.4327 COVAR 0.1657
2002 0.0649 BETA 1.2340
2003 -0.0959
2004 0.3687 TOTAL 0.6590
2005 0.0095 MEAN 0.1318
2006 -0.0675 STD DEV 0.1872
2007 0.3485 COVAR 0.0220
2008 -0.0004 BETA 1.5129
TOTAL 2.0651
MEAN 0.1087
STD DEV 0.4202
VAR 0.1765
COVAR 0.1136
BETA 1.4003
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 Figure 7.7 reveals that, except for the sharp losses in 1998 and 1999 following the 
Asian financial crisis, NSAP has a more stable performance relative to CP and SAP as 
reflected through the portfolio‟s relatively smaller standard deviation.  Contrary to CP 
and SAP whose return rose dramatically in 1993 only to be followed by profit taking 
activities a year later and severe losses in 1995 and 1996 periods, NSAP continued its 
1993 impressive performance to reach its highest return in 1994. After brief profit taking 
activities in 1995, the portfolio‟s return resumed its uptrend in 1996 and 1997 periods and 
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continued to outperform CP and SAP in the post-crisis period.  This suggests that NSAP 
was able to outperform the other two portfolios in the bullish market as well as when the 
stock market rebounded from its bearish trend.  Hence, NSAP is arguably the best 
performing portfolio, which is attributed to the investment quality of its component stocks 
as proven by the analysis of the returns of industries in the portfolio.  
 
 
Figure 7.7: Return Trend of the Non-Shariah-Approved Portfolio (NSAP) 
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 Figure 7.8 indicates that finance, conglomerates, tobacco, properties, travel 
services, construction and gaming sectors are the major profit contributors to NSAP.  
Finance sector accounted for 40.72 per cent of the portfolio‟s total return and is the best 
performing sector in all sub-periods with its standard deviation lower than the overall 
portfolio. The conglomerate sector is the second biggest income earner with 16.01 per 
cent share but the sector suffered heavily during the crisis period.  Tobacco is the only 
sector that generated positive return in all sub-periods and contributed 12.25 per cent to 
the total return. Together, the three sectors contributed 70 per cent of NSAP‟s cumulative 
profit.  Hence, unlike CP and SAP, NSAP could rely on several sectors for its earnings. In 
addition, tobacco sector could provide the portfolio with a significant and sustainable 
income source based on its consistent return. 
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Figure 7.8: Return of the Non-Shariah-Approved Portfolio (NSAP) Based on Sectors, 1990-
2008 
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 Table 7.8 shows the return correlation of all sectors in the NSAP‟s portfolio.  The 
table reveals that, in general, returns from all industries in the portfolio are moderately 
correlated. Finance sector has a significant positive correlation with most of the major 
industries and with the benchmark KLCI but has low and insignificant correlation with 
the tobacco sector, the portfolio‟s third largest income earner.  Since finance sector is the 
single biggest contributor to earnings, this could explain the portfolio‟s return trend which 
generally follows the overall market performance. Conglomerate sector is not 
significantly correlated with tobacco, beverages, electrical, logistic and oil-related 
industries, hence it offers good diversification benefit. Travel services sector has low and 
insignificant correlation with logistic, oil and tobacco related stocks. Meanwhile, tobacco 
sector has low and insignificant correlation with finance, plantation, conglomerate, 
logistic, oil, properties, travel services and gaming sectors as well as with the KLCI.  The 
moderate correlation level in returns of the major sectors in the portfolio indicates that 
NSAP is able to maximise the benefit from its industry diversification which could 
explain the ability of the portfolio to maintain its performance in varying market 
conditions.   
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Table 7.8: Industry Return Correlation – Non-Shariah-Approved Portfolio (NSAP) 
AUTOM BEVER CHEMI CONST ELECT FINAN PLANT GENER HEALT HOUSE INENG LEISU LOGIS MEDIA OILEQ PROPE PERSO TECHN TELEC TOBAC TRAVE TVGAM KLCI
Pearson Correlation 1
Sig. (2-tailed)
N 19
Pearson Correlation .426 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .069
N 19 19
Pearson Correlation .264 .794
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .275 .000
N 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .413 .873
**
.918
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .079 .000 .000
N 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .424 .320 .069 .286 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .071 .181 .780 .235
N 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .571
*
.525
*
.551
*
.687
** .409 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .011 .021 .014 .001 .082
N 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .685
**
.474
* .351 .568
* .402 .819
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .040 .140 .011 .088 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .557
* .455 .510
*
.542
* .430 .501
*
.557
* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .013 .050 .026 .017 .066 .029 .013
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .007 .034 -.007 .031 -.096 .066 .121 .002 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .978 .891 .977 .900 .697 .789 .623 .992
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .334 .780
**
.934
**
.941
** .252 .710
**
.495
*
.477
* .100 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .163 .000 .000 .000 .298 .001 .031 .039 .685
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation -.110 -.014 -.030 .025 -.093 -.023 .110 .014 .897
** .061 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .655 .955 .902 .919 .705 .925 .653 .955 .000 .805
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation -.091 .286 .146 .172 .293 .256 .018 .140 -.035 .154 -.086 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .712 .236 .551 .481 .224 .291 .941 .569 .888 .529 .727
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .361 .433 .141 .211 .227 .394 .375 .248 -.168 .176 -.298 .424 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .129 .064 .564 .386 .351 .095 .114 .306 .491 .472 .215 .071
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .486
*
.544
*
.549
*
.656
** .268 .656
**
.543
*
.529
* .165 .588
** .005 -.025 .378 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .035 .016 .015 .002 .267 .002 .016 .020 .500 .008 .984 .920 .111
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .220 .165 -.010 .167 -.058 .192 .184 .022 .281 .037 .228 .027 .438 .522
* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .366 .500 .966 .495 .814 .432 .450 .928 .243 .882 .349 .913 .061 .022
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .355 .837
**
.953
**
.970
** .230 .654
**
.492
*
.462
* .009 .963
** -.031 .139 .168 .613
** .041 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .136 .000 .000 .000 .344 .002 .033 .046 .972 .000 .899 .572 .491 .005 .868
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .491
* .309 .170 .277 .301 .340 .382 .209 .068 .192 .086 .429 .279 .057 .272 .211 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .033 .199 .488 .251 .210 .155 .107 .391 .781 .432 .727 .067 .248 .817 .259 .385
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .658
** .428 .197 .409 .496
*
.487
*
.615
**
.662
** .102 .271 .073 .231 .350 .508
* .219 .293 .375 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .067 .418 .082 .031 .034 .005 .002 .679 .261 .766 .342 .142 .026 .367 .223 .113
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation -.007 -.034 .007 -.031 .096 -.066 -.121 -.002 -1.000
** -.100 -.897
** .035 .168 -.165 -.281 -.009 -.068 -.102 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .978 .891 .977 .900 .697 .789 .623 .992 .000 .685 .000 .888 .491 .500 .243 .972 .781 .679
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .039 .388 .240 .344 .386 .137 .048 .006 -.163 .329 -.216 -.211 .077 .330 .119 .334 -.217 -.130 .163 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .873 .101 .322 .149 .103 .575 .846 .979 .506 .169 .375 .385 .754 .168 .627 .162 .371 .597 .506
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .419 .723
**
.836
**
.885
** .182 .833
**
.651
**
.498
* .265 .938
** .173 .157 .248 .649
** .165 .884
** .208 .347 -.265 .236 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .074 .000 .000 .000 .455 .000 .003 .030 .274 .000 .478 .522 .306 .003 .501 .000 .394 .146 .274 .331
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .569
*
.485
*
.473
*
.612
**
.525
*
.916
**
.760
**
.591
** .082 .671
** .019 .290 .439 .509
* .151 .567
* .314 .489
* -.082 .199 .790
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .011 .035 .041 .005 .021 .000 .000 .008 .737 .002 .939 .228 .060 .026 .538 .011 .191 .034 .737 .414 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Pearson Correlation .582
**
.739
**
.648
**
.783
**
.522
*
.906
**
.779
**
.622
** .158 .782
** .096 .276 .504
*
.715
** .251 .722
** .332 .563
* -.158 .296 .851
**
.887
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .009 .000 .003 .000 .022 .000 .000 .004 .518 .000 .694 .252 .028 .001 .300 .000 .165 .012 .518 .219 .000 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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 To conclude, NSAP is generally characterised by high return and moderate risk 
which is attributable to the investment quality of the stocks in the portfolio.  NSAP 
performed considerably well throughout the 19-year period and has outperformed CP and 
SAP as well as the benchmark KLCI.  The superior performance was essentially due to its 
profitable but less correlated industries such as finance, conglomerate, tobacco and 
gaming.  NSAP also has more sectors that could provide a substantial portion of income 
to its total return.  Therefore, unlike CP and SAP, NSAP is not overly dependent upon a 
single industry for its earnings.  The moderate and insignificant correlation in returns of 
its major income contributing sectors is another advantage since it implies that the 
portfolio will be able to reap the most from its industry diversification.  For instance, its 
finance and conglomerate stocks are poised to outperform in a bullish market whilst its 
tobacco stocks will provide the much needed support if the overall market turns bearish.  
With such a properly diversified portfolio, it is clear that NSAP could maximise or 
sustain its return in any given market condition.   
 
 This section has discussed the general characteristics of each of the hypothetical 
portfolios and established that NSAP is the best performing portfolio as compared to CP 
and SAP.   The chapter continues with the empirical analysis of the portfolios‟ return in 
the following section.  
 
 
7.3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PORTFOLIOS’ PERFORMANCE  
 
This section focuses on the empirical analysis of the hypothetical portfolios‟ return in an 
attempt to further investigate the portfolios‟ performance and the relationship of their 
return.  Several statistical tests were conducted: namely the t-tests to determine the 
significance of the difference in the portfolios‟ mean return, the correlation tests, the 
portfolios‟ volatility tests, the stationary or unit root tests and the ordinary least square 
(OLS) regression tests.  This section also provides the analysis of the size effect and 
analysis of portfolio performance using the traditional portfolio valuation models.  Prior 
to conducting the statistical tests, the data were tested for their normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity to ensure that none of the underlying assumptions is violated.       
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7.3.1 Test of Significance of the Difference in the Portfolios’ Mean Return 
 
The purpose of this test is to analyse the statistical significance of the observed 
differences in the portfolios‟ mean return.  The test is conducted using the paired sample 
t-test in which returns of two different portfolios are compared directly.  The test is 
necessary as it would establish whether return of SAP is significantly different from 
return of CP and NSAP.       
 
 
7.3.1.1 Test of Mean Return – All Period 
 
Table 7.9 provides the results of the paired sample t-test on returns of the hypothetical 
portfolios in the full period sample (1990–2008).  The null hypothesis of the test states 
that the mean return of the portfolios in the full period is not significantly different 
between one another.  Consequently, a rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the 
difference in the mean return of the portfolios in the full period is significant statistically.  
The results show that the t-test values are not statistically significant at a 5-per cent level 
which suggests that the null hypothesis of an equal mean return cannot be rejected at this 
level.  Notwithstanding however, there is rather weak evidence that the difference in the 
mean return of CP and SAP in the full period sample is significantly different since the 
null hypothesis is rejected at a 10-per cent significance level.  The test also provides 
robust statistical evidence that the mean return of CP and NSAP as well as SAP and 
NSAP in the full sample period is not significantly different statistically.   
 
Table 7.9: Paired Sample Test – All Period 
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7.3.1.2 Test of Mean Return – Market Rally Period 
 
Table 7.10 provides the results of the paired sample t-test on returns of the hypothetical 
portfolios in the market rally period (1990–1997).  The null hypothesis of the test states 
that the mean return of the portfolios in the market rally period is not significantly 
different between one another.  Consequently, a rejection of the null hypothesis implies 
that the difference in the mean return of the portfolios in the market rally period is 
significant statistically. The results show that the t-test values are not statistically 
significant at a 5-per cent level which suggests that the null hypothesis of an equal mean 
return cannot be rejected.  Therefore, there is no robust statistical evidence to support that 
the mean return of the hypothetical portfolios in the market rally period is significantly 
different.  
 
Table 7.10: Paired Sample Test – Market Rally Period 
 
 
 
7.3.1.3 Test of Mean Return – Crisis Period 
 
Table 7.11 provides the results of the paired sample t-test on returns of the hypothetical 
portfolios in the crisis period (1998–2003).  The null hypothesis of the test states that the 
mean return of the portfolios in the crisis period is not significantly different between one 
another.  Consequently, a rejection of the null hypothesis implies that there is a significant 
difference in the mean return of the portfolios in the crisis period.  The results show that 
the t-test values are not statistically significant at a 5-per cent level which suggests that 
the null hypothesis of an equal mean return cannot be rejected.  Therefore, there is no 
robust statistical evidence to support that the mean return of the hypothetical portfolios in 
the crisis period is significantly different.  
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Table 7.11: Paired Sample Test – Crisis Period 
 
 
 
7.3.1.4 Test of Mean Return – Post-Crisis Period 
 
Table 7.12 provides the results of the paired sample t-test on returns of the hypothetical 
portfolios in the post-crisis period (2004–2008).  The null hypothesis of the test states that 
the mean return of the portfolios in the post-crisis period is not significantly different 
between one another.  Consequently, a rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the 
difference in the mean return of the portfolios in the post-crisis period is significant 
statistically. The results show that the t-test values are not statistically significant at a 5-
per cent level which suggests that the null hypothesis of an equal mean return cannot be 
rejected.  Therefore, there is no robust statistical evidence to support that the mean return 
of the hypothetical portfolios in the post-crisis period is significantly different.  
 
Table 7.12: Paired Sample Test – Post-Crisis Period 
 
 
 
 To conclude, results from the paired-sample t-tests indicate that there is no robust 
evidence to support that the observed differences in the mean returns of the hypothetical 
portfolios across the sample periods is significant statistically.  Hence, it can be inferred 
from the absence of the statistical evidence that the return of SAP is not significantly 
different from the return of CP and SAP. 
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7.3.2 Analysis of the Hypothetical Portfolios’ Return Correlation  
 
The correlation analysis attempts to investigate the relationship of returns amongst the 
hypothetical portfolios and the benchmark index.  The analysis is important as it would 
reveal how a portfolio‟s return is related to or influenced by return from another portfolio 
or the market index.  The null hypothesis of the correlation analysis states that there is no 
significant correlation between returns of the hypothetical portfolios.  Therefore, a 
rejection of the null hypothesis implies that there is evidence of correlation between the 
portfolios‟ returns whereby return of one portfolio is assumed to be significantly 
influenced by return of another portfolio.  The correlation values ranged from −1 
(indicating a perfect negative correlation) to +1 (indicating a perfect positive correlation) 
whilst a zero correlation value indicates no correlation between returns of the two 
portfolios.  Results of the correlation regression for the full period sample are shown in 
Table 7.13.     
 
Table 7.13: Portfolio Return Correlation – All Period 
CPRE SAPRE NSAPRE KLCIRE
Pearson 
Correlation
1
Sig. (2-tailed)
N 19
Pearson 
Correlation
1.000
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 19 19
Pearson 
Correlation
.878
**
.872
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
N 19 19 19
Pearson 
Correlation
.792
**
.787
**
.949
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000
N 19 19 19 19
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
CPRE
SAPRE
NSAPRE
KLCIRE
 
 
 The table suggests that returns of the hypothetical portfolios have a strong and 
significant correlation between each other as well as with the benchmark KLCI.  CP and 
SAP have a perfect positive correlation indicating that both portfolios move in a very 
similar direction.  One plausible reason is because the component stocks of the two 
portfolios are practically similar, hence their returns are bound to be closely correlated. 
 178 
The high correlation level also confirms the identical performance between CP and SAP 
as observed in the preceding analysis.  Return of SAP is also positively correlated with 
return of NSAP.  With regards to the relationship between SAP and the overall market, 
return of the Shariah-compliant portfolio has the least correlation level with the KLCI, 
thus explaining the observed lag in the performance of SAP as manifested by the 
portfolio‟s performance trailing behind the benchmark‟s performance.  On the other hand, 
NSAP is strongly correlated with the KLCI which explain the ability of the „sin‟ portfolio 
to match the overall market performance.  One plausible reason for the observed strong 
correlation between NSAP and the KLCI is because the majority of NSAP‟s main 
component stocks are also the benchmark‟s heavyweight stocks. Since Table 7.13 
provides correlation results only for the full period sample, further analysis to determine 
the correlation behaviour in different market conditions was conducted.  Table 7.14 gives 
the correlation results in the market rally period.       
 
Table 7.14: Portfolio Return Correlation – Market Rally Period 
CPRE01 SAPRE01 NSAPRE01 KLCIRE01
Pearson 
Correlation
1
Sig. (2-tailed)
N 8
Pearson 
Correlation
1.000
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 8 8
Pearson 
Correlation
.723
*
.710
* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .043 .048
N 8 8 8
Pearson 
Correlation
.525 .509 .950
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .182 .198 .000
N 8 8 8 8
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
CPRE01
SAPRE01
NSAPRE01
KLCIRE01
 
 
 
 The table shows that although CP and SAP are positively correlated with the 
KLCI during the market rally period, the degree of the correlation is moderate and not 
statistically significant.  This implies that despite the performance of the two portfolios 
generally following the overall market performance their return was not significantly 
influenced by the benchmark‟s performance.  Closer examination on the portfolios‟ 
 179 
returns during this period reveals that the two portfolios outperformed the KLCI in terms 
of return but their standard deviation is three times higher than that of the benchmark 
index, indicating that the portfolios have substantially higher risk as compared to the 
KLCI.  This is due to the large numbers of medium and small-capitalised stocks in the 
two hypothetical portfolios whose collective return could significantly influence the total 
return of the portfolios. On the other hand, the KLCI is solely represented by large-
capitalised stocks whose returns are more stable and less volatile.  During this period, 
return of SAP is moderately correlated with NSAP.  In comparison to CP and SAP, 
NSAP has stronger correlation to the KLCI owing to the similarities in their major 
component stocks.  Table 7.15 provides the correlation results during the crisis period.  
 
Table 7.15: Portfolio Return Correlation – Crisis Period 
CPRE02 SAPRE02 NSAPRE02 KLCIRE02
Pearson 
Correlation
1
Sig. (2-tailed)
N 6
Pearson 
Correlation
1.000
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 6 6
Pearson 
Correlation
.992
**
.989
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
N 6 6 6
Pearson 
Correlation
.961
**
.959
**
.973
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .003 .001
N 6 6 6 6
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
CPRE02
SAPRE02
NSAPRE02
KLCIRE02
 
 
 
 The table reveals that the degree of correlation amongst the portfolios‟ returns and 
with the KLCI increased during the crisis period.  A similar phenomenon is also seen in 
the post-crisis period as shown in Table 7.16.  In fact, CP and SAP are more closely 
correlated with the KLCI than NSAP in the post-crisis period.  This reflects a change in 
the performance trend of the portfolios‟ component stocks which during this period 
appeared to be dominated by large-capitalised stocks, hence the observed inclination 
towards the KLCI.  One plausible reason is, in the absence of market boosting news or 
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speculative trading to push the price of medium and small-capitalised stocks as is 
normally the case in a market rally period, the price of these stocks will remain lacklustre 
which prompts investors to turn their attention to the KLCI for direction, instead. This 
argument is supported by the positive return posted by large-capitalised stocks in the 
post-crisis period against the losses suffered by medium and small-capitalised stocks, thus 
explaining the higher correlation level.  Notwithstanding however, NSAP continue to 
have a strong correlation with the KLCI.  
 
Table 7.16: Portfolio Return Correlation – Post-Crisis Period 
CPRE03 SAPRE03 NSAPRE03 KLCIRE03
Pearson 
Correlation
1
Sig. (2-tailed)
N 5
Pearson 
Correlation
.998
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 5 5
Pearson 
Correlation
.972
**
.954
* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .012
N 5 5 5
Pearson 
Correlation
.999
**
.996
**
.974
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .005
N 5 5 5 5
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
CPRE03
SAPRE03
NSAPRE03
KLCIRE03
 
 
 
 For comparison purposes, Table 7.17 shows the correlation between the 
portfolios‟ return and the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Emas Shariah Index (FBMSHA).  It 
should be noted that the data available for FBMSHA covers a shorter period from 1999 to 
2008.  The results indicate that the Shariah index has negative but low and insignificant 
correlation with all the portfolios as well as the KLCI.  Therefore, despite the weak 
statistical evidence, the results suggest that Shariah-compliant stocks could provide an 
efficient protection for portfolio value from a poor market condition.  This is because 
most of the high-valued Shariah-compliant stocks are large-capitalised companies 
involved in plantation, properties, construction and oil-related sectors.         
 
 
 181 
Table 7.17: Portfolio Correlation – Comparison with the Shariah Index*  
CPRE SAPRE NSAPRE KLCIRE FBMESIRE
Pearson 
Correlation
1
Sig. (2-tailed)
N 9
Pearson 
Correlation
.999
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 9 9
Pearson 
Correlation
.984
**
.978
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
N 9 9 9
Pearson 
Correlation
.987
**
.984
**
.980
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000
N 9 9 9 9
Pearson 
Correlation
-.278 -.256 -.376 -.319 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .468 .507 .319 .402
N 9 9 9 9 9
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
FBMESIRE
CPRE
SAPRE
NSAPRE
KLCIRE
Note:  The FBMSHA is represented by the FBMESIRE 
 
 
  To conclude, the correlation analysis reveals that returns of all the portfolios are 
strongly and significantly correlated between one another and with the benchmark KLCI.  
The positive correlation implies that returns of all the portfolios are moving in a similar 
direction together with the overall market return.  There is also evidence of varying 
degrees of correlation in different time periods, of which, CP and SAP are found to be 
more correlated with the KLCI in the crisis and post-crisis periods than in the market rally 
period.  This is arguably because, in a poor market condition, performance of the two 
portfolios is dominated by large-capitalised stocks whilst in a market rally period their 
performance is substantially influenced by medium and small-capitalised stocks which 
form the majority of their component stocks.  The Shariah index has negative but low and 
insignificant correlation with the portfolios and with the benchmark KLCI.  Despite the 
weak statistical evidence, the results do suggest that Shariah-compliant stocks may offer 
an efficient protection to portfolio value by virtue of their relatively negative correlation 
with NSAP and the benchmark index. 
  
 182 
7.3.3 Analysis of the Effect of Equity Size on Portfolio Performance  
 
This section analyses the impact of equity size on the hypothetical portfolios‟ 
performance.  The main objective of the analysis is to investigate the presence of the firm 
size effect which argues that size of equities in a portfolio could significantly influence the 
portfolio‟s return performance.  For this purpose, the components of each of the 
hypothetical portfolios are divided into four categories based on the size of their market 
capitalisation with CP1X, SAP1X and NSAP1X series indicate portfolios consisting of 
stocks with the largest market capitalisation whilst CP4X, SAP4X and NSAP4X series 
represent portfolios comprising of stocks with the smallest market capitalisation.  The 
analysis of the size effect is explained below. 
 
7.3.3.1 Descriptive Analysis of the Firm Size Effect in Portfolio Performance 
 
Table 7.18 presents the descriptive analysis of the portfolios‟ performance which is also 
shown graphically in Figure 7.9.  The results reveal a rather interesting pattern in the 
performance of the portfolios and offer yet another perspective about the advantages of 
Islamic-based portfolio since the results suggest that the performance of SAP is superior 
to CP, NSAP and even the benchmark KLCI.   
 
 In the full period sample, SAP10 generated a total return of 188.56 per cent as 
compared to 91.93 per cent by NSAP10 and 124.55 per cent by the KLCI.  The 
performance however, was second to CP10 which accumulated 222.66 per cent return in 
the same period.  The annual mean return during the full period sample was 11.72 per 
cent, 9.92 per cent, and 4.84 per cent for CP10, SAP10 and NSAP10, respectively in 
comparison to 6.56 per cent return per annum for the KLCI. The overwhelming 
performance was particularly driven by the spectacular performance of the construction 
and plantation stocks which together form the main component stocks of CP and SAP 
against NSAP where performance relies heavily on finance, conglomerate, properties and 
tobacco stocks.   CP however, has a slight advantage over SAP since the conventional 
portfolio may also invest in non-halal-approved large-capitalised stocks and hence, 
benefit significantly from such investment.  This explains why return of CP is higher than 
return of the Shariah-compliant portfolio whose investment is restricted only to halal-
approved stocks.   
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Table 7.18: Summary of Portfolio Return by Equity Size, 1990-2008 
CP10 SAP10 NSAP10 CP20 SAP20 NSAP20 CP30 SAP30 NSAP30 CP40 SAP40 NSAP40 KLCI00 FBMESI00
TOTAL 2.2266 1.8856 0.9193 -0.7649 -0.5116 0.6867 0.1878 0.1545 0.1546 -0.4661 -0.5328 0.3044 1.2455 0.4829
MEAN 0.1172 0.0992 0.0484 -0.0403 -0.0269 0.0361 0.0099 0.0081 0.0081 -0.0245 -0.0280 0.0160 0.0656 0.0254
STD DEV 0.3617 0.4174 0.1076 0.2317 0.1779 0.1116 0.0981 0.1219 0.1361 0.0875 0.0744 0.1285 0.2848 0.1013
VAR 0.1308 0.1742 0.0116 0.0537 0.0316 0.0125 0.0096 0.0149 0.0185 0.0077 0.0055 0.0165 0.0811 0.0103
COVAR 0.0423 0.0511 0.0292 0.0437 0.0386 0.0220 0.0217 0.0254 0.0325 0.0217 0.0176 0.0298 0.0811 -0.0045
BETA 0.5211 0.6301 0.3605 0.5390 0.4758 0.2707 0.2679 0.3134 0.4013 0.2677 0.2166 0.3679 1.0000 -0.0559
TOTAL 1.7723 1.1794 0.5750 -0.1472 0.4038 0.6907 0.4352 0.4819 0.5624 0.1106 0.0493 0.5895 1.1565 0.0000
MEAN 0.2215 0.1474 0.0719 -0.0184 0.0505 0.0863 0.0544 0.0602 0.0703 0.0138 0.0062 0.0737 0.1446 0.0000
STD DEV 0.5250 0.6099 0.0801 0.2105 0.0653 0.1312 0.1076 0.1347 0.1080 0.0356 0.0219 0.1538 0.2217 0.0000
VAR 0.2756 0.3720 0.0064 0.0443 0.0043 0.0172 0.0116 0.0181 0.0117 0.0013 0.0005 0.0237 0.0492 0.0000
COVAR 0.0451 0.0477 0.0170 0.0027 0.0015 0.0143 0.0162 0.0176 0.0175 0.0053 0.0022 0.0300 0.0492 0.0000
BETA 0.9176 0.9696 0.3465 0.0553 0.0303 0.2911 0.3291 0.3578 0.3549 0.1075 0.0455 0.6094 1.0000 0.0000
TOTAL -0.0702 0.1411 -0.0536 -0.7589 -1.0193 -0.1839 -0.2414 -0.3119 -0.4801 -0.5498 -0.5519 -0.2939 -0.6577 -0.0775
MEAN -0.0117 0.0235 -0.0089 -0.1265 -0.1699 -0.0306 -0.0402 -0.0520 -0.0800 -0.0916 -0.0920 -0.0490 -0.1096 -0.0129
STD DEV 0.0959 0.2020 0.1294 0.3112 0.2479 0.0829 0.0940 0.1201 0.1717 0.1229 0.1006 0.1066 0.3665 0.1144
VAR 0.0092 0.0408 0.0167 0.0969 0.0614 0.0069 0.0088 0.0144 0.0295 0.0151 0.0101 0.0114 0.1343 0.0131
COVAR 0.0326 0.0710 0.0467 0.1077 0.0782 0.0289 0.0312 0.0382 0.0546 0.0418 0.0336 0.0355 0.1343 -0.0253
BETA 0.2424 0.5290 0.3480 0.8019 0.5819 0.2155 0.2326 0.2847 0.4064 0.3112 0.2500 0.2642 1.0000 -0.1881
TOTAL 0.5245 0.5650 0.3979 0.1411 0.1039 0.1799 -0.0060 -0.0155 0.0723 -0.0269 -0.0302 0.0089 0.7467 0.5604
MEAN 0.1049 0.1130 0.0796 0.0282 0.0208 0.0360 -0.0012 -0.0031 0.0145 -0.0054 -0.0060 0.0018 0.1493 0.1121
STD DEV 0.0872 0.0848 0.0885 0.0508 0.0575 0.0464 0.0342 0.0365 0.0288 0.0289 0.0290 0.0268 0.1205 0.1140
VAR 0.0076 0.0072 0.0078 0.0026 0.0033 0.0022 0.0012 0.0013 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0145 0.0130
COVAR 0.0101 0.0095 0.0101 0.0059 0.0067 0.0054 0.0039 0.0043 0.0033 0.0033 0.0033 0.0031 0.0145 0.0010
BETA 0.6951 0.6529 0.6966 0.4072 0.4578 0.3737 0.2716 0.2934 0.2299 0.2285 0.2257 0.2127 1.0000 0.0684
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Figure 7.9: Trend of Portfolio Return by Equity Size, 1990-2008 
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Note: 
CP10, SAP10, NSAP10 – Portfolios of largest capitalised stocks. 
CP40, SAP40, NSAP40 – Portfolios of smallest capitalised stocks. 
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 Analysis based on the sub-period samples reveals that at the start of the market 
rally in 1990, medium and small-capitalised stocks outperformed large-capitalised stocks 
as shown by Figure 7.9. The strong performance was arguably driven by intense 
speculative interest in medium and small-capitalised stocks as investors took advantage of 
the relatively low prices of these stocks as compared to the usually more expensive blue-
chip stocks at the early stage of the bullish market, effectively pushing the price of 
medium and small-capitalised stocks higher. During the market rally especially in 1992–
1994 periods, large-capitalised SAP portfolio outperformed other portfolios as investors 
began to trade based on fundamental factors and avoided speculative trading. 
Cumulatively, SAP10 gained 117.94 per cent throughout the market rally period or 14.74 
per cent average return per year against 57.50 per cent or 7.19 per cent return per annum 
generated by NSAP10.   
 
 Interestingly, the advantage of Shariah-compliant portfolio is very obvious in the 
crisis and post-crisis periods.  In the crisis period, SAP‟s large-capitalised stocks portfolio 
emerged as the only portfolio which posted positive return while other portfolios suffered 
heavy losses, especially smaller size stocks portfolios. SAP10 gained 14.11 per cent 
cumulative return as compared to a total loss of 7.02 per cent for CP and 5.36 per cent for 
NSAP.   In the post-crisis period, SAP10 remained the best performing portfolio with a 
cumulative return of 56.50 per cent, thus outperforming CP10 (52.4 per cent) and 
NSAP10 (39.79 per cent).  Large-capitalised stocks in SAP did exceptionally well in 
2007 and 2008.  In 2008, the portfolio posted 12.44 per cent return as compared to 8.78 
per cent and 0.69 per cent return from CP and NSAP, respectively.   This is attributed to 
the strong performance by plantation stocks amid poorer performance by finance stocks 
in 2008.  The SAP10 also outperformed both the benchmark KLCI and the Shariah index 
during the crisis and post-crisis periods. 
 
 In terms of portfolio risk, the standard deviation of the SAP‟s large-capitalised 
stocks portfolio is higher than the other portfolios which perfectly coincide with the 
higher return generated by the portfolio.  The standard deviation for the full period 
sample for SAP10 is 41.74 per cent against 36.17 per cent for CP10 and 10.76 per cent 
for NSAP10.  The portfolio risk however, shows a declining trend in the different sub-
period samples.  The risk is particularly high during the market rally period but 
moderated in the crisis and post-crisis periods.  For example, the portfolio risk for SAP10 
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was 60.99 per cent in the market rally period, improving to 20.20 per cent and 8.48 per 
cent in the crisis and post-crisis periods respectively, in line with the lower profit 
generated during the two sub-periods.   As revealed by Figure 7.9, the high standard 
deviation in the crisis period was partly attributable to the sharp losses suffered in the 
1995, 1996 and 1998 periods.  Nevertheless, the ability of the SAP‟s large-capitalised 
stocks portfolio to improve its risk level while maintaining its profitability particularly 
during the crisis and post-crisis periods signifies the major advantage that the Shariah-
compliant portfolio has over conventional and sin portfolios.  This clearly indicates the 
investment quality of large-capitalised, Shariah-compliant stocks as stable and defensive 
assets that can be utilised to safeguard portfolio value especially when the stock market 
turns bearish.  The following section discusses the empirical analysis of the size effect. 
 
 
7.3.3.2 Empirical Analysis of the Firm Size Effect in Portfolio Performance 
 
The empirical analysis of the firm size effect involves the t-tests, correlation tests and 
ordinary least square (OLS) regression tests to investigate the relationship of the size-
based portfolio return and the statistical significance of the difference in the returns of the 
various portfolio sizes.  Table 7.19a to 7.19d provide the results of the paired sample t-
test conducted to determine whether the mean returns of the portfolios differ significantly 
between each other.  Since the descriptive analysis reveals that only the return of the 
large-capitalised portfolios gives a rather meaningful comparison between Shariah-
compliant and non-Shariah-compliant portfolios, only results of the paired sample t-test 
for large-capitalised portfolios are presented.   The results indicate that none of the paired 
portfolio returns is statistically significant in all sample periods.  This further confirms the 
results of the previous analysis that the difference between return of Shariah-compliant 
portfolio and return of non-Shariah-compliant portfolio is not statistically significant.    
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Table 7.19a: Paired Sample T-Test (All Portfolios-Largest, Full Period) 
 
  
 
Table 7.19b: Paired Sample T-Test (All Portfolios-Largest, Market Rally Period) 
 
 
 
Table 7.19c: Paired Sample T-Test (All Portfolios-Largest, Crisis Period) 
 
 
 
Table 7.19d: Paired Sample T-Test (All Portfolios-Largest, Post-Crisis Period) 
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 Tables 7.20 to 7.22 show the results of the correlation tests on returns of each of 
the hypothetical portfolios based on different equity sizes.  Results of the correlation tests 
for CP, shown in Table 7.20, indicate that return of the largest stocks portfolio (CP10) is 
positively correlated with the other portfolios as well as with the benchmark index but the 
degree of correlation is weak and insignificant.  Return of the medium and small-
capitalised portfolios however, are positively and significantly correlated between the 
portfolios and with the KLCI.  A similar correlation pattern is also found in SAP as 
shown in Table 7.21.  The insignificant correlation between the return of the large-
capitalised portfolio with return of the other portfolios is consistent with the superior 
performance of the large-capitalised portfolio against the other portfolios throughout the 
period.  Hence, while the performance of medium and small-capitalised stocks tend to 
move in similar direction at the influence of the overall market, performance of the large-
capitalised stocks have not been significantly affected by the general market, as proven by 
the ability of the large-capitalised portfolio to generate positive return despite losses 
incurred by the other portfolios and the index. This implies that large-capitalised stocks 
are better choices than medium and small- capitalised stocks.   
 
 
Table 7.20: CP Return Correlation based on Portfolio Size (All Period) 
CP10 CP20 CP30 CP40 KLCI
Pearson 
Correlation
1
Sig. (2- ailed)
N 19
Pearson 
Correlation
.202 1
Sig. (2- ailed) .407
N 19 19
Pearson 
Correlation
.181 .502
* 1
Sig. (2- ailed) .457 .028
N 19 19 19
Pearson 
Correlation
.268 .664
**
.820
** 1
Sig. (2- ailed) .268 .002 .000
N 19 19 19 19
Pearson 
Correlation
.410 .662
**
.777
**
.871
** 1
Sig. (2- ailed) .081 .002 .000 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
KLCI
CP10
CP20
CP30
CP40
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Table 7.21: SAP Return Correlation based on Portfolio Size (All Period) 
SAP10 SAP20 SAP30 SAP40 KLCI
Pearson 
Correlation
1
Sig. (2- ailed)
N 19
Pearson 
Correlation
.213 1
Sig. (2- ailed) .381
N 19 19
Pearson 
Correlation
.124 .633
** 1
Sig. (2- ailed) .613 .004
N 19 19 19
Pearson 
Correlation
.284 .861
**
.645
** 1
Sig. (2- ailed) .239 .000 .003
N 19 19 19 19
Pearson 
Correlation
.430 .762
**
.732
**
.829
** 1
Sig. (2- ailed) .066 .000 .000 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
SAP10
SAP20
SAP30
SAP40
KLCI
 
 
 
 The correlation results for NSAP shown in Table 7.22 reveal that returns among 
all the portfolios and the benchmark index are positively and significantly correlated.  The 
strong correlation signifies that the portfolio‟s component stocks are performing in a 
similar direction and influenced by the benchmark‟s performance.  The portfolio‟s large-
capitalised stocks have a very strong positive and significant correlation with the KLCI.  
This is due to a majority of the non-Shariah-compliant large-capitalised stocks 
particularly those of finance; gaming and conglomerate stocks are also the benchmark‟s 
heavyweight component stocks.  The significantly high correlation between the NSAP‟s 
large-capitalised stocks and the key index can also be explained by the fact that finance 
sector is a cyclical industry in which performance is normally subject to ever-changing 
business or economic cycles.  Therefore, since return from finance-related stocks 
constituted the bulk of the NSAP‟s return, it can be expected that the performance of the 
large-capitalised stocks portfolio will be paralleled with the performance of the general 
market.   
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Table 7.22: NSAP Return Correlation based on Portfolio Size (All Period) 
NSAP10 NSAP20 NSAP30 NSAP40 KLCI
Pearson 
Correlation
1
Sig. (2- ailed)
N 19
Pearson 
Correlation
.608
** 1
Sig. (2- ailed) .006
N 19 19
Pearson 
Correlation
.767
**
.612
** 1
Sig. (2- ailed) .000 .005
N 19 19 19
Pearson 
Correlation
.725
**
.641
**
.667
** 1
Sig. (2- ailed) .000 .003 .002
N 19 19 19 19
Pearson 
Correlation
.954
**
.691
**
.840
**
.815
** 1
Sig. (2- ailed) .000 .001 .000 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
KLCI
NSAP10
NSAP20
NSAP30
NSAP40
 
 
 
 While the descriptive analysis and the correlation analysis already indicate there is 
a relationship between equity size and portfolio return, the firm size effect is further 
analysed using OLS regression methods.  However, prior to performing the OLS 
regression, data of each of the hypothetical portfolios‟ returns from different equity sizes 
are tested for their stationarity using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test.  
The unit root test results are shown in Table 7.23.  It is evident from the table that the 
absolute value of all the ADF test statistics is larger than the absolute value of their 
corresponding critical ADF statistics at 5-per cent significant level for all portfolios.  
Therefore, the null hypothesis which states that the data contains unit root (non-
stationary) is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis which states that the data is 
stationary, instead.  As all the data is proven stationary, the analysis of the firm size effect 
can now proceed with the OLS regression analysis. 
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Table 7.23: Unit Root Test Results  
Portfolios/Index ADF 
Test 
Statistic 
95% critical 
value for the 
ADF statistic 
Decision 
Conventional – Largest (CP10) -3.9689 -3.7119 Reject Ho i.e. data is stationary 
Conventional – Medium (CP20) -5.0558 -3.7119 Reject Ho i.e. data is stationary 
Conventional – Small (CP30) -5.0482 -3.7119 Reject Ho i.e. data is stationary 
Conventional – Smallest (CP40) -4.4839 -3.7119 Reject Ho i.e. data is stationary 
Conventional – Total Return (CP) -3.8896 -3.6921 Reject Ho i.e. data is stationary 
Shariah-Approved – Largest (SAP10) -3.8776 -3.7119 Reject Ho i.e. data is stationary 
Shariah-Approved – Medium (SAP20) -4.0306 -3.7119 Reject Ho i.e. data is stationary 
Shariah-Approved – Small (SAP30) -4.6708 -3.7119 Reject Ho i.e. data is stationary 
Shariah-Approved – Smallest (SAP40) -4.4424 -3.7119 Reject Ho i.e. data is stationary 
Shariah-Approved – Total Return (SAP) -3.8741 -3.6921 Reject Ho i.e. data is stationary 
Non-Shariah-Approved – Largest (NSAP10) -5.7642 -3.7119 Reject Ho i.e. data is stationary 
Non-Shariah-Approved – Medium (NSAP20) -3.9059 -3.7119 Reject Ho i.e. data is stationary 
Non-Shariah-Approved – Small (NSAP30) -4.4874 -3.7119 Reject Ho i.e. data is stationary 
Non-Shariah-Approved – Smallest (NSAP40) -4.7517 -3.7119 Reject Ho i.e. data is stationary 
Non-Shariah-Approved – Total Return (NSAP) -4.9470 -3.6921 Reject Ho i.e. data is stationary 
Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) -5.3574 -3.6921 Reject Ho i.e. data is stationary 
 
 
 Regression results incorporating dummy variables used to examine the firm size 
effect on portfolio return based on Equation 6.20 are presented in Table 7.24.  The table 
shows that the statistical parameters of the regression results have not been violated, thus 
allowing for inference to be made.  The results reveal that return from large-capitalised 
stocks portfolio of CP and SAP, in particular, is bigger than the other types of portfolio 
sizes, hence implying the existence of size effect favouring large-capitalised stocks.  For 
CP, the mean return for large-capitalised stocks is 21.54 per cent against medium-
capitalised stocks (2.18 per cent), small-capitalised stocks (−14.20 per cent) and smallest-
capitalised stocks (18.47 per cent).  For SAP, the mean return of large-capitalised stocks 
is 19.76 per cent against medium-capitalised stocks (0.59 per cent), small-capitalised 
stocks (−14.83 per cent) and smallest-capitalised stocks (18.34 per cent).  Size effect is 
also observed in NSAP but the effect is not as obvious as in CP or SAP.  Unfortunately 
however, none of the dummy coefficients is statistically significant, whilst the R
2
 of the 
regressions is considered too small to support that the regression equation is fit to 
represent the relationship of the different equity sizes with portfolio return, hence proof of 
the size effect.  Therefore, although the dummy coefficients indicate the presence of firm 
size effect favouring large-capitalised stocks, the evidence is not robust statistically and is 
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deemed rather weak to infer that return of the large-capitalised stocks portfolio is superior 
to the return of medium and smaller stocks portfolios.   
 
 
Table 7.24: Regression Results of Size-Based Portfolio Return with Dummy Variables 
Rit = β1 + β2D2it  + β3D3it  + β4D4it  + ɛit 
CPt = 0.2154 - 0.1936CP20t - 0.3574CP30t   - 0.0307CP40t + ɛt 
 (se = 0.3129) (se = 0.4198) (se = 0.4198) (se = 0.4198)  
 (t = 0.6884) (t = -0.4613) (t = -0.8514) (t = -0.0732)  
 (p-val = 0.502) (p-val = 0.651) (p-val = 0.408) (p-val = 0.943)  
 R
2
 = 0.0616 F = 0.3282 DW = 1.8899   
SAPt = 0.1976 - 0.1917SAP20t - 0.3459SAP30t - 0.0142SAP40t + ɛt 
 (se = 0.3233) (se = 0.4337) (se = 0.4337) (se = 0.4337)  
 (t = 0.6113) (t = -0.4420) (t = -0.7975) (t = -0.0327)  
 (p-val = 0.550) (p-val = 0.665) (p-val = 0.438) (p-val = 0.974)  
 R
2
 = 0.0575 F = 0.3049 DW = 1.8892   
NSAPt = 0.0972     + 0.0658NSAP20t       - 0.1563NSAP30t + 0.1342NSAP40t + ɛt 
 (se = 0.2282) (se = 0.3061) (se = 0.3061) (se = 0.3061)  
 (t = 0.4259) (t = 0.2150) (t = -0.5105) (t = 0.4384)  
 (p-val = 0.676) (p-val = 0.833) (p-val = 0.617) (p-val = 0.667)  
 R
2
 = 0.0689 F = 0.3702 DW = 2.1761   
 
 
 Results from Equation 6.21 involving a direct regression between the respective 
portfolio‟s annual return with return from their different portfolio sizes are shown in 
Table 7.25.  As none of the statistical parameters has been violated, inferences can now 
be derived from the regression outputs.  By invoking a greater tolerance level, the results 
provide a much stronger evidence of the size effect particularly for CP and SAP portfolios 
since return from the large-capitalised stocks portfolio appears to be statistically 
significant albeit at a lower significance level of around 10 per cent, whilst return for the 
other equity sizes in the two portfolios are not statistically significant.  The R
2
 of around 
34 per cent is considered acceptable to indicate that the regression model is fairly fit to 
properly explain the size-based return relationship.  A more robust result is found in 
NSAP with return of the large-capitalised portfolio having the highest significance level 
whilst the R
2
 is also high at around 87 per cent.  Hence, the size effect favouring large-
capitalised stocks has been partly confirmed by this regression. 
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Table 7.25: Regression Results of Size-Based Portfolio Return 
Rit = β1 + β2XLargest2it  + β3XMedium3it  + β4XSmall4it  + β5XSmallest5it +  ɛit 
CPt = 0.0332 + 1.2502CP10t    + 2.2556CP20t     + 4.2596CP30t     +   3.5810CP40t   + ɛt 
 (se = 0.1460) (se = 0.7212) (se = 2.5986) (se = 4.4919) (se = 2.5765) 
 (t = 0.2275) (t = 1.7336) (t = 0.8680) (t = 0.9483) (t = 1.3898) 
 (p-val = 0.823) (p-val = 0.105) (p-val = 0.400) (p-val = 0.359) (p-val =0.186) 
  R
2
 = 0.3365  F = 1.7749 DW = 2.0261   
SAPt = 0.0302     + 1.3081SAP10t + 2.1572SAP20t + 3.0111SAP30t  +   3.7445SAP40t   +   ɛt 
 (se = 0.1469) (se = 0.7108) (se = 2.5699) (se = 3.9262) (se = 2.4519) 
 (t = 0.2055) (t = 1.8402) (t = 0.8394) (t = 0.7669) (t = 1.5272) 
 (p-val = 0.840) (p-val = 0.087) (p-val = 0.415) (p-val = 0.456) (p-val =0.149) 
  R
2
 = 0. 3473  F = 1.8620 DW = 1.8992  
NSAPt = 0.0026   +  4.6577NSAP10t  +  4.7195NSAP20t  +  4.2468NSAP30t  + 3.0010NSAP40t    +   ɛt 
 (se = 0.0457) (se = 0.5900) (se = 1.7443) (se = 1.1355) (se = 0.9703) 
 (t = 0.0568) (t = 7.8945) (t = 2.7056) (t = 3.7400) (t = 3.0930) 
 (p-val = 0.956) (p-val = 0.000) (p-val = 0.017) (p-val =0.002) (p-val =0.008) 
  R
2
 = 0.8692  F = 23.2641 DW = 2.1159  
 
 
 To conclude, casual observation of the portfolio performance based on different 
equity sizes signifies the presence of the size effect in portfolio performance.  It appears 
that Shariah-compliant portfolio consisting of large-capitalised stocks is not only superior 
to its sister portfolios of medium and smaller size equities but is also superior to 
conventional and sin portfolios as well as the benchmark index.   Interestingly, the sheer 
advantage of Shariah-compliant large-capitalised stocks portfolio is even more evident 
during unfavourable market conditions.  Therefore, the findings have supported the 
general perception that Islamic funds could outperform conventional funds particularly in 
a bearish stock market condition, thus making the funds a better choice for defensive 
investment.  However, the empirical analysis reveals that although there is evidence of 
superior performance by large-capitalised stocks, the size effect is not robust statistically.  
The test of mean return implies that there is no significant difference in the return 
generated by large-capitalised stocks with return from medium or smaller size stocks 
portfolios.  The correlation results indicate that return of the large-capitalised stocks in CP 
and SAP have low and insignificant correlation level with return of the other equity sizes 
portfolios as well as with the benchmark index, thus suggesting that the large-capitalised 
stocks portfolio is less influenced by the general market performance. This is due 
particularly to the strong performance of plantation stocks which has contributed 
substantially to the profit of the large-capitalised stocks portfolio of CP and SAP 
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especially during crisis and post-crisis periods. The regression results applying dummy 
variables to capture the size effect also reveal that the large-capitalised stocks portfolios 
of CP and SAP are superior to medium and smaller-capitalised stocks portfolios.  
However, since the coefficients are not statistically significant, the statistical evidence is 
rather inconclusive and should be interpreted cautiously.     
 
 
7.3.4 Analysis of Portfolio Return Volatility  
 
This section examines the portfolio return volatility by measuring the beta of the 
hypothetical portfolios.  This analysis is necessary to determine how the portfolios would 
react to the changes in the overall market condition.  The main objective is to analyse the 
nature of the portfolios‟ return volatility and to determine whether there is a significant 
difference between Shariah-compliant portfolio and conventional portfolio in terms of 
their return volatility.  For the purpose of this study, the portfolio beta is calculated based 
on Equation 6.22 and the results are presented in Table 7.26 to Table 7.29.  
 
 
Table 7.26: Portfolio Beta in the Full Period  
CPt =  – 0.0423  +  1.5957KLCI t +  ɛt 
 (se = 0.0872) (se = 0.2985)  
 (t = -0.4851) (t = 5.3455)  
 (p-val = 0.634) (p-val = 0.000)  
 R
2
 = 0.6270 F = 28.5740 DW = 1.8843 
SAPt =  – 0.0548  +  1.6359KLCI t   +  ɛt 
 (se = 0.0908) (se = 0.3107)  
 (t = -0.6039) (t = 5.2653)  
 (p-val = 0.554) (p-val = 0.000)  
 R
2
 = 0.6199 F = 27.7236 DW = 1.8877 
NSAPt =  0.0169  +  1.4003KLCI t   +  ɛt 
 (se = 0.0329) (se = 0.1127)  
 (t = 0.5128) (t = 12.4256)  
 (p-val = 0.615) (p-val = 0.000)  
 R
2
 = 0.9008 F = 154.3944 DW = 2.0027 
 
 
 Table 7.26 above gives the portfolios‟ beta in the full period sample.  The results 
show that none of the statistical parameters is violated and all of the beta coefficients are 
statistically significant, thus allowing for inference to be made.  In relation to the overall 
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market‟s performance as proxied by the benchmark KLCI, SAP emerged as the most 
volatile portfolio with a beta of 1.64 times as compared to CP (1.60 times) and NSAP 
(1.40 times).  This is attributed to the SAP‟s component stocks which comprise of various 
positively correlated sectors as well as the large number of medium and small-capitalised 
stocks.  The strong positive correlation between the returns of SAP and KLCI also 
contribute to the high volatility.  CP is the second most volatile portfolio due to the 
similarity in its component stocks with the SAP but the presence of several uncorrelated, 
large-capitalised but non-halal heavyweight stocks helped to reduce the portfolio‟s 
volatility.  On the other hand, NSAP has the lowest volatility as the portfolio‟s main 
component stocks are made up of various high-yielding, uncorrelated sectors.  
Nevertheless, the lower R
2
 for CP and SAP relative to the R
2
 of NSAP indicates that 
KLCI alone is not the best predictor for the two portfolios in line with their relatively 
lower correlation with the benchmark index.  
 
 
Table 7.27: Portfolio Beta in the Market Rally Period  
CPt =  0.0676  +  1.4094KLCI t +  ɛt 
 (se = 0.2471) (se = 0.9334)  
 (t = 0.2737) (t = 1.5099)  
 (p-val = 0.794) (p-val = 0.182)  
 R
2
 = 0.2754 F = 2.2798 DW = 1.7444 
SAPt =  0.0614  +  1.4033KLCI t   +  ɛt 
 (se = 0.2567) (se = 0.9696)  
 (t = 0.2394) (t = 1.4473)  
 (p-val = 0.819) (p-val = 0.198)  
 R
2
 = 0.2588 F = 2.0946 DW = 1.7236 
NSAPt =  0.0675  +  1.6014KLCI t   +  ɛt 
 (se = 0.0560) (se = 0.2117)  
 (t = 1.2038) (t = 7.5644)  
 (p-val = 0.274) (p-val = 0.000)  
 R
2
 = 0.9051 F = 57.2207 DW = 2.5255 
 
 
 The portfolios‟ beta during the market rally period is shown in Table 7.27 above.  
The results indicate that none of the statistical parameters is violated but only NSAP has 
a statistically significant beta and a high R
2
 value, whilst beta for CP and SAP is not 
statistically significant and both have a fairly low R
2
 value.  Consequently, inference 
based on these results should be made with caution.  SAP and CP have lower beta than 
NSAP due to the construction sector, which is the major contributor to the portfolios‟ 
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return during this period, is not strongly and not significantly correlated with the KLCI, 
hence the portfolios‟ performances have not been heavily affected by the overall market‟s 
volatility during the market rally period.  With a statistically significant beta of 1.60 
times, NSAP emerges as the most volatile portfolio during the market rally period which 
is in-line with the fact that the sin portfolio is the best performing portfolio during the 
bullish market enjoying the highest profit among the three portfolios. 
 
 
Table 7.28: Portfolio Beta in the Crisis Period  
CPt =  - 0.0960  +  1.5881KLCI t +  ɛt 
 (se = 0.0874) (se = 0.2285)  
 (t = -1.0978) (t = 6.9491)  
 (p-val = 0.334) (p-val = 0.002)  
 R
2
 = 0.9235 F = 48.2902 DW = 2.5882 
SAPt =  - 0.1100  +  1.6454KLCI t   +  ɛt 
 (se = 0.0935) (se = 0.2444)  
 (t = -1.1765) (t = 6.7331)  
 (p-val = 0.305) (p-val = 0.003)  
 R
2
 = 0.9189 F = 45.3353 DW = 2.5996 
NSAPt =  - 0.0333  +  1.2340KLCI t +  ɛt 
 (se = 0.0560) (se = 0.1463)  
 (t = -0.5951) (t = 8.4354)  
 (p-val = 0.584) (p-val = 0.001)  
 R
2
 = 0.9468 F = 71.1564 DW = 2.2183 
 
 
 Table 7.28 above provides portfolio beta during the crisis period.  The results 
show that none of the statistical parameters is violated and all of the beta coefficients are 
statistically significant, thus allowing for inference to be made.  Comparatively, SAP is 
the most volatile portfolio with a beta of 1.65 times against CP (1.59 times) and NSAP 
(1.23 times).  The higher beta for SAP in the crisis period is attributed to the dismal 
performance of its medium and small-capitalised stocks which constitute the majority of 
the SAP‟s component stocks and they are strongly correlated with the KLCI.  It was the 
poor performance of these stocks that significantly undermined the stronger but less 
correlated return of the large-capitalised stocks in the portfolio.  NSAP has the lowest 
beta which implies a more stable trading in this portfolio.  One plausible explanation is 
that the tobacco sector has provided a considerable cushion to the portfolio‟s volatility, 
whilst the other major contributing sectors in the portfolio, with exception of the finance 
sector which is highly volatile, are less volatile and have low correlation with each other 
and with the benchmark index.  The high R
2
 during this period indicates that trading 
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activities, hence the portfolios‟ performances, are tracking the KLCI‟s movement closely 
as investors traded cautiously and looked to the benchmark index for direction. 
 
Table 7.29: Portfolio Beta in the Post-Crisis Period  
CPt =  - 0.1128  +  1.6027KLCI t +  ɛt 
 (se = 0.0063) (se = 0.0329)  
 (t = -17.8672) (t = 48.7277)  
 (p-val = 0.000) (p-val = 0.000)  
 R
2
 = 0.9987 F = 2374.4 DW = 1.8559 
SAPt =  - 0.1188  +  1.6300KLCI t   +  ɛt 
 (se = 0.0155) (se = 0.0807)  
 (t = -7.6667) (t = 20.1934)  
 (p-val = 0.005) (p-val = 0.000)  
 R
2
 = 0.9927 F = 407.7715 DW = 2.4909 
NSAPt =  - 0.0942  +  1.5129KLCIt  +  ɛt 
 (se = 0.0389) (se = 0.2028)  
 (t = -2.4199) (t = 7.4610)  
 (p-val = 0.094) (p-val = 0.005)  
 R
2
 = 0.9489 F = 55.6663 DW = 1.6789 
 
 
 The portfolios‟ beta in the post-crisis period is shown in Table 7.29 above.  The 
results show that none of the statistical parameters is violated and all of the beta 
coefficients are statistically significant, thus allowing for inference to be made.  In 
relation to the KLCI, all three portfolios have a high and significant beta, implying that 
trading was fairly volatile during the post-crisis period.  One plausible reason is because, 
when the general market sentiment turned lacklustre due to the absence of market 
boosting news, as in the case of the post-crisis period, trading activities, particularly for 
medium and small-capitalised stocks will closely follow the benchmark index 
performance.  This is reflected by the strong positive correlation between the portfolios 
and the KLCI in the post-crisis period as well as the significantly high R
2
 of the 
regressions.  With a beta of 1.63 times, SAP is the most volatile portfolio since its 
performance is once again skewed by the poor but highly correlated return of small-
capitalised stocks despite strong performance by its large and medium-capitalised stocks.  
Nevertheless, SAP is the best performing portfolio as it posted the most recovery from 
the huge losses incurred during the crisis period.  With a beta of 1.51 times, NSAP has 
the lowest volatility which is attributed to the encouraging performance of its main 
component sectors, the majority of which have low correlation among each other 
although they are positively correlated with the benchmark KLCI.   
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 To conclude, analysis of the portfolio volatility reveals that in general the 
performance of the three portfolios is more volatile than the performance of the 
benchmark index.  SAP emerged as the most volatile portfolio when compared to CP and 
NSAP since it is dominated by sectors which are positively correlated between one 
another and with the KLCI.  In addition, the majority of the Shariah-compliant 
portfolio‟s component stocks comprise of medium and small-capitalised stocks whose 
performance is highly volatile which could significantly affect the portfolio‟s total 
collective return.  During the market rally period, SAP‟s beta is the lowest among the 
portfolios in line with the lower return generated by the Shariah-compliant portfolio 
relative to CP and NSAP.  The lower beta is also attributed to the strong performance of 
the construction sector which, in turn, is not significantly correlated with the KLCI.  
During the crisis and post-crisis period, SAP has the highest beta due to its performance 
being adversely affected by small-capitalised stocks despite the positive return generated 
by its large and medium-capitalised stocks.  Notwithstanding however, in comparison to 
CP and NSAP, SAP is arguably the best performing portfolio since it made the most 
recovery for the losses incurred during the crisis period.  For CP, the portfolio generally 
has beta lower than SAP but higher than NSAP.  This is attributed to CP having similar 
portfolio composition structure to SAP while the presence of high-yielding and less 
volatile non-halal heavyweight stocks helped reduce its portfolio‟s volatility.  NSAP has 
the lowest beta among the portfolios, thus implying that trading in this portfolio is 
relatively less volatile.  This reflects that the portfolio has enjoyed the most benefit from 
its diversification since, excepting its finance-related stocks which are highly correlated 
with the KLCI, its other major component stocks are high-yielding, less correlated 
heavyweight stocks.  The high R
2
 level in the crisis and post-crisis periods signifies that 
trading during these periods is significantly influenced by the overall market‟s 
performance as investors relied heavily on the KLCI for direction hence the portfolios‟ 
performance tracked the benchmark‟s movement closely resulting in the high betas.  
 
 
7.3.5 Analysis of the Hypothetical Portfolios’ Performance Based on the 
Traditional Portfolio Performance Measurement Models 
 
This section analyses the hypothetical portfolios‟ performance using the standard 
portfolio performance valuation models namely the Sharpe Index (Equation 6.23), the 
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Treynor Index (Equation 6.24) and the Jensen-alpha Index (Equation 6.25).  The analysis 
is important as the traditional portfolio measurement models allow the portfolios‟ 
performance to be analysed based on their risk-adjusted return and enables for the ranking 
of the portfolios according to their performance.  Since past studies suggest that the 
analysis of Islamic fund performance is also sensitive to the benchmark used, this analysis 
examines the performance of the portfolios using both conventional and Shariah-
compliant benchmark instruments.   The first part of this section evaluates the 
hypothetical portfolios‟ performance using conventional benchmarks whilst the second 
part of this section analyses the hypothetical portfolios‟ performance using Shariah-
compliant benchmark instruments. 
   
 
7.3.5.1 Portfolio Performance Valuation Using Conventional Benchmark 
Instruments 
 
Table 7.30 shows the results of the Sharpe Index and the Treynor Index including the 
portfolio ranking determined based on the two measures.  Apart from the full period 
sample, the analysis also looks into the portfolio performance in each sub-period to 
investigate the impact of the market condition on the portfolios‟ performance and their 
ranking.  To give a clearer understanding, the results are also presented graphically as 
shown in Figures 7.10 to 7.13 for both the Sharpe and Treynor measures, respectively.  
The figures allow for a quick judgement of the portfolios‟ performance by simply looking 
at the position of the portfolios against their respective market line.   
 
 The results of the Sharpe Index and Treynor Index shown in Table 7.30 indicate 
that SAP underperformed both CP and NSAP in all period samples.  The Shariah-
compliant portfolio has the lowest Sharpe Index and the lowest Treynor Index in 
comparison to the unrestricted portfolios.  In relation to the benchmark performance, all 
portfolios outperformed the market portfolio only in the market rally period but 
underperformed during the crisis and post-crisis periods.  SAP is also consistently ranked 
lower than NSAP and CP by both the Sharpe Index and the Treynor Index. The graphs 
depicting the portfolios‟ performance as shown by Figures 7.10 to 7.13 give a visual 
confirmation to the results of the Sharpe Index and the Treynor Index.  With exception of 
the market rally period when all portfolios are located above their respective market lines 
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(CML and SML)
21
, the portfolios lie below their market lines in the full period, the crisis 
and post-crisis periods indicating that they have underperformed the market portfolio 
during these periods.  Therefore, the results from both the Sharpe Index and the Treynor 
Index signify that the Shariah-compliant portfolio is unable to outperform either the 
conventional portfolio or the market portfolio. 
 
 
Table 7.30: Portfolio Performance & Ranking Based on the Sharpe and Treynor Measures 
 
   
(%) 
σi  
(%) 
βi 
(x) 
   
(%) 
Sharpe 
Index 
Treynor 
Index 
Sharpe 
Ranking 
Treynor 
Ranking 
(A) Full Period (1990-2008) 
CP  6.23  57.39  1.5957 4.63  0.0279  1.0027 2 2 
SAP  5.24  59.17  1.6359 4.63  0.0103  0.3729 3 3 
NSAP  10.87  42.02  1.4003 4.63  0.1485  4.4562 1 1 
KLCI  6.56  28.48  1.0000 4.63  0.0678  1.9300   
(B) Market Rally Period (1990-1997) 
CP  27.14  59.56  1.4094 6.24  0.3509  14.8290 2 2 
SAP  26.43  61.17  1.4033 6.24  0.3301  14.3875 3 3 
NSAP  30.22  37.41  1.6014 6.24  0.6410  14.9744 1 1 
KLCI  14.46  22.17  1.0000 6.24  0.3708  8.2200   
(C) Crisis Period (1998-2003) 
CP  -27.00  60.57  1.5881 3.77  -0.5080   -19.3754 2 2 
SAP  -29.03  62.91  1.6454 3.77  -0.5214  -19.9344 3 3 
NSAP  -16.86  46.48  1.2340 3.77  -0.4438  -16.7180 1 1 
KLCI  -10.96  36.65  1.0000 3.77  -0.4019  -14.7300   
(D) Post-Crisis Period (2004-2008) 
CP  12.65  19.33  1.6027 3.07  0.4956  5.9774 2 2 
SAP  12.46  19.72  1.6300 3.07  0.4762  5.7607 3 3 
NSAP  13.18  18.72  1.5129 3.07  0.5401  6.6825 1 1 
KLCI  14.93  12.05  1.0000 3.07  0.9842  11.8600   
 
  
                                                 
21
 CML – Capital Market Line; SML – Security Market Line 
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Figure 7.10: Risk-Adjusted Return Performance (Full Period) 
A. Risk-Adjusted Performance (Sharpe) 
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Figure 7.11: Risk-Adjusted Return Performance (Market Rally Period) 
A. Risk-Adjusted Performance (Sharpe) 
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Figure 7.12: Risk-Adjusted Return Performance (Crisis Period) 
A. Risk-Adjusted Performance (Sharpe) 
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B. Risk-Adjusted Performance (Treynor) 
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Figure 7.13: Risk-Adjusted Return Performance (Post-Crisis Period) 
A. Risk-Adjusted Performance (Sharpe) 
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B. Risk-Adjusted Performance (Treynor) 
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 Table 7.31 below shows the results of the risk-adjusted return performance of the 
hypothetical portfolios as measured using the Jensen-alpha index and the order of the 
portfolio ranking determined based on the adjusted Jensen-alpha Index (Equation 6.26).  
The table reveals that, given the beta of the portfolios, NSAP is the only portfolio which 
managed to beat the market in the full sample period.  The sin portfolio outperformed the 
market portfolio by 3.54 per cent whilst CP underperformed the market portfolio by 1.48 
per cent and SAP by 2.55 per cent.  The zero Jensen-alpha value for the KLCI indicates 
that the benchmark index was chosen as the market portfolio. As expected, the three 
portfolios outperformed the market portfolio significantly during the market rally period 
with NSAP earning the highest excess return of 10.82 per cent followed by CP (9.31 per 
cent) and SAP (8.65 per cent).  However, the performance of the hypothetical portfolios 
relative to the market portfolio in the crisis and post-crisis period was rather disappointing 
as none of the hypothetical portfolios was able to outperform the market portfolio during 
the periods.  Hence, although the hypothetical portfolios managed to recover substantially 
after the crisis, their recovery was lower than that of the market portfolio on a risk-
adjusted basis.  Consistent with the results obtained from the Sharpe Index and Treynor 
Index previously, SAP has underperformed the other portfolios and ranked third among 
the hypothetical portfolios throughout the period.       
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Table 7.31: Portfolio Performance and Ranking Based on the Jensen-alpha Index 
    
(%) 
βi 
(x) 
   
(%) 
   
(%) 
Jensen-α 
Index 
Adjusted 
Jensen-α 
Ranking 
(A) Full Period (1990-2008) 
CP  6.23  1.5957 4.63  6.56  -1.4797  -0.9273 2 
SAP  5.24  1.6359 4.63  6.56  -2.5473  -1.5571 3 
NSAP  10.87  1.4003 4.63  6.56  3.5374  2.5262 1 
KLC1  6.56  1.0000 4.63  6.56  0.0000  0.0000  
(B) Market Rally Period (1990-1997) 
CP  27.14  1.4094 6.24  14.46  9.3147  6.6090 2 
SAP  26.43  1.4033 6.24  14.46  8.6549  6.1675 3 
NSAP  30.22  1.6014 6.24  14.46  10.8165  6.7544 1 
KLCI  14.46  1.0000 6.24  14.46  0.0000  0.0000  
(C) Crisis Period (1998-2003) 
CP  -27.00  1.5881 3.77  -10.96  -7.3773  -4.6454 2 
SAP  -29.03  1.6454 3.77  -10.96  -8.5633  -5.2044 3 
NSAP  -16.86  1.2340 3.77  -10.96  -2.4523  -1.9880 1 
KLCI  -10.96  1.0000 3.77  -10.96  0.0000  0.0000  
(D) Post-Crisis Period (2004-2008) 
CP  12.65  1.6027 3.07  14.93  -9.4280  -5.8826 2 
SAP  12.46  1.6300 3.07  14.93  -9.9418  -6.0993 3 
NSAP  13.18  1.5129 3.07  14.93  -7.8330  -5.1775 1 
KLCI  14.93  1.0000 3.07  14.93  0.0000  0.0000  
 
 
7.3.5.2 Portfolio Performance Valuation Using Islamic-Based Benchmark 
Instruments 
 
Thus far, the valuation of the portfolios‟ performance on the basis of their risk-adjusted 
return was undertaken based on conventional instruments namely the KLCI and the 
Malaysian T-Bills.  Therefore, it would be appropriate to extend the analysis by applying 
Shariah-compliant assets since such instruments arguably are the more suitable 
benchmarks when measuring the performance of Islamic-based portfolio. This is because 
conventional instruments are essentially a different class of assets since they are not 
subject to Shariah restrictions as in the case of the Islamic-based portfolio.  In addition, 
there is also a need to preserve the purity and fairness in the valuation of the Islamic-
based portfolio.   For the purpose of this study, the chosen Shariah-compliant benchmarks 
are the FBM Emas Shariah Index (FBMSHA) to represent the market portfolio and the 
Mudharabah investment account rate as the proxy for the risk-free rate instrument.  Since 
the FBMSHA is a relatively new benchmark, the analysis covers only one time period 
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from 2000 to 2008.  The results of the analysis are shown in Tables 7.32 and 7.33 as well 
as in Figure 7.14 below.   
 
Table 7.32: Portfolio Performance & Ranking Based on the Sharpe and Treynor Measures 
 
   
(%) 
σi  
(%) 
βi 
(x) 
   
(%) 
Sharpe 
Index 
Treynor 
Index 
Sharpe 
Ranking 
Treynor 
Ranking 
CP 5.87  39.11  -0.7667 3.55  0.0593  -3.0260 2 2 
SAP 4.94  41.18  -0.7415 3.55  0.0338  -1.8746 3 1 
NSAP 9.27  29.70  -0.7856 3.55  0.1926  -7.2811 1 3 
FBMSHA 5.37  14.20  1.0000 3.55  0.1282  1.8200   
 
 
Figure 7.14: Risk-Adjusted Return Performance Based on Shariah-Compliant Instruments  
A. Risk-Adjusted Performance (Sharpe) 
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Table 7.33: Portfolio Performance and Ranking Based on the Jensen-Alpha Index 
    
(%) 
βi 
(x) 
   
(%) 
   
(%) 
Jensen-α 
Index 
Adjusted 
Jensen-α 
Ranking 
CP 5.87  -0.7667 3.55  5.37  3.7154  -4.8460 2 
SAP 4.94  -0.7415 3.55  5.37  2.7395  -3.6946 1 
NSAP 9.27  -0.7856 3.55  5.37  7.1498  -9.1011 3 
FBMSHA 5.37  1.0000 3.55  5.37  0.0000  0.0000  
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 Table 7.32 reveals that if the performance of SAP is measured by the Sharpe 
Index, the results are consistent with the outcomes of the previous analyses using 
conventional instruments as the benchmark, of which, SAP underperformed the other 
portfolios, having the lowest Sharpe Index and ranking third among the portfolios.  Figure 
7.14 gives a visual confirmation of the SAP‟s underperformance by virtue of the 
portfolio‟s position below the market line.  Portfolio ranking by the Treynor Index and 
the adjusted Jensen-alpha Index shown in Table 7.33 however, is rather different since 
both measures suggested that SAP is the best performing portfolio and ranked first among 
the portfolios.  Although the Jensen-alpha Index signifies that SAP has outperformed the 
market portfolio by 2.74 per cent against 3.72 per cent by CP and 7.15 per cent by NSAP, 
the Shariah-compliant portfolio is ranked first when the alpha is adjusted for the beta of 
the individual portfolio.  The contradicting ranking is due to the Treynor Index and the 
adjusted Jensen-alpha Index rewarding a portfolio that has the lowest systematic risk 
unlike the Sharpe Index which gives an advantage to a portfolio with minimum total risk.  
Therefore, since SAP has the lowest beta, it was ranked as the best portfolio by the two 
measures accordingly.  With regards to the Treynor Index, although the negative value of 
the index may not give a meaningful interpretation when such analysis involved an actual 
fund performance, the result is nonetheless consistent with the adjusted Jensen-alpha 
Index.  Therefore, while the results might need to be interpreted cautiously, they give an 
important indication that the valuation of an Islamic-based portfolio is also sensitive to 
the type of assets used as benchmark. 
 
 To conclude, the risk-adjusted performance analysis using the traditional portfolio 
performance valuation models of the Sharpe Index, the Treynor Index and the Jensen-
alpha Index reveals that NSAP was consistently ranked the best portfolio followed by CP 
and SAP when their performance is benchmarked against conventional instruments.  In 
sub-period samples, the hypothetical portfolios outperformed the market portfolio only in 
the market rally period but underperformed in the crisis and post-crisis period.  This 
suggests that the best trading strategy is probably to invest in the KLCI‟s component 
stocks during unfavourable market condition.  Another interesting conclusion that can be 
drawn from the analysis is that the performance of Shariah-compliant portfolio might also 
be sensitive to the type of benchmarks used for comparison.  This is evident from the 
finding that when using Shariah-compliant instruments, the Islamic-based portfolio 
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managed to outperform its conventional counterparts and it was ranked as the top 
portfolio by both the Treynor Index and the adjusted Jensen-alpha Index.   
 
 
 
7.4 RESULTS DISCUSSION  
 
This section discusses the results obtained from the various empirical tests of the 
hypothetical portfolios‟ performance.   To recap, the statistical tests that have been 
undertaken include descriptive analysis to obtain a general overview of the portfolios‟ 
performance; the t-test to determine the significance of the difference in the portfolios‟ 
mean returns; the correlation test to examine the relationship of the portfolios‟ returns; the 
OLS regressions to investigate the firm size effect on portfolios‟ return as well as the 
portfolios‟ volatility;  and, the analysis of portfolio performance using the traditional 
portfolio valuation models to measure the portfolios‟ performance and their ranking.  The 
empirical analyses undertaken and their findings are summarised in Figure 7.15.   
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Figure 7.15: Summary of Quantitative Analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Analysis: 
 
 Analyse the portfolio composition as well 
as return and risk performance. 
 The portfolio value and size for CP, SAP 
and NSAP has increased tremendously. 
 The long-run performance is volatile due to 
the market rally and crisis periods. 
 SAP underperformed both CP and NSAP 
and has the highest risk, comparatively. 
 Strong mean reversion trend in the 
portfolios‟ long-term return. 
Size-Effect Analysis: 
 
 Analyse the impact of different equity sizes 
on portfolio‟s return. 
 There is indication that return of SAP‟s 
large-capitalised stocks portfolio is superior 
to the other portfolios and the main index.  
 The large-capitalised stocks outperformed 
during the crisis and post-crisis periods. 
 The evidence of the size effect is rather 
weak, statistically.   
Portfolio Volatility (Beta) Analysis: 
 
 Analyse portfolio volatility (beta) based on 
single index regression model. 
 All portfolios are relatively more volatile 
than the benchmark KLCI.  
 The beta is higher during the crisis and 
post-crisis period. 
 SAP has relatively higher beta than CP and 
NSAP. 
Analysis of Mean Return (t-test): 
 
 Analyse the significance of the mean return 
of the portfolios based on t-test.  
 T-tests on the portfolios‟ mean return reveal 
that the difference is not significant. 
 T-tests on the size effect reveal that the 
difference is not significant. 
 Therefore, the observed differences in the 
mean return are not proven statistically. 
Portfolio Performance Measurement 
Analysis: 
 
 Analyse the portfolios‟ risk-adjusted return 
performance based on Sharpe, Treynor and 
Jensen-α measures.  
 Similar ranking was obtained if using conv. 
benchmarks: (1) NSAP; (2) CP; (3) SAP. 
 If using Islamic-based benchmarks, SAP is 
ranked first according to Treynor and Jensen.  
MAIN FINDINGS: 
 
Conventional Portfolio: 
 It has a volatile performance in which its return 
and risk level is substantially influenced by the 
overall market performance. 
 
Shariah-Compliant Portfolio: 
 Its return and risk performance is identical to 
conventional portfolio‟s performance. 
 Its return is not significantly different from return 
of non-Shariah-compliant portfolio. 
 Its earnings depend on few major sectors such as 
plantation, construction and oil-related sectors. 
 Its sectors‟ returns are positively correlated hence 
unable to maximise the benefit of diversification. 
 Its large-capitalised stocks portfolio is the best 
performing portfolio. 
 It outperformed unrestricted portfolios in bearish 
market but underperforms during bullish market. 
Hence, it can be a good defensive portfolio. 
 
Non-Shariah-Compliant (Sin) Portfolio: 
 It has a high return and moderate risk which is due 
to the investment quality of its component stocks. 
 It has more sectors that contribute substantially to 
profit thus reducing over reliance on few sectors.  
 Its sectors‟ returns are uncorrelated thus enabling 
maximum benefit from diversification.  
 
Other Findings: 
 A case of vital few, trivial many for SAP. 
 Evidence of cost of discipleship hypothesis. 
 An active fund management strategy is arguably 
the best strategy for Malaysian-based funds. 
Correlation Analysis: 
 
 Analyse the cross correlation of returns 
between the portfolios and with the index. 
 All portfolios are positively correlated 
between each other and with the index. 
 The correlation level is higher during the 
crisis and post crisis periods. 
 All sectors in CP and SAP are positively 
correlated whilst some of major sectors in 
NSAP are less or uncorrelated. 
 Return of SAP‟s large-capitalised stocks 
portfolio has low correlation with others.  
   
li    
l i  
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 Casual observation on the portfolios‟ performance over the 19-year period from 
1990 to 2008 indicates that the sizes of the three hypothetical portfolios have grown 
tremendously both in terms of value as well as the numbers of their component stocks.  
The long-term performance also reveals that trading in the Malaysian stocks has been 
excessively volatile particularly on two occasions: namely the market rally of 1993 to 
1994, and the stock market crisis of 1998 to 2003 periods.  Consequently, the long-run 
historical performance was heavily skewed by these two market events, thus making the 
analysis of the portfolio performance rather tricky and preventing a conclusive decision to 
be made if such analysis is solely based on the full period sample.  Therefore, the full 
period sample was further divided into three sub-periods namely the market rally period 
(1990 to 1997), the crisis period (1998 to 2003), and the post-crisis period (2004 to 2008) 
to allow for in depth examination of the impact of different market conditions on the 
portfolios‟ return.  The volatile performance of the hypothetical portfolios‟ return is 
generally consistent with the overall volatility in the stock market as reflected by the large 
fluctuation in the KLCI.  This implies that share prices in the Malaysian stock market, 
and hence, the portfolios‟ performance, are significantly influenced by the general market 
performance. Fortunately, despite the volatile market condition, all portfolios have 
successfully generated a cumulative positive return throughout the period.  The long-term 
performance of the hypothetical portfolios‟ return has clearly followed the overall market 
trend with bulk of the return being earned during the market rally period.  Although the 
portfolios suffered heavy losses during the crisis period, they were able to recover their 
losses and return to profit in the post-crisis period.  In general, however, return of the 
SAP‟s portfolio is below the return of the conventional and sin portfolios.  
 
 The descriptive analysis shows that SAP underperformed the unrestricted 
portfolios in full as well as sub-period samples.  In addition, SAP has the highest risk 
relative to CP and NSAP for most of the periods except during the post-crisis period 
during which its risk was the lowest.  It also appears that the performance of SAP closely 
resembles the performance of CP which is attributed to the similarities in their portfolio 
composition as SAP also invests in almost all stocks held by CP.  However, the presence 
of non-Shariah-compliant heavyweight stocks in CP has enabled the portfolio to slightly 
outperform SAP.  In view that CP invests in both Shariah-approved and non-Shariah-
approved stocks, it could be regarded as representing actual conventional portfolios 
commonly available in the market.  On the other hand, NSAP, which can be regarded as a 
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sin portfolio since it invests entirely in non-permissible (haram) stocks, has outperformed 
both CP and SAP throughout the period.   Although the observed lower return and higher 
risk level implies that an adherence to Shariah restrictions may have adverse 
consequences on portfolio performance, it is premature at this point to assume that return 
of the Shariah-compliant portfolio is inferior to conventional or sin portfolios without 
undergoing relevant empirical tests. The following discussion attempts to find the reasons 
behind the SAP‟s underperformance.  
 
 To determine whether the difference in the portfolios‟ mean return is statistically 
significant, paired-sample t-tests were conducted.  The t-tests revealed that the differences 
in the portfolios‟ mean return are not significant statistically.  Consequently, the observed 
superior return of NSAP, or to view it from a rather different perspective the inferiority of 
SAP‟s return, has not been proven statistically by the t-tests analysis.  Likewise, the t-
tests also confirmed that the difference between the mean return of SAP and CP is not 
statistically significant.  Therefore, although the descriptive analysis shows that there are 
differences in the mean return of the portfolios, the statistical results are not robust 
enough to support the claim that the return of the Shariah-compliant portfolio is inferior 
to the return of non-Shariah-compliant portfolios, or vice versa, amid the absence of more 
conclusive evidence.  Instead, the statistical results do suggest that the return of the 
Shariah-compliant portfolio is not significantly different from the return of non-Shariah-
compliant portfolios.    
 
 In terms of portfolio risk, the descriptive analysis indicates that SAP is riskier than 
CP and NSAP since it has a slightly higher standard deviation when compared to its rival 
portfolios in all periods.  This is confirmed by the analysis of the portfolio beta.  The 
hypothetical portfolios in general have high beta indicating that their performance is 
relatively more volatile than the performance of the benchmark KLCI.  This is attributed 
to the strong positive correlation between the hypothetical portfolios‟ returns and the 
benchmark‟s return which results in the performance of the hypothetical portfolios being 
influenced by the performance of the KLCI, particularly during the crisis and post-crisis 
periods.  SAP has lower beta during the market rally period but its beta is the highest in 
crisis and post-crisis periods.  On the contrary, NSAP has the lowest beta among the 
portfolios which reflects that trading in this portfolio is relatively less volatile. 
Notwithstanding however, SAP is arguably the best performing portfolio, particularly in 
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the post-crisis period considering that it posted the most recovery from the crisis period in 
comparison to CP and NSAP.  Therefore, the higher risk and volatility in SAP is 
consistent with the stronger rebound by the Shariah-compliant portfolio in the post-crisis 
period.  
 
 Since a portfolio‟s return and risk level is directly influenced by its component 
stocks or industries in the portfolio, the analyses have examined each of the hypothetical 
portfolios‟ component sectors to determine their composition.  For CP, its return is 
mainly supported by large-capitalised stocks involved in construction, finance, plantation, 
industrial engineering, tobacco and oil-related sectors.  For SAP however, most of its 
earnings come from just a few defensive industries such as construction, plantation, 
industrial engineering and oil-related stocks.  In addition, the correlation analysis reveals 
that returns of the sectors in SAP are positively correlated, thus implying that the 
Shariah-compliant portfolio may not be able to maximise the benefit from its industry 
diversification. With respect to industry composition, NSAP has the advantage since it 
could rely on profitable and stable sectors such as finance, gaming, conglomerate and 
tobacco to ensure sustainable earnings growth.  Therefore, unlike SAP, NSAP has more 
sectors which contribute substantially to its total income, thus reducing the overreliance 
on just a few sectors to support its earnings.  Since correlation analysis indicates that 
returns from the different major income generating sectors in CP and NSAP are 
moderately and insignificantly correlated, the non-Shariah-compliant portfolios are able 
to maximise the benefits from their industry diversification, thus allowing the portfolios 
to maintain their earnings in any given market condition.        
 
 Results of the correlation analysis, undertaken to examine the cross relationship in 
the hypothetical portfolios‟ returns, reveal a strong positive correlation in returns of the 
portfolios and the benchmark index. This signifies that the portfolios tend to move in a 
similar direction and are significantly influenced by the overall market performance.  
There is also evidence of varying degrees of correlation levels in different time periods 
whereby CP and SAP are found to be more correlated with the KLCI in the crisis and 
post-crisis periods than in the market rally period.  The high correlation between the 
portfolios‟ returns and the KLCI‟s return during the bearish market condition implies that 
investors turned to the benchmark index for direction amid the absence of market 
boosting news and tracked the index performance closely.  The findings from the 
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correlation tests are supported by the analysis of the portfolios‟ volatility, in which, their 
positive betas indicate that the hypothetical portfolios would tend to fluctuate in a similar 
direction with the KLCI‟s movement.  The portfolio betas of CP and SAP are also higher 
than the beta of NSAP in the crisis and post-crisis periods which coincided with the 
observed higher correlation between the two portfolios and the KLCI during these 
periods.      
 
 Results of the analysis of the hypothetical portfolios‟ returns based on different 
equity sizes indicate the presence of the firm size effect favouring large-capitalised stocks 
particularly in the Shariah-compliant portfolio.  The analysis found that SAP‟s portfolio 
consisting of large-capitalised stocks has outperformed not only its sister portfolios which 
invested in medium and smaller capitalised stocks but also non-Shariah-compliant 
portfolios and the benchmark index, particularly during bearish market condition.  The 
result is important, as it implies that Shariah-compliant funds or halal-approved stocks 
are better candidates for defensive investment strategy as they are able to help in 
maintaining a portfolio‟s earnings or to lessen the impact of market volatility arising from 
the changing economic or business cycles.  One plausible explanation for the outstanding 
performance of the large-capitalised stocks portfolio is its low and insignificant 
correlation with other types of portfolio sizes and with the benchmark index which, in 
turn, suggests that the large-capitalised stocks portfolio is not heavily influenced by other 
portfolios or by the general market performance.  This is due to the portfolio‟s 
components being mainly comprised of blue-chip companies with sound fundamentals 
and sustainable income.  The evidence of the size effect however, is not robust 
statistically, as shown by the regression analysis, thus rendering the findings to be rather 
inconclusive statistically.   
 
 The final part of the quantitative analysis evaluated the hypothetical portfolios‟ 
return using the traditional risk-adjusted portfolio performance measurement models of 
the Sharpe Index, the Treynor Index and the Jensen-alpha Index.  The results confirmed 
the findings from earlier analyses that SAP generally underperforms CP, NSAP and the 
market portfolio.  When the hypothetical portfolios‟ performance is benchmarked against 
conventional instruments, all three standard models produced a consistent ranking in 
which NSAP is ranked the top portfolio followed by CP and SAP.  NSAP is the only 
portfolio that outperformed the market portfolio in the full sample period while both CP 
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and NSAP underperformed the market portfolio in the same period.  As expected, the 
three hypothetical portfolios outperformed the market portfolio in the market rally period 
but underperformed during the crisis and post-crisis periods.  The findings are in-line with 
the results obtained from the descriptive analysis, the correlation analysis and the 
portfolio volatility analysis which indicate that the performance of share prices, and 
hence, the hypothetical portfolios is heavily influenced by the KLCI particularly when 
market condition is unfavourable.  The superior performance of NSAP is attributed to the 
investment quality of its component stocks which comprises of high-yielding, large-
capitalised but non-Shariah-compliant stocks as earlier revealed by the descriptive 
analysis related to the portfolio‟s component stocks.         
 
 On the other hand, when performance is benchmarked against Shariah-compliant 
instruments, SAP emerged as the best performing portfolio based on the Treynor Index 
and the adjusted Jensen-alpha Index albeit the Islamic-based portfolio remained in third 
ranking by the Sharpe Index.  The contradicting ranking being due to the Treynor Index 
and the adjusted Jensen-alpha Index rewarding the least volatile portfolio, in this case 
SAP has the advantage since it has the lowest beta when its performance is measured 
against the Shariah index.  Although the negative Treynor Index may not provide a 
meaningful interpretation when such analysis involves an actual managed fund, the result 
is consistent with the adjusted Jensen-alpha Index, hence suggesting that any analysis 
related to Islamic fund performance should be undertaken cautiously as the outcomes may 
be sensitive to the type of benchmark used for comparing the Islamic fund performance, 
particularly the choice between Shariah-compliant or conventional benchmark 
instruments.   
 
 To conclude, the quantitative analysis has investigated the performance of the 
Shariah-compliant portfolio vis-à-vis the performance of the non-Shariah-compliant 
portfolios and the benchmark index.  Several types of statistical tests were conducted 
systematically to allow for thorough examination of the performance of the hypothetical 
portfolios.  The empirical analysis begins with the descriptive analysis of the portfolios‟ 
return which enables each of the portfolios to be characterised based on their return and 
risk performance.  The descriptive analysis reveals that there is an obvious difference in 
the hypothetical portfolios‟ performance, with SAP generally underperforming both CP 
and NSAP.  This is based on the findings that the return of the Shariah-compliant 
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portfolio is below the return of the non-Shariah-compliant portfolios, whilst its risk is 
higher than the risk of its rival portfolios.  Subsequently, the difference in the return of the 
portfolios is analysed using the paired sample t-test to determine whether the difference 
between two portfolios‟ mean return is statistically significant.  Results of the t-test show 
that the difference in the portfolios‟ return is not significant statistically.  Since return of 
the portfolios is greatly affected by the performance of their component stocks, further 
analysis was conducted to examine the contribution from each industry in the 
hypothetical portfolios.  The results reveal that while SAP has to rely on just a few 
profitable industries, NSAP has more industries capable of generating substantial income 
for the portfolio.  In addition, results of the correlation analysis reveal that returns of the 
hypothetical portfolios are positively and strongly correlated amongst each other and with 
the benchmark index, and the correlation levels vary in different market conditions.  The 
correlation analysis also indicates that NSAP has more uncorrelated industries in its 
portfolio which explains the superior performance of the sin portfolio against the Shariah-
compliant portfolio as observed in the descriptive analysis.  
 
 The analysis was further extended into the investigation of the firm size effect.  
The analysis found that SAP‟s portfolio comprising large-capitalised stocks is the best 
performing portfolio since it managed to outperform not only the other portfolios but also 
the benchmark index especially in bearish market conditions.  However, despite the 
overwhelming evidence from the descriptive analysis, the evidence of the size effect is 
not robust statistically, hence the evidence cannot be used to generalise that the 
performance of an Islamic-based portfolio which specialises in large-capitalised stocks is 
superior to the other portfolios.  The analysis of the portfolios‟ volatility in relation to the 
overall market performance was conducted by calculating the hypothetical portfolios‟ 
beta using the single index regression model.  The beta analysis indicates that the 
portfolios are more volatile than the benchmark index which, in turn, implies that their 
performance is significantly influenced by the overall market performance.  The 
portfolios‟ return volatility also varies in different market conditions based on their beta 
which tends to be higher during the crisis and post-crisis periods.  In addition, SAP 
generally has higher beta relative to CP and NSAP.  Therefore, results from the analysis 
of the portfolios‟ beta have confirmed the earlier findings pertaining to the portfolio risk 
analysis using the standard deviation as well as the correlation analysis.  
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 The portfolio performance analysis based on the risk-adjusted return reveals that 
SAP was consistently ranked lower as compared to CP and NSAP.  In fact, NSAP was 
ranked as the best portfolio by the traditional portfolio valuation models.  This implies the 
difficulty of the Shariah-compliant portfolio to outperform the non-Shariah-compliant, 
particularly if their performance is measured against conventional benchmarks.  This is 
arguably due to the possible bias against the Islamic-based portfolio arising from the 
Shariah restrictions on stocks and industries selection which prevent Islamic-based 
portfolio from investing in high-yielding non-Shariah-compliant conventional 
instruments, yet its performance is benchmarked against those instruments.  Further 
analysis has demonstrated that when Shariah-compliant instruments are used as the 
performance benchmarks, the Islamic-based portfolio is able to outperform conventional 
portfolios.  This implies that the valuation of Islamic-based portfolio performance is 
sensitive to the type of benchmark used as the basis for measuring its performance.   
 
 
7.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter focuses on the quantitative analysis of the performance of Shariah-compliant 
funds based on hypothetical portfolios comprising entirely of Malaysian stocks.  There 
are three portfolios created specifically for the purpose of this study, namely: 
Conventional Portfolio (CP), a non-Shariah-compliant portfolio which invests in both 
halal-approved and non-halal-approved stocks and is used to represent conventional or 
ethical funds in Malaysia; Shariah-Approved Portfolio (SAP), a Shariah-compliant 
portfolio which invests only in halal-approved stocks and is meant to represent Islamic-
based funds; and, Non-Shariah-Approved Portfolio (NSAP), a non-permissible (haram) 
or sin portfolio which invests only in stocks deemed prohibited by the Shariah.   
 
 The descriptive analysis indicates that return of SAP is generally below the return 
of CP and NSAP as well as the benchmark KLCI index.  The difference however, is not 
statistically significant; hence the evidence is not robust enough to infer that return of 
Shariah-compliant funds is inferior to the return of non-Shariah-compliant funds.  The 
results also suggest that the performance of SAP is identical to the performance of CP 
which is attributed to the similarities in their portfolio composition as the latter is able to 
invest in both halal-approved and non-halal-approved stocks.  Consequently, CP is 
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poised to have an advantage over SAP in terms of securities selection since it could 
choose the best stocks from both halal-approved and non-halal-approved assets universe.  
Consequently, this makes it rather difficult for the Islamic-based portfolio to beat its 
conventional counterparts.  In hindsight, the findings of the descriptive analysis have 
partly confirmed the cost of discipleship hypothesis which argues that investment with 
religious or ethical concerns entails costs, resulting in lower performance due to various 
constraints imposed on the portfolio.   
 
 Interestingly however, further analysis suggests that the performance of a SAP 
portfolio that invests only in large-capitalised stocks is superior to the performance of 
conventional portfolios and the KLCI particularly during an unfavourable market 
condition.  Hence, at least, the Islamic-based portfolio may be regarded as an effective 
defensive portfolio due to its ability to outperform other portfolios especially when the 
stock market turned bearish.  Although the results supporting the size effect are not robust 
statistically, despite the overwhelming evidence from the portfolios‟ return, they do 
indicate the presence of the firm size effect favouring large-capitalised stocks in the 
Shariah-compliant portfolio.  In view of this, the SAP‟s underperformance can be 
attributed to the overexposure to medium and small-capitalised stocks whose earnings 
and share prices are more volatile as compared to the more stable heavyweight stocks, 
thus increasing the portfolio‟s risk as shown by the higher standard deviation and the beta 
of the portfolio.  Since the composition of the Shariah-compliant portfolio is dominated 
by medium and small-capitalised stocks, their volatile performance, especially during 
crisis and post-crisis periods, has compromised the positive return from the large-
capitalised stocks and dragged the Shariah-compliant portfolio‟s return lower relative to 
the return of the non-Shariah-compliant portfolios.  Hence, it is a classic case of “vital 
few, trivial many” for the Islamic-based portfolio since the availability of the large 
numbers of halal-approved stocks may not necessarily give an advantage to the Shariah-
compliant portfolio over the non-Shariah-compliant portfolio.  This is due to majority of 
the halal-approved stocks being medium and smaller stocks whose earnings and share 
prices are more volatile, thus, unfortunately, affecting the Islamic-based portfolio‟s 
performance adversely.       
 
 The comparative performance between SAP and NSAP clearly indicates that, in 
the process of portfolio construction involving stock selection, the investment quality of 
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the stocks rather than their quantity is crucial to portfolio performance.  Hence, if 
consideration is based strictly on stocks or industry selection, an Islamic-based portfolio 
would clearly be in a disadvantaged position as compared to conventional and sin 
portfolios since Shariah restrictions would effectively cause Islamic-based portfolio to 
shun high-yielding, uncorrelated but non-halal heavyweight stocks or industries.  
Consequently, an Islamic-based fund is left with just a limited numbers of high-yielding 
stocks or profitable industries which, in turn, are likely to increase the risk of over-
reliance of the Shariah-compliant fund towards a handful of quality stocks or industries in 
view that majority of halal-approved stocks are unfortunately rather trivial, investment 
wise.  The analysis has revealed that the superior performance of NSAP is primarily due 
to its ability to maximise the benefit from industry diversification since the sin portfolio 
has more high-yielding, non-correlated heavyweight stocks in its portfolio. Under this 
circumstance, it will be rather difficult for an Islamic-based portfolio to outperform its 
conventional counterparts and it would also cause the portfolio‟s performance to be 
heavily dependent upon other factors, among which, its fund managers‟ superior 
investment skill is arguably the most vital.  
 
 Analysis of the hypothetical portfolio performance based on their risk-adjusted 
return reveals some interesting results.  Although the Sharpe Index, the Treynor Index 
and the adjusted Jensen-alpha Index generally confirmed the superiority of the sin 
portfolio over the Shariah-compliant portfolio by virtue of their consistent ranking which 
put NSAP as the top performing portfolio when performance is measured against 
conventional benchmarks, similar analysis using Shariah-compliant benchmarks indicates 
that the Islamic-based portfolio is able to outperform the sin portfolio.  Though the results 
favouring SAP may be considered premature amid the limited data available, the findings 
do suggest that any valuation of an Islamic-based portfolio might be sensitive to the type 
of benchmarks used for performance comparison particularly with regards to the choice 
between Shariah-compliant or conventional benchmarks, nonetheless.  In addition, the 
findings that the hypothetical portfolios outperformed the market portfolio only during 
the market rally period but underperformed the index in the crisis and post-crisis periods 
also have quite a significant implication.  The result which is consistent with the findings 
of the correlation analysis implies that the best trading strategy to pursue in a bearish 
market condition is to invest in the KLCI‟s main component stocks.        
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 Another interesting observation from the quantitative analysis is that the historical 
performance of the hypothetical portfolios‟ returns shows a very strong mean reversion 
trend which suggests that a passive buy-and-hold policy is unlikely to generate favourable 
positive return over a long-term period.  This is because the hypothetical portfolios are 
designed as purely market-based portfolios, of which, their return is entirely influenced 
by the overall market performance without interference from other non-market factors 
such as fund managers‟ investment skills or changes in trading microstructure, regulatory 
environment or corporate activities of the listed companies.  Instead, the volatility in the 
hypothetical portfolios‟ return reflects the actual fluctuation in the overall market 
performance, in which, the strong mean reversion trend implies that the long-term return 
of the portfolio is close to zero on the back of the excessive price fluctuation in the 
Malaysian stock market over the last 19-year period.  Therefore, in confronting such a 
highly volatile market environment, the more successful approach is arguably the active 
fund management strategy, especially for an Islamic-based fund which at its inception has 
already been constrained by its Shariah-related investment mandates.  Certainly, the most 
crucial aspect in an active fund management strategy is the fund/investment managers 
themselves.  The next chapter provides the qualitative analysis involving interviews with 
actual fund/investment managers based in Malaysia who are directly responsible for the 
handling of Islamic funds.  Analysis of the primary data obtained from the industry 
practitioners would offer a new perspective on issues pertaining to Islamic fund 
operations and performance valuation that could further broaden and strengthen the 
findings of this study. 
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Chapter 8 
 
EXPLORING THE ACTUAL ISLAMIC FUND 
MANAGEMENT OPERATION AND VALUATION  
OF ISLAMIC FUNDS’ PERFORMANCE IN MALAYSIA: 
PERCEPTION ANALYSIS  
 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter focuses on the analysis of the Islamic fund management operation and 
valuation of Islamic funds‟ performance in Malaysia.  This analysis is basically intended 
to complement the quantitative analysis discussed in the preceding chapter by obtaining 
inputs from industry practitioners through face-to-face interviews with Islamic 
fund/investment managers.  The main objectives of the qualitative analysis is to look into 
the actual Islamic fund management practices, to analyse how comprehensive the Shariah 
principles are applied in the Islamic funds‟ creation and handling, to examine the impact 
of Shariah-compliance requirements on Islamic funds‟ performance, and to investigate 
the actual Islamic funds‟ performance and measurement techniques. The subject interest 
of this analysis includes Islamic funds‟ characteristics (such as investment objectives, 
types and structure), the fund managers‟ traits (including their experience, skills, 
education background and decision making process), the Shariah-compliance matters (for 
instance including the role and function of the Shariah advisory board, the application of 
the Shariah principles as well as the impact of the Shariah-compliance requirements), and 
issues related to the performance of the actual Islamic funds (for example the factors 
affecting the performance of Islamic funds and the performance valuation methods used 
by the Islamic fund managers). The outcome from the analysis can be used to determine 
the impact of Shariah restrictions on Islamic funds‟ performance and to gauge how 
holistic the current Islamic fund management operation is by looking at their Shariah 
practice.  Incorporating the input obtained directly from industry practitioners will 
certainly add significant value to the depth and reliability of this study.   
 
    The chapter begins with a detailed explanation of the research method used in this 
qualitative analysis, particularly the research purpose, tool and sample selection as well as 
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the various tasks involved in fieldwork activities which include planning, execution and 
post-execution stages.  This is followed by a discussion of the research questions that this 
analysis seeks to address which are related to Islamic fund characteristics, real intention 
of fund management companies, factors that contribute to Islamic fund performance, 
Shariah practice and measurement of Islamic funds‟ performance.  The chapter continues 
with the data analysis section which analyses the responses from participating fund 
managers using the coding analysis technique and the results were then deliberated in the 
results discussion section.  The chapter then ends with a conclusion.    
 
8.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
This section elaborates the research method used in this analysis.  The section is divided 
into two parts. The first part explains the research purpose, tool and sample selection of 
the qualitative analysis whilst the second part discusses the chronology of works which 
includes the planning, execution and post-execution stages involved in the fieldwork. 
 
8.2.1 Research Purpose, Tool and Sample Selection 
 
The analysis seeks to investigate the operation and handling of the existing Islamic funds, 
particularly with regards to the relationship of all parties involved in the Islamic funds 
operation as depicted in Figure 5.5 below (reproduced from Chapter 5, page 133):    
 
Figure 5.5: Typical Relationship Structure in Fund Management Industry 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fund Management Company 
Fund/Investment Managers 
Unit Trust Fund Investors/Unit Holders 
(A) Subscription (B) Pooled Investment 
(D) Performance (E) Return 
Source: Adapted from Sekaran (2003: 92) 
(C)  
Moderating Factors: 
Fund‟s characteristics. 
Fund managers‟ skills. 
Valuation methods used. 
External factors. 
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 The relationship begins when an individual investor purchases (subscribes) a 
specific amount of unit(s) of an Islamic fund offered by a fund management company, 
thus invoking the first stage of the relationship (A) between the investor, as the registered 
unit holder, and the fund management company, as the party entrusted to manage the 
Islamic fund professionally on behalf of its investors through the subscription of the fund.  
In return for the fund management services rendered, the company is entitled to a pre-
determined rate of fund management fees normally calculated based on a certain 
percentage of the fund‟s portfolio value.  All proceeds from the Islamic fund subscription 
are kept by the fund management company in a pooled investment account (B) which is 
later invested into a portfolio of assets or securities based on the mandate specified for the 
fund.  While the role of the fund management company is essentially to handle all the 
administration and marketing matters of the fund, the investment activities are actually 
undertaken by licensed fund/investment managers appointed by the fund management 
company.  In this respect, the fund/investment managers can either be sourced externally 
from other fund management companies or internally from within the fund management 
company itself, provided that the company holds both the fund management company as 
well as investment management licence from the Securities Commission of Malaysia (or 
“the SC”).  Therefore, the second stage of relationship (C) occurs which is between the 
fund management company and fund/investment managers whereby the former appoint 
the latter to carry out investment activities for the Islamic fund in return for a specific 
investment management fee.  Return from all investments made on behalf of the fund is 
then channelled back to the fund which is later distributed to its investors/unit holders in 
the form of dividend return (E) at a rate which is normally determined on a discretionary 
basis by fund management companies.  The fund performance (D) however, is subject to 
various factors, including the Islamic fund‟s characteristics, its fund managers‟ 
investment skills, and other external factors such as the economics or business cycles, 
stock market performance and general market sentiment.   
 
 Hence, the interest of the qualitative analysis is to investigate whether there are 
clear Shariah principles applied in the Islamic fund investors–fund management 
companies–investment managers tripartite relationship, and to examine how fund 
management companies handle Shariah-compliance matters related to their Islamic fund.  
This analysis also attempts to investigate the Islamic funds‟ performance particularly with 
regards to the consequences of adopting Shariah-compliance requirements and fund 
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valuation techniques used by fund managers when evaluating their Islamic funds‟ 
performance.  
 
 To obtain maximum input from industry practitioners directly, the analysis uses 
semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with fund managers as a research tool.  The 
interview method is preferred since it is more flexible than other data gathering methods 
such as telephone interview, questionnaire, internet survey or personal observation 
because it is conducted in-person between researcher and respondents, thus allowing the 
researcher to clarify interview questions immediately when needed or make necessary 
amendments by adding new or withdrawing unsuitable questions depending on 
respondents‟ reply or circumstances. This enables deeper on-site investigation and helps 
minimise error due to confusion. A face-to-face interview also provides a wider 
opportunity for thorough observation as it allows the researcher to detect nonverbal cues 
through the respondents‟ body language that may be significant to this analysis.   
 
 The interviews are based on a set of 46 questions which are divided into five 
categories to reflect the five research questions that this analysis intends to investigate.  
Each interview lasted between 45 to 90 minutes and was recorded using a digital audio 
recorder.  Apart from the interviews, additional information was also obtained from 
official printed materials such as fund prospectuses, internal reports, newsletters, in-house 
magazines and other publications.  The sample comprises of seven fund management 
companies from a total of 23 companies which offer Shariah-compliant funds in 
Malaysia.  The following section elaborates the chronology of events in the fieldwork 
activities. 
 
8.2.2 Chronology of the Fieldwork 
 
The fieldwork involved three main stages namely planning, execution and post-execution.  
Each of the stages is explained below. 
 
8.2.2.1 Planning 
 
The idea of conducting interview analysis emerged after considering the vital role of fund 
managers in determining the success of a unit trust or mutual fund.  Fund managers are 
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essentially perceived as professionals who provide investment management and advisory 
services to their clients – either fund management companies or individual (usually high 
net worth) investors.  In this respect, the fund managers are given full authority and 
responsibility to make investment decisions on behalf of their clients with the aim of 
achieving the desired return for the fund they manage, albeit they are bound to act within 
their respective investment mandate.  The role of the fund manager is becoming even 
more crucial nowadays amid a more dynamic stock market environment that makes it 
essential for fund managers to possess superior investment skills to remain competitive.  
The skills include the ability to predict future market direction accurately; to determine 
the best time to buy or sell financial instruments; to identify undervalued securities or 
sectors; and, to find the right mix of individual asset classes in their portfolios‟ asset 
composition.  Therefore, the dynamic market environment provides the acid test to fund 
managers‟ real capabilities as only fund managers with superior investment skills are 
likely to produce a satisfactory return for their clients regardless of the market condition, 
hence justification for their investment management fees. In addition, fund managers are 
also the actual industry players or practitioners in the fund management industry.  
Subsequently, it is natural to perceive that the fund managers would have considerable 
knowledge on fund management operations including investment activities, Shariah-
compliance requirement particularly those related to portfolio investment as well as fund 
performance and valuation techniques.  Hence, their participation would contribute 
significantly to this study, particularly in providing valuable input regarding fund 
management operations which secondary data would not be able to accommodate.   
 
 The interview process began in April 2009 with the drafting of interview 
questions (completed in June 2009 after numerous discussions and amendments).  The set 
contains 46 questions which are divided into five categories to reflect the five research 
questions that this analysis seeks to investigate (see Appendix III).  Each of the categories 
is related to the Islamic fund‟s characteristics and operations; the Shariah practice; the 
Islamic fund‟s performance; and issues related to an alternative fund performance 
measure, respectively.  The fieldwork was planned to be carried out in July/August 2009 
to coincide with the normally quiet period for trading activities in the Malaysian stock 
market. Such timing is chosen to increase the chances of acceptance by fund management 
companies. 
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 The next step in the planning stage is to identify the sample respondents for this 
study.  Since fund management services is a highly regulated industry and closely 
supervised by the SC, the initial list of all fund management companies was obtained 
from the SC itself.  There are 39 fund management companies in Malaysia, of which, 29 
companies are located in Kuala Lumpur.  From the total, 25 companies are offering 
Islamic funds, with one company specialising solely in the Shariah-compliant fund while 
the rest are offering Islamic funds based on the Islamic window concept together with 
their conventional funds.  Eventually, all 23 fund management companies offering 
Islamic funds and located in Kuala Lumpur were chosen as the sample.  The list of fund 
management companies is given in Appendix II.  Basic information about the selected 
fund management companies‟ including their company structure, investment personnel, 
the funds under their management, and contact information was obtained from their 
website on the internet.   
 
 Once the officer-in-charge was identified, all 23 selected fund management 
companies were contacted by telephone, in which the purpose of the study and intention 
to invite the company to take part in the analysis was conveyed to the officer-in-charge.  
The telephone contact was then followed by a letter of invitation sent through both 
surface mail and e-mail in June and July 2009 specifying the proposed date for the 
interview.  From the total of 23 fund management companies that were invited, eight 
agreed to take part in the interview exercise.  It is worth mentioning that all fund 
managers who agreed to be interviewed are Muslim fund managers whilst none of the 
non-Muslim dominated fund management companies accepted the invitation. Therefore, 
the response rate of 30 per cent from the total of 23 companies is deemed satisfactory 
amid the limited numbers of Muslim fund managers and the unwillingness of the non-
Muslim fund managers. The fieldwork began at end-July 2009 as planned.  The following 
section highlights the activities involved in the execution stage. 
 
8.2.2.2 Execution 
 
During the fieldwork however, one respondent cancelled the interview at the very last 
minute citing that they needed more time to prepare for the interview, thus bringing the 
number of the sample to seven respondents eventually.  The interview process involved 
12 respondents comprising of fund/investment managers from seven different fund 
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management companies.  Prior to the interview sessions, all respondents were given a 
reassurance of the confidentiality of the conversation and information revealed in the 
interview, and were also reminded that they could exercise their discretion when 
answering any of the interview questions.  All respondents were directly responsible for 
managing Islamic funds at their respective companies and held various positions either as 
chief executive officers, head of investment operations, fund managers or senior 
investment officer.  In view that fund management companies are represented by their 
senior investment personnel, it carries considerable weight to the value of the analysis.  
All interviews took place at the fund management companies‟ premises and lasted 
between 45 minutes to 90 minutes each.   
 
 The interviews were recorded using a new digital audio recorder and stored in a 
laptop computer for easy retrieval. The use of a digital tape recorder reduces distraction 
caused by the need to take interview notes and allows full focus on the interviewing 
process itself.  The digital tape recorder also minimises data loss as it records the 
interview conversation entirely.  Since the interviews were fully recorded, the remaining 
task for interviewer during the interview session was to observe any significant non-
verbal cues from interviewees, these were duly entered into interview notes.  The process 
was then continued in the post-execution stage as follows.   
 
8.2.2.3 Post-Execution 
 
The post-execution stage involved the process of data transcription, coding, data analysis 
and report writing as shown in Figure 8.1 below.  Indeed, this was the most crucial stage 
of the fieldwork process as it involved actual analysis from the very time consuming data 
transcription process to the very challenging coding analysis and data display processes, 
and eventually, the writing of the analysis itself.  Notwithstanding these difficulties 
however, the entire process had to be undertaken carefully to ensure the accuracy of the 
analysis. 
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Figure 8.1: The Post-Execution Activities in the Interview Process 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Miles and Huberman (1994), pp. 85. 
 
 The interview recordings were initially transcribed from audio form into written 
form verbatim without any alteration, preserving the authenticity of the data before 
analysis using the template analysis method involving various coding and decoding 
processes.  The transcription was indeed a lengthy and time consuming process since 
most recorded words or phrases had to be repeated several times for clarity.   The 
outcome from the data transcription process was a written document containing the entire 
conversation for each of the interview sessions.  To obtain a general view of the interview 
results, a reply summary sheet (see Appendix IV) was created which clearly indicated the 
respondents‟ replies to all of the interview questions. In order to develop a comprehensive 
list of first-level codes (see Table 8.1, page 231), each interview document was examined 
and scrutinised several times and reflective, as well as marginal, remarks were introduced 
into the documents to better explain the meaning of words or phrases from the 
respondents.  Reflective and marginal remarks are additional information derived from 
field notes taken during the interview session which include non-verbal cues and personal 
observation as well as other printed materials such as prospectus, internal reports, 
magazines and newspapers that could help in the interpretation process by clarifying the 
context in which a particular word or phrase was mentioned by respondents when 
replying to a particular interview question.  Hence, both the reflective and marginal 
remarks allow for more accurate interpretation beyond just the simple meaning of the 
original words or phrases used by the respondents.  The initial codes were then grouped 
into specific sets of themes or constructs to produce pattern codes (see Table 8.1) from 
which the relationship of the codes was revealed, thus allowing for more meaningful 
interpretation of the data.  The coding process and discussion is explained in greater detail 
in Section 8.4.1. 
 
Audio recording/ 
Field note 
Data 
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Conclusions 
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[ Iterate ] 
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 The next task in the post-execution stage was to display the data through a 
mapping technique.  The mapping is simply a schematic approach in data presentation 
that clearly highlights the interaction of different themes or constructs identified in the 
coding process.  This significantly enhances the understanding of a particular subject 
interest or research question being investigated since it provides a better overview of the 
analysis and broadens the researcher‟s perspective.  From the data mapping, the nature of 
relationship between codes, themes and constructs could be established rather easily 
which would greatly improve the reliability of the research findings and conclusions.  The 
data display and the ensuing results discussion is given in Section 8.4.2. 
 
 The final step in the post-execution stage is report writing. The report preparation 
begins with the outline of the report drafted based on the coding analysis and data 
mapping. The report outline consists of title headings and summary of its contents that 
later form the basis for writing.  Indeed, the writing implies that the entire process of this 
qualitative analysis has been completed.   As the chronology of the fieldwork activities 
has been clearly explained, this chapter continues with the elaboration of the research 
questions. 
 
 
8.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The subject interest of this qualitative analysis is summarised into five research questions 
from which the interview questions were designed.  The following topics elaborate the 
five research questions in greater detail. 
 
 
8.3.1  What are the general characteristics and operations of the Islamic funds? 
 
This research question attempts to identify the general characteristics of Islamic funds 
currently available in the market for the purpose of profiling the funds in terms of their 
types and size, their Shariah practice, their investment approach, their return and risk 
potential as well as their clients‟ profile.  Hence, the hypothesis is that the general 
characteristics of an Islamic fund are different than the general characteristics of a 
conventional fund.  The characteristics are important since they provide a better 
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understanding of how an Islamic fund is structured and managed that may explain the 
nature of the return and risk of the fund.  It may also reveal the appeal of the Islamic fund 
and how comprehensively the Shariah principles are applied in the operation of the fund. 
The general characteristics are identified either through direct interview questions or 
deduction process throughout the data analysis. 
 
 
8.3.2 What is the real intention of the fund management companies in offering 
Islamic funds? 
 
This research question seeks to investigate the actual motives of fund management 
companies in offering Islamic funds.  This issue is important since it could reveal the real 
intention behind fund management companies when offering Islamic funds. The 
hypothesis is that if the real intention is due to religious reasons or for the ultimate benefit 
of the society, the operation of the Islamic fund and its implications would reflect the true 
value of Islamic teachings beyond the mere pursuit of monetary gain. For this purpose, 
the objective and impact of Islamic funds are benchmarked against the attainment of the 
Shariah objectives (maqasid al-Shariah).  This is determined through direct question to 
respondents and observation towards the construct of their Islamic fund, the extent to 
which Shariah principles are applied in the operation of their Islamic fund, their preferred 
securities and selection procedures as well as the appropriateness of resources dedicated 
to Islamic fund operations. On the contrary, if the Islamic fund is perceived as just 
another product by fund management companies, it is likely that economic reason would 
supersede religious motive and the Islamic fund‟s successes would be particularly 
measured by how well it was subscribed by investors and how much monetary return it 
could generate so as to attract more investors to purchase the fund.  Consequently, the 
adoption of Shariah principles would likely be confined to just meeting the regulatory 
requirements to ensure that the fund continues to be accredited as Shariah-compliant.  In 
this circumstance, the companies are not expected to devote significant amount of their 
resources to genuinely develop the Islamic fund industry, such as promoting the cause of 
Shariah objectives through their Islamic funds or creating an authentic Islamic-based 
fund or expanding the number of their Shariah trained investment or marketing 
personnel.  Instead, the more likely scenario is that the Islamic funds are structured by 
mimicking conventional funds and handled by the same personnel who have little or no 
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knowledge of Islam or the Shariah.   This will seriously impede the long-term 
development of the Islamic fund industry itself.   
 
 However, this analysis is neither intended to be provocative towards the real 
intention of fund management companies nor that did it mean to question the sincerity of 
the companies in their offering of Islamic funds.  Rather, the purpose is to examine the 
real motivation of the fund management companies and how their intention is reflected 
through the overall handling of their Islamic funds.  Nevertheless, since the real intention 
is not revealed clearly and is rather complicated to be determined precisely, a deduction 
process through direct and indirect interview questions, observations of the Islamic fund 
management operations and reference to the funds‟ prospectuses are used to infer the real 
intention. 
 
 
8.3.3 What are the factors that contribute to the Islamic funds’ performance? 
 
While a typical Islamic fund is subject to similar systematic and unsystematic risks to 
those that affect a conventional fund, its performance may also be affected by the Shariah 
requirements which restrict its asset universe and increase its operating cost.  Therefore, 
the hypothesis is that Shariah requirements affect Islamic fund performance adversely by 
restricting asset selection and introducing an additional cost to the fund.  This research 
question intends to investigate this issue by determining the factors that affect Islamic 
fund performance including the impact of Shariah restrictions from the practitioners‟ 
perspective.  This question is crucial in ascertaining the salient feature of Islamic fund 
performance and in establishing whether Shariah restrictions have indeed affected Islamic 
fund performance adversely.  The analysis will also reveal how Islamic fund managers 
mitigate the Shariah effects and ensure that the return from their Islamic funds remains 
competitive or on a par with conventional funds.  The factors affecting Islamic funds‟ 
performance are identified through deduction process in the data analysis based on direct 
and indirect interview questions. 
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8.3.4 What is the current nature of the Shariah-compliance practice by the fund 
management companies? 
 
This research question is designed to examine the nature of the Shariah-compliance 
practice, particularly on how Shariah principles are appreciated and applied in the Islamic 
fund operations.  This includes the underlying Shariah principles used in the creation of 
Islamic funds, the handling of Islamic fund accounts, the securities selection procedures 
of Islamic fund portfolios, the treatment of profit and distribution of income to the Islamic 
fund investors as well as the handling of Shariah matters, such as the setting-up of a 
Shariah advisory board and its roles.   The interview also looks into the existing pool of 
human resources particularly the fund/investment manager and marketing personnel as 
well as the Islamic fund documentation and distribution network.  The hypothesis is that 
if the Islamic fund is truly created to achieve the Shariah objectives, this will be reflected 
clearly through the Shariah principles applied in the creation and operation of the Islamic 
fund as well as in the commitment of fund management companies to develop Shariah-
based fund products and expertise.  Otherwise, the intention of the companies is arguably 
to merely fulfil the minimum regulatory requirements necessary to ensure that their 
Islamic funds remain Shariah-compliant.  Findings are obtained through deduction 
process in the data analysis based on direct and indirect interview questions and from the 
Islamic fund prospectuses.  
 
 
8.3.5 Is it necessary to develop an alternative portfolio performance measurement 
model specifically for Islamic funds?  
 
This is a rather tactical question which aims to seek the industry practitioners‟ view of 
whether there is a need to develop a new alternative portfolio performance measurement 
model specifically for Islamic funds. Their view is crucial since the fund managers are the 
natural user of the proposed model if it is to be developed in the future.  Their vast 
experience in fund management activities would also provide considerable input 
pertaining to the method used in portfolio performance measurement, the suitability or the 
shortcomings of the existing traditional portfolio performance valuation model and the 
additional variables that need to be taken into consideration when developing the 
alternative model.  The hypothesis is that Islamic funds would require an alternative 
portfolio performance measurement model if there are serious flaws in the existing 
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models amid the Shariah restrictions.  Findings for this research question are obtained 
from direct and indirect question to the respondents.   
 
 The five research questions were carefully designed to explore the current Islamic 
fund management practices particularly with regards to the impact of the Shariah 
restrictions on Islamic funds‟ characteristics and performance and to determine the need 
to develop an alternative portfolio performance measurement model.  The interview 
transcripts are next examined in the data analysis stage as explained in the following 
section.  
 
 
8.4 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS DISCUSSION 
 
This section comprises of two parts namely data analysis and results discussion.  The data 
analysis topic elaborates the procedures involved in the analysis of interview transcripts 
through coding techniques.  The findings from the data analysis are then deliberated in 
the results discussion topic with the aid of data display techniques to derive more 
comprehensive and reliable inferences from the interview data.  Both processes are 
explained below. 
 
8.4.1 Data Analysis  
 
The data analysis attempts to extract valuable and meaningful information from the 
interview transcripts through coding analysis technique by conducting a qualitative 
perception analysis. The coding analysis starts with the creation of descriptive codes to 
provide basic meaning and categories for words or phrases used by respondents in the 
interview transcripts.  Subsequently, first level codes were created to give interpretive 
meaning to the words or phrases.  The final task in the coding stage is assigning pattern 
codes to enhance the inferential or explanatory power of the words or phrases retrieved 
from the descriptive and first level codes.   All codes are shown in Table 8.1 below.  
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Table 8.1: List of Codes 
Descriptive Codes 1
st
 Level Codes Pattern Codes Question No. 
FUND CHARACTERISTICS CHAR   
CHAR: Staff expertise/ qualification: 
 PG-Non Shariah. 
 UG-Non Shariah. 
CHAR-EXPT  
CHAR-EXPT-PGNON 
CHAR-EXPT-UGNON 
1.1; 1.2 
CHAR: Size: 
 Bigger. 
 Smaller. 
 Not applicable. 
 Low subscription. 
CHAR-SIZE  
CHAR-SIZE-BIG 
CHAR-SIZE-SMALL 
CHAR-SIZE-NA 
CHAR-SIZE-LOW 
1.4 
CHAR: Fund type: 
 Shariah only. 
 Mixed. 
CHAR-TYPE  
CHAR-TYPE-SHAR 
CHAR-TYPE-MIXED 
1.5; 1.6; 1.7 
CHAR: Client‟s profile: 
 All Muslims. 
 Mixed. 
 Long-term. 
 Institutions. 
CHAR-CLIENT  
CHAR-CLIENT-ALM 
CHAR-CLIENT-MIX 
CHAR-CLIENT-LT 
CHAR-CLIENT-INST 
1.3; 1.8 
CHAR: Motivation to invest: 
 Religious. 
 Return/Risk. 
 Diversification. 
 Ethical. 
 Directive (esp. insti‟nal) 
CHAR-MOTI  
CHAR-MOTI-RELIG 
CHAR-MOTI-RR 
CHAR-MOTI-DIVER 
CHAR-MOTI-ETHIC 
CHAR-MOTI-DIRECT 
1.9 
CHAR: Motivation to offer: 
 Benefit for the ummah. 
 Economics (demand). 
 Inherit. 
CHAR-MOTO  
CHAR-MOTO-UMMA 
CHAR-MOTO-ECON 
CHAR-MOTO-INHER 
1.10 
CURRENT SHARIAH PRACTICE PRAC   
PRAC: Shariah principles applied: 
 Ba‟i an-naqdi. 
 Al-wadiah. 
 Al-wakalah. 
 Fee based (Al-ujr). 
 Respondent doesn‟t know. 
 Al-Wa‟ad. 
PRAC-CONT  
PRAC-CONT-BNAQ 
PRAC-CONT-WADIA 
PRAC-CONT-WAKA 
PRAC-CONT-FEE 
PRAC-CONT-DNTKN 
PRAC-CONT-WAAD 
2.1; 2.4 
PRAC: Shariah principles on deposit: 
 Al-wadiah. 
 Not stated – assumed al-wadiah 
PRAC-DEP  
PRAC-DEP-WADIA 
PRAC-DEP-ASUWAD 
2.2 
PRAC: Segregation of funds: 
 Yes. 
 Not applicable. 
PRAC-SEGR  
PRAC-SEGR-YES 
PRAC-SEGR-NA 
2.5 
PRAC: Income purification: 
 No. 
 Yes – to charity. 
 Yes – to own non-Sharia funds. 
 
 Explained in prospectus: 
 Yes 
 No 
 
PRAC-PURI  
PRAC-PURI-NO 
PRAC-PURI-YESCHA 
PRAC-PURI-YESOWN 
 
 
PRAC-PUREX-YES 
PRAC-PUREX-NO 
2.3; 2.6; 2.7 
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Descriptive Codes 1
st
 Level Codes Pattern Codes Question No. 
PRAC: Types of instruments invested in: 
 Equities, bonds, cash, MM.   
 Derivative – Yes. 
 Derivative – No. 
 Proportion – Varies. 
PRAC-INST  
PRAC-INST-EBCMM 
PRAC-INST-DERVY 
PRAC-INST-DERVN 
PRAC-INST-VARIES 
2.8; 2.10 
PRAC: FM manages both funds: 
 Yes. 
 Not applicable. 
 
PRAC: Allow non Muslim FM:  
 Yes. 
 No. 
PRAC-FM 
 
 
PRAC-FM-YES 
PRAC-FM-NA 
 
 
PRAC-FM-NMYES 
PRAC-FM-NMNO 
 
2.9 
SHARIAH MONITORING AND 
SUPERVISION 
MONI   
MONI: Full Shariah compliant: 
 Yes. 
 Partly. 
MONI-COMP  
MONI-COMP-YES 
MONI-COMP-PART 
3.1 
MONI:  Have a Shariah advisory board: 
 Yes – own board. 
 Yes – 3rd party (sharing). 
MONI-SAB  
MONI-SAB-INT 
MONI-SAB-EXT 
3.2; 3.3 
MONI:  The primary role of SAB.  
 Advice on Shariah matters only.  
MONI-ROLE  
MONI-ROLE-SHAR 
3.4 
MONI: Shariah checking: 
 Regular meeting (Qtr). 
 Self-checking by FMs. 
MONI-CHEK  
MONI-CHEK-QTRM 
MONI-CHEK-SFCHK 
3.5; 3.6; 3.7 
MONI: Depend on the SC list: 
 Yes. 
MONI-SCLIST  
MONI-SCLIST-YES 
 
3.8 
PERFORMANCE OF SHARIAH 
FUNDS 
PERF   
PERF: Performance of Islamic fund: 
 Excellent/Good. 
 Underperformed. 
PERF-RATE  
PERF-RATE-OUTBEN 
PERF-RATE-UNDER 
4.1 
PERF: Islamic vs conventional fund:  
 There is difference.  
 There is no difference. 
 Long term – similar. 
 Short term – different. 
PERF-COMP  
PERF-COMP-DIFFER 
PERF-COMP-NODIF 
PERF-COMP-LTSIM 
PERF-COMP-STDIF 
 
4.2 
PERF: Main factors affecting perform: 
 Asset allocation. 
 Timing. 
 Stock selection. 
 Market condition. 
 Tactical strat/Execution. 
 Shariah fees. 
PERF-FACTOR  
PERF-FACTOR-ALLO 
PERF-FACTOR-TIME 
PERF-FACTOR-PICK 
PERF-FACTOR-MKT 
PERF-FACTOR-STGY 
PERF-FACTOR-SHFE 
4.3 
PERF: Criteria for asset allocation: 
 Big cap, high liquidity. 
 Good fundamental. 
 Small cap not preferred. 
PERF-ALLOC  
PERF-ALLOC-LRGE 
PERF-ALLOC-GDFTL 
PERF-ALLOC-NOSM 
4.4 
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Descriptive Codes 1
st
 Level Codes Pattern Codes Question No. 
PERF: Company do self-valuation: 
 Yes. 
 No. 
 3
rd
 party. 
PERF-SELVAL 
 
 
PERF-SELVAL-YES 
PERF-SELVAL-NO 
PERF-SELVAL-3PTY 
4.5 
PERF: Use the standard methods: 
 Yes. 
 No. 
PERF-STDVAL  
PERF-STDVAL-YES 
PERF-STDVAL-NO 
4.6 
PERF: Benchmark for valuation: 
 FBM Emas Shariah Index. 
 Al-Mudharabah GIA. 
 Conventional GIA. 
PERF-BENCH  
PERF-BENCH-SHIDX 
PERF-BENCH-FDIS 
PERF-BENCH-FDCV 
4.7 
NEW ALTERNATIVE 
PERFORMANCE MODEL 
ALT   
ALT: Return and risk are: 
 Similar. 
 Different. 
ALT-RRCHAR  
ALT-RRCHAR-SAME 
ALT-RRCHAR-DIFF 
5.1 
ALT:  Shariah reduces asset universe: 
 Yes 
 No 
ALT-REDUNI  
ALT-REDUNI-YES 
ALT-REDUNI-NO 
5.2; 5.3 
ALT: Shariah reduce performance: 
 Yes. 
 No. 
ALT-REDRET 
 
 
ALT-REDRET-YES 
ALT-REDRET-NO 
5.4 
ALT: Shortfall in valuation models: 
 Religious/Shariah elements. 
 No shortfall. 
ALT-SHTFAL 
 
 
ALT-SHTFAL-RELIG 
ALT-SHTFAL-NOSHF 
5.5 
ALT: Suitable for Islamic funds: 
 Yes. 
 Probably. 
ALT-SUIT 
 
 
ALT-SUIT-YES 
ALT-SUIT-PROBLY 
5.6 
ALT: Is the alternative models needed: 
 Yes, because: 
 Industry is growing. 
 Need for an identity. 
 For academic purpose. 
 
 No, because: 
 Not needed/practical. 
 Lack of infrastructure. 
 Lack of demand - size. 
 Existing models sufficient. 
ALT-WHY  
 
ALT-WHYES-INGRO 
ALT-WHYES-IDNTY 
ALT-WHYES-ACAD 
 
 
ALT-WHYNO-NOND 
ALT-WHYNO-NOINF 
ALT-WHYNO-NODD 
ALT-WHYNO-EXOK 
5.7; 5.8 
ALT: Factors to be incorporated:  
 Shariah element. 
 Shariah rating. 
 Intention. 
 CSR practices. 
 No suggestion. 
ALT-ADDVAR 
 
 
ALT-ADDVAR-SHA 
ALT-ADDVAR-RAT 
ALT-ADDVAR-INTN 
ALT-ADDVAR-CSR 
ALT-ADDVAR-NOS 
5.9 
 
The coding and decoding analysis is explained in the following section which provides a 
descriptive analysis of the outcome from the interviews. 
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8.4.1.1 What are the general characteristics and operations of the Islamic funds? 
 
This section analyses the responses given by participating fund managers who represent 
their respective fund management companies (FMC) on issues pertaining to the general 
characteristics and operations of their Islamic funds.   The coding analysis reveals that the 
responses can be categorised into six focussed coding groups from which the general 
characteristics of Islamic funds currently available in the market can be established.  The 
six focussed coding groups are: fund size and type, asset universe, Shariah-compliance 
practice, personnel, return and risk performance, and investors‟ motives.  The coding 
analysis is summarised in Tables 8.2(a) to Table 8.2(g) below.     
 
 
Table 8.2(a): Data Analysis for Research Question 1  
Research 
Question 1 
What are the general characteristics and operations of the Islamic funds? 
Focussed 
Coding 
1
st
 Level Coding Sub-Themes/Remarks 
1 CHAR-SIZE 
CHAR-TYPE 
Characteristics based on the size and types of funds offered: 
 The size of Islamic funds is smaller than conventional funds. 
 The size of Islamic funds is bigger than conventional funds. 
 Islamic funds have low subscription rate 
 Offered both Islamic and conventional funds. 
 Offered Islamic funds only. 
 
2 MONI-SCLIST 
PERF-ALLOC 
PRAC-INST 
 
Characteristics based on the asset universe of Islamic fund 
portfolio: 
 Depend on the SC list of approved halal stocks for equities. 
 Invest in fundamentally sound stocks particularly large-
capitalised and high liquidity stocks. 
 Invest in derivative securities for hedging purposes.  
 
3 MONI-COMP 
MONI-SCLIST 
MONI-SAB 
PRAC-SEGR 
PRAC-PURI 
PRAC-CONT 
Characteristics based on the current Shariah compliance 
practices in fund management companies: 
 Full compliant based on Shariah guidelines by the SC. 
 Adherence to SC list of halal–approved stocks. 
 Separation of funds and investment accounts. 
 Engage Shariah scholars. 
 Regular Shariah monitoring by Shariah advisory board. 
 Investment income is purified. 
 No profit and loss sharing-based (PLS) contract. FMCs 
charged Islamic funds on fee-based basis. 
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4 CHAR-EXPT 
PRAC-FM 
Characteristics based on the personnel handling the Islamic 
funds: 
 Muslim fund managers only. 
 Mixed between Muslims and non-Muslims fund managers. 
 Completed undergraduate education but with no Shariah 
qualification. 
 Completed postgraduate education but with no Shariah 
qualification. 
5 PERF-RATE 
PERF-COMP 
ALT-RRCHAR 
Characteristics based on return and risk of Islamic funds: 
 Outperformed own benchmark. 
 Underperformed conventional funds.  
 No significant difference between performance of Islamic 
fund and conventional fund. 
 The performance of Islamic fund is different than 
conventional fund. 
 Return and risk are similar with conventional. 
 Return and risk are different from conventional. 
6 CHAR-MOTI Characteristics based on the motivation that encourage investors 
to subscribe into Islamic funds: 
 Religious 
 Return and risk consideration 
 Diversification 
 Ethical 
 Directive from government 
Concluding 
Theme 
Islamic funds are essentially funds that adhere to Shariah guidelines but are not 
treated exclusively different from conventional funds by fund management 
companies.  Islamic funds are particularly characterised by their Shariah 
identities but tend to be smaller in size and have lower fund subscription rate 
while their performance is below than that of conventional funds.  Investors 
subscribed into Islamic fund for economic and religious reasons.  
 
 
Table 8.2(b): Focussed Coding No. 1 for Research Question 1 
Sub-Theme Characteristics based on the size and types of funds offered. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 CHAR-TYPE-SHAR  Offers Islamic funds only. 
FMC2 
FMC3 
FMC6 
FMC7 
CHAR-SIZE-SMALL 
 
CHAR-TYPE-MIXED 
CHAR-SIZE-LOW 
 The size of Islamic funds is smaller than 
conventional funds. 
 Offered both Islamic and conventional funds. 
 Islamic funds have low subscription rate. 
FMC4 
FMC5 
CHAR-SIZE-BIG 
 
CHAR-TYPE-MIXED 
CHAR-SIZE-LOW 
 The size of Islamic funds is bigger than 
conventional funds. 
 Offered both Islamic and conventional funds. 
 Islamic funds have low subscription rate. 
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Table 8.2(c): Focussed Coding No. 2 for Research Question 1 
Sub-Theme Characteristics based on the asset universe of Islamic fund portfolio. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 – FMC7 
 
MONI-SCLIST-YES 
 
Depend on the SC list of halal-approved stocks for 
equity investment.  
FMC1 – FMC7 PERF-ALLOC-GDFTL Invest in fundamentally sound stocks particularly 
large-capitalised and high liquidity stocks. 
FMC2 
FMC3 
FMC5 
FMC7 
PRAC-INST-DERV Invest in derivative securities for hedging purposes. 
 
 
Table 8.2(d): Focussed Coding No. 3 for Research Question 1 
Sub-Theme Characteristics based on the current Shariah-compliance practices in fund 
management companies. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 – FMC7 MONI-COMP-YES 
 
MONI-SCLIST-YES 
PRAC-SEGR-YES 
MONI-SAB-INT 
MONI-SAB-EXT 
 
PRAC-PURI-YES 
 Full compliant based on Shariah guidelines by 
the SC. 
 Adherence to the SC list of halal stocks. 
 Separation of funds and investment accounts. 
 Engage Shariah scholars. 
 Regular Shariah monitoring by Shariah advisory 
board. 
 Investment income is purified. 
 No profit and loss sharing-based (PLS) contract. 
 
 
Table 8.2(e): Focussed Coding No. 4 for Research Question 1 
Sub-Theme Characteristics based on the personnel handling the Islamic funds. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 PRAC-FM-NMNO Islamic funds are handled by Muslim investment 
managers only. 
FMC2 – FMC7 PRAC-FM-NMYES Islamic funds are also handled by non-Muslim fund 
managers. 
FMC1 – FMC7 CHAR-EXPT-UGNON All investment managers completed at least 
undergraduate education level but have no Shariah 
qualification. 
FMC4 – FMC7 CHAR-EXPT-PGNON Some investment managers completed their 
postgraduate education level but have no Shariah 
qualification. 
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Table 8.2(f): Focussed Coding No. 5 for Research Question 1 
Sub-Theme Characteristics based on return and risk of Islamic funds. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1  PERF-RATE-OUTBEN 
PERF-COMP-DIFFER 
 
ALT-RRCHAR-SAME 
 Outperformed own benchmark. 
 The performance of Islamic fund is different than 
conventional fund. 
 Return and risk are similar with conventional. 
FMC2 – FMC5   PERF-RATE- OUTBEN 
PERF-COMP-NODIF 
 
ALT-RRCHAR-SAME 
 Outperformed own benchmark. 
 No significant difference between performance of 
Islamic fund and conventional fund. 
 Return and risk are similar with conventional. 
FMC6 PERF-RATE-UNDER 
ALT-RRCHAR-DIFF 
 Underperformed conventional funds.  
 Return and risk are different from conventional. 
FMC7 PERF-RATE-UNDER 
PERF-COMP-DIFFER 
 
ALT-RRCHAR-DIFF 
 Underperformed conventional funds.  
 The performance of Islamic fund is different than 
conventional fund. 
 Return and risk are different from conventional. 
 
 
Table 8.2(g): Focussed Coding No. 6 for Research Question 1 
Sub-Theme Characteristics based on the motivation that encourage investors to 
subscribe into Islamic funds. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 – FMC7  CHAR-MOTI-RELIG Religious reason. 
FMC2 – FMC7 CHAR-MOTI-RR Return and risk consideration. 
FMC3 CHAR-MOTI-DIVERS Diversification purposes. 
FMC2 
FMC6 
CHAR-MOTI-ETHIC Ethical 
FMC7 CHAR-MOTI-DIRECT Directive from government. 
 
 
 Table 8.2(b) shows the characteristics based on the size and type of Islamic funds.  
In general, most fund management companies offered both Islamic and conventional 
funds whereby the types and structure of their Islamic funds are not significantly different 
from their conventional funds judging from the funds‟ objectives and investment 
mandates.  However, Islamic funds are relatively smaller in size and have a low 
subscription rate as compared to conventional funds.  The low subscription rate is not 
only obvious in fund management companies that offer both Islamic and conventional 
funds but also for companies that specialises purely in Islamic funds or in which the 
approved size of their Islamic fund is bigger than their conventional funds.   
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 Table 8.2(c) reveals the Islamic funds‟ characteristics based on their asset 
universe.  All fund management companies relied upon the SC‟s list of halal-approved 
stocks for their equity investment and their Shariah advisory board (SAB) for other 
financial instruments.  Islamic funds tend to invest in fundamentally sound stocks, 
particularly large-capitalised companies with stable earnings and high trading liquidity.  
A typical Islamic fund portfolio is usually heavily weighted towards plantation, 
construction and properties as their favourite sectors.  Some fund management companies 
allow investment in derivative instruments on condition that such derivative securities 
must be Shariah-compliant whilst investment is made strictly for hedging purposes.   
 
 The Shariah-compliance practice shown in Table 8.1(d) is undoubtedly a 
characteristic unique to the Islamic funds.  In general, all respondents claimed that their 
Islamic funds are fully Shariah-compliant.  The Shariah guidelines require fund 
management companies to separate Islamic fund accounts from conventional fund 
accounts, appoint a Shariah advisory board, conduct regular Shariah monitoring and 
purify investment income.  The segregation of funds however, does not necessarily 
require a separation of other functions or resources involved in the fund management 
operations such as office premises and equipment or personnel undertaking the accounts, 
marketing, administration or investment functions, since similar resources can be utilised 
or shared by both Islamic and conventional funds.  Instead, the separation of funds merely 
involves the segregation of accounts in which any financial proceeds generated for or by 
Islamic funds are deposited into Islamic banking accounts.  Another notable feature 
among the existing Islamic funds is that all funds are using a fee-based contract and not 
profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) despite the latter being preferred by the Shariah. 
 
 With respect to the personnel handling the Islamic funds, all but one fund 
management company allowed non-Muslim investment managers to handle their Islamic 
funds as reflected by Table 8.2(e).  All fund managers have completed various academic 
disciplines in their education to at least undergraduate level and hold a fund management 
license issued by the SC. Unfortunately however, none of the investment managers have 
any formal Shariah academic qualification.       
 
 Table 8.2(f) highlights the return and risk characteristic of the Islamic funds.  In 
terms of return, Islamic funds generally outperformed their own designated benchmarks 
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but underperformed conventional funds.  Most fund managers believe that Islamic funds 
are not significantly different from conventional funds arguing that there are numerous 
stocks available within the SC‟s list of halal-approved securities that fund managers can 
choose from to meet their investment strategy.  Hence, they contended that Islamic funds 
shall not be handicapped by the Shariah restrictions with respect to stock selection.  On 
the contrary, some fund managers believe that Islamic funds‟ performance is significantly 
different from conventional funds since the funds incur a relatively higher operating cost 
and have a rather limited asset investment universe, making it difficult for Islamic funds 
to outperform conventional funds.  In addition, Islamic funds are also subject to Shariah 
non-compliance risk, thus making the funds riskier than their conventional counterparts.    
 
 Islamic funds‟ investors could provide another unique characteristic for Islamic 
funds since those who subscribe into the funds are likely to be motivated by some other 
non-pecuniary motives beyond just the pursuit of monetary gains.  The investors‟ 
commitment toward Islamic funds despite receiving relatively a lower return than 
conventional funds reflects that Islamic funds‟ investors are not excessively concerned 
about financial reward from the funds, as is normally perceived with economically 
rational investors, but they are also seeking other non-monetary satisfaction from their 
investment in the funds. Table 8.2(g) reveals five reasons that motivate investors to 
subscribe into Islamic funds, namely: religious preference, return and risk consideration, 
diversification strategy, ethical tendency, or simply due to directive from the government. 
Of all the reasons, religious and economic motives are the two main driving factors that 
encourage investors to choose Islamic funds. 
 
 To conclude, the existing Islamic funds are particularly characterised by their 
Shariah identities that make them different from conventional funds.  However, the 
structure of Islamic funds resembles that of conventional funds in principle with the 
exception that they also comply with certain Shariah requirements.  The main 
distinguishing factor is that Islamic funds generally have a limited asset investment 
universe since they invest only in halal-approved securities and are monitored by a 
Shariah advisory board.  The size of Islamic funds is usually smaller and less subscribed 
when compared to conventional funds, whilst their performance is generally below the 
latter but higher than their self-designated benchmarks. Investors generally subscribe into 
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Islamic funds for economic and religious reasons.  The following section analyses the real 
intention of the FMCs in offering Islamic funds.  
 
 
8.4.1.2 What is the real intention of the fund management companies in offering 
Islamic funds? 
 
This section analyses the responses related to the real intention of fund management 
companies in offering Islamic funds.   The coding analysis reveals that the responses can 
be categorised into a single focussed coding group.  Indeed, it is rather difficult to 
establish the real intention behind the Islamic fund offerings by fund management 
companies since the real intention is not measurable and the companies are legal entities 
rather than individual persons.  Nevertheless, respondents were asked about their opinion 
of the possible motivation behind their companies‟ decision to offer Islamic funds and 
additional information was then obtained from further reading of their funds‟ prospectus.  
Findings from the two sources are then used to infer the real intention of the fund 
management companies.  The coding analysis is summarised in Table 8.3(a) and Table 
8.3(b) below.     
 
Table 8.3(a): Data Analysis for Research Question 2  
Research 
Question 2 
What is the real intention of the fund management companies in offering 
Islamic funds? 
Focussed 
Coding 
1
st
 Level Coding Sub-Themes/Remarks 
1 CHAR-MOTO Reasons for fund management companies to offer Islamic funds: 
 Religious 
 Economics 
 Inherited from previous management 
Concluding 
Theme 
Economic reason is the main factor that motivates the fund management 
companies to offer Islamic funds although religious motive is also important. 
 
Table 8.3(b): Focussed Coding No. 1 for Research Question 2 
Sub-Theme Reasons for fund management companies to offer Islamic funds. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 
FMC4 
CHAR-MOTO-UMMA Religious reason for the benefit of the Muslim 
community (umma), in particular. 
FMC1 – FMC7 CHAR-MOTO-ECON Economic reason. 
FMC5 CHAR-MOTO-INHER Inherited from previous management. 
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 There are three main reasons why the fund management companies offer Islamic 
funds.  Certainly, religious reason would be the best possible intention when Islamic 
funds are offered with a noble aim of promoting the ideals of Islamic teachings such as 
the attainment of the maqasid al-Shariah (the objectives of the Shariah) or to benefit the 
Muslim umma (society) by providing them an investment instrument that meets their 
religious requirements, allowing them to invest freely without having to compromise their 
religious beliefs.  However, only two respondents have explicitly mentioned the religious 
intention. Instead, the more popular motive was, arguably, economic-related reasons 
whereby fund management companies primarily seek to capitalise on the growing interest 
towards Islamic finance and banking industry to make more profit by offering Islamic 
funds.  Some respondents argued that Islamic funds may be viewed by fund management 
companies as just another product or as a marketing tool to enhance their competitive 
advantage or enlarge their market share in the unit trust industry.  The ultimate pursuit of 
profit is made clear by some respondents through their admission that financial 
considerations usually undermine religious intention; fund management companies are 
unlikely to offer Islamic funds if it is not economical or there is no cost-benefit to be 
earned. The intention to invest in derivative securities and the income purification 
approach that allows fund management companies to retain non-halal stocks in their 
Islamic fund portfolio until the stocks reach their breakeven price for disposal further 
supports the contention that economic considerations are always a priority to fund 
management companies, even when dealing with Islamic funds.  Meanwhile, one 
respondent claimed that his Islamic funds were actually inherited from the previous 
management following a corporate restructuring. 
 
 To conclude, economic-related reasons, namely to maximise profit by capitalising 
on the growing interest on Islamic fund investments, enhancing the fund management 
companies‟ competitive advantage as well as marketing strategy, are arguably the main 
motives behind fund management companies‟ offering Islamic funds, whilst religious 
reason unfortunately seems to be a secondary motive.  This perception is based on the 
fund management companies‟ willingness to offer Islamic funds only if it is profitable to 
do so or if the fund enhances their competitive advantage.  One of the main economic 
concerns is a good performance which is also vital for Islamic funds. The following 
section analyses the factors affecting Islamic funds‟ performance.  
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8.4.1.3 What are the factors that contribute to the Islamic funds’ performance? 
 
This section analyses the responses related to factors influencing the Islamic funds‟ 
performance.  The coding analysis reveals that the responses can be categorised into four 
focussed coding groups namely fund managers‟ special investment skills, economic and 
market condition, fund managers‟ stock selection approach, and Shariah-compliance 
effect.  The coding analysis is summarised in Table 8.4(a) to Table 8.4(e) below.     
 
 
Table 8.4(a): Data Analysis for Research Question 3  
Research 
Question 3 
What are the factors that contribute to the Islamic funds’ performance? 
Focussed 
Coding 
1
st
 Level Coding Sub-Themes/Remarks 
1 PERF-FACTOR Fund managers‟ special investment skills: 
 Superior asset allocation skill. 
 Good timing skill when buying or selling securities. 
 Exceptional sector and stock selection. 
 Excellent trading/execution strategy. 
2 PERF-FACTOR Economic and market condition: 
 General economic and market condition (systematic risk). 
3 PERF-ALLOC Fund managers‟ stock selection approach: 
 Emphasise on fundamentally sound stocks. 
 Focus on large-capitalised and highly liquid stocks. 
 Less interested in small-capitalised stocks. 
4 PERF-FACTOR 
ALT-REDUNI 
ALT-REDRET 
Shariah-compliance effect: 
 Shariah requirements caused administrative cost to increase and 
add new risk into the Islamic funds.   
 Asset universe of Islamic funds is reduced by the Shariah 
restrictions. 
 Shariah restrictions reduce Islamic fund performance. 
Concluding 
Theme 
Islamic funds’ performance is significantly influenced by fund managers’ special 
investment skills, general market condition, stock selection approach of the fund 
managers, and consequences of Shariah-compliance.  Arguably, the most crucial is 
fund managers’ special investment skills as it enables the fund managers to 
outperform in any given market condition. The Shariah-compliance effect however, 
has a rather adverse impact on the Islamic funds’ performance.    
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Table 8.4(b): Focussed Coding No. 1 for Research Question 3 
Sub-Theme Fund managers’ special investment skills. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 PERF-FACTOR-ALLO 
PERF-FACTOR-TIME 
 Superior asset allocation skill. 
 Good timing skill to buy or sell securities. 
FMC2 PERF-FACTOR-ALLO  Superior asset allocation skill. 
FMC3 PERF-FACTOR-ALLO 
PERF-FACTOR-TIME 
PERF-FACTOR-STGY 
 Superior asset allocation skill. 
 Good timing skill to buy or sell securities. 
 Excellent trading/execution strategy. 
FMC4 PERF-FACTOR-ALLO 
PERF-FACTOR-PICK 
 Superior asset allocation skill. 
 Exceptional sector and stock selection. 
FMC5 PERF-FACTOR-TIME 
PERF-FACTOR-PICK 
PERF-FACTOR-STGY 
 Good timing skill to buy or sell securities. 
 Exceptional sector and stock selection. 
 Excellent trading/execution strategy. 
 
 
Table 8.4(c): Focussed Coding No. 2 for Research Question 3 
Sub-Theme Economic and market condition. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 PERF-FACTOR-MKT General economic and market condition (systematic 
risk). 
 
 
Table 8.4(d): Focussed Coding No. 3 for Research Question 3 
Sub-Theme Fund managers’ stock selection approach. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 – FMC7 PERF-ALLOC-GDFTL Emphasise on fundamentally sound stocks. 
FMC1,  FMC6 PERF-ALLOC-LRGE Focus on large-capitalised and highly liquid stocks. 
FMC1 – FMC5 PERF-ALLOC-NOSM Less interested in small-capitalised stocks. 
 
 
Table 8.4(e): Focussed Coding No. 4 for Research Question 3 
Sub-Theme Shariah-compliance effect. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 ALT-REDUNI-YES 
 
ALT-REDRET-YES 
 Asset universe of Islamic fund is reduced by the 
Shariah restrictions. 
 Shariah restrictions reduce Islamic fund 
performance. 
FMC6 PERF-FACTOR-SHFE  Shariah requirements caused administrative cost 
to increase and add new risk into Islamic fund.  
FMC7 PERF-FACTOR-SHFE 
 
ALT-REDUNI-YES 
 Shariah requirements caused administrative cost 
to increase and add new risk into Islamic fund.   
 Asset universe of Islamic fund is reduced by 
Shariah restrictions. 
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 Among the four factor categories shown in Table 8.4(b), fund managers‟ special 
investment skill is arguably the most critical to the performance of Islamic funds.  The 
crucial skills are: superior asset allocation, good timing, exceptional sector and stock 
selection, as well as excellent trading/execution strategy.  The asset allocation skill refers 
to the ability of a fund manager to achieve the right mixture or proportion of various 
assets that will benefit the most from a given market condition.  Hence, a fund manager 
who has superior asset allocation skill is likely to outperform the overall market or his/her 
rivals by ingeniously altering his/her portfolio‟s asset composition to suit the changing 
market environment. A good timing skill is the ability to determine when is the best time 
to buy or sell securities which enable a fund manager to minimise purchasing cost by 
buying securities at their lowest possible price, or maximise return from capital 
appreciation by selling securities at their highest possible price.  The sector and stock 
selection skill is the ability to identify and choose profitable industries or underpriced 
securities.  A fund manager with an exceptional sector and stock selection skill will be 
able to maximise return for his/her portfolio by choosing the right industries or stocks that 
will outperform the market over a certain period of time. The trading/execution skill 
refers to trading adeptness of a fund manager.  An excellent trading/execution skill 
enables a fund manager to maximise return for his/her portfolio by minimising transaction 
cost, attaining the best average buying or selling price – especially for bulk trading or 
transactions involving a large amount of shares –  or by determining the best time to 
execute a buy or sell order.   Notwithstanding however, the respondents almost 
unanimously agreed that a superior asset allocation skill was the most critical to ensuring 
good performance.  An Islamic fund manager who possesses this skill has a greater 
chance to outperform the overall market or other rival funds.  Some respondents even 
argued that any shortcomings endured by Islamic funds caused by the Shariah restrictions 
can be remedied through superior asset allocation skills since the skill enables Islamic 
fund managers to achieve the best portfolio mix within the Islamic funds‟ investment 
mandate to generate equivalent return with conventional funds.    
   
 One respondent cited the general economic and market condition as a factor that 
influenced Islamic funds‟ performance as shown in Table 8.4(c).  The general economic 
and market condition is a systematic risk which is non-diversifiable and affects all 
financial instruments, unit trusts or mutual funds and business entities operating in the 
same market.  The risk includes changes in business or economic cycles, regulatory 
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structures, political stability and shifts in market sentiment or consumer taste.  An Islamic 
fund manager however, may be able to reduce the negative impact from the risk by 
anticipating the possible changes in general economic or market conditions and 
instigating remedial measures to protect the value of his/her portfolio.  Thus, possessing 
the ability to accurately predict the general economic and market condition and formulate 
appropriate actions in response to the anticipated changes would enable the Islamic fund 
manager to lessen the impact of the risk on his/her portfolio. 
 
 Performance of Islamic funds is also influenced by their fund managers‟ stock 
selection approach.  Table 8.4(d) reveals that all respondents place emphasis on 
fundamentally sound stocks such as those that have a solid financial standing with steady 
profit and dividend track record, excellent business and market prospects, competent 
management team, and attractive earnings growth potential.  The favourite stocks are 
large-capitalised – since these stocks are generally very stable and less risky – and highly 
liquid. High liquidity ensures that there is continuous trading in these stocks, through 
which, the fund managers will be able to buy or sell the stocks easily in the stock market 
without suffering huge price differentials. Focussing on large-capitalised stocks also 
brings additional advantage in view that these stocks are closely monitored by external 
research houses, from which, the fund management companies are able to access in-depth 
information and company analysis without having to hire investment research analysts 
internally, thus reducing operational cost and research time.  On the other hand, small-
capitalised stocks are less preferred by the fund managers due to the stocks‟ high price 
volatility, lower trading liquidity and information asymmetry caused by lack of research 
or company analysis on smaller size stocks.  By focussing primarily on fundamentally 
sound stocks, Islamic funds could expect reasonable and consistent return generated from 
dividend income or capital appreciation earned from these companies.   
 
 The other influencing factor, but with a rather adverse consequences on Islamic 
funds‟ performance, is the Shariah-compliance effects as shown in Table 8.4(e).  Islamic 
funds are prohibited by the Shariah guidelines from investing in companies involved in 
any non-halal activities either directly or indirectly through their subsidiary companies, or 
in companies whose majority of their earnings are derived from non-halal sources 
(including interest income).  Consequently, the Shariah restrictions effectively reduce the 
asset universe of Islamic funds by confining their investment into halal-approved 
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securities, ruling out investment in companies involved in conventional finance, gaming 
and conglomerates, despite their attractive return.  Since conglomerates and finance-
related companies are mostly large-capitalised stocks, Shariah restrictions have 
practically denied the Islamic funds access to these companies, hence forcing the funds to 
focus on rather conservative industries such as plantations and properties sectors.  Fund 
management companies offering Islamic funds are also required to appoint Shariah 
scholars for advisory services on matters pertaining to Shariah-compliance issues.  The 
service can either be sourced internally by hiring their own Shariah scholars or 
outsourced externally from a third-party institution providing such services.  Either way, 
engaging Shariah scholars will certainly increase operating costs, thus reducing return 
from the Islamic funds, putting the funds in disadvantaged position when their return is 
compared directly with the return from conventional funds or the market index.  In 
addition, there is a Shariah-compliance risk which is unique to Islamic funds.  It is a risk 
associated with the changes in the halal status whereby a company which was originally 
approved as halal has its permissible status revoked due to some material changes in its 
core business activities, thus effectively turning it into a non-halal stock, instead.   
Following the withdrawal of the halal-approved status, Islamic funds are obliged to 
dispose of any holding interest that they have in the company.  However, depending on 
the market condition, there is a probability that Islamic funds may suffer substantial 
losses if the price of the stock is below their original buying or breakeven price, or if the 
Islamic funds are forced to keep the stock while waiting for the right timing for its 
disposal without being able to enjoy any income generated from the stock throughout the 
duration after which it was declared non-halal. 
 
 To conclude, Islamic funds‟ performance is substantially influenced by fund 
managers‟ special investment skills, general market condition, the stock selection 
approach of the fund managers, and Shariah-compliance effects.  The latter, in particular, 
is unique to Islamic funds and is more likely to affect the funds‟ performance adversely.  
Therefore, any attempt to compare the performance of both Islamic and conventional 
funds directly is poised to be biased against the Islamic funds.  The following section 
analyses the current state of the Shariah-compliance practice by fund management 
companies.   
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8.4.1.4 What is the current nature of the Shariah-compliance practice by the fund 
management companies? 
 
This section analyses the responses related to the Shariah-compliance practice.  The 
coding analysis reveals that the responses can be categorised into five focussed coding 
groups, namely: the Shariah-compliance status, the dependency towards the SC‟s list of 
halal-approved securities, the Shariah advisory board, the Shariah monitoring practice, 
and the segregation between Islamic and conventional funds.  The coding analysis is 
summarised in Table 8.5(a) to Table 8.5(f) below. 
     
Table 8.5(a): Data Analysis for Research Question 4  
Research 
Question 4 
What is the current nature of the Shariah-compliance practice by the fund 
management companies? 
Focussed 
Coding 
1
st
 Level Coding Sub-Themes/Remarks 
1 MONI-COMP Fund management operation is fully Shariah-compliant. 
2 MONI-SCLIST Use the SC‟s list as reference for the approved halal securities. 
3 MONI-SAB Engaged Shariah scholars through a Shariah advisory board 
(SAB): 
 Internal SAB. 
 External SAB. 
4 MONI-CHEK Frequency of Shariah monitoring: 
 Quarterly Shariah review between FMC and SAB. 
 Internal self-checking for Shariah compliance by investment 
officer and audit personnel. 
5 PRAC-SEGR 
PRAC-DEP 
Accounts of Islamic fund is separated from conventional fund: 
 Both funds are separated. 
 Islamic fund uses Islamic bank account.  
Concluding 
Theme 
All existing Islamic funds have been certified Shariah-compliant by the SC.  The 
current practice reveals a separation of roles between Shariah advisory boards 
(SAB) and investment committee of fund management companies.  The boards 
have a rather limited responsibility and involvement but deemed adequate with 
regards to ensuring the existing Islamic funds remain Shariah-compliant.   The 
concern towards higher cost and lack of investment and development in Shariah 
practice indicates that fund management companies are merely fulfilling the 
minimum regulatory requirement for Shariah-compliance. 
 
Table 8.5(b): Focussed Coding No. 1 for Research Question 4 
Sub-Theme Fund management operation is fully Shariah-compliant.  
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 – FMC6 MONI-COMP-YES Yes.  
FMC7 MONI-COMP-PART Partly. 
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Table 8.5(c): Focussed Coding No. 2 for Research Question 4 
Sub-Theme Use the SC’s list as reference for the halal-approved securities. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 – FMC7 MONI-SCLIST-YES Yes. 
 
Table 8.5(d): Focussed Coding No. 3 for Research Question 4 
Sub-Theme Engaged Shariah scholars through a Shariah advisory board (SAB). 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 – FMC3 MONI-SAB-INT Internal SAB. 
FMC4 – FMC7 MONI-SAB-EXT External SAB. 
 
Table 8.5(e): Focussed Coding No. 4 for Research Question 4 
Sub-Theme Frequency of Shariah monitoring. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 – FMC7 MONI-CHEK-QTRM Quarterly Shariah review between FMC and SAB. 
FMC1 MONI-CHEK-SFCHK Internal self-checking for Shariah-compliance by 
investment officers and audit personnel. 
 
Table 8.5(f): Focussed Coding No. 5 for Research Question 4 
Sub-Theme Account of Islamic fund is separated from conventional fund. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC2 – FMC7 PRAC-SEGR-YES Both funds are separated. 
FMC1 
FMC4 
PRAC-DEP-WADIA Islamic fund uses Islamic bank account. 
 
 The analysis into the Shariah-compliance status of the Islamic funds begins with 
the participating fund managers being asked a tactical question about whether their 
Islamic funds are fully Shariah-compliant.  Table 8.5(b) highlights that all but one fund 
manager confidently claimed that their Islamic funds are fully Shariah-compliant.  
Notwithstanding however, further review on the respondents‟ fund prospectuses reveals 
that their Islamic funds have been approved by the SC, thus confirming that all the funds 
have indeed complied with the Shariah guidelines.  Therefore, the rather contradictory 
reply given by a fund manager which seems to suggest that his Islamic fund is partly 
Shariah-compliant actually refers to the mixture of both conventional and Islamic funds 
offered by his company rather than it implying that his Islamic fund is not fully Shariah-
compliant. 
 
 Table 8.5(c) indicates that all fund managers are using the list of halal-approved 
stocks issued by the SC‟s Shariah Advisory Council (SCSAC).  The list, which is issued 
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on a regular basis by the SCSAC and considered the most important reference for the list 
of halal-approved stocks in Malaysia, significantly reduces the burden of identifying 
halal stocks from fund management companies, thus avoiding any possible confusion 
resulting from the various different sets of list that would arise if each fund management 
company was forced to produce their own individual list of halal-approved stocks.  It also 
enables fund management companies to focus on fund management and trading activities 
rather than spending their resources on research for permissible stocks which can be a 
very costly and time consuming effort.     
 
 Table 8.5(d) confirms that all fund management companies are engaging Shariah 
scholars through a Shariah advisory board (SAB).  Three of the fund management 
companies hired their own Shariah scholars whilst four companies outsourced their 
Shariah experts from a third party.  The members and the roles of the SAB are stated 
clearly in their fund prospectus.  In general, the members usually comprise of senior 
Shariah scholars with vast experience or formal academic qualification in a Shariah-
related discipline but arguably have very limited knowledge on fund management or 
investment operations.  Hence, the SAB is principally responsible in giving advisory 
services specifically on Shariah-related matters to fund management companies, 
including Shariah valuation and approval for new financial products introduced by the 
companies as well as Shariah monitoring through regular or ad-hoc meetings.  The SAB 
however, is not involved actively in the day-to-day operations of the fund management 
companies.  Several respondents asserted that to date there has not been a conflict 
between them and their SAB.  
 
 The current Shariah monitoring practice is shown in Table 8.5(e).  The level of 
monitoring is considered adequate with all fund management companies having regular 
quarterly Shariah-compliance reviews with their SAB.  In addition, all fund management 
companies stated that they maintain close communication with their SAB members and 
conduct ad-hoc meetings whenever necessary. However, only one fund management 
company‟s investment officers and audit personnel undertook internal self-checking of 
Shariah-compliance status.  This rather distinguishing practice is probably because the 
company is a subsidiary of an established Islamic banking group with an all-Muslim staff, 
including its fund managers, and specialises only in Islamic funds.  Therefore, this 
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company can be expected to have greater awareness and appreciation towards the 
Shariah. 
 
 For fund management companies offering both Islamic and conventional funds, all 
transactions involving the two funds are managed using separate accounts as revealed by 
Table 8.5(f).  In this respect, all financial transactions including proceeds from unit trust 
subscription, investment income earned by Islamic funds and dividend payment to unit 
holders are undertaken through Islamic banking accounts.  However, this segregation 
only applies to financial accounts and does not affect other company‟s resources such as 
manpower, support services and back-office operations.  For instance, the marketing 
officer or unit trust agent who promotes the Islamic funds on behalf of the fund 
management companies is likely to promote their conventional funds as well.  Likewise, 
the operation of the Islamic funds is carried out from the same office premises and shares 
similar facilities with the operation of conventional funds.   
 
 To conclude, the approval granted by the SC implies that the existing Islamic 
funds are indeed Shariah-compliant.  The current practice of fund management 
companies is to use the SC‟s list of halal-approved stocks as their primary source of 
reference for their equity investment, while separating their Islamic fund accounts from 
their conventional fund accounts.  The other companies‟ resources however, including 
personnel and office facilities are normally shared by or utilised for both types of fund.  
Since fund management companies are lacking in Shariah expertise, they have to appoint 
Shariah scholars who sit in the Shariah advisory board to advise them on Shariah-related 
issues pertaining to their Islamic funds‟ operation. The SAB however, has a rather limited 
role and authority as it merely provides advisory services on Shariah matters and is not 
usually involved actively in the day-to-day functions of fund management companies, 
especially with respect to their investment operation. Hence, there is a clear separation of 
role between the Shariah advisory board and fund management companies, whilst the 
limited understanding and commitment to develop Shariah infrastructure within the fund 
management companies has resulted in a lack of genuine development in the Islamic fund 
industry. This is due to the relatively small market size and the high cost involved which 
is feared to affect their Islamic funds‟ performance adversely. The following section 
discusses the fund performance valuation model. 
  
251 
 
8.4.1.5 Is it necessary to develop an alternative portfolio performance measurement 
model specifically for Islamic funds? 
 
This section analyses the responses on issues pertaining to the necessity of developing an 
alternative portfolio performance measurement model for Islamic funds.  The coding 
analysis reveals that all responses can be categorised into three focussed coding groups 
namely the impact of Shariah requirements on Islamic funds‟ performance and the 
rationale for either supporting or rejecting the idea to develop an alternative portfolio 
measurement model specifically for Islamic fund.  The coding analysis is summarised in 
Table 8.6(a) to Table 8.6(d) below.     
 
 
Table 8.6(a): Data Analysis for Research Question 5  
Research 
Question 4 
Is it necessary to develop an alternative portfolio performance measurement 
model specifically for Islamic funds? 
Focussed 
Coding 
1
st
 Level Coding Sub-Themes/Remarks 
1 PERF-FACTOR 
ALT-REDRET 
Impact of Shariah requirements on fund performance: 
 Higher administrative cost due to engaging Shariah scholars. 
 Additional Shariah non-compliance risk. 
 Reducing Islamic fund performance. 
2 ALT-WHYES Why a new alternative portfolio measurement model is needed: 
 For future use as the industry is growing.  
 For own identity and proper measurement. 
 For academic purposes. 
3 ALT-WHYNO Why a new alternative portfolio measurement model is not 
needed: 
 Not needed/practical. 
 Lack of infrastructure. 
 Lack of demand. 
 Existing model is sufficient. 
Concluding 
Theme 
Shariah restrictions have affected Islamic funds’ performance rather 
unfavourably.  However, feedbacks from industry practitioners imply that a 
new alternative portfolio measurement model is considered not necessary at the 
moment. Instead, there is a need to assess the extent to which Shariah principles 
are being implemented by fund management companies.  
 
Table 8.6(b): Focussed Coding No. 1 for Research Question 5 
Sub-Theme Impact of Shariah requirements on fund performance. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 ALT-REDUNI-YES 
 
ALT-REDRET-YES 
 Asset universe of Islamic fund is reduced by 
Shariah restrictions. 
 Reducing Islamic fund performance. 
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FMC6 PERF-FACTOR-SHFE 
 
 
ALT-REDRET-YES 
 Higher administrative cost due to engaging Shariah 
scholars. 
 Additional Shariah non-compliance risk. 
 Reducing Islamic fund performance. 
FMC7 PERF-FACTOR-SHFE 
 
 
ALT-REDRET-YES 
 Higher administrative cost due to engaging Shariah 
scholars. 
 Additional Shariah non-compliance risk. 
 Reducing Islamic fund performance. 
 
 
Table 8.6(c): Focussed Coding No. 2 for Research Question 5 
Sub-Theme Why a new alternative portfolio measurement model is needed. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 ALT-WHYES-IDNTY For own identity and proper measurement. 
FMC4 ALT-WHYES-INGRO 
ALT-WHYES-IDNTY 
 For future use as the industry is growing. 
 For own identity and proper measurement. 
FMC3 
FMC5 
ALT-WHYES-ACAD For academic purposes. 
 
 
Table 8.6(d): Focussed Coding No. 3 for Research Question 5 
Sub-Theme Why a new alternative portfolio measurement model is not needed. 
Interview No. Pattern Coding Remarks 
FMC1 ALT-WHYNO-NOINF 
ALT-WHYNO-NODD 
 Lack of infrastructure. 
 Lack of demand. 
FMC3 ALT-WHYNO-NOND 
ALT-WHYNO-NODD 
ALT-WHYNO-EXOK 
 Not needed/practical. 
 Lack of demand. 
 Existing model is sufficient. 
FMC4 ALT-WHYNO-EXOK  Existing model is sufficient. 
FMC5 ALT-WHYNO-NOND  Not needed/practical. 
FMC2 
FMC6 
FMC7 
ALT-WHYNO-NOND 
ALT-WHYNO-EXOK 
 Not needed/practical. 
 Existing model is sufficient. 
 
 While Shariah requirements imposed on Islamic funds make the funds 
philosophically different from conventional funds, the religious constraints also have 
some unfavourable impact on the performance of the funds.  As highlighted in Table 
8.6(b), Shariah requirements cause the operating cost of Islamic fund to increase due to 
the need to appoint Shariah scholars; reduce the funds‟ asset universe since only halal-
approved securities can be included in their portfolio; and bring in the Shariah non-
compliance risk to Islamic funds.  None of these shortcomings are known to affect 
conventional funds.  Consequently, the potential return from Islamic funds is poised to be 
lower than return from conventional funds although Islamic funds may still be able to 
outperform their own designated benchmarks.     
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 Table 8.6(c) and 8.6(d) reveal the fund managers‟ replies to question on whether 
there is a need to develop an alternative portfolio performance measurement model 
specifically for Islamic funds.  Respondents who supported the idea argued that the 
alternative valuation model will give the Islamic fund industry its unique identity which is 
needed to refute the allegation that Islamic funds merely mimic conventional funds.  The 
new model is envisaged to give a more accurate measurement of Islamic funds‟ 
performance by incorporating variables which are relevant to Islamic funds but neglected 
by the traditional portfolio performance measurement models. In particular, respondents 
have identified the additional variables as including religious attributes, Shariah effects, 
real intention, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and ethical factors.  Some 
respondents contended that in view of the growing interest in the Islamic fund industry, 
perhaps such a model may become a necessity sometime in the future.  At the very least, 
the quest to develop a new alternative model can be perceived as a purely academic 
undertaking for the time being until the Islamic fund industry is large and mature enough 
that it requires a distinctive and supposedly more accurate performance measurement 
model.  In general however, all respondents believe that there is no urgency to develop an 
alternative portfolio performance model specifically for Islamic funds.  The main 
argument is that the existing models are perceived to be adequate and suitable for 
evaluating Islamic funds‟ performance.  They claimed that although religious attributes 
are also important factors for Islamic funds, the attributes are very subjective and difficult 
to measure. Instead, similar to conventional funds, return and risk are the two most 
critical factors that determine Islamic funds‟ performance, thus making the traditional 
portfolio performance measurement models suitable for evaluating Islamic funds‟ 
performance.  The other reason is the lack of demand for the new model among fund 
managers themselves since the size of the Islamic fund industry is still small when 
compared to the size of the conventional fund industry.  The current Islamic fund industry 
is also lacking the necessary infrastructure due to the unavailability of a Shariah rating 
agency as well as the limited Shariah-compliant instruments, benchmarks and Shariah 
expertise available.  Therefore, a new alternative portfolio performance valuation model 
for Islamic funds is viewed as impractical at the moment.   
 
 To conclude, Shariah restrictions may have affected Islamic funds‟ performance 
rather adversely.  The impact on performance varies among Islamic funds as it dependent 
upon the investment skills or competency of their fund/investment managers.  However, 
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despite the fundamental difference between Islamic funds and conventional funds, there is 
no urgency to develop an alternative portfolio performance valuation model at the 
moment since industry practitioners are content with using conventional models when 
evaluating the performance of their Islamic funds.  In addition, the need for a proper 
valuation model is also undermined by inadequate Shariah infrastructure.  Based on the 
results of the coding analysis, the chapter now continues with the results discussion in the 
following section.      
 
 
8.4.2 Discussing the Results 
 
This section provides the results of the discussion on findings obtained from the coding 
analysis.  The discussion is organised based on the five research questions of the 
interview analysis and each discussion is accompanied by a diagram derived from the 
data mapping process to give a broader perspective of the issue and the interaction 
between relevant variables concerned.  
 
8.4.2.1 General Characteristics and Operations of the Islamic Funds  
 
The coding analysis has established that Islamic funds are particularly characterised by 
their Shariah-compliance identities, particularly their restricted asset universe – 
comprised of only halal-approved securities – and Shariah monitoring.  Islamic funds are 
also usually smaller and less subscribed when compared to their conventional 
counterparts.  Since Islamic funds are usually offered together with conventional funds, 
fund management companies normally utilise similar company resources in the operation 
and promotion of both types of funds.  The general characteristics of the existing Islamic 
funds are highlighted in Figure 8.2.  While there is no significant issue arising with 
regards to the Shariah-compliance status as reflected by the approval from the SC, there 
are certain issues related to the structure and the underlying contracts of the existing 
Islamic funds, the Shariah expertise, the clients‟ profile, and the real intention of fund 
management companies in offering Islamic funds that require close attention, nonetheless.   
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Figure 8.2: General Characteristics of the Existing Islamic Funds 
 
  
Summary: 
RQ 1: What are the general characteristics and operations of the Islamic funds? 
Theme 1: Islamic funds are essentially funds that adhere to Shariah guidelines but are not treated exclusively different from conventional funds by fund management 
companies. Islamic funds are particularly characterised by their Shariah identities but tend to be smaller in size and have lower fund subscription rate while their 
performance is below than that of conventional funds.  Investors subscribed into Islamic funds for economic and religious reasons. 
Islamic Funds 
Staff expertise/qualification: 
- At least completed undergraduate level 
but with no Shariah background. 
Fund types and structure: 
- Mixed. 
- Islamic fund structure is copied from 
conventional. 
- Used similar subscription procedures 
and documents. 
Client profile: 
- Mixed and invest mainly for long term. 
 
Motivation: 
- Investors subscribe Islamic funds on 
religious and return/risk consideration. 
- FMCs offer Islamic funds mainly because 
of; 1) economic; 2) religious; 3) inherit. 
Shariah aspects: 
- Fully Shariah-compliant. 
- Separation of funds. 
- Use the SC‟s list of halal-approved stocks. 
- Appoint Shariah scholars through SAB. 
- Regular Shariah monitoring by SAB. 
- Income is purified. 
 
 
Exclusivity: 
- Non-exclusive although investment 
accounts are separated from conventional. 
- Offered together with conventional funds.  
- Islamic funds are handled by the same 
staff and uses similar company resources. 
Shariah contract applied: 
- Not profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) contract.  
- Funds are structured on fee-based basis. 
- No clear reference to which Shariah 
principles are applied. 
Investment managers: 
- Mixed. Both Muslims and non-Muslims 
handle the fund. 
Performance: 
- Outperform its benchmark. 
- Underperform conventional funds. 
Asset universe: 
- Invest in halal-approved securities only. 
- Invest in fundamentally sound stocks. 
- Favourite sectors are plantation, 
construction and properties.  
- Allow derivatives for hedging purposes. 
Fund size: 
- Smaller than conventional funds. 
- Low fund subscription rate. 
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 It is apparent that the structure of the existing Islamic funds is basically similar to 
conventional funds, thus raising a suspicion that the former is essentially a copycat of the 
latter but crammed with Shariah features.  This approach is not uncommon as most of the 
current Shariah-compliant financial products are structured by mimicking their 
conventional counterparts.  Consequently, both Islamic and conventional funds are 
normally thought to be largely similar with no significantly differences to one another.  
For instance, how Shariah principles are applied in the underlying contracts of an Islamic 
fund is not clearly defined in Islamic fund prospectus.  Therefore, it is not surprising that 
with exception of two respondents, the other fund managers interviewed have no 
knowledge whatsoever of which Shariah transaction contracts are applied in their Islamic 
funds.  When reading an Islamic fund prospectus or fund subscription form, one will 
realise that the fund prospectus and subscription form documents are indeed very similar 
to those of a conventional fund.  In fact, there is one fund management company which is 
using a standard subscription form for all funds under its management.  While the 
rationale for copying conventional documents is perhaps related to regulatory or cost 
considerations, it may unfortunately limit the amount of Shariah information that can be 
conveyed through the documents.   
 
 It appears that the existing Islamic funds do not differ significantly from 
conventional funds in terms of their operation. The relationship between unit holders as 
investors/subscribers of the Islamic funds with fund management companies is not 
defined in Shariah terms but simply on a fee-based arrangement basis whereby the fund 
management companies are paid a certain percentage of fund management fees calculated 
from the outstanding net asset value (NAV) of the Islamic funds‟ portfolio in return for 
their service.  Likewise, the relationship between fund management companies and 
fund/investment managers is also usually fee-based whereby the former pay the latter a 
certain amount of investment management fees in return for their service.  In addition, the 
respondents have also revealed that Islamic funds determined their dividend payout in a 
similar way to that in which conventional funds determined their dividend.  At first, all 
profits (and losses) generated by the Islamic funds‟ investment portfolio are pooled into 
an investment income account.  After deducting all expenses including fund management 
fees accrued to the fund management companies and making an allocation of retained 
earnings for the purpose of reinvestment, dividend rate is then determined from the 
remaining income available for distribution at the discretion of the fund management 
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companies.  Hence, Islamic funds principally do not guarantee any dividend income for 
their investors.   
 
 In the Shariah context, the fee-based arrangement is termed al-ujr and, like in 
conventional funds, the fee remains payable regardless of whether the Islamic funds 
earned a positive return from their investment or otherwise.  The majority of respondents 
however, were unable to relate the Shariah terms when explaining the relationship 
between investors–fund management companies–investment managers and there is strong 
indication that their failure to make such an explanation is due to their lack of awareness 
on the Shariah contract.  This is attributed to the fact that Islamic fund managers are 
essentially responsible to manage and administer the Islamic funds whilst all Shariah 
matters, including Shariah-compliance related issues, are primarily the responsibility of 
the Shariah scholars in the Shariah advisory board.  
 
 The existing Islamic fund prospectuses do not explain the relationship from the 
Shariah perspective, which normally recognises the fund management activities as a 
business venture involving a capital provider (rab al-maal) and an entrepreneur 
(mudarib), for which, the Shariah has devised a preferred mode of cooperation namely 
profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) to ensure that each party in such a business venture will be 
fairly rewarded for their contribution and the interest of all stakeholders involved will be 
duly protected.  Unfortunately, the popularity of the fee-based arrangement in the Islamic 
fund industry has seriously undermined the PLS contract.  The fee-based arrangement is 
highly vulnerable to moral hazard problems since fund management companies and/or 
investment managers would continue to enjoy their fees regardless of the Islamic funds‟ 
performance.  Therefore, there will be no recourse for investors/fund management 
companies to obtain any compensation from fund management companies/investment 
managers if the Islamic fund is underperforming or incurs losses since it will not be 
possible to identify whether the underperformance was due to external factors beyond the 
fund or because of incompetency on the part of the fund management 
companies/investment managers.  Since both fund management companies and 
investment managers are guaranteed to receive their fees, unlike dividend which is not 
guaranteed to be paid to investors, there is a possibility that fund management companies 
and/or investment managers may not be performing at their best while continuing to 
receive their fees at the expense of Islamic fund investors, especially if the fund is not 
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generating a positive return.  Instead, through the PLS contract, fund management 
companies and fund/investment managers are more likely to be committed when 
exercising their duty since their income (fee) is directly dependent upon the profit 
generated by the Islamic funds.  However, none of the existing Islamic funds are 
structured based on the PLS contract, but instead, have adopted the fee-based basis 
similar to conventional funds.  Hence, to better realise the aspiration of the Islamic 
teachings, fund management companies should consider structuring their Islamic funds 
using the PLS contract since it is the more preferred arrangement.  Moreover, the 
popularity of the fee-based arrangement also reflects a lack of genuine innovation or 
creativity on the part of the fund management companies when structuring their Islamic 
funds.    
 
 It is rather unfortunate that most respondents have little knowledge of the Shariah 
matters despite their responsibility for Islamic funds.  Although all respondents are 
educated to at least undergraduate academic level and have secured a fund management 
license, they have no formal Shariah education or training.  In fact, most respondents 
assumed Islamic funds are merely funds that invest only in halal-approved securities and 
adhere to certain Shariah guidelines.  Therefore, by taking into consideration that Islamic 
funds are usually designed by mimicking conventional funds, it is not surprising when 
most respondents perceive Islamic funds as similar with conventional funds.  This 
perception may have prompted some respondents to put pecuniary motive higher than 
religious motive, with some respondents admitting they will not hesitate to advise their 
Islamic funds‟ clients to switch into conventional funds if their Islamic funds are 
underperforming.  The desire to maximise return may have also encouraged some Islamic 
funds to allow investment in derivative securities albeit asserting that such investment 
will strictly involve Shariah-compliant derivative instruments and be undertaken solely 
for hedging purposes to protect the value of the Islamic funds‟ portfolio.  Although the 
argument seems valid, investment in derivative securities will unnecessarily expose 
Islamic funds to speculative trading activities.  Furthermore, the emphasis on 
performance leads fund management companies to undermine religious criteria when 
choosing a fund manager, or entrusting their Islamic funds to the hands of a non-Muslim 
fund manager.  The ignorance towards the importance of the Shariah knowledge has 
resulted in the Islamic fund industry remaining in stagnancy with a lack of genuine 
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product development, apart from those copied from the conventional arena and an 
inability to promote the true Islamic teachings through the Islamic funds. 
 
 The existing Islamic fund investors are not exclusively Muslim as the funds have 
successfully attracted non-Muslim subscribers, as well.  For Muslim investors, religious 
reason is obviously one of the motivating factors for them to choose Islamic funds amid 
other reasons, such as return and risk consideration, diversification and ethical motives.  
However, it is also apparent that Islamic funds are relatively small and less subscribed 
when compared to conventional funds, whilst the low fund switching activities imply that 
Islamic fund clients are basically passive, or less aggressive, investors who adopt the buy-
and-hold strategy and invest for a long-term period.  The low subscription rate is probably 
due to Islamic funds generally giving a lower return relative to conventional funds which 
makes the funds rather less attractive to investors in terms of monetary return.    
 
 Islamic funds suffer two additional risks which put the funds at a disadvantage 
when compared to conventional funds. The risks are the Shariah non-compliance risk and 
higher operating costs due to the requirement to appoint Shariah scholars.  Due to these 
shortcomings, it is difficult for Islamic funds to beat either conventional funds or the 
market index directly.  In terms of operation, fund management companies do not give 
special treatment on their Islamic funds but instead all company resources are normally 
utilised for or shared by both Islamic and conventional funds.  The lack of emphasis in 
promoting the ideals of Islamic teachings through the Shariah-compliant fund; the 
inadequate research in the development of genuine Islamic-based fund products; and, the 
limited Shariah knowledge among key personnel especially those at the top management 
level, fund managers and marketing personnel, has cast serious doubts on the real 
intention of fund management companies in offering Islamic funds.  While the motivation 
of offering Islamic funds can be as noble as to benefit the umma (Muslim society) as 
some respondents have claimed, it can also significantly be driven by economic motives 
such as to broaden the fund management companies‟ earnings base or to create a 
competitive advantage against their rival companies.  The following topic analyses the 
real intention of the fund management companies in offering Islamic funds. 
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8.4.2.2 Real Intention of Fund Management Companies in Offering Islamic Funds 
 
This section discusses the real intention of fund management companies in offering 
Islamic funds. The coding analysis reveals that most respondents believed economic 
motive was the main factor behind their fund management companies‟ decision to offer 
Islamic funds but religious causes were nonetheless also cited by some of the 
respondents.  Hence, it is important to investigate the issue further by examining how the 
real intention is reflected through the current operations of the existing Islamic funds.   In 
this section, the scope of discussion of the fund management companies‟ real intention is 
broadened to include several other themes namely the Shariah issue, the personnel, the 
size and performance of the Islamic funds as well as the client characteristics as shown in 
Figure 8.3.  It is to be noted that the arrow lines do not necessarily imply causality effect 
among the variables concerned. 
 
 For the Shariah theme, focus is given on how fund management companies 
understand and appreciate the Shariah objectives in the handling of their Islamic funds.  
For the purpose of this study, the Shariah understanding, hence the religious motive is 
defined based on how the respondents perceive their Islamic funds contribute to the 
success of attaining the objectives of Shariah (maqasid al-Shariah).  The assumption is 
that if the offer of Islamic funds by fund management companies is largely motivated by 
religious causes, this should be reflected through their commitment to achieve the 
purposes of the Shariah, hence the ideal of Islamic teachings, through a wider application 
of the Shariah principles in the construct and handling of their Islamic funds as well as 
enhancing the level of the Shariah understanding amongst their staff, especially in 
investment and marketing functions so proper advice can be given to their Islamic fund 
clients.  Hence, if the respondents are at least aware of the Shariah objectives, their 
response to questions pertaining to the original intention of their fund management 
companies in offering Islamic funds should be able to explain the manner in which their 
Islamic funds will help in attaining the purposes of the Shariah, particularly the fulfilment 
of the necessities level.  Strictly speaking, their Islamic funds should be designed in a way 
that will help Muslims to preserve or enhance their faith, wealth, mind and honour when 
investing in those funds. 
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Figure 8.3: Real Intention of the Fund Management Companies in Offering Islamic Funds and Its Implications 
 
Less emphasise on 
Shariah qualification 
Summary: 
RQ 2: What is the real intention of the fund management companies in offering Islamic funds? 
Theme 2: Economic reason is the main factor that motivates the fund management companies to offer Islamic funds although religious motive is also important. 
Over reliance on SAB as FMs are not trained on 
Shariah matters. 
Higher cost 
Lack of marketing strategy Lack of marketing strategy 
Poor Shariah advice 
Less competitive 
The fund performance theme: 
- Underperformed conventional funds. 
(PERF-RATE; PERF-COMP) 
Less attractive 
Separation of role 
Disposal of 
non-halal 
stocks at least 
at breakeven 
price 
Real intention: 
CHAR-MOTO-ECON 
CHAR-MOTO-UMMA 
CHAR-MOTO-INHERIT 
The Shariah theme: 
- Achieving the purposes of Shariah (maqasid al-Shariah) 
- Lack of awareness on Shariah matters (PRAC-CONT) 
- SAB handles all Shariah matters (MONI-SAB) 
-  
 
Capital preservation: 
- PRAC-PURI 
- PERF-INST-DERVY 
Passive trading The client character theme: 
- Mixed (CHAR-CLIENT-MIX) 
- Invest long-term (CHAR-CLIENT-LT) 
Capital protected from 
losses due to purification 
The personnel theme: 
- No Shariah qualification (CHAR-EXPT-PGNON; 
CHAR-EXPT-UGNON) 
- Non-Muslims FMs (PRAC-FM-NMYES) 
 
The fund size theme: 
- Small (CHAR-SIZE-SMALL) 
- Low subscription rate. 
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 Unfortunately however, none of the respondents were able to explain how their 
Islamic funds would contribute in achieving the Shariah objectives apart from saying that 
their funds benefits the Muslim society (umma) by providing them the opportunity to 
invest without forsaking their religious belief.  Although this argument is valid and in one 
way or another conforms to the Shariah purposes, it is obviously a generalised comment 
and reflects that the respondents have a rather vague understanding towards the Shariah 
role in the construct of their Islamic funds.  Further examination of their Islamic funds‟ 
prospectus also reveals that their prospectus does not make any explicit reference to 
religious or Shariah motive as the driving factor behind their Islamic fund offering, or 
explaining how the funds will benefit the Muslim society or promote Islamic teachings.  
Instead, what is obvious is that their Islamic fund prospectus closely resembles their 
conventional fund prospectus, differentiated only through additional information 
pertaining to the Shariah restrictions on the funds‟ investment universe, the Shariah risk 
and the Shariah advisory board.    Except for one respondent whose fund management 
company is a subsidiary of an Islamic banking group, the other respondents had no 
knowledge whatsoever of the types of the Shariah contracts applied in their Islamic 
funds.  Only one company clearly identified the Shariah principles governing their unit 
trust transactions and the tripartite relationship between investors–the fund management 
company–investment managers.  However, as explained in the previous section, the 
existing Islamic funds have been structured mainly on a fee-based (al-ujr) basis, similar 
to conventional funds, instead of the PLS basis although the latter is the more preferred 
mode of venture by the Shariah.     
 
 For the personnel theme, the apparent lack of key personnel with Shariah 
knowledge and qualifications has prompted fund management companies to engage 
Shariah scholars through a Shariah advisory board (SAB).  Typically, these Shariah 
scholars only specialise in Shariah matters and have little or no knowledge on investment 
operation.  This results in a separation of roles between the Shariah scholars and the fund 
managers, with the former merely advising on Shariah matters whilst the latter are 
responsible for investment matters of the Islamic funds.  Although it was claimed that 
there has not yet been a conflict between the Shariah advisory board and the fund 
management companies, the separation of roles has nevertheless reduced the function of 
the Shariah advisory board to become merely a reference or endorsing authority, rather 
than an active involvement in the day-to-day operation of the fund management 
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companies, including personnel and financial product development. The separation of 
roles also creates a situation where the fund management companies become overly 
reliant on the Shariah advisory board for advice on Shariah matters.  This reduces the 
incentive for fund management companies to develop a pool of their own Shariah 
experts, or to provide Shariah training for their key personnel, especially fund managers, 
or to place emphasis on Shariah qualifications when hiring or appointing a fund manager. 
One respondent has even admitted that religious belief or Shariah knowledge is not an 
important factor to be considered when hiring a fund manager, even if the fund involved 
is an Islamic fund.  This explains why none of the fund managers have substantial 
Shariah knowledge and why non-Muslim fund managers are entrusted to manage Islamic 
funds.  A dire consequence resulting from the lack of attention towards the Shariah is a 
fund manager becoming unable to give proper advice on Islamic fund to their clients or to 
help promote the true Islamic teachings or attaining the purposes of Shariah (maqasid al-
Shariah).  This is demonstrated by one respondent‟s admission that he will not hesitate to 
advise his Islamic fund clients to switch their investment from Islamic funds to 
conventional funds if the return from the Islamic funds is expected to be lower than the 
conventional funds. While this advice may be sensible from investment strategy point of 
view, simply advising Islamic fund investors to switch funds in pursuit of monetary gains 
reflects ignorance towards the real intention of investing in Islamic funds from the 
maqasid al-Shariah point of view.  
 
 With regards to fund size, the existing Islamic funds are relatively smaller and less 
subscribed than conventional funds though interest towards the funds remains strong, 
nonetheless. Performance wise, published statistics indicate that Islamic funds have 
generally underperformed conventional funds if the two types of fund are compared 
directly, despite that Islamic funds may outperform their own benchmarks.  One plausible 
reason is because Islamic funds inevitably suffer from higher operating cost.  Even if an 
Islamic fund is able to match its conventional counterpart in terms of asset composition 
and fund managers‟ investment skills, it is still in a disadvantaged position due to the 
additional Shariah risk and expenses which result in a higher operating cost for the fund.  
The relatively poor performance makes Islamic funds less competitive or less attractive 
when compared to conventional funds which, in turn, contribute to the lower subscription 
rate in Islamic funds.   
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 One interesting issue related to Islamic funds‟ performance is the tendency of fund 
management companies to protect the capital or portfolio value of their Islamic funds.  
Most fund management companies allow their Islamic funds to invest in derivative 
securities despite that such instruments are mired by controversial issues pertaining to 
their halal status and speculative nature.  Although fund management companies claim 
that such investment will be undertaken strictly for hedging purposes and with due care to 
ensure Shariah-compliance, investment in derivative securities will unnecessarily exposes 
Islamic funds‟ portfolio to excessive risk and speculative activities which, in turn, may 
contradict the Shariah purposes that underline the Islamic funds‟ creation.  The desire to 
protect portfolio value or return of Islamic funds is also evident from income purification 
practice.  Not all respondents are actually aware about the income purification exercise or 
its significance.  In fact, fund management companies do not purify income generated 
from investment made in listed companies on the assumption that the purification is not 
necessary since the stocks have already been approved as halal.  The current practice also 
allows fund management companies to delay the disposal of a stock that has turned non-
halal until the market price of the stock reach the breakeven level where the fund 
management companies are able to recover all transaction costs incurred at the time when 
the stock was acquired originally.  This effectively means that the fund management 
companies may continue to keep the non-halal stock until a favourable price is reached 
for its disposal but no dividend income can be received from the stock during the period.  
Although this practice is acceptable, it risks Islamic funds receiving dividend income 
from a non-halal stock, especially if the price of the non-halal stock takes longer to 
recover. It is interesting to note that some fund management companies have even 
thought of retaining the purified income by transferring the amount into their 
conventional funds‟ pooled income account rather than channelling it to charities.  The 
tendency to invest in derivative securities and preserve capital indicates that the fund 
management companies are putting the pecuniary motive above the religious motive.  
 
 For the client theme, the small fund size and low subscription rate suggest that 
Islamic fund investors are generally passive and invest for a long-term period.  This 
assumption is supported by the low fund switching activities between different Islamic 
funds offered by the same fund management company, implying that investors mainly 
adopt the buy-and-hold strategy when investing in Islamic funds.  The low subscription 
rate and the passive trading indicate that perhaps Islamic funds are less attractive to 
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investors and this is further aggravated by the funds‟ relatively lower performance.  
Another contributing factor is the lack of promotion since marketing activities carried out 
by unit trust agents or employees of fund management companies normally involves the 
entire bundle of financial products offered by the companies and are not specifically 
focussed on Islamic funds.  
 
 To conclude, it can be argued that the real intention of fund management 
companies in offering Islamic funds is driven primarily by economic motives rather than 
religious causes.  This is apparent from the current operation of the fund management 
companies which seems to put less emphasis on promoting the true Islamic teachings 
through their Islamic funds.  Instead, Islamic funds are generally perceived as just another 
product line by the fund management companies, with the main purposes of generating 
additional income, enhancing their market share and improving their competitive 
position.  The apparent lack of Shariah knowledge among key personnel coupled with the 
lack of serious efforts to develop the Shariah infrastructure implies that the existing 
Islamic funds‟ operation has been focussed upon the stock screening process to ensure 
that the funds only invest in halal-approved securities.  Even then, most of the fund 
management companies simply relied on the SC‟s list of halal stocks for their equity 
investment.  Hence, the understanding of Islamic funds should be expanded into the 
philosophy underlying the funds‟ creation and the contract governing all stakeholders 
affected by the funds.  In fact, some Muslim fund managers have voiced their concern 
and discomfort, especially with regards to non-Muslim fund managers‟ handling of 
Islamic funds and the real intention of non-Muslim dominated fund management 
companies‟ offering of Islamic funds.  Apart from their Shariah attachment, the appeal of 
Islamic funds is also determined by their profit performance as in the case of other 
financial products.  
 
8.4.2.3 Factors Affecting the Islamic Funds’ Performance 
 
This section discusses the factors influencing Islamic fund performance. The coding 
analysis reveals that the factors can be categorised into four focussed coding groups 
namely the fund managers‟ special investment skills, the general market condition, the 
stock selection approach of the fund managers, and the impact of Shariah-compliance.  
The factors and their implications are depicted in Figure 8.4.   
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Figure 8.4:  Factors Affecting the Islamic Funds’ Performance  
  
 
Performance of Islamic 
unit trust fund 
 
Fund managers’ superior investment skills: 
- Asset allocation (PERF-FACTOR-ALLO). 
- Timing (PERF-FACTOR-TIME). 
- Sector and stock selection (PERF-FACTOR-PICK). 
- Trading/Execution  strategy (PERF-FACTOR-STGY). 
 
Economic and market condition: 
- Systematic risk  
(PERF-FACTOR-MKT). 
Shariah-compliance effect: 
- Higher operational cost (PERF-FACTOR-SHFE). 
- Reduce investment asset universe (ALT-REDUNI). 
- Lower return from the fund (ALT-REDRET-YES). 
Stock selection approach: 
- Stocks are selected based on fundamentals  
(PERF-ALLOC-GDFTL). 
- Focus on large capitalised stocks (PERF-ALLOC-LARGE). 
- Avoid smaller capitalised stocks (PERF-ALLOC-NOSM). 
Performance benchmark: 
- Shariah index  
(PERF-BENCH-SHIDX). 
- Conventional index 
(PERF-BENCH-FDCV). 
Summary: 
RQ 3: What are the factors that contribute to the Islamic funds‟ performance? 
Theme 3: Islamic funds‟ performance is significantly influenced by fund managers‟ special investment skills, general market condition, stock selection approach of the 
fund managers, and consequences of Shariah-compliance. Arguably, the most crucial is fund managers‟ special investment skills as it enables the fund managers to 
outperform in any given market condition.  The Shariah-compliance effect however, has a rather adverse impact on the Islamic funds‟ performance. 
The main differentiating factor 
now is their asset allocation 
skill in a given market 
condition.  FMs are willing to 
act beyond their mandate in 
order to preserve their fund‟s 
investment value. 
Islamic fund already suffered a 
disadvantage in terms of 
higher administrative cost. 
Shariah restriction makes asset 
choices rather limited. 
Less than 40 stocks are 
shortlisted thus implying that 
majority of the approved stock 
are trivial. It‟s most likely that 
all FMCs hold similar stocks. 
There could be potential bias 
in making the comparison 
when fund performance is 
benchmarked against broader 
market or customised index.  
Implications 
The impact can be minimised 
through superior investment 
skills of fund managers. 
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 The main contributing factor to the performance of any mutual fund is arguably its 
fund managers‟ superior investment skills. The four crucial skills are the asset allocation, 
timing, industry and stock selection, as well as trading/execution strategy.  The asset 
allocation skill refers to the ability of fund managers to accurately decide the proportion 
of each type of asset in their portfolio or to make the appropriate changes to their 
portfolio‟s asset composition in response to the changing market environment.  
Specifically, this refers to the ability of fund managers to anticipate possible changes in 
the future market direction and react effectively by determining the right mix of assets in 
the portfolio between fixed income securities, equities, cash and money market 
instruments that will best suit the new market condition.  Further review of the fund 
prospectuses however, shows that there is a huge variation in the percentage of each asset 
allowed for investment. For example, consider a two-asset portfolio involving equities 
and fixed income securities. The portfolio mix usually allows fund managers to invest 
between a minimum of 20 per cent to a maximum of 80 per cent in each asset class 
depending on market condition.  Therefore, if the stock market is expected to be bullish 
initially, the fund managers may choose to invest a maximum of 80 per cent of the fund in 
equities and 20 per cent in fixed income securities (80:20), and later change the asset 
composition to 20:80 if the stock market is poised to be bearish, or 50:50 if the outlook of 
the two asset classes is similar.  Since fund managers are given full authority to alter the 
asset mix at their discretion, the huge variation in the maximum and minimum allowable 
percentage of investment for each asset classes in any given market environment would 
reflect whether the fund managers possess superior asset allocation skill or otherwise. It is 
worth mentioning here that some Islamic fund prospectuses have even put in a clause 
allowing their fund managers to act beyond their portfolio mandate in order to preserve 
the fund‟s portfolio value as can be interpreted from the following excerpts: 
 
In adverse market conditions, the Funds may hold significantly higher amount of 
liquid and defensive assets (including fixed income securities with different maturity 
dates) than that prescribed by their respective mandates as a temporary positions. 
(emphasis is researcher‟s) 
 
A clause such as above explicitly authorises fund managers to breach their portfolio 
mandate which requires that investment in a specific asset class be made within a certain 
proportion in accordance with the pre-determined portfolio objectives.  Although the 
clause may have a bona fide intention to protect the portfolio value, the implication is that 
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it exposes the Islamic fund to asset allocation risk caused by fund managers violating 
their portfolio mandate without consulting their investors.  Again, if the clause is meant to 
represent an unconditional trust by investors that fund managers will do their best in 
managing the fund, there is no way to determine that the fund managers really act at the 
best interest of the investors, especially considering that the fund managers have been 
guaranteed their fees regardless of the funds‟ performance.  Hence, the clause may result 
in fund managers dishonouring the concept of trust that underlies the very foundation of 
the contract.  This also makes the assessment of unit trust or mutual fund performance 
more difficult if analysis is made using the existing funds available in the market.  
Possessing the timing, stock and industry selection as well as trading/execution strategy 
skills means the fund managers are able to determine the best timing to buy or sell 
securities, identify underpriced securities or profitable industries, and minimise 
transaction costs. Therefore, a fund manager who possesses these skills is likely to 
outperform a rival fund manager who is lacking these skills.  In one case, a respondent 
claimed that her Islamic fund had managed to recover and performed significantly better 
in 2008–2009 period after she decided to appoint a new fund manager to replace the 
previous underperforming fund manager. This case provides a real example of the 
importance of fund managers‟ investment skills in determining Islamic funds‟ 
performance. 
 
 Economic and market condition is undoubtedly a crucial factor which may affect 
Islamic funds‟ performance.  It‟s a systematic risk which cannot be avoided by fund 
managers since it affects all financial instruments available and all business entities 
operating in the same market.  The risk include changes in business and economic cycles, 
inflation, political stability, changes in regulatory environment, worldwide recession or 
financial crisis, or shift in consumer taste.  While the risk is unavoidable, the impact 
however, can be minimised through fund managers‟ superior investment skill by 
accurately anticipating the possible changes in the market direction and reacting to the 
changes accordingly.   
 
 One factor which certainly influences Islamic funds‟ performance unfavourably is 
the Shariah-compliance effects.  Although strict adherence to Shariah requirements is 
essential for Islamic funds, Shariah restrictions on stock selection have resulted in a 
reduced investment asset universe for Islamic funds.  In general, Islamic funds are 
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prohibited from investing in companies or financial instruments that are involved in 
conventional banking and insurance, interest rate-based transactions and production of 
goods or services deemed haram by the Shariah either directly or indirectly.  
Consequently, Islamic funds are prevented from investing in companies involved in 
conventional banking and finance, gaming, liquor, and most conglomerate companies 
with diversified business interests.  These are the sectors which are usually represented by 
large-capitalised stocks with attractive dividend payout, strong earnings potential and less 
volatile trading.  Instead, Islamic funds‟ portfolio is heavily invested in defensive industry 
such as plantation, food, utilities and properties companies.  To illustrate the consequence 
of the Shariah restrictions on stock selection, consider two identical portfolios that have 
the same mandates, structure and are managed by the same fund manager (therefore, the 
effect from portfolio structure and the fund manager‟s investment skills is controlled) but 
one is Islamic-based and the other is conventional.  Obviously, the conventional portfolio 
will have the advantage since it is able to invest in all profitable stocks whether halal or 
non-halal whilst the Islamic portfolio is restricted to investment in non-halal stocks 
regardless of how profitable the companies are.  This drawback significantly reduces the 
chances for Islamic funds to outperform their conventional counterparts.   
 
 Although some respondents argued that Shariah restrictions may not significantly 
reduce the asset universe of Islamic funds, as fund managers can always capitalise on the 
large numbers of halal-approved stocks available to create a combination of stocks that 
will give similar return and risk exposure with investment in a non-halal stock, the 
strategy is neither as simple as it was claimed nor is it easy to find and create a 
combination of halal-approved stocks that could exactly match the return and risk as well 
as trading volatility of a non-halal stock. Certainly, such a strategy requires exceptional 
investment and trading skills on the part of the fund managers.  In addition, although 
there are a large number of halal-approved stocks, the Islamic fund industry is still 
lacking other types of financial products including money market instruments, 
commercial papers and fixed incomes securities. This may explain why Islamic funds‟ 
performance is inferior to conventional funds as indicated by the published statistics. 
 
 The coding analysis has identified the stock selection approach of fund managers 
as another factor influencing Islamic funds‟ performance.  Fund managers usually prefer 
stocks with sound fundamentals as these stocks are perceived to be strong both 
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operationally and financially, and they offer a sustainable dividend income to their funds.  
Since the selection approach emphasises good fundamentals, the shortlisted stocks 
normally comprise of large-capitalised companies as they are usually the market leader in 
their industry and pay relatively higher dividend payout rates. Such characteristics make 
fundamentally sound stocks attractive to institutional investors who normally purchase 
these stocks on a long-term basis resulting in a more stable and less volatile trading.  
Large-capitalised stocks with strong fundamentals could also provide considerable 
protection against a bearish market or excessive volatility in the stock market since their 
prices are more likely to fluctuate in a relatively narrow range and would recover at a 
faster rate in the event the stock market rebounds.  These stocks are also the major 
beneficiary of good economic condition or a bullish stock market.  In addition, large-
capitalised stocks are monitored by investment research houses closely, thus giving these 
stocks the information advantage and making them more visible, particularly to 
institutional investors including Islamic fund managers.  Therefore, concentrating on 
fundamentally sound, large-capitalised stocks would help to ensure that the value of 
Islamic funds‟ investment portfolio would remain sustainable.  Consequently, Islamic 
fund managers will tend to avoid smaller-capitalised stocks as these stocks are perceived 
to be more risky due to their relatively low and less sustainable dividend payout, volatile 
trading with huge price fluctuation, and greater information asymmetry since they are less 
monitored by investment research houses.   
 
 However, the selection approach which favours mostly large-capitalised stocks 
may also have its own negative implication.  Response from the participating fund 
managers indicates that less than 40 stocks are normally being shortlisted as compared to 
855 halal-approved stocks available in the SC‟s list.  This represents less than 5 per cent 
of the total halal stocks that make their way into Islamic funds‟ portfolios, thus signifying 
that the majority of the halal stocks are unfortunately trivial, investment-wise.  More 
importantly, this also implies that all Islamic funds with the same objectives or portfolio 
mandate are likely to have similar stocks in their portfolio which, ceteris paribus, may 
result in their performance not to be substantially different comparatively. Therefore, any 
significant difference in the performance of a given type of Islamic funds is likely to 
reflect their fund managers‟ investment skills or the type of performance benchmark used.   
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 In terms of performance, respondents have argued that it is rather misleading to 
make a direct comparison between the performances of Islamic funds against 
conventional funds since both constitute different classes of unit trust funds.  Since 
conventional funds have practically no limits on the types of asset they can invest in, 
unlike Islamic funds which at the onset are already restricted by the Shariah, comparing 
the performance of the two funds is poised to produce biased results against Islamic funds 
as they are likely to be easily outperformed by conventional funds.  In view of this, the 
current industry practice is to compare Islamic funds‟ performance against Shariah-
compliant benchmarks such as the KL Shariah Index (now withdrawn), the FBM Emas 
Shariah Index, the FBM Hijrah Shariah Index, or a customised index comprising of a 
mixture of Shariah-compliant securities developed internally by fund management 
companies.  Therefore, extra caution should be exercised when interpreting a report 
claiming Islamic funds‟ outperformance or underperformance since comparison may be 
made against the Islamic funds‟ own designated benchmark and not against common 
benchmarks or market index.   
 
 Although it seems logical to compare Islamic funds‟ performance against Shariah 
indices on the grounds that both involve Shariah-compliant instruments, there is a 
potential shortcoming in using Shariah indices as performance benchmark.   Shariah 
indices such as the FBM Emas Shariah Index basically comprise of all listed halal-
approved equities, the majority of which are medium and small-capitalised stocks.  On 
the contrary, Islamic funds‟ portfolios are mainly comprised of large-capitalised stocks as 
these are the preferred stocks of Islamic fund managers owing to their superior earnings, 
stable price fluctuation and high trading liquidity.  In view of the huge differences in 
stock components, there is a potential mismatch when Shariah indices are used as a 
performance benchmark for Islamic funds since the indices comprise mostly of medium 
and small-capitalised stocks whilst the funds are heavily weighted towards large-
capitalised stocks.  Considering that trading in large-capitalised stocks is more stable and 
less volatile as compared to small-capitalised stocks, there is high likelihood that Islamic 
funds will outperform the Shariah index.  Hence, the appropriate benchmark for 
comparing Islamic funds‟ performance is a Shariah index which is represented by large-
capitalised, Shariah-compliant stocks similar to the KLCI. 
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 In practice however, some fund management companies are using conventional 
instruments such as conventional fixed deposit rates as a benchmark against their Islamic 
funds.  The fund managers concerned justify the practice by saying that the adoption of 
the conventional fixed deposit rates does not contradict the Shariah or render their 
Islamic funds non-Shariah-compliant since the instruments merely serve as a benchmark 
and do not constitute part of their Islamic funds‟ investment.  This line of argument 
however, is arguably unconvincing and it highlights inconsistency on the part of Islamic 
fund managers concerned when it comes to performance measurement.  It appears that the 
Islamic fund managers have purposely been selective in their approach when choosing the 
benchmark to be used to compare their Islamic funds‟ performance.  This inconsistency 
may be driven by the motive to show that their Islamic funds could outperform 
conventional instruments. Arguably, if the use of conventional instruments is purely for 
benchmarking purposes as claimed, then it raises a question why such a practice is not 
widely applied on all Islamic funds and other Shariah-compliant instruments.  Instead, 
Islamic fund managers generally prefer to compare their Islamic funds‟ performance 
against Shariah-compliant instruments or indices and on only a few occasions are 
conventional instruments or index used, thus reflecting a possible adverse selection 
strategy of choosing only underperforming conventional instruments or indices as 
benchmarks for evaluating their Islamic funds.         
  
 To conclude, four factors have been identified as influencing Islamic fund 
performance namely the fund managers‟ special investment skills, the general market 
condition, the stock selection approach of the fund managers, and the Shariah-compliance 
effects.  Further analysis reveals that extra caution should be exercised when interpreting 
Islamic funds‟ performance since in most cases the performance is measured against other 
Shariah-compliant benchmarks and does not represent a direct comparison with the 
performance of conventional funds or benchmarks. While the first three factors may have 
contributed to Islamic funds‟ performance positively, the Shariah-compliance factor 
unfortunately, is affecting Islamic funds‟ return adversely since the adherence to the 
Shariah requirements resulted in restricted investment choices.  In fact, the respondents 
have neither mentioned that Shariah-compliance factor brings positive results nor that 
Shariah expertise contributes significantly to their Islamic funds‟ performance. The 
following section analyses the current Shariah practices of fund management companies. 
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8.4.2.4 The Current Nature of Shariah-Compliance Practices by Fund Management 
Companies 
 
This section discusses the current nature of Shariah-compliance practice by fund 
management companies.  The coding analysis has examined the Shariah-compliance 
practice in terms of stock selection, appointment of Shariah advisory board (SAB), 
Shariah monitoring as well as separation of investment and trading accounts between 
Islamic and conventional funds.  Aided by Figure 8.5, this section analyses the issue 
further from three perspectives namely the handling of Islamic funds, the Shariah 
advisory and monitoring practice and the Islamic fund products.   
 
 The coding analysis has revealed that the existing fund management companies 
are using the list of halal-approved stocks issued by the SC.  Although the SC‟s list 
provides the industry with a standardised directory of halal-approved stocks, thus 
avoiding any possible confusion resulting from multiple and contradictory listing if each 
of the fund management companies is compelled to produce their own list of halal-
approved stocks, the dependency on the SC‟s list represents a rather convenient option 
since the burden to determine the halal status of a listed company no longer rests with the 
individual fund management companies. Consequently, the implication is that all fund 
management companies will end up having the same list of potential stocks to choose 
from and they will have little incentive either to seriously develop their own internal 
Shariah expertise or to grant their appointed Shariah scholars a greater role, such as to be 
involved actively in their investment operations or product development, apart from 
merely providing Shariah-related advisory services.  As long as the current practice 
continues, the separation of role between the Shariah advisory board and the fund 
management companies is likely to prevail, thus limiting the prospect of genuine 
development in the Islamic fund industry. 
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Figure 8.5: The Nature of the Current Shariah-Compliance Practices 
 
Summary: 
RQ 4: What is the current nature of the Shariah-compliance practice by the fund management companies? 
Theme 4: All existing Islamic funds have been certified Shariah-compliant by the SC.  The current practice reveals a separation of roles between Shariah advisory boards 
(SAB) and investment committee of fund management companies.  The boards have a rather limited responsibility and involvement but deemed adequate with regards to 
ensuring the existing Islamic funds remain Shariah-compliant.   The concern towards higher cost and lack of investment and development in Shariah practice indicates that 
fund management companies are merely fulfilling the minimum regulatory requirement for Shariah-compliance. 
Shariah-Compliance Practices 
Invest in halal securities only: 
- SC list and others. 
Separation of role: 
- Limited authority for SAB. 
- Regular monitoring. 
Engaging Shariah Advisory 
Board (SAB): 
- Possible conflict of interest? 
- Laissez-faire attitude in FMC. 
Separation of funds: 
- Islamic funds use Islamic 
banking accounts.   
 
Lack of Shariah understanding: 
- Less emphasis on Shariah knowledge. 
Product innovation: 
- Products mainly copied from conventional.  
- No PLS-based product. 
- Lack of innovation.  
Documentation: 
- The design of Islamic fund prospectuses and subscription 
forms are basically similar with conventional fund.  
- Some FMC use a single subscription form for both its 
Islamic and conventional funds. 
- Public information pertaining to the operations of Shariah 
fund is rather limited.  
 
Shariah principles applied: 
- Not clear.  
- Mainly fee-based.  
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 With regards to dual funds offerings, all transactions are principally maintained in 
two separate set of accounts to ensure that financial proceeds from the Islamic funds are 
not mixed with proceeds from the conventional funds.  The rationale is to safeguard the 
purity of Islamic funds by preventing the funds from receiving any non-halal interest 
from its banking accounts.  Therefore, all financial transaction involving Islamic funds 
will be channelled through Islamic bank accounts.  However, this separation only applies 
to financial accounts and does not affect other fund management companies‟ resources 
such as manpower, support services and back-office operations.  For instance, a fund 
manager may be assigned to undertake investment tasks for both Islamic and 
conventional funds whilst a marketing officer or unit trust agent will be doing the 
promotion for both types of funds.  The same treatment is also applied on other fund 
management companies‟ resources such as office premises, equipment and other support 
services.  One plausible reason for the sharing of manpower and facilities is the common 
usage by both Islamic and conventional funds which makes it economical for fund 
management companies to simply share the resources.  Therefore, it is apparent that 
Islamic funds are not treated exceptionally different from conventional funds whenever 
fund management companies‟ resources are concerned. 
 
 A current practice that has raised considerable concern among Muslim fund 
managers is the appointment of non-Muslim fund managers to manage Islamic funds.  
One common reason given is the insufficient number of licensed Muslim fund managers 
in the country, thus forcing fund management companies to assign their Islamic funds to 
non-Muslim fund managers. Although religious belief is not yet considered an important 
criterion when selecting a fund manager, entrusting Islamic funds to non-Muslim fund 
managers who have very little or no knowledge whatsoever about Islamic teachings and 
Shariah objectives might not augur well for the long-term development of the Islamic 
fund industry. This is because their apparent lack of understanding may prevent them 
from appreciating the philosophy underlying the Islamic funds‟ creation within the 
context of promoting the Shariah objectives.  Instead, for non-Muslim fund managers, 
Islamic funds are perceived as just another product that their fund management 
companies are selling to the general public.  Therefore, it can be argued that non-Muslim 
fund managers would neither be able to help in achieving the Shariah objectives nor they 
can be expected to appreciate the real aspiration of Islamic funds beyond the mere pursuit 
of monetary gains.  Furthermore, exclusively assigning Islamic funds to Muslim fund 
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managers will help enhance investors‟ confidence towards the purity of the Islamic funds‟ 
operation.  One respondent has admitted that there is a growing concern amongst his 
Islamic fund clients towards this issue whereby the clients have requested his fund 
management company assign only Muslim fund managers to handle its Islamic funds 
which has resulted in a restructuring of their fund managers. 
 
 With regards to the Shariah practice, the existing norm is that all fund 
management companies appoint Shariah scholars who will advise them on Shariah-
related matters through a Shariah advisory board (SAB).  Three of the respondents set up 
their own internal Shariah board whilst four other respondents outsourced their Shariah 
experts from a third party.  While there is no significant issue arising with respect to 
internal SAB, there are potentially unfavourable consequences involving external SAB, 
instead.  For instance, all four fund management companies are appointing similar 
Shariah scholars employed by the same institution specialising in providing Shariah 
advisory services.  Since the four different fund management companies are sharing the 
same Shariah scholars, there is always a risk – regardless of how remote the possibility is 
– that the individual fund management company‟s trade secrets or confidentialities may 
be compromised.  Hence, when faced with such a risk, fund management companies may 
become extra vigilant for fears that their secrets or strategy may be compromised. The 
sharing of Shariah scholars will also result in rather slow progress in the development of 
the Islamic fund management industry since it would deepen the separation of roles 
between the SAB and the fund management companies.  Consequently, the former may 
eventually end up functioning more as an endorsing entity rather than being actively 
involved in the operations and development of genuine Islamic-based funds.  This 
perception is based on the admission by a respondent that he has never encountered any 
difficulty with regards to Shariah-related matters as he had always been able to obtain the 
necessary approval from the SAB appointed by his fund management company. 
 
 On issues pertaining to Islamic fund products, the respondents have generally 
admitted that the existing Islamic funds are basically structured by mimicking 
conventional funds.  This is evident from the design of the Islamic funds‟ prospectuses 
and subscription forms which have a stark resemblance to their conventional counterparts 
but with an additional section to incorporate Shariah-related information. It is also not 
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surprising that the existing Islamic funds have been structured on a fee-based scheme in 
which fund management companies are practically assured to earn their income in the 
form of a fund management fee chargeable at a certain percentage rate of the funds‟ 
NAV.  Since the fee-based scheme is common in conventional funds, its vast adoption by 
Islamic funds has undermined the profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) scheme which is 
preferred by the Shariah.  Unlike the fee-based scheme which is vulnerable to moral 
hazard problems, the PLS scheme will supposedly encourage Islamic fund managers to 
make their best efforts since their income is no longer guaranteed, but instead, is subject 
to the actual performance of their Islamic funds.  In addition, with exception of one 
respondent who was able to outline the relevant Shariah contracts applied in his Islamic 
funds‟ transactions, the other respondents apparently have no clear understanding of the 
Shariah contracts and no explanation about the types of Shariah contracts used is given in 
their Islamic funds‟ prospectus.  Therefore, it can be inferred from the mimicking of the 
conventional funds that the current Islamic fund industry is still lacking of product 
innovation to give the industry a more genuine Islamic-based products.                         
 
 To conclude, while the Shariah-compliance status of the existing Islamic funds is 
undoubted, there is an apparent lack of knowledge and understanding towards the Shariah 
principles and objectives amongst the industry practitioners.  This observation is based on 
the current practice of the fund management companies which has so far being heavily 
focussed on stock screening rather than developing genuine Islamic fund products or 
expanding the Shariah knowledge and expertise within their companies.  Even then, most 
companies have conveniently relied upon the SC‟s list of halal-approved stocks.  The 
current practice unfortunately, may have contributed significantly to the stagnancy in the 
Islamic fund industry.  Instead, the objectives and scope of Islamic funds should be 
expanded to incorporate Shariah principles and objectives governing all the Islamic 
funds‟ stakeholders through the attainment of the Shariah purposes (maqasid al-Shariah), 
profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) and corporate social responsibility (CSR).  Therefore, based 
on the large discrepancies between the fund management companies‟ commitment in 
expanding the Shariah knowledge and expertise as well as developing genuine Islamic 
fund products against their profit or economic pursuits in their offering of Islamic funds, 
it can be deduced that the current approach of the fund management companies is 
primarily to fulfil the minimum regulatory requirements that enable their Islamic funds to 
obtain or retain the Shariah-compliant status. The main reason for the limited investment 
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in Shariah development is because it involves higher costs, which, the fund management 
companies fear would affect their Islamic funds‟ performance adversely.  The following 
section discusses the portfolio performance valuation model for Islamic funds.  
 
 
8.4.2.5 The Necessity of Developing a New Alternative Portfolio Performance 
Measurement Model Specifically for Islamic Funds  
 
This section focuses on issues related to the valuation of Islamic funds‟ performance and 
the need to develop an alternative portfolio performance measurement model exclusively 
for Islamic funds.  The coding analysis revealed that the Shariah restrictions may have 
affected Islamic funds‟ performance unfavourably but the impact varied among the 
Islamic funds depending on the investment capability or skills of their fund managers.  
The analysis also indicates that an alternative valuation model may not be necessary at 
present since industry practitioners seem content with using the traditional portfolio 
performance models when evaluating their Islamic funds, whilst the current inadequate 
Shariah infrastructures are likely to hinder any effort to develop such an alternative 
valuation model.  This section analyses the issue further while looking into other options 
available for improving the method of assessing Islamic funds.  The entire discussion is 
illustrated through a flowchart in Figure 8.6. 
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Figure 8.6: Flowchart of the Feasibility of Developing an Alternative Portfolio Valuation 
Model 
  
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Summary: 
RQ 5: Is it necessary to develop an alternative portfolio performance measurement model specific for Islamic funds? 
Theme 5: Shariah restrictions have affected Islamic fund performance rather unfavourably.  However, feedbacks 
from practitioners imply that a new alternative portfolio measurement model is considered not necessary at the 
moment. Instead, there is a need to assess the extent to which Shariah principles are being implemented by FMCs.  
START: 
Examining the need for 
alternative portfolio performance 
measurement model. 
Are the two 
portfolios different? 
Is a new 
measurement model 
required? 
What are the new variables? 
ALT-SHTFAL 
Religious element: 
ALT-ADDVAR-SHA 
Real intention: 
ALT-ADDVAR-INTN 
ALT-ADDVAR-CSR 
Are they 
quantifiable? 
Suggestion for future study. 
Can the model be 
modified? 
END: 
Status quo 
Alternative measurement: 
Applied Shariah Rating Assessment 
(ALT-ADDVAR-RAT) 
Is the Shariah rating 
feasible? 
No 
Reasons for acceptance: 
1. For future use as the industry is growing 
 (ALT-WHYES-INGRO). 
2. For own identity and proper measurement 
 (ALT-WHYES-IDNTY). 
3. For academic purposes (ALT-WHYES-ACAD). 
 
Reasons for rejection: 
1. Not needed/practical (ALT-WHYNO-NOND). 
2. Lack of infrastructure (ALT-WHYNO-NOINF). 
3. Lack of demand (ALT-WHYNO-NODD). 
4. Existing model is sufficient (ALT-WHYNO-EXOK). 
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  Although the respondents have generally agreed that the Shariah restrictions 
render Islamic funds to be essentially different from conventional funds - or if using a 
respondent‟s own analogy, it‟s like comparing an apple with an orange, so to speak - 
which causes a direct comparison of their performance rather inappropriate and 
misleading, they however, are divided when asked about whether Islamic funds require an 
alternative performance measurement model that could better reflect the noble motives 
and the constraints faced by the funds.  Respondents have cited three reasons for 
supporting the idea namely the growing Islamic fund industry, the need to have a unique 
identity and proper measurement as well as for academic purposes. The statistics have 
shown that Islamic funds continue to attract investors‟ interest and despite that the size of 
the current Islamic funds is still substantially smaller than the size of conventional funds, 
there is no doubt that the Islamic fund industry is nonetheless poised to grow even bigger 
both in terms of size and value.  In view of this, it was argued that there will come a time 
when the Islamic fund industry will want to enhance its self-esteem by having its very 
own identity where it can significantly distinguish itself from its conventional 
counterpart.  This includes a new portfolio performance measurement model that will 
give a more accurate valuation of Islamic funds‟ performance.  Hence, at least for the 
time being, the attempt to develop an alternative portfolio valuation model is likely to be 
spearheaded by the academic community since the task requires both intellectual and 
industry input at different stages of its development. 
 
 In contrast, the rationale for rejecting the idea of developing the alternative 
portfolio measurement model is largely based on the current state of the Islamic fund 
industry.   Most respondents argued that the new model is neither needed nor practical at 
the moment for two reasons.  Firstly, the majority of fund managers are not using the 
standard portfolio measurement model such as the Sharpe Index, the Treynor Index or the 
Jensen-alpha Index when evaluating their fund performance.  Instead, the popular 
approach used by fund managers is simply the peer group comparison whereby fund 
managers compare their funds‟ performance against rival funds of similar category.  In 
practice, fund managers mostly refer to mutual funds ratings issued by third parties such 
as Lipper and Morningstar which are published on a regular basis on the internet as well 
as in selected financial newspapers or magazines. Therefore, although rather simplified, 
the practice is widely accepted as the norm of the industry for measuring fund 
performance.  Secondly, some respondents argue that it will be almost impossible to 
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quantify the additional variables such as the religious or ethical values, Shariah elements, 
real intention and corporate social responsibility due to their subjective nature.  Hence, 
while it may be possible to identify all the relevant variables affecting Islamic funds, the 
difficulty in quantifying these variables and later fitting them into an existing or newly 
created model will greatly impede the attempt to develop the alternative model, 
particularly when addressing the validity and reliability issue of the new or modified 
model later. Other reasons mentioned by respondents are the insufficient infrastructure 
within the Islamic fund industry which refers to the limited Shariah-compliance financial 
instruments, reference index, market size and industry players as well as the 
unavailability of a Shariah rating agency; the lack of demand especially from Islamic 
fund managers themselves who actually are the actual intended users of the alternative 
model; and, the perception that the traditional portfolio performance measurement models 
are sufficient and suitable for evaluating Islamic funds since they argue that return and 
risk factors remain the two most important variables even for Islamic funds.      
 
 In view of the current considerable lack of interest among industry practitioners 
towards the alternative portfolio performance valuation model and the significantly 
limited resources and means to pursue the development of the new model, it is therefore 
assumed that the time is not yet suitable for such a model to be created.  In this respect, 
although the task of this study may have probably changed, its ultimate aim to find an 
innovative way to help improve the performance assessment method for the Islamic fund 
industry remains nonetheless largely intact.  Subsequently, this analysis has looked into 
the issue from a rather different angle by examining the current handling of Islamic funds 
with an intention to determine the fund managers‟ perception towards how Shariah 
principles are being appreciated and adopted by fund management companies.  This 
change of focus is made necessary following comments by several respondents who 
questioned the real intention and commitment of fund management companies, 
particularly those owned or dominated by non-Muslim owners or fund managers.  They 
argued that since some fund management companies are treating their Islamic funds as 
just another product line with profit becoming the primary motive behind their Islamic 
funds offering, these companies may not be capable to appreciate the true spirit of Islamic 
teachings or achieve the Shariah purposes through their Islamic funds.  They are also 
concerned that the fund management companies‟ focus of maximising return from their 
Islamic funds would exhort the companies to compromise on Shariah principles in certain 
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parts of the handling processes except those which are necessary for ensuring that their 
Islamic funds remain Shariah-compliant. Similarly, the commitment of these companies 
to lead in the development of the Islamic fund management industry - which could pave 
the way for the creation of more innovative Shariah-based financial products and greater 
understanding of the Shariah principles among fund managers and promoters of their 
Islamic funds - is also questionable.   
 
 Hence, there is a serious doubt as to whether the entire process of the existing 
Islamic funds‟ handling has purely conformed to the true Islamic teaching and Shariah 
aspiration, or some of the fund management companies may have merely acted to fulfil 
the minimum regulatory requirement for their funds to remain Shariah-compliant. This 
concern was eloquently expressed by a respondent in the following quotation extracted 
from his interview transcript in which he questioned the sincerity of fund management 
companies, particularly those which offer Shariah-compliant funds through the Islamic 
window concept:   
 
When you run by a window, it‟s just a by-product, as long as I comply (with the 
Shariah). The approach is not holistic. They have the forms but there‟s no substance. 
They may have the body, but not the soul. 
 
Furthermore, the observation and analysis of the current fund management companies‟ 
practices have revealed that the operation of the so-called Islamic fund management has 
primarily focussed on the halal stocks‟ screening or making sure that their Islamic funds 
invest only in halal-approved securities.  The results also reveal a serious lack of 
understanding towards the Shariah principles and objectives even among Islamic fund 
managers, whilst the separation of roles between fund management companies and the 
Shariah advisory board has resulted in a lower incentive for the former to further enhance 
the Shariah knowledge among their key personnel.   
 
 In view of this, perhaps what the Islamic fund industry currently need is a method 
to measure how comprehensively the Shariah principles are being applied by fund 
management companies.   The method may be designed in the form of a Shariah rating 
assessment with an objective to measure the extent to which a fund management 
company has really embraced the Islamic teachings and the Shariah purposes in the 
operation of its Shariah-compliant funds.  The area of interest for assessment includes the 
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objectives and nature of the Islamic funds; the management and operations of the fund; 
the Shariah-compliance practice and Shariah understanding; as well as the company‟s 
commitment towards socially responsible investment (SRI), ethical issues and corporate 
governance.  Certainly, the Shariah rating assessment method would require further study 
to examine its feasibility which is beyond the scope of this study.  Nevertheless, the 
proposed method would be unique to the Islamic fund industry and is poised to contribute 
to the future development of the industry positively by strengthening investors‟ 
confidence and promoting a holistic approach in the Islamic fund industry.   More on this 
proposal will be discussed in the conclusion chapter.  
 
 To conclude, although the respondents have generally agreed that Islamic funds 
are essentially different from conventional funds which render a direct comparison of 
their performance rather inappropriate and misleading, they however, believe that there is 
no urgent need at the moment to develop an alternative portfolio performance measure 
specifically for Islamic funds.  Their main argument is that there is a considerable lack of 
demand for such a model from fund managers while the traditional portfolio performance 
measurement models are also applicable for Islamic funds, as well.  The other constraints 
are the difficulty to quantify religious or Shariah variables and the insufficient 
infrastructure of the current Islamic fund industry.  In contrast, fund managers who 
supported the idea argue that the model will provide the Islamic fund industry its unique 
identity, especially considering that the industry will continue to grow on the back of 
strong demand from investors.  However, the attempt to develop the alternative model is 
best considered to be an academic quest in view of the current lack of interest in the 
model among industry practitioners. Otherwise, as shown by Figure 8.7, the current state 
of Islamic fund industry will certainly remain in status quo if no action is initiated to 
further improve the industry. 
 
 
8.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter has analysed the existing Islamic fund operations using a qualitative analysis 
method of face-to-face interviews involving seven Islamic fund managers in Malaysia.  
The analysis is intended to complement the quantitative analysis method by providing 
primary data from industry practitioners on the actual operation of Islamic fund 
 284 
management and their perception towards the issues involving Islamic funds‟ 
performance.  The analysis has found that Islamic funds are particularly characterised by 
their Shariah identities but tend to be smaller relative to conventional funds in terms of 
their fund size, fund subscription rate and return to investors.  With regards to the real 
intention of the fund management companies, the analysis found that economic-related 
motives are normally the main reasons behind the offering of Islamic funds.  The analysis 
also discovered that Islamic funds‟ performance is significantly influenced by their fund 
managers‟ special investment skills, the general market condition, the stock and industry 
selection approach of their fund managers, and the consequences of Shariah-compliance.  
While the first three factors may have a positive impact on the Islamic funds‟ 
performance, the Shariah-compliance effect however, is more likely to affect the funds‟ 
performance adversely.  The analysis also revealed that although the existing Islamic 
funds have all been certified as Shariah-compliant by the SC, there is still a huge gap in 
terms of Shariah understanding and the adoption of Shariah principles in the creation of 
the Islamic funds, especially when considering that the funds are created mostly by 
mimicking conventional funds.  Despite agreeing that Islamic funds are essentially 
different from conventional funds, the respondents argued that there is no urgent need to 
develop an alternative portfolio performance measurement model for Islamic funds, 
mainly due to the current lack of demand and the various shortcomings in the Islamic 
fund industry.    
    
 With regards to the fund performance valuation, the respondents have not totally 
rejected the idea that Islamic funds may require an alternative valuation model but they 
contend that such a model is not urgently needed at the moment.  Ironically, to suggest 
that the economically-driven traditional portfolio valuation models in their original 
construct are applicable for Islamic funds while, on the other hand, acknowledging the 
philosophical differences between the two types of funds would put Islamic funds in a 
rather awkward position when it comes to measuring the performance properly. This is 
because, any valuation model which fails to give due recognition to the attainment of 
socially beneficial motive beyond the mere pursuit of monetary gains and has equally 
failed to properly account for the Shariah constraints that compromise Islamic funds‟ 
performance will not be able to give accurate measurement of Islamic funds‟ 
performance, hence the true potential of Islamic funds can never be realised.  In view of 
the rapidly growing Islamic fund industry, the phrase “one size fits all” may not 
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necessarily be applicable to the Islamic fund valuation but the Islamic fund industry 
presently has no other choice except to embrace the traditional portfolio valuation models 
in the absence of any alternative model.  Perhaps, what is needed is a form of a paradigm 
shift in the performance measurement approach, whereby superior performance is not 
only defined in terms of the maximum monetary gains but also by the success of an 
investment in achieving non-pecuniary objectives by maximising its benefit to the 
society, environment and other stakeholders. The growing interest towards ethical or 
socially responsible investment (SRI) as well as corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
clearly shows that general investors are increasingly diverting from being inward looking 
or self-centred individuals concerned only with enriching themselves without due regards 
to the interest of the other stakeholders, into more virtuous individuals equally concerned 
about the betterment of the other stakeholders, thus bringing them closer to the homo 
islamicus individuals aspired by the Islamic teaching.  Therefore, it is important to pursue 
this study further to ensure the orderly and genuine development of the Islamic fund 
industry and to provide the industry with its very own identity.  Without further study, the 
Islamic fund industry will certainly remain in its status quo with limited prospect of 
developing further to establish its unique identity or to reduce its dependency on 
conventional practices.  
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Chapter 9 
 
CONTEXTUALISING THE FINDINGS:  
AN INTERPRETATIVE DISCUSSION 
 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter contextualises the findings from the three sources of analysis methods 
namely the literature review, the quantitative analysis and the qualitative analysis.  The 
literature review discussed in Chapter 2 to Chapter 3 looks into modern portfolio theory 
and past studies related to mutual fund performance as well as the nature and performance 
of ethical and Islamic funds.  Chapter 4 discusses the statistical data and literatures 
pertaining to the growth and performance of the Malaysian stock market and unit trust 
fund industry.  Collectively, the literature review provides the theoretical foundation and 
the necessary input from which this study has evolved.  The last two chapters have 
examined the characteristics, performance and operation of Islamic funds through both 
the quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis.  The quantitative analysis discussed in 
Chapter 7 attempts to identify the general return and risk characteristics as well as the 
performance of Islamic funds through hypothetical portfolios comprising entirely of 
Malaysian listed companies.  Though the quantitative analysis has successfully produced 
meaningful results from which the general characteristics and performance of Islamic 
funds can be established, certain issues related to Islamic fund operation such as the 
Shariah effects and fund performance valuation cannot be analysed from the secondary 
data alone.  To overcome this shortcoming, the qualitative analysis was employed to 
obtain primary data from industry practitioners through face-to-face interviews with 
Islamic fund/investment managers in Malaysia as discussed in Chapter 8.  As this study 
adopts the methodological triangulation technique of data analysis, the findings from the 
three different methods of analysis are now integrated and discussed in this chapter.  The 
integration process allows the findings to be linked together, thus broadening the 
perspective of the subject interest. In addition, the consistencies of the findings can be 
validated through the cross referencing of the results from the literature review, 
quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis.  This enables in-depth analysis and credible 
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inference to be made.  This chapter is organised as follows.  The results discussion 
revolves around the four research questions of this study whereby for each question 
relevant findings obtained from the three sources of analytical methods are discussed and 
interpreted. The chapter then ends with a conclusion. 
  
 
9.2 DISCUSSION ON THE FINDINGS  
 
The findings from the quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis is summarised in 
Table 9.1.  In this chapter, the scope of the discussion is focussed upon the four problem 
statements of this study, in which, the findings from the three sources of analysis methods 
are intertwined to make meaningful inferences of the general characteristics and 
performance of Islamic funds.  The four problems statements are related to the general 
characteristics of return and risk of Islamic funds; the performance trend of Islamic funds; 
the impact of Shariah requirements on the performance of Islamic funds; and, the actual 
Islamic fund management practice and performance valuation.   
 
 
9.2.1 The General Characteristics of Return and Risk of Islamic Funds 
 
This section elaborates on the general characteristics of return and risk of Islamic funds.  
However, prior to discussing the return and risk profile of Islamic funds, the discussion 
will focus on the structure of Islamic funds, particularly the underlying contracts between 
investors and fund management companies/fund managers of Islamic funds and the real 
motives of fund management companies offering Islamic funds.  The findings are mainly 
deduced from the literature reviews and qualitative analysis as secondary data does not 
provide relevant input on the contract and real intention of fund management companies.      
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Table 9.1: Summary of the Findings  
Subject Interest  Findings of Quantitative Analysis Findings of Qualitative Analysis 
1) The general characteristics of return and risk of Shariah-compliant portfolio 
i) Investment approach. Do not invest in riba, gharar and 
other non-Shariah-compliant stocks 
Do not invest in riba, gharar and 
other non-Shariah-compliant stocks 
ii) Return characteristics of 
Islamic-based portfolio. 
Generally lower than unrestricted 
portfolios except for large- 
capitalised stocks portfolio or if 
using Islamic benchmarks. 
Return is comparable with 
conventional portfolios if measured 
using Islamic-based benchmark 
instruments. 
iii) Risk characteristics of 
Islamic-based portfolio. 
Generally higher than unrestricted 
portfolios except for large stocks. 
Risk is comparable with 
conventional portfolios. 
iv) Correlation of return. Sectors in Islamic-based portfolio 
are positively correlated with each 
other and with the index.  
Return of Islamic-based portfolio is 
positively correlated with the index. 
v) Fund size and subscription 
rate.  
Fund size is smaller than 
conventional funds. 
Fund size and subscription rate are 
smaller than conventional funds.  
vi) Favourite stocks and sectors 
of Islamic-based portfolio. 
Large-capitalised stocks involved in 
construction, plantation, properties 
and oil-related sectors. 
Large-capitalised stocks with sound 
fundamentals.  Preferred plantation, 
construction and properties sectors. 
2) The performance of Shariah-compliant portfolio 
i) Performance comparison 
between Islamic-based 
portfolio and conventional 
portfolio.  
Performance is generally 
comparable with conventional 
portfolios but below the return of 
sin portfolios. However, the 
difference in performance is not 
statistically significant. 
Not significantly different since 
performance is heavily influenced 
by fund/investment managers‟ 
superior investment skills. 
ii) Performance trend of Islamic-
based portfolio. 
Generally underperformed in 
bullish market but outperformed 
during bearish market.     
Outperformed during bearish 
market but underperformed during 
bullish market.   
iii) Size effect in the performance 
of Islamic-based portfolio. 
Its large-capitalised portfolio is the 
best performing portfolio and is far 
superior to others and the index. 
Islamic funds that performed 
mainly invest in large-capitalised or 
heavyweight stocks. 
3) The impact of Shariah requirements on the performance of Shariah-compliant portfolio  
i) Investment asset or securities 
universe of Islamic-based 
portfolio. 
Vast choices of securities are 
available since majority of listed 
stocks are halal-approved.  
However, fundamentally sound 
stocks are limited as most of the 
stocks are trivial, investment wise. 
Shariah restrictions do not affect 
performance since there are more 
halal stocks available.  Islamic 
funds normally invest in less than 
40 stocks mainly in heavyweight 
and fundamentally sound stocks.  
ii) The net effect of Shariah 
requirements on portfolio 
performance. 
Securities selection limited to halal-
approved stocks only.  This resulted 
in over reliance on few profitable 
sectors or stocks to support its 
earnings and difficulty to 
outperform unrestricted portfolio.  
Fund to invest only in halal-
approved stocks.  Operating cost 
increases due to the need to hire 
Shariah scholars thus affecting 
return performance adversely. 
4) The fund management practice and performance measurement of Shariah-compliant portfolio 
i) The necessity for an 
alternative portfolio 
performance measurement 
model specifically to evaluate 
Islamic-based fund. 
The standard portfolio performance 
measurement models were used due 
to the unavailability of alternative 
valuation models, and similarities 
in valuation approach between 
Islamic and conventional portfolios. 
Difficulties in developing an 
alternative portfolio valuation 
model due to insufficient 
infrastructure, lack of demand, the 
suitability of the existing models, & 
simplicity in assessment techniques. 
ii) Portfolio management 
strategy of Islamic-based 
fund. 
The strong mean return reversion 
trend indicates that Islamic funds 
should adopt an active portfolio 
management strategy. 
Fund managers adopt an active 
portfolio management strategy in 
order to maximise return. 
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 In general, the study has found that the structure and operation of Islamic funds 
are not much different from conventional funds.  This is primarily due to the existing 
Islamic funds having been designed based on the structure of conventional funds and 
managed in similar way to the fund management companies‟ management of their 
conventional funds, except with respect to Shariah-compliance requirements.  Therefore, 
while the existing Islamic funds may be considered as Shariah-compliant by virtue of 
their avoidance in investments that involved the production of non-halal (haram) 
products, riba (interest) and gharar (uncertainty or speculation), they fall short of 
fulfilling the third criteria that could distinguish them from their conventional 
counterparts: namely the adoption of profit and loss sharing (PLS) as the preferred mode 
of venture or mean for profit distribution between investors and fund management 
companies as outlined by Presley and Sessions (1994), Hourani (2004) and Usmani 
(2005).  Instead, similar to conventional funds, the existing Islamic funds have adopted 
the fee-based arrangement (al-ujr) in which the fund management companies/fund 
managers are paid certain percentage of fund management fees in return for their services. 
The weakness of the fee-based contract was explained in greater detail in the previous 
chapter (see Section 8.4.2.1).  The major disadvantage of the contract is that it exposes 
Islamic funds to a moral hazard problem as argued by Wilson (1997).  In this case, since 
fund management companies/fund managers are assured of receiving their income 
regardless of whether the Islamic funds generate a positive return or otherwise, there is a 
risk that the fund management companies/fund managers may not be acting in the best 
interest of the Islamic fund investors or putting their best effort or commitment towards 
the funds.  Instead, a PLS-based contract will minimise the moral hazard risk by tying the 
service fees with the actual performance of the Islamic fund directly, hence the income to 
be received by fund management companies/fund managers will correspond with the 
actual return generated by the funds at a pre-determined PLS ratio between investors and 
the fund management companies/fund managers.  The advantage of the PLS-based type 
contract was reveal by Stracca (2006) and Khorana et al. (2007) who found a positive 
correlation between the return of mutual funds and the ownership level of the fund 
managers. 
 
 The study also found that economic-related motives, rather than religious motives, 
are the main motivating factors behind the Islamic funds offering by fund management 
companies, particularly if the funds are offered under the Islamic window concept 
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together with conventional funds.  The economic motives include the fund management 
companies‟ intention to capitalise on the rising demand for Islamic fund products from 
general investors, to maximise their return or to enhance their competitive advantage.  
This perception is derived through deduction made from the feedback of the Islamic fund 
managers, the income purification practice and the apparent lack of appreciation towards 
Islamic principles and understanding in the creation and management of Islamic funds.  
Unfortunately, by putting the economic motives above the religious motives, the existing 
Islamic funds may have strayed away from the fundamental aim of Islamic finance which 
Zaher and Hassan (2001: 158) suggested as “to fulfil the teaching of the Holy Quran as 
opposed to reaping maximum returns on financial assets”.  In addition, if the economic 
motives become the main reason for fund management companies offering Islamic funds, 
then the intention represents a deviation from the principal objective of Islamic funds as 
suggested by Shah (2008: 15) as “to attract investors whose investment decision is based 
on the guidance provided by the Islamic Shariah”.   Therefore, the over emphasis of 
pecuniary return and the limited understanding of Islamic or Shariah principles may 
affect the ability of the existing Islamic funds to help in attaining the Shariah purposes 
(maqasid al-Shariah) or to achieve the objective of transforming Islamic fund investors 
closer into homo Islamicus rather than homo economicus.  The concern over the real 
intention of fund management companies is not exclusive to Islamic funds: similar doubt 
was also raised with regards to ethical funds.  Several authors such as Lewis and Cullis 
(1990), Davis (1996) as well as Cowton (1994) and Anderson et al. (1996) (Cowton and 
Anderson et al. are cited in Sparkes, 2001: 197) have questioned the real motive behind 
the offering of ethical funds by fund management companies, arguing that the ethical 
fund is essentially an innovative marketing tactic for product differentiation by the 
companies or is used as a strategy to capitalise on the growing demand for ethically-
oriented investment.  A criticism by Haigh (2006) that fund managers of ethical funds 
consider ethical motives as just a “secondary importance” to monetary return prompted 
him to label ethical funds as a mere “camouflage play” by fund managers.    
 
 Therefore, all the arguments suggest that, despite offering Islamic or ethical funds, 
the main purpose of the issuing fund management companies is actually to maximise their 
profit rather than genuinely intending to promote religious or ethical causes.  As revealed 
by the interview analysis, the emphasis towards return is unavoidable since return is 
crucial for the survival of the funds and the companies/fund managers themselves.  It is 
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fair to assume that a well performing mutual fund is always preferred by investors than a 
poorly performing fund, regardless of the fund‟s objectives.  Notwithstanding however, 
though some may argue that the real intention is more of a philosophical issue and it is 
impossible to measure the intention of fund management companies, it is nevertheless a 
crucial issue, since real intention could have major consequences on the creation process 
and proper handling of the Islamic funds. 
 
 Analysis pertaining to the return and risk characteristics indicate that Islamic 
funds generally have a lower return when compared to conventional funds and the market 
index.  This is evident from the actual published data and the quantitative analysis.  Table 
4.5 (page 102) shows that the 5-year cumulative return of the Malaysia Islamic Equity is 
17.06 per cent which is lower than the conventional Malaysia Equity (29.60 per cent) and 
the KLCI (24.78 per cent).  Similarly, the average annual return during the same period 
for the three portfolios is 2.92 per cent, 4.96 per cent and 4.53 per cent, respectively.  
Results from the quantitative analysis also reveal similar findings as return of SAP is 
lower than return of CP, NSAP and the KLCI in all sub-periods.  Although there was no 
estimate given by the Islamic fund managers, they generally agreed that return of Islamic 
funds is lower than return of conventional funds when the two types of funds are 
compared directly.   In terms of portfolio risk, the actual data implies that the return of 
Islamic funds is more volatile than the return of conventional funds and the benchmark 
index particularly in the short-term period (less than one year) which was later supported 
by the empirical analysis that shows SAP has higher standard deviation and portfolio beta 
in comparison to conventional and sin portfolios as well as the market index. 
 
 The study suggests that one factor which could determine the return and risk 
characteristics of Islamic funds significantly is the attributes of the component assets in 
the Islamic funds‟ portfolio, particularly the size of equities and the type of industries that 
the Islamic funds invested in.  In this respect, the quantitative analysis indicates that the 
halal stock screening reduces the number of stable, large-capitalised stocks which Islamic 
funds are allowed to invest in, thus leaving more of the volatile, small-capitalised stocks 
for Islamic funds.  Comparatively, the high concentration of investment in small-
capitalised stocks is also common in ethical portfolios as reported by Luther and Matatko 
(1994), Sparkes (1995), Gregory et al. (1997), Wilson (1997) and Scholtens (2005).  
Therefore, the rather unsatisfactory return and risk profile of Islamic funds may be due to 
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the presence of a large number of small-capitalised stocks in their portfolio whose returns 
are arguably more volatile as evident from both the actual data and the empirical analysis.  
Table 4.5 shows that that the Malaysia Islamic Equity-Smallcap Fund posted a total loss 
of 5.42 per cent, or an average loss of 1.13 per cent per year, in the last 5-year period to 
July 2009.  This is in line with the results of the empirical analysis, which reveals that 
small-capitalised stocks portfolio of SAP (SAP30 and SAP40) posted a total loss of 4.57 
per cent or an average loss of 0.91 per annum during the 5-year period from 2004 to 2008 
(the crisis period).   SAP30 and SAP40 also have the highest risk compared to their 
conventional counterparts.  This is supported by the actual data which indicates a 
substantial fluctuation in the performance of the small-capitalised stocks when the 
Malaysia Islamic Equity-Smallcap Fund posted a positive return of 20.08 per cent and 
21.20 per cent for 3-month and 6-month periods, respectively but its cumulative 1-year 
performance shows the small-capitalised stocks suffered a loss of 7.58 per cent.  
Consequently, the findings also signify that although there are more halal-approved 
stocks available, the majority of the stocks however are trivial, investment wise.    
 
  In terms of correlation, the quantitative analysis suggests that returns of Islamic 
funds‟ component stocks are positively and strongly correlated between each other and 
with the benchmark index.  One plausible reason is that most of the funds‟ main income 
contributing stocks comprises of companies involved in defensive industries such as 
plantation, food, oil, and industrial engineering as well as project-based industries such as 
construction and properties sectors whose activities are closely interrelated.  Furthermore, 
the nature of their business which involves sustainable crops and long-standing contracts 
makes these stocks suitable for long-term investment and favoured by fund managers.  
The strong positive correlation however, does not augur well for Islamic funds since it 
implies that the component stocks or industries would have similar performance 
depending on the market condition.  Since positive correlation implies that the portfolio 
risk of Islamic funds is not properly diversified, Islamic funds are not fully protected 
despite investing in various sectors. The finding that Islamic funds are not properly 
diversified is supported by Shah Zaidi et al. (2004), Abdullah et al. (2007) and the fund 
managers‟ contention that Islamic funds have strong positive correlation with the market 
index.  Poor diversification is also observed in ethical funds‟ portfolios as reported by 
Lewis and Cullis (1990), Gregory et al. (1997), Tippet (2001), Luther and Matatko 
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(1994), Farmen et al. (2005), Geczy et al. (2005, cited in Schröder, 2007) and Chong et 
al. (2006). 
 
 In contrast, conventional funds have more industries whose returns are less or are 
uncorrelated.  Though there are some cyclical sectors in conventional funds such as 
finance and technology industries which have high correlation with the market index, the 
funds also enjoy considerable support from stable industries such as tobacco and 
alcoholic beverages as well as cash-rich industries such as gaming which have low or 
negative correlation.  Lau (2007) stated that low or negative correlation help enhances 
fund performance whilst the advantage of having “sinful industries” is mentioned by 
Bloch and Lareau (1985), Moskowitz (1992) and Luck and Tigrani (1994) (all cited in 
Tippet, 2001; 172) who argued that investment in alcohol, tobacco and gambling 
industries enable mutual funds to significantly outperform the S&P 500 index.  This 
explains why conventional funds are able to sustain their earnings in any given market 
condition and outperform Islamic funds.   
 
 The other notable characteristics of Islamic funds are related to the fund size and 
subscription rate and the type of their favourite industries.   Both the actual statistics and 
the quantitative analysis indicate that Islamic funds have smaller fund size and value 
relative to conventional funds.  Table 4.3 (page 94) reveals that the total net asset value 
(NAV) of Islamic funds in 2008 stood at RM17.80 billion, representing just 11.1 per cent 
of the total NAV of the Malaysian fund management industry.  This gives an average per 
unit NAV of RM0.39 for Islamic funds against RM0.76 for conventional funds.  
Similarly, the empirical analysis based on the hypothetical portfolios shows that the 2008 
value of the 770-stocks SAP is RM1,078.21 which is lower than the value of the 890-
stocks CP of RM1,384.98.  This gives an average per unit value of RM1.40 for SAP 
against RM1.56 for CP.  Analysis of Islamic fund prospectuses and the input obtained 
from the interview analysis also reveals that the size of Islamic funds is lower than 
conventional funds.  In terms of subscription rate, Islamic funds have lower subscription 
rates as reflected from the actual statistics where, in 2008, there were 46.22 billion units 
of Islamic unit trust in circulation which is four times smaller than the 186.79 billion units 
subscribed for conventional funds.  The small fund size and lower subscription rate are 
due to Islamic funds being regarded as a relatively new product in the industry in 
comparison to the more established conventional funds.  Analysis of various fund 
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prospectuses also reveals that conventional funds have more varieties as compared to 
Islamic funds, thus making the former more attractive to investors.  Since conventional 
funds are well established, they are more widely marketed through the extensive network 
of conventional financial institutions or unit trust/mutual fund agents, thus explaining 
why conventional funds are relatively bigger and better subscribed by general investors as 
compared to Islamic funds.  The importance of historical performance and fund size in 
determining fund subscription rates is highlighted by Ramasamy and Metthew-Yong 
(2003) who also found that transaction costs, the type of fund and the quality of fund 
managers are crucial factors that can affect fund subscription rate.    
 
   The interview analysis suggests that Islamic funds are mainly focussed on large-
capitalised stocks especially those involved in defensive or stable industries such as 
plantation and construction sectors.   The preference towards heavyweight stocks is 
driven by the stocks‟ sound fundamentals and stable prices.  It also signifies the tendency 
of Islamic fund managers to avoid small-capitalised stocks which is most probably due to 
the high volatility of the small-capitalised stocks as evident from the empirical analysis 
and the actual data.  This finding is confirmed by the results of the empirical analysis that 
large-capitalised stocks of SAP could outperform conventional funds and the market 
index.  The analysis also found that plantation, construction, industrial engineering, oil, 
automobile, telecommunications, and properties stocks are the major income contributors 
to the Shariah-compliant portfolio.  Hence, the empirical analysis finding that Islamic 
funds should concentrate on large-capitalised stocks is in-line with the investment 
preference of the Islamic fund managers. 
 
  To conclude, findings from the literature review, the quantitative analysis and the 
qualitative analysis implies that, relative to conventional funds, Islamic funds are 
generally characterised by a lower return but a higher risk; have limited numbers of 
profitable stocks or sectors whose returns are strongly and positively correlated; have a 
smaller fund size and low fund subscription rate; and are mainly invested in large-
capitalised or heavyweight stocks involved in defensive industries, especially plantation-
based companies.  Furthermore, there are obvious similarities between Islamic funds and 
ethical funds in terms of their structure and performance since both are designed to meet 
certain investment philosophies which subject the stock selection process of the funds to 
certain religious or ethical filtering.  However, since the findings of this study are mainly 
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derived from the performance of the hypothetical portfolios, caution should be applied.  
The performance of actual Islamic funds is also subjected to their fund managers‟ 
investment skills and expertise, the size of the Islamic funds, as well as the overall 
stockmarket, and economic conditions. Hence, the performance is not merely due to the 
smaller stock selection universe caused by the Shariah screening.   
 
 
9.2.2 The Performance Trend of Islamic Funds 
 
This section discusses the performance of Islamic funds against conventional funds.  In 
general, empirical findings from past studies are deemed inconclusive in view of their 
contradictory findings which are attributed to the different sampling, different research 
methodologies and different time period employed by the studies.  Studies by Yaacob and 
Yakob (2002), Shah Zaidi et al. (2004) and Abdullah et al. (2007) found that Islamic 
funds in Malaysia are able to achieve superior performance but Abdullah et al. (2002; 
cited in Nik Muhammad and Mokhtar, 2008) and Nik Muhammad and Mokhtar (2008) 
claimed the opposite. A study by Mueller (1994) revealed that Islamic funds in the United 
States underperformed conventional funds.  As in the case of Islamic funds, past studies 
analysing ethical funds‟ performance also yield contradictory findings when Lewis and 
Cullis (1990), Mallin et. al. (1995), Gregory et al. (1997), Tippet (2001), Luther and 
Matatko (1994), Farmen et al. (2005), Geczy et al. (2005, cited in Schröder, 2007) and 
Chong et al. (2006) concluded that ethical funds generate a lower return as compared to 
conventional funds, but Sparkes (1995), Sauer (1997) and Schröder (2007) argued 
otherwise. 
 
 Results of this study suggest that Islamic funds generally underperform 
conventional funds and the market index.  The quantitative analysis indicates that the 
performance of SAP is identical to the performance of CP which is due to the similarities 
in their portfolio composition as the latter invest in both halal-approved and non-halal-
approved stocks.  However, CP is poised to have a significant advantage over SAP since 
it could invest in fundamentally sound, non-halal stocks as well, thus making it difficult 
for the Shariah-compliant portfolio to outperform the conventional portfolio.  
Unfortunately, the return of SAP is far below the return of NSAP, thus confirming the 
advantage of investing in sin industries such as banking, alcohol, gaming and tobacco as 
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previously reported by Bloch and Lareau (1985), Moskowitz (1992) and Luck and 
Tigrani (1994) (all cited in Tippet, 2001; 172).    In the qualitative analysis, Islamic fund 
managers admitted that the return of their Islamic funds is generally lower than 
conventional funds but insisted that such a direct comparison is inappropriate while 
claiming that their Islamic funds do outperform their own designated Shariah-compliant 
benchmarks.  
 
 Several theories have been suggested to explain the Islamic funds‟ 
underperformance such as the effect of small-capitalised stocks, poor diversification and 
higher operating cost. Although the number of halal-approved stocks far exceeded the 
number of non-halal-approved (or sin) stocks at a ratio of 6:1, the majority of the 
Shariah-compliant stocks however, are medium and small-capitalised stocks.  Hence, the 
Shariah screening has excluded large-capitalised, high yielding but non-halal stocks 
particularly those involved in conventional banking and finance services, gaming, 
alcoholic beverages, tobacco and conglomerate sectors.  Since medium and small-
capitalised stocks are mainly comprised of growth stocks, their earnings and share prices 
are relatively more volatile than large-capitalised stocks which are categorised as either 
stable or income stocks.  The quantitative analysis reveals that SAP‟s portfolio has high 
concentration of medium and small-capitalised stocks.  Similar phenomenon is seen in 
ethical funds by Luther and Matatko (1994), Sparkes (1995), Gregory et al. (1997), 
Wilson (1997) and Scholtens (2005) with some of the authors attributing the relatively 
lower performance of ethical funds to the small-capitalised stocks.  The results of this 
study confirmed that the overall return of SAP is adversely affected by the high volatility 
of the small-capitalised stocks in the portfolio. Perhaps, the volatile performance of small-
capitalised stocks may have affected the return of the Malaysia Islamic Equity-Smallcap 
(see Table 4.5: page 102) the same way it has inflicted lower performance on SAP.  The 
high risk associated with small-capitalised stocks may also be the main reason behind the 
Islamic fund managers‟ preference towards large-capitalised stocks as revealed by the 
interview analysis.  
 
 The quantitative analysis also shows that SAP‟s portfolio is not properly 
diversified since returns of its component stocks are positively correlated, thus resulting 
in the portfolio being unable to maximise the benefit from diversification.  This finding is 
consistent with Shah Zaidi et al. (2004) and Abdullah et al. (2007) as well as the fund 
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managers‟ contention that Islamic funds have strong positive correlation with the market 
index.  The findings of this study imply that the returns of the major component industries 
in a Shariah-compliant portfolio are likely to move in similar directions, thus reducing the 
kind of protection that the Islamic fund may enjoy if it has a greater number of 
uncorrelated stocks or industries in its portfolio.  This is aggravated by the fact that 
Shariah restrictions have also reduced the number of profitable industries that the Islamic 
fund is able to invest in, thus resulting in overreliance of the fund towards a few 
profitable sectors to support its earnings.  Unlike the Islamic fund, a conventional fund is 
able to invest in a wide variety of profitable industries that have low or negative 
correlation, thus enabling the fund to maximise the benefit from diversification, reduce its 
over-reliance on certain industries, and protect its portfolio value in any given market 
environment due to the presence of uncorrelated industries in its portfolio.  The 
underperformance of Islamic funds is also attributed to the higher operating cost since 
Islamic funds incur additional expenses, particularly the cost of appointing Shariah 
scholars and officers as argued by Islamic fund managers.  Poor diversification and higher 
operating costs were also cited as the causes of underperformance of ethical funds by 
Lewis and Cullis (1990), Gregory et al. (1997), Tippet (2001), Farmen et al. (2005), 
Geczy et al. (2005, cited in Schröder, 2007) and Chong et al. (2006). 
 
 Fortunately however, not all evidence is against Islamic funds.  The findings of 
the quantitative analysis suggest that Islamic funds which focus on large-capitalised 
stocks are able to outperform conventional funds, particularly in bearish market 
condition.  The size effect favouring large-capitalised stocks is evident from the 
quantitative analysis that shows the spectacular performance of the SAP10 portfolio 
which outperformed other portfolios including all SAP‟s smaller size portfolios, 
conventional and sin portfolios as well as the KLCI.  The ability of Islamic funds to 
generate a higher return as compared to conventional portfolios and the benchmark index 
in different time periods is also evident from the actual data as revealed by Table 4.5 
(page 102).   The table also provides evidence that Islamic-based large-capitalised stock 
funds performed better than smaller-capitalised stock funds.  The study indicates that the 
superior performance is attributed to the investment in high-yielding and stable 
heavyweight stocks, particularly those involved in plantation, construction, oil-related and 
properties sectors.   
 
 298 
 The findings of the quantitative analysis that Islamic funds could outperform 
conventional funds, particularly in bearish market condition, is supported by past studies 
such as Abdullah et al. (2007) and Abdullah et al. (2002; cited in Nik Muhammad and 
Mokhtar, 2008) and reaffirmed by the Islamic fund managers.  The ability of Islamic 
funds to sustain their performance in bearish market condition is particularly due to the 
presence of defensive industries such as plantation and oil-related stocks which provides a 
considerable cushion to the funds‟ earnings.  This also signifies that the Islamic fund is a 
good candidate for defensive investment strategy which is consistent with the findings by 
Abdullah et al. (2007) and indicated by the overwhelming performance of SAP over CP 
and NSAP portfolios in 2007 and 2008 that coincided with the substantial increase in 
Islamic funds‟ subscription rate as shown in Table 4.3 (page 94).  In 2007, the total units 
in circulation for Islamic funds doubled to 36.35 billion units from 18.55 billion units in 
2006, resulting in the total NAV increasing to RM16.86 billion from RM9.17 billion 
during the same period.   In 2008, the total units in circulation rose moderately to 46.22 
billion valued at RM17.80 billion.  The sharp increase in the number of units in 
circulation and the value of the funds reflects huge interest and growing investors‟ 
confidence toward Islamic funds as a viable investment instrument particularly during the 
relatively volatile and poor market condition. 
 
 Despite the observed differences between return of the Shariah-compliant fund 
and the return of the non-Shariah-compliant funds, the study found that the differences 
are not statistically significant.  Therefore, the findings are not robust enough to infer that 
the return of Islamic funds is inferior to the return of conventional funds or vice versa.  
This finding is in line with the Islamic fund managers‟ contention that although Islamic 
funds underperform conventional funds, the return and risk of the two types of funds are 
not substantially different, and Islamic funds are still able to generate return comparable 
to conventional funds.  The fund managers‟ argument that the return and risk 
characteristics of Islamic funds are similar to conventional funds may be caused by two 
reasons.  Firstly, their opinion is based on the performance of the actual Islamic funds 
which, based on their argument, are mainly invested in large-capitalised stocks.  
Consequently, the appropriate comparison is to examine the performance of SAP‟s large-
capitalised stocks portfolio (SAP10) with equivalent portfolios in CP and NSAP and the 
market index.  If this is the case, then the finding of the quantitative analysis that SAP10 
could outperform both the non-Shariah-compliant portfolios and the KLCI is consistent 
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with the fund managers‟ contention.  Secondly, their opinion is based on the premise that 
the performance of Islamic funds is measured against either Shariah-compliant or 
customised benchmarks but not conventional benchmarks.  This is made explicit by the 
evidence obtained from the Islamic fund prospectuses and the fund managers‟ assertion 
that the two types of funds are fundamentally different hence it is inappropriate to make a 
direct comparison between Islamic funds and conventional funds.  Again, if this is the 
case, then the findings of the quantitative analysis that the risk-adjusted return of Islamic 
funds could outperform conventional funds when performance is measured against 
Shariah-compliant benchmarks is also consistent with the fund managers‟ contention.  
Statistically insignificant results involving ethical funds are also reported by Luther and 
Matatko (1994), Bauer et al. (2005), Bello (2005), Kreander et al. (2005), Scholtens 
(2005) and Bauer et al. (2006).  The authors concluded that although the return of ethical 
funds is different from the return of conventional funds, the difference however, is not 
statistically significant.  A similar finding was reported by Boasson et al. (2006) and 
Schröder (2007) when they compared the performance of ethical funds vis-à-vis the 
market index. 
 
 To conclude, the findings of this study suggest that the performance of Islamic 
funds is generally below the performance of conventional funds and the market index. 
The underperformance is attributed to the volatile performance of small-capitalised 
stocks, poor diversification and higher operating costs incurred by Islamic funds.  The 
evidence showing the difference in the portfolios‟ returns however, is not robust 
statistically hence the findings should be inferred cautiously and cannot be used to make a 
generalisation that the return of Islamic funds is inferior to the return of conventional 
funds, or vice versa.  The study also indicates that Islamic funds which mainly invest in 
large-capitalised stocks could outperform conventional funds and the market index.  The 
valuation of Islamic funds is also sensitive to the benchmarks used for performance 
comparison since there is evidence that Islamic funds are able to outperform conventional 
funds if the performance is benchmarked against Shariah-compliant instruments.  While 
the findings from the literature review, quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis of 
this study are consistent between each other, the findings reveal clear similarities between 
the performance of Islamic funds and the performance of ethical funds.   
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9.2.3 The Impact of Shariah Requirements on the Performance of Islamic Funds 
 
This section elaborates the impact of Shariah requirements on Islamic fund performance.  
The study found that Shariah requirements affect performance in two ways: 1) during the 
portfolio construction process in which Shariah rulings would compel Islamic funds to 
select and invest only in halal-approved securities; and, 2) it causes operating costs to 
increase as fund management companies would have to create auxiliary functions such as 
appointing Shariah scholars to provide them with advisory services on Shariah matters or 
to hire additional officers who will be responsible for Shariah monitoring, auditing and 
supervision to ensure the Shariah-compliant status of their Islamic funds.   
 
 With respect to the stock selection process, at a ratio of 6:1, there are indeed more 
halal-approved stocks than non-halal-approved stocks.  At first glance, and as has been 
contended by some fund managers, the large number of halal-approved stocks available 
despite the strict Shariah screening signifies that Shariah restrictions on stock selection 
would not affect Islamic fund performance adversely.  This led to the argument that 
Shariah restrictions should not be perceived as an obstacle for investors or Islamic fund 
managers to create an efficient portfolio comprising of only halal-approved stocks that 
meet their return and risk objectives.  They also argued that the Shariah restrictions will 
not put Islamic funds in a disadvantaged position for not being able to invest in certain 
high-yielding but non-halal-approved stocks as the shortcoming can be compensated 
through a tactical investment strategy by creating a combination of two or more halal-
approved stocks which will produce a similar return and risk exposure to investment in 
the high-yielding but non-halal-approved stocks.  In this regard, there are two interesting 
issues to be examined here: 1) do the vast number of the halal-approved stocks give any 
significant advantage to Islamic funds?; and, 2) if the Shariah restrictions have not 
affected Islamic funds‟ return adversely or if the shortcoming of not being able to invest 
in high-yielding but non-halal-approved stocks can be remedied by embarking on the 
tactical investment strategy, then arguably, the realised return of Islamic funds should be 
more or less equal with the realised return of conventional funds.  
 
 Unfortunately however, evidence from the published data of the actual Islamic 
funds‟ return and price performance and the results from the quantitative analysis indicate 
that the realised return of Islamic funds is lower than the realised return of conventional 
 301 
funds or the market index, particularly over a long-term period.  In addition, the fund 
managers themselves generally agreed that the return of Islamic funds is relatively lower 
than the return of conventional funds.  This implies that neither do the vast number of 
halal-approved stocks give any significant advantage to Islamic funds, nor is the tactical 
investment strategy always successful.  As discussed previously, the empirical analysis 
reveals that the large number of halal-approved stocks does not necessarily makes Islamic 
funds better off than conventional or sin funds since the more crucial factor in the context 
of an investment portfolio is the quality of the component stocks, particularly the 
correlation among the different stocks and industries in the portfolio to ensure that the 
portfolio is able to maximise the benefit from diversification.  The empirical analysis also 
indicates that there are only a small number of large-capitalised, fundamentally sound 
halal-approved stocks, whilst the majority of the halal stocks are trivial investment-wise, 
considering that most of the stocks are medium and small-capitalised companies.  Since 
the Shariah restrictions have ruled out investment in most heavyweights stocks, 
particularly those involved in conventional finance, conglomerate, alcoholic beverage, 
tobacco and gaming industries, Islamic funds are left with limited number of high-
yielding stocks or profitable industries, thus increasing the risk of overdependence 
towards a few stocks or industries to support the funds‟ earnings.   
 
 The published data showing the existing Islamic funds‟ underperformance has an 
even more startling and serious implication towards the actual investment capability or 
competency of Islamic fund managers.  The data implies that some Islamic fund 
managers are unable to outperform the market index or even the risk free rate (the 3-year 
and 5-year average annual return of Islamic-based mudharabah investment account is 
3.56 per cent and 3.44 per cent, respectively).  Hence, although the tactical investment 
strategy was purportedly feasible at least in hindsight, the success of mimicking 
investment in high-yielding, non-halal-approved stocks has two prerequisite conditions 
related to Islamic fund managers‟ capabilities: 1) special investment skills to identify the 
right combination of more than one halal-approved stock which will closely mimic the 
return and risk profile of the high-yielding but non-halal-approved stocks that the Islamic 
fund managers wish to mimic; and, 2) the kind of halal-approved stocks having the right 
characteristics in terms of return, risk, liquidity, price and timing needed to create a 
proper combination that could mimic the investment in the non-halal-approved stocks 
should be available in the first place.  To date however, the issue of whether fund 
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managers actually posses superior investment skills is still a subject of intense debate 
since findings from past studies on this issue are rather inconclusive.  Jensen (1968, 
1969), Kon (1983), Chang and Lewellen (1984), Henriksson (1984), Chuan (1995), 
Sorros (2001) and Matallín-Sáez (2006) argued that fund managers generally are unable 
to forecast future security prices, hence generating superior return for their investors.   On 
the contrary, some studies concluded that fund managers do possess certain investment 
skills, albeit with limited capability or insignificant impact to earning, such as market 
timing skill as found by Grinblatt and Titman (1994) and Bowden (2000) and stock 
selection skill as claimed by Elton et al. (1996), Daniel et al. (1997), Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999), Chen et al. (2000), Wermers (2000), and Avramov and Wermers (2006).  
In Malaysia, studies by Shah Zaidi et al. (2004) and Abdullah et al. (2007) found that 
Islamic funds are not well diversified, thus indicating a lack of stock selection skills 
among Islamic fund managers to identify underpriced securities.  Therefore, in view that 
an attempt to mimic the return and risk exposure of investment in high-yielding, non-
halal-approved stocks requires considerable investment skills on the part of Islamic fund 
managers, the actual data showing Islamic funds‟ underperformance thus raises serious 
doubts about the Islamic fund managers‟ real investment capability to generate 
satisfactory return for their investors. 
 
 The impact of Shariah requirements on operating cost is not visible in the 
hypothetical portfolios but was highlighted by the Islamic fund managers during the 
interviews.   The Shariah-related costs are unavoidable since they are incurred in the 
course of ensuring that the Islamic funds remain Shariah-compliant.  These include the 
requirement to appoint Shariah scholars to advise the fund management companies on 
Shariah-related matters or hiring Shariah-compliance officers responsible for monitoring, 
supervision and management of their Islamic funds.  The Shariah scholars can be 
engaged either by developing a pool of their own internal Shariah experts or by 
outsourcing the Shariah scholars externally through a third party who provides such 
services.  Either way, the additional costs will inevitably increase the administrative 
expenses of the Islamic fund management companies, though it might not affect the 
return of their Islamic funds directly.  The higher operating cost is also common among 
ethically-oriented funds as reported by Gregory et al. (1997) and Tippet (2001), and it is 
considered as one of the main causes of lower performance by ethical funds.  The adverse 
impact of higher expenses on fund performance is highlighted in Goldsmith (1976), 
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Elton, et al. (1996), Bers and Madura (2000), Moskowitz (2000), Wermers (2000), and 
Fisher and Khoury (2007).  The Shariah requirements also introduce additional risk to 
Islamic funds, namely the Shariah-compliance risk which arises due to changes in the 
core business activities of an originally halal-approved company that render the stock to 
become non-halal.  In this instance, Islamic funds are obliged to dispose of the stock 
which may result in substantial losses.  Therefore, in order to outperform conventional 
funds, Islamic funds will have to earn significantly a higher return than conventional 
funds to compensate for the additional Shariah risk.    
 
 To conclude, the adherence to Shariah requirements or branding a fund as Islamic 
does not give any significant economic advantage apart from attracting pious or ethically-
concerned investors.  In comparison to conventional funds, the Shariah restrictions cause 
Islamic funds to be unable to invest in high-yielding, large-capitalised but non-halal 
stocks and increase the operating costs of the funds, as well.  Therefore, it is essential for 
Islamic fund managers to possess exceptional investment skills to remedy the 
disadvantages of Islamic funds in stock/industry selection, and for Islamic funds to 
generate a significantly higher return in order to outperform conventional funds or the 
market index.   However, to put the issue in the right perspective, this does not at all 
represent a weakness of Islamic funds since the underlying philosophy of the funds is 
actually to attain other non-pecuniary motives, including fulfilling the religious obligation 
although maximising profit undoubtedly remains an important objective of Islamic funds 
for their very survival.  
 
 
9.2.4 The Fund Management Practice and Valuation of Islamic Fund Performance 
 
This section discusses the current practices of fund management companies with respect 
to the operation and valuation of Islamic funds.  The findings were deduced mainly from 
the qualitative data since the quantitative analysis does not dealt with this issue explicitly.  
The study found that the operation of the existing Islamic funds is essentially similar to 
the operation of conventional funds, particularly for fund management companies that 
offer Islamic funds together with their conventional funds under the Islamic window 
concept.  Analysis based on the contents of the fund management companies‟ 
publications including their Islamic fund prospectus and other in-house publications 
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(annual reports, investment reports, newsletter, magazines, company website etc.) implies 
that the Islamic fund is generally perceived as different from conventional funds only in 
terms of the funds‟ investment in halal-approved securities and the separation of 
investment accounts. The other company‟s resources such as the back-office operations 
and fund/investment managers or unit trust agents however, are used for both Islamic and 
conventional funds operations. Therefore, it is not surprising that some fund management 
companies perceive their Islamic funds as merely another financial product without 
giving due recognition to the funds‟ underlying philosophy or religious significance.   
 
 The finding that Islamic funds are structured and managed in practically the same 
way as conventional funds is also rather disturbing since it implies that the current Islamic 
funds do not meet the two basic conditions in order to truly qualify as „Islamic funds‟ as 
outlined by Usmani (2005).  The first condition is that return from Islamic funds must be 
distributed on a pro-rata basis, of which, profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) is arguably the 
best mechanism.  On the contrary, the existing Islamic funds are structured on a fee-based 
basis, of which, the fund management companies and fund managers received a fixed 
management fee for their services, hence their income is practically secured regardless of 
whether the Islamic funds are making profit or otherwise.  The second condition is that 
every aspect of the Islamic funds‟ investment must be carried out with intention to uphold 
the true Islamic teachings apart from merely complying with the Shariah requirements.  
This is not limited to investment in halal-approved securities only but extended to all 
aspects of the Islamic funds‟ operation including at the creation stage, the underlying 
philosophies, the type of contracts between fund management companies/fund managers 
and Islamic fund investors and the entire handling of the Islamic funds.  The findings of 
the qualitative analysis however, reveal that there is a serious lack of Shariah 
understanding even among Islamic fund managers, whilst the Shariah aspects in the terms 
and conditions of the Islamic funds‟ investments are not clearly explained in the 
prospectus.  It is also apparent that fund management companies are using their Islamic 
funds essentially for generating higher income or to enhance their competitiveness. In 
addition, the fact that Islamic funds are also entrusted to non-Muslim fund managers and 
agents raises serious concerns about the ability of the non-Muslim fund managers and 
agents to promote the true objectives of the Islamic funds. 
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 With regards to the valuation of Islamic fund performance, the unavailability of an 
alternative portfolio valuation model that takes into account the religious or Shariah 
aspects in Islamic funds has left this study with no other option but to use the traditional 
portfolio performance measurement models to evaluate the risk-adjusted return of the 
Shariah-compliant portfolio. The absence of such an alternative valuation model reflects 
the lack of genuine development in the Islamic fund management industry which the 
Islamic fund managers have attributed to an insufficient infrastructure with difficulties in 
measuring religious or Shariah variables, the limited data available on Islamic funds and 
Shariah-compliant instruments, the unavailability of an Islamic fund rating agency, lack 
of demand for an alternative portfolio valuation model, particularly from the Islamic fund 
managers themselves even though they are the natural intended users of such a model, 
and the perception that the existing portfolio valuation models are suitable enough to be 
applied on Islamic funds based on the premise that the most important variables in any 
portfolio performance valuation are the return and risk, even for Islamic funds.   
 
 Despite these shortcomings however, there is strong merit to support the 
development of an alternative portfolio valuation model for ethical or Islamic funds.  This 
is in view of the fundamental differences between Islamic funds and conventional funds 
which have also been acknowledged by the Islamic fund managers themselves.  For 
instance, Renwick (1968), Fama and MacBeth (1973), Markowitz (1991) and Sharpe 
(1994) have questioned the long established presumption that mean and variance are the 
sufficient variables for portfolio performance valuation whilst McKenzie (1977), Cullis et 
al. (1992), Anand and Cowton (1993), Mackenzie and Lewis (1999), and Beal et al. 
(2005) argued that some investors are equally motivated by other factors than just 
maximising monetary return.  Therefore, the existing portfolio valuation models which 
only take into account the return and risk variables may not be able to give a true and 
unbiased assessment of Islamic funds since the models have clearly failed to give due 
recognition to the fundamental differences or restrictions of Islamic funds.  This is a point 
which was highlighted by Mallin et al. (1995) when they argued that ethical funds 
possess some unique characteristics which render a direct comparison between the 
performance of the funds and stock market benchmarks somewhat misleading (see 
Hussein and Omran, 2005: 106).  The lack of development in the Islamic finance industry 
occurs not only in Malaysia but also in other Muslim countries.  One of the reasons is the 
tendency of the Muslim countries to simply copy whatever models that have been 
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developed by the West rather than being innovative as reported by Maurer (2001).  
Another reason, as highlighted by Lydenberg (2007), is because of the dominance of the 
modern financial theory which has been well established as compared to newly developed 
Islamic finance.   
 
 Furthermore, the most popular fund performance measurement methods adopted 
by fund managers are the tracking error technique and the peer group comparison.  In the 
tracking error technique, the price of Islamic funds is allowed to move within a certain 
trading band to ensure a stable price movement.  In the peer group comparison technique, 
fund managers monitor and compare the performance of their Islamic funds against 
similar classes of funds issued by other fund management companies, normally through 
mutual funds ratings as provided by Lipper or Morningstar.  Hence, the traditional risk-
adjusted return portfolio performance valuation models are arguably not widely used in 
Malaysia, which is just the same case as reported by Strong (2003: 479) that traditional 
measures are not really followed by portfolio managers in the United States.  One of the 
reasons, as argued by some fund managers, is because general investors are largely 
concerned about the actual realised return rather than the risk-adjusted return. The 
emphasis towards realised return can be appreciated considering that unit trust or mutual 
fund investors themselves – who may have been well adapted to the notion of high risk, 
high return – may not be too disturbed by their fund managers taking excessive risk as 
long as the potential return from such extreme risk taking is high.  
 
 The finding of this study that the hypothetical portfolios show a strong mean 
reversion trend in their long-term performance is generally in line with the active fund 
management strategy adopted by the actual Islamic funds.  The finding implies that the 
role of active fund management strategy is crucial in order to maximise portfolio return.  
This is particularly true in the case of Islamic funds in view that their stock and industry 
selection has already been constrained by the Shariah restrictions whilst their operating 
cost increases due to the additional Shariah-related expenses.  In one case, a respondent 
from a fund management company admitted that she had once decided to terminate the 
service of one of her fund managers for reason of underperformance and the decision was 
paid off handsomely when the new fund manager was able to generate positive return for 
her Islamic fund in the succeeding year.  This real-life example signifies the crucial role 
of engaging a competent fund manager, especially for Islamic funds.   
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 To conclude, the study has found that the current fund management practices of 
Islamic funds are virtually similar to conventional funds, with exception of the Shariah-
compliance requirements involving the stock screening process, the separation of 
investment accounts and the appointment of Shariah scholars.  With respect to the Islamic 
funds‟ performance valuation, the popular techniques used by the existing Islamic fund 
managers are the tracking error and the peer group comparison methods whilst the 
traditional portfolio performance valuation models are not widely used due to the 
apparent emphasis towards realised return rather than the risk-adjusted return of the fund 
by general investors.  The study also found that the active fund management strategy is 
arguably the best approach for Islamic funds in Malaysia. 
 
 
9.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter has discussed the findings from the three analysis methods used in the 
methodological triangulation technique of this study namely literature review analysis, 
the quantitative analysis, and the qualitative analysis.  The literature review analysis 
involved the analysis of past studies related to the modern portfolio theory, performance 
of ethical and Islamic funds as well as actual data of Islamic fund industry in Malaysia.  
The quantitative analysis involved the analysis of return and risk characteristics and 
performance of Islamic funds based on hypothetical portfolios comprising entirely of 
Malaysian listed equities. The qualitative analysis attempts to provide further insight into 
the operation and performance of actual Islamic funds based on face-to-face interviews 
with Islamic fund managers in Malaysia.  The discussion revolved around the four 
problem statements of this study which are related to the general return and risk 
characteristics of Islamic funds, the performance trend of Islamic funds, the Shariah 
impact on Islamic funds‟ performance, and Islamic funds‟ operation and performance 
valuation.  In view that the results of the three sources of analysis methods are not 
contradicting but complementing each other‟s findings, the study was able to derive a 
comprehensive conclusion pertaining to Islamic funds‟ characteristics, operation and 
performance in Malaysia.  It should be noted here that the discussion of the findings from 
the quantitative and qualitative analysis in this chapter is primarily related to the 
comparison between the Shariah-compliant portfolio (SAP) and conventional portfolio 
(CP).  Since no known haram or sin fund is actually available in Malaysia, the NSAP 
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cannot be used as proxy to any existing funds, hence a direct comparison between SAP 
and NSAP may not be meaningful to make generalisation of the real scenario.  
Notwithstanding however, the results can still be used to support the observed superior 
performance by conventional funds since the funds also invest in non-permissible 
(haram) stocks.  The following chapter provides the final conclusion of the study and 
recommendation for possible future study. 
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Chapter 10 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 
10.1 REFLECTIONS ON THE STUDY 
 
This study is meant to provide a critical review of the characteristics and performance of 
Islamic funds in Malaysia, and it was conceived on the back of a spectacular growth of 
the Islamic fund industry amid the growing interest towards Islamic unit trust or mutual 
fund investment in the country.  The study aims to address the outstanding issues relating 
to the performance of Islamic funds and to contribute positively to the development of the 
Islamic fund industry by exploring the means to further enhance the assessment methods 
of Islamic funds.  The primary objectives of the study are to identify the return and risk 
characteristics of Islamic funds and to examine the Islamic funds‟ performance and 
valuation methods.   
 
 The main motivation of this study is the observation that Islamic funds in general 
have, unfortunately, largely underperformed conventional funds.  Since the subject 
interest of this study is the unit trust or mutual fund, a popular type of investment 
instrument in Malaysia which invests in various assets including stocks, fixed income 
securities, cash and other assets through an investment fund pooled from a large number 
of individual investors and managed by professional fund managers, the performance of 
the fund therefore, is subjected to various macro and micro economic factors such as the 
general economic condition, political stability, changes in regulatory framework, the 
stock market trend and the overall industry performance.  While the factors just 
mentioned represent the systematic risk of the mutual fund, the two most crucial factors 
which could affect the fund‟s performance substantially are the investment skills of the 
fund managers and the quality of the individual stocks that make up the fund‟s investment 
portfolio.  In this regards, the securities selection process is crucial especially for Islamic 
funds which have already been constrained by their investment mandate.  On the other 
hand, the traditional portfolio performance measurement models arguably may not be 
able to give fair valuation to Islamic funds since the standard portfolio valuation models 
 310 
do not take into account the fundamental differences or the constraints faced by Islamic 
funds, hence the results obtained from the models may be biased against Islamic funds.  
Therefore, the study is interested to analyse the return and risk characteristics of Islamic 
funds thoroughly in an attempt to unravel the causes of Islamic funds‟ underperformance.     
 
 The significance of this study is attributed to the lack of comprehensive research 
as well as the inconclusive results and contradictory findings of earlier studies on this 
topic. The main shortcoming of the past studies analysing Islamic fund performance is the 
derivation of their findings from research methodology that uses a sample of actual 
Islamic funds available in the market.  Since past studies analysing Islamic fund 
performance were based solely on secondary data in the forms of the unit price or NAV 
of the actual Islamic funds, the results may have been affected by the prevailing market 
condition at the time that the studies were undertaken and the appropriateness of the 
empirical models used in the studies.  Moreover, since past studies were merely based on 
secondary data and did not involve the participation of industry practitioners, the scope of 
the studies may have been limited by their failure to understand the actual operation and 
constraints of Islamic funds, information regarding which can only be obtained through 
the involvement of industry practitioners.  Being at the forefront of the Islamic fund 
industry, input from Islamic fund managers, in particular, is highly valuable for a 
thorough understanding of the issue.  To overcome the various shortcomings of the past 
studies and to ensure the thoroughness of the analysis, this study employed both 
quantitative and qualitative analytical approaches and utilised both secondary and primary 
data.  It is worth mentioning here that this study is the first known attempt that utilises the 
methodological triangulation technique in the analysis of Islamic funds‟ characteristics 
and performance.     
 
 It is rather obvious that investment mandate of Islamic funds has exposed the 
funds to several return-impacting Shariah-compliance requirements which are peculiar 
only to Islamic funds and do not affect their conventional counterparts. On the other hand, 
the traditional portfolio performance measurement models have not been appropriately 
adjusted to reflect the underlying philosophy of the Islamic fund creation or the Shariah 
constraints affecting Islamic funds, thus rendering the traditional models unable to give a 
true or unbiased valuation of Islamic funds‟ performance.  Therefore, this study is 
important since it investigates the issue in greater detail to determine whether there is an 
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urgent need to develop an alternative portfolio performance valuation model which will 
give a fair valuation to Islamic funds.  However, although the study has successfully 
identified the additional variables which are supposed to be taken into account for a 
proper valuation of Islamic fund performance, numerous limitations related to insufficient 
infrastructure, lack of data on Shariah-compliant instruments and indices, the 
considerably low interest towards the alternative valuation model especially by the 
Islamic fund managers themselves, and the difficulty in quantifying religious or Shariah-
related variables have not permitted the new alternative model to be developed within the 
short duration of this study.    
 
 Nevertheless, the significance of the study can be appreciated academically 
through its contribution towards the expansion of knowledge and enhancing the literature 
on topic related to Islamic fund management.  This certainly augurs well for the Islamic 
fund industry in view of the shortage of extensive research in this area despite the 
impressive growth of the industry.  Though the importance of having an alternative 
portfolio valuation model specifically for Islamic funds is not widely realised at the 
moment, the need for such a model is likely to arise in the future when the size of the 
Islamic fund industry becomes more significant proportionately.  Therefore, the findings 
of this study can be used as a platform for future studies related to Islamic fund 
performance.  For now, any effort to develop an alternative portfolio performance 
valuation model for Islamic funds is likely to be spearheaded by the academic community 
instead of industry practitioners.      
     
 The scope of the study was divided into four main areas, namely the analysis of 
return and risk characteristics of Islamic funds; analysis of the performance trend of 
Islamic funds; analysis of the impact of Shariah-compliance requirements on Islamic 
funds‟ performance; and, analysis of the handling of Islamic funds by fund management 
companies.  To ensure that the study was thorough in its analysis, the study employed the 
methodological triangulation technique which utilises both the quantitative and 
qualitative analyses.  The quantitative analysis method is used to analyse and make 
inferences from secondary data whilst the qualitative analysis method is used to analyse 
and make inferences from primary data obtained through face-to-face interviews with 
Islamic fund/investment managers.  Hence, this study is explorative in nature as it 
attempts to investigate the issue of Islamic fund performance valuation by identifying the 
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return and risk characteristics of Islamic funds from both secondary and primary sources.  
The analysis of the return and risk characteristics of Islamic funds has helped in 
determining the performance behaviour of the funds whilst the inputs obtained through 
feedbacks from Islamic fund managers has revealed the actual fund management practice, 
the Shariah effects on Islamic fund performance, and the current fund valuation 
techniques adopted by Islamic fund managers.    
 
 The findings of the study are deemed as both intriguing and thought provoking.  
The study found that the existing Islamic funds have been created largely by mimicking 
conventional funds, hence there are large similarities between Islamic funds and 
conventional funds in terms of their structure and operations.  In fact, the economic 
motive, rather than the religious-related motive, is arguably the main reason behind 
Islamic funds offering by fund management companies.  The main factor distinguishing 
Islamic funds from conventional funds is the Shariah-compliance-related activities, 
particularly with regards to stock selection and Shariah-compliance supervision.  Islamic 
funds are generally characterised by lower return and high volatility, have limited 
numbers of profitable stocks or industries whose returns are strongly and positively 
correlated, have a smaller fund size and low fund subscription rate, and, are mainly 
invested in large-capitalised or heavyweight stocks that are involved in defensive 
industries.  Interestingly, the study found that Islamic funds which invest mainly in large-
capitalised stocks could outperform both conventional funds and the market index.  
Furthermore, the study found that the analysis of Islamic fund performance is sensitive to 
the benchmark used for performance comparison. This is highlighted by the analysis 
using the traditional portfolio valuation models which are based on the risk-adjusted 
return that shows Islamic funds are able to outperform conventional funds if Shariah-
compliant instruments are used as the performance benchmarks.   
 
 Despite the overwhelming evidence of Islamic funds‟ underperformance, the 
empirical results indicate that the difference between return of Islamic funds and return of 
conventional funds are not robust statistically.  Therefore, the results should be inferred 
cautiously and should not be construed as giving conclusive evidence that Islamic funds 
are inferior to conventional funds, or vice versa.  In addition, to put the issue in the right 
perspective, the evidence of Islamic funds‟ underperformance does not in any way 
represent a disadvantage of Islamic funds considering that the underlying philosophy of 
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the funds actually goes beyond the maximising of monetary return, as in the case of 
conventional funds, but to attain other non-pecuniary motives including the fulfilment of 
religious obligation or adherence to Shariah principles while making an investment.  
Based on this perspective, outperforming conventional funds may not be the main 
challenge for Islamic funds, but equally the funds are expected to generate a satisfactory 
level of return, preferably one which is not substantially lower than the return of 
conventional funds, in order for Islamic funds to remain competitive and viable to general 
investors. 
 
 With respect to the Shariah implementation, the study found that all the existing 
Islamic funds are fully Shariah-compliant by virtue of their approval by the Securities 
Commission (SC).  However, the study noticed that there is a huge gap in terms of 
Shariah understanding and adoption of Shariah principles in the creation of the Islamic 
funds.  Specifically, the structure of the existing Islamic funds have not been explicitly 
tailored to promote the true Islamic teachings or to achieve the Shariah objectives 
(maqasid al-Shariah).  Instead, the existing Islamic funds closely resembled their 
conventional counterparts in their structure and handling, thus resulting in the general 
perception that Islamic funds are not significantly different to conventional funds or that 
Islamic funds merely represent another type of financial product from the issuing fund 
management companies without due recognition to their religious significance. The 
perception is mainly stimulated by the Islamic funds‟ mimicking of conventional funds, 
the current handling or treatment of Islamic funds by fund management companies, and 
the clear separation of role between fund management companies and their Shariah 
advisory board.  The separation of role effectively relieves fund management companies 
from the necessity to develop their own Shariah experts or to promote the understanding 
and adoption of Shariah principles among key management personnel, fund managers 
and unit trust or mutual fund agents.   
 
 The study found that Shariah-compliance requirements affects Islamic fund 
performance particularly in two instances: 1) it increases the operating cost of Islamic 
fund management companies by creating additional Shariah-related expenses; and, 2) it 
introduces additional risk namely the Shariah non-compliance risk to Islamic funds.   
Since both the Shariah-related costs and Shariah risk are unique to Islamic funds and not 
affecting conventional funds, the former would have to generate a significantly higher 
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return in order to outperform the latter if their performance is compared directly.  This 
explains why it is difficult for Islamic funds to outperform conventional funds based on 
realised return.  Hence, it appears that the adherence to Shariah requirements or branding 
a fund as Islamic does not give any significant economic advantage, apart from attracting 
pious Muslim or ethically-concerned investors.   
 
 With regards to the Islamic funds‟ performance valuation, the study found that the 
traditional models which measure fund performance based on risk-adjusted return are not 
widely used by the participating fund managers.  Instead, the more popular methods of 
fund performance valuation used by the fund managers are the peer group comparison 
and the tracking error techniques.  The rather limited interest towards the standard 
portfolio valuation models is due to investors general emphasis on the actual realised 
return rather than risk-adjusted return.  In addition to the lack of demand from the fund 
managers themselves, any effort to develop an alternative fund performance measurement 
model may also be hampered by insufficient infrastructure such as the limited data on 
Shariah-compliant instruments or indices, the absence of an Islamic fund rating agency, 
and the difficulty in quantifying or measuring religious or Shariah-related variables.  
Despite these shortcomings however, the participating fund managers have generally 
agreed that Islamic funds are essentially different from conventional funds, hence a direct 
comparison between the two funds is rather inappropriate.  Therefore, the reservation 
shown by the Islamic fund managers should not be construed as an outright rejection to 
the idea of developing an alternative portfolio valuation model for Islamic funds.  On the 
contrary, what the fund managers have merely suggested is that such model is not 
urgently needed at the moment in view of the significantly small current market size of 
the Islamic fund industry and the limited number of Shariah-compliant fund products and 
financial instruments as well as industry players.  In fact, some fund managers have 
supported the idea since the alternative portfolio valuation model, if materialised, will 
certainly benefit the Islamic fund industry significantly by providing the industry with a 
performance measurement model that will give a fair valuation to Islamic funds.  
However, unless the shortcomings are addressed satisfactorily and there is a significant 
shift in the way investors perceive the actual return, or the manner in which the return is 
calculated by taking into account other non-pecuniary variables, it would be almost 
impossible to break the dominance of the conventional portfolio theory.    
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 The study also found that the active fund management strategy is arguably the best 
approach for Islamic funds in Malaysia as compared to the simple buy-and-hold or 
passive fund management strategy.  This is in view of the high volatility of the Malaysian 
stock market which requires fund managers to capitalise on every opportunity that arises 
from price fluctuations or embark into a defensive position to protect their funds‟ 
investment value in the event the stock market turns bearish.  Adopting the simple buy-
and-hold or passive strategy especially for a considerably long period of time may not be 
a wise strategy at all as shown by the historical performance of the share prices and the 
benchmark index, reflected in this study through the strong mean reversion trend in the 
long-term return of the hypothetical portfolios and the KLCI.  The active fund 
management strategy is even more crucial for Islamic funds which have been constrained 
by their investment mandate.  Notwithstanding however, the success of the strategy 
depends largely on the superior investment skills of the Islamic fund managers.  Though 
the study is designed to analyse the characteristics and performance of Islamic funds 
thoroughly, various constraints encountered during the course of this study in terms of 
research duration, funding, software and technical knowhow has inevitably resulted in 
several limitations of this study which, if addressed, would provide stronger foundations 
for further study.  The limitations and suggestions for future study are discussed in the 
following two sections.   
 
 
10.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
This section highlights the limitations of the study which are as follows: 
 
10.2.1 Limited Scope of the Analysis 
 
The scope of the study has mainly focussed on the general return and risk characteristics 
and performance valuation of Islamic funds.  Hence, the data and the sample selection for 
both the quantitative analysis and the qualitative analysis have been specifically tailored 
towards achieving the research objectives.  Consequently, the study has not directly 
looked into the behavioural aspects of Islamic fund investors that would require 
participation from the general investors; or examined the portfolio decision making 
process in the fund management companies that would require participation from key 
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management personnel apart from the fund/investment managers; or investigated the 
marketing and promotion activities of Islamic funds that would require participation from 
unit trust agents; or scrutinised the regulatory supervision of the Islamic fund industry 
that would require participation from the authorities such as the SC or members of the 
Shariah advisory board.   Nevertheless, the study has taken into consideration the 
possible contributions from all parties involved in the operation and performance of 
Islamic funds.  In addition, since the study is conducted in Malaysia, the findings reflect 
Malaysian experiences which may not necessarily be similar with other countries‟ 
experiences due to the differences in the stock market environment, regulatory structure, 
Shariah rulings and fund management practice.       
 
10.2.2 Limited Type of Investment Asset 
 
The hypothetical portfolios used in the quantitative analysis have only a single type of 
asset, namely Malaysian listed equities.  Hence, the performance of the hypothetical 
portfolios merely reflects the kind of return that a unit trust or mutual fund may achieve if 
it invests entirely in shares of companies listed on the Malaysian stock market.  In 
contrast, an actual fund would typically invest in several types of securities such as 
stocks, fixed income securities, money market instruments, cash and fixed assets in 
accordance with the fund‟s asset allocation strategy. Since the hypothetical portfolios 
only have a single type of asset, their returns do not reflect the more dynamic 
performance of a multi-assets portfolio.       
 
10.2.3 Limited Data Available on Shariah-Compliant Instruments 
 
The findings derived based on Shariah-compliant index or assets may be constrained by 
the limited data available for these instruments.  For instance, the FBM Emas Shariah 
Index used to represent the Shariah index in this study was launched in 2008 with its data 
backdated to 1999.  Hence, the findings were solely based on the performance of the 10-
year period whilst analysis based on the different sub-periods for the purpose of making a 
parallel comparison with the portfolios‟ performance using conventional instruments 
cannot be made.        
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10.2.4 Limited Sample of Respondents 
 
Though the sample of seven respondents which comprises about one-third of the total 
number of fund management companies offering Islamic funds in Malaysia is deemed 
sufficient, all the participating fund managers are Muslims who may already have some 
basic knowledge about the Shariah.  However, since the number of non-Muslim 
dominated fund management companies offering Islamic funds based on the Islamic 
window concept and the number of non-Muslim fund managers are greater than the 
number of Muslim dominated fund management companies/Muslim fund managers, it 
will be interesting to obtain the non-Muslim fund managers‟ perception towards Islamic 
funds.  It has to be noted here that every effort has been made to obtain the participation 
from non-Muslim fund managers but the unwillingness of the non-Muslim fund managers 
to take part in the interview for various reasons as well as several other constraints related 
to the limited time period and logistic problems during the fieldwork have hampered 
efforts to obtain the participation of the non-Muslim fund managers. Furthermore, the 
study has purposely selected only Islamic fund managers as respondents to suit the scope 
of the study and has not obtained participation from conventional fund managers, key 
management personnel, unit trust agents, investors or regulators of the Islamic fund 
industry.    
 
 
10.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Having identified the limitations of the study, the following are the recommendations for 
future study related to Islamic funds: 
 
10.3.1 Expanding the Scope of Analysis and Sample of Respondents 
 
Future research on Islamic funds‟ operation and performance may be extended into the 
study of behaviour of Islamic fund investors to determine their actual intention in 
subscribing into Islamic funds and to examine their trading strategy when investing in the 
funds.  Future studies may also look into the role and strategy of fund management 
companies in educating Islamic funds investors particularly in creating awareness towards 
the noble intention and the true nature of Islamic funds as an investment instrument in 
 318 
which the objectives go beyond the mere pursuit of monetary gains. This includes studies 
on how to improve the quality of Shariah information dissemination through mediums 
such as the Islamic fund prospectus and proper training for fund managers and mutual 
fund agents.  Other interesting areas for future studies are the analysis of the components 
of actual Islamic funds‟ portfolio or analysis of the investment decision making process 
particularly with regards to securities selection and the roles of Shariah advisory boards 
as well as the analysis of marketing strategy used by unit trust or mutual fund agents to 
convince potential investors to subscribe into Islamic funds. Future studies may also 
involve participation from non-Muslim fund managers, key personnel of fund 
management companies, Shariah scholars and regulators of Islamic fund industry to 
obtain further insight into the operation of Islamic funds and to examine the extent to 
which Shariah-compliant funds have fully upheld the true spirit of Islamic teachings or 
achieving the Shariah objectives. 
 
 
10.3.2 Quantifying the Shariah-Related Variables 
 
One major obstacle to any research pertaining to Islamic finance is the inability to 
quantify religious or Shariah-related variables. While the conventional economic theory 
attributes the individual‟s satisfaction (expected utility) to attaining maximum monetary 
gains against a certain level of risk taking, Islamic finance theory has yet to develop its 
own definition of “satisfaction” that incorporates both conventional utility and religious 
values.   At present, there is no specific formula to measure religiousness or piousness 
level or to reward an individual for their virtuous acts.  In relation to fund performance, 
there is no formula yet to calculate the incentive for avoiding high-yielding non-Shariah-
approved stocks so Islamic funds‟ return can be adjusted to reflect the inability of the 
funds to invest in sin stocks, of which, their conventional counterparts are free to invest at 
will.  There is also no formula yet to compensate for additional Shariah costs incurred so 
the return of Islamic funds can be fairly evaluated against conventional funds which are 
not subject to such additional expenses.  Notwithstanding however, although the idea to 
quantify religious or Shariah related variables seems to be far fetched, the ability to 
measure the quality of the religious attributes, if successful, will certainly open an entirely 
new horizon of Islamic finance theory.  
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10.3.3 The Applied Shariah Rating Assessment (ASRA) Model  
 
Two interesting findings of the qualitative analysis are: 1) economic motives, rather than 
religious motives, are actually the main factor behind Islamic funds offering by fund 
management companies; and, 2) there is an apparent lack of appreciation towards Islamic 
teachings or Shariah objectives in the creation and handling of Islamic funds.  The 
findings are particularly true for fund management companies which offer Islamic funds 
under the Islamic window concept.  These raise a serious concern pertaining to the 
“purity” of the existing Islamic funds available in the market, despite being certified as 
Shariah-compliant by the SC. Since branding a fund as Islamic will inevitably associate 
the fund with Islamic virtues, it is logical to expect that the so-called Islamic fund is 
created with some underlying religious philosophies so it can assist in promoting the 
Islamic values or attaining the Shariah objectives while enabling pious Muslim investors 
to participate in economic activities through unit trust or mutual fund investment that 
adheres to Islamic principles.  It is also logical to expect that the Islamic fund will be 
handled in accordance to Islamic teachings entirely so the purity of the fund can be 
ensured. 
 
 With this in mind and based on the feedback from Islamic fund managers, it is 
suggested that future study looks into the actual handling of Islamic funds thoroughly and 
measures the degree of the adoption of Islamic principles in the existing Islamic funds.  
Hence, it is proposed that a study, which can tentatively be called the Applied Shariah 
Rating Assessment (ASRA) Model, is undertaken in future.  The model is envisioned 
amid concern of the limited understanding especially among Islamic fund managers (both 
Muslims and non-Muslims) and fund management companies on the underlying 
principles of Islamic funds and how Shariah principles should be implemented in the 
process of creating, managing and marketing of Islamic funds.  It is apparent from the 
Islamic fund prospectuses that the current understanding of what constitutes an Islamic 
fund is merely confined to stock screening or investment in halal-approved stocks and 
having a Shariah advisory board as a source of reference and supervision of Shariah-
related matters.  Further investigation has also revealed that Islamic funds are mostly 
created in response to market demand and administered by both Muslims and non-
Muslims alike.  Therefore, the ASRA model is designed to measure the extent to which 
fund management companies really embrace Islamic principles in the operation of their 
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Islamic funds.  The ASRA model will have three main objectives: 1) to determine how 
comprehensively the fund management companies embrace Islamic principles in the 
operations of their Islamic funds; 2) to provide a rating based on the level of Shariah-
compliance or adoption of Islamic principles in the operation of Islamic funds; and, 3) to 
distinguish between a mere “Shariah-compliant fund” with a true “Islamic-based fund”.  
The research terms of reference, scope, methodology, tools or instruments are among the 
issues that need to be addressed in the future.   
 
 
10.4 CLOSING REMARKS   
 
This study is undertaken with a single purpose namely to contribute positively to the 
development of the Islamic fund management industry by providing a comprehensive 
analysis of the characteristics and performance of Islamic funds.   It is hoped that more 
research in this area will be carried out in the future, especially research that takes into 
account the recommendations put forward by this study.   
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EPILOGUE 
 
The clock turns to 11:00 am just as SAP, a 35-year old executive, enters into a 
conventional bank wanting to cash-in his dividend voucher.  Once inside, he walks 
towards the ticketing machine and pulls a ticket out.  It‟s ticket No. 123.  The bank is 
pretty quiet that morning unlike the busy and chaotic situation that normally prevails at 
this hour.  “Emm! It‟s my lucky day, indeed,” he says to himself quietly as he looks upon 
the display screen showing No. 119, “three more customers, then it‟ll be my turn.” He 
moves towards an unoccupied chair next to a customer service desk.   
He counts eight other customers inside the bank while four counters are open: 
three are manned by female clerks of which two are non-Muslim Chinese and the other is 
a Muslim Malay, and one counter is handled by a non-Muslim Indian male clerk.   
At the customer service desk next to him, a non-Muslim Chinese lady officer is 
explaining about the bank‟s financial products to a Muslim Malay lady wearing a 
headscarf.  The lady listens attentively to the officer while holding an Islamic fund 
prospectus offered by the bank in her hand.  Another Muslim Malay male officer is at the 
back of the counters, apparently verifying forms and passbooks handed to him by one of 
the bank clerks.  “A typical multi-ethnic Malaysian society working in complete 
harmony”, he says to himself proudly.   
While he is observing this, another customer enters the bank and comes towards 
him, taking the chair next to him.  They are about the same age and he is holding an 
envelope that looks very familiar to him.  
“This guy must be here to cash-in his dividend, as well”, SAP speculates.      
 “How well did your fund perform?” the man asks.   
 Surprised by the sudden question by CP, SAP replies spontaneously, “Not that 
good, unfortunately, I‟m only getting RM29.20 from my RM1000 investment.  It‟s quite 
a modest return I would say. How‟s yours?” 
 “Lucky me, my fund did quite well this time,” says CP, smiling, “I got RM49.96 
for my RM1000 investment this year”, he continues.   
 There is an announcement calling No. 120 to Counter 4.  A middle-aged man rises 
from his chair and walks slowly to Counter 4 to be attended by a Malay lady teller. 
 “My number is 125. What‟s yours?” asks CP. 
 “Mine is 123”, SAP answers, briefly.   
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 “Just wondering, what fund you are investing in?” asks CP, “it looks like you‟re 
getting below the FD rate to me.” He points to the display screen showing the FD rates 
offered by the bank. The rate for 12-month maturity period is 3.07 per cent. 
 “It‟s below the FD rate, alright,” replies SAP, smiling, “but it does not really 
concern me much, because I‟m investing in Islamic fund.”  
 “Oh!  So, it‟s a religious fund, then.  I presume you wanted to invest in a fund that 
deals entirely in halal stocks. I can understand that, but it seems to me that your fund is 
not much different from my fund,” CP argues. “Why invest in this company and not in a 
fully-fledged Islamic fund management company?  How sure are you that the fund is 
entirely managed the Islamic way?”  he asks enthusiastically.   
 “I don‟t, actually.  I just trust the fund management company. Their guarantee is 
good enough for me.  By the way, their Islamic fund is giving the highest return as 
compared to any Islamic funds including those offered by the fully-fledged Islamic fund 
management company.  So, it‟s the fund‟s return that attracted me the most.”  
 “Even if the return is lower than the FD?”  CP asks anxiously, “Are you really 
happy with the return?” There is an announcement calling for No. 121 to Counter No. 1.     
 SAP takes a quick look at his number again, then replies, “Well, if based on the 
risk-adjusted return, my investment is not that bad, actually since it is the best fund in its 
class and even outperformed some conventional funds.”  
 “Oh! I see. I don’t really know what the risk-adjusted return means, but I do know 
the actual return is more important to me. I get more money from my dividend than you, 
that‟s for sure, regardless of whether my fund is ranked below your fund.”  
 “You might be right, in your own perspective, of course”, SAP replies. “But, I 
think there is more than just the fund‟s return to this investment.  What matters to me the 
most is that I‟m investing in a halal fund. That‟s more important.”     
 There is an announcement calling No. 123 to Counter No.3.  “Aha! That‟s my 
number being called. I think I should go now. It‟s nice to have a chat with you, though”, 
he continues.   
 SAP bids CP a farewell then walks to the counter which is manned by a non-
Muslim Chinese female teller.  CP gazes at him in amazement while trying to rationalise 
why SAP would invest in a fund that gives lower return to the FDs.   
 “Ultimately, it‟s an individual‟s choice and preference, of course”, he concludes. 
CP continues waiting for his turn while his mind is wondering how he will spend the 
money that he‟s getting from the dividend later.  
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 APPENDIX I 
 
 
LIST OF SHARIAH-COMPLIANT SECURITIES BY THE SHARIAH ADVISORY 
COUNCIL OF THE SECURITIES COMMISSION (as at 28
th
 of November 2008) 
 
LISTING BOARD: MAIN BOARD 
 
SECTOR: CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
1.  7120  Acoustech Bhd 
2. 2658  Ajinomoto (M) Bhd 
3.  7090  Apex Healthcare Bhd 
4.  6432  Apollo Food Holdings Bhd 
5.  7129  Asia File Corporation Bhd 
6.  5039 Baneng Holdings Bhd 
7.  9288  Bonia Corporation Bhd 
8.  2828  C.I. Holdings Bhd 
9.  7174  CAB Cakaran Corporation Bhd 
10.  7148  CCM Duopharma Biotech Bhd 
11.  7202  Classic Scenic Bhd 
12.  7205  Cocoaland Holdings Bhd 
13.  2925  Cycle & Carriage Bintang Bhd 
14.  7119  DeGem Bhd 
15.  2976  DNP Holdings Bhd 
16.  7198  DPS Resources Bhd 
17.  3026  Dutch Lady Milk Ind. (Malaya) Bd 
18.  5074  DXN Holdings Bhd 
19.  5091  Ekowood International Bhd 
20.  7125  Emivest Bhd 
21.  7149  Eng Kah Corporation Bhd 
22.  9172  Formosa Prosonic Industries Bhd 
23.  5649  Golden Pharos Bhd 
24.  5102  Guan Chong Bhd 
25.  3301  Hong Leong Industries Bhd 
26.  7213  Hovid Bhd 
27.  5024 Hup Seng Industries Bhd 
28.  5058  Hytex Integrated Bhd 
29.  5107  IQ Group Holdings Bhd 
30.  7152  Jaycorp Bhd 
31.  8931  Jerasia Capital Bhd 
32.  8532  John Master Industries Bhd 
33.  7182  KBB Resources Bhd 
34.  7030  Kenmark Industrial Co. (M) Bhd 
35.  6203  Khee San Bhd 
36.  7151  Kimble Corporation Bhd 
37.  0002  Kotra Industries Bhd 
38.  7006  Latitude Tree Holdings Bhd 
39.  4839  Leong Hup Holdings Bhd 
40.  7089  Lii Hen Industries Bhd 
41.  2887  Lion Diversified Holdings Bhd 
42.  7126  London Biscuits Bhd 
43.  3662  Malayan Flour Mills Bhd 
44.  5282  Mamee-Double Decker (M) Bhd 
45.  9733  Maxbiz Corporation Bhd 
46.  5886  Mintye Industries Bhd 
47.  3921  MWE Holdings Bhd 
48.  4707  Nestle (Malaysia) Bhd 
49.  7060  New Hoong Fatt Holdings Bhd 
50.  5017  Nikko Electronics Bhd 
51.  5066  NTPM Holdings Bhd 
52.  7107  Oriental Food Ind. Hldgs. Bhd 
53.  4006  Oriental Holdings Bhd 
54.  7052  Padini Holdings Bhd 
55.  3719  Panasonic Manufacturing M‟sia B 
56.  6068  PCCS Group Bhd 
57.  5231  Pelikan International Corp. Bhd 
58.  7088  Poh Huat Resources Holdings Bhd 
59.  5080  Poh Kong Holdings Bhd 
60.  4065  PPB Group Bhd 
61.  2895  Putera Capital Bhd 
62.  7134  PW Consolidated Bhd 
63.  7084  QL Resources Bhd 
64.  7184  Sequoia Holdings Bhd 
65.  7180  Sern Kou Resources Bhd 
66.  7136  Silver Bird Group Bhd 
67.  4316  Sin Heng Chan (Malaya) Bhd 
68.  4405  Tan Chong Motor Holdings Bhd 
69.  7200  Tek Seng Holdings Bhd 
70.  7230  Tomei Consolidated Bhd 
71.  4421  Tradewinds (M) Bhd 
72.  4588  UMW Holdings Bhd 
73.  7757  UPA Corporation Bhd 
74.  7121  Xian Leng Holdings Bhd 
75.  7178  Y.S.P. Southeast Asia Hlding Bhd 
76.  5584  Yee Lee Corporation Bhd 
77.  4642  Yeo Hiap Seng (M) Bhd 
78.  5131  Zhulian Corporation Bhd 
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SECTOR: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
1.  7191  Adventa Bhd 
2.  7609  Ajiya Bhd 
3.  2674  Aluminium Com. of Malaysia Bhd 
4.  2682  Amalgamated Industrial Steel Bhd 
5.  4758  Ancom Bhd 
6.  6556  Ann Joo Resources Bhd 
7.  5568  APB Resources Bhd 
8.  5479  APL Industries Bhd 
9.  5015  APM Automotive Holdings Bhd 
10.  7162  Astino Bhd 
11.  7187  Boon Koon Group Bhd 
12.  8133  Boustead Heavy Ind Bhd 
13.  5100  BP Plastics Holding Bhd 
14.  7135  BSA International Bhd 
15.  5105  Can-One Bhd 
16.  7076  CB Industrial Product Hldg. Bhd 
17.  7171  Century Bond Bhd 
18.  2879  Chemical Com. of Malaysia Bhd 
19.  5007  Chin Well Holdings Bhd 
20.  5797  Choo Bee Metal Industries Bhd 
21.  5071  Coastal Contracts Bhd 
22.  5094  CSC Steel Holdings Bhd 
23.  5082  Cymao Holdings Bhd 
24.  8125  Daibochi Plastic & Pack. Ind. Bhd 
25.  6505  Delloyd Ventures Bhd 
26.  5086  DK Leather Corporation Bhd 
27.  5835  Dolomite Corporation Bhd 
28.  7169  Dominant Enterprise Bhd 
29.  7233  Dufu Technology Bhd 
30.  9016  Eksons Corporation Bhd 
31.  7166  Englotechs Holding Bhd 
32.  7217  Eonmetall Group Bhd 
33.  7773  EP Manufacturing Bhd 
34.  3042  Esso Malaysia Bhd 
35.  5101  Evergreen Fibreboard Bhd 
36.  7552  Evermaster Group Bhd 
37.  2984  FACB Industries Incorporated Bhd 
38.  7229  Favelle Favco Bhd 
39.  2755  FCW Holdings Bhd 
40.  3611  Goh Ban Huat Bhd 
41.  2135  Gopeng Bhd 
42.  3247  GUH Holdings Bhd 
43.  5168  Hartalega Holdings Bhd 
44.  5095  Heveaboard Bhd 
45.  5072  Hiap Teck Venture Bhd 
46.  8443  HIL Industries Bhd 
47.  9644  Hirotako Holdings Bhd 
48.  9601  Ho Wah Genting Bhd 
49.  3328  Hume Industries (Malaysia) Bhd 
50.  6829  Industrial Concrete Products Bhd 
51.  7112  Ingress Corporation Bhd 
52.  2127  Integrated Rubber Corp. Bhd 
53.  7223  Jadi Imaging Holdings Bhd 
54.  2747  Java Incorporated Bhd 
55.  4383  Jaya Tiasa Holdings Bhd 
56.  7167  Johore Tin Bhd 
57.  3476 Keck Seng (M) Bhd 
58.  6211  Kia Lim Bhd 
59.  3522  Kian Joo Can Factory Bhd 
60.  5371  Kim Hin Industry Bhd 
61.  5060  Kinsteel Bhd 
62.  9466  KKB Engineering Bhd 
63.  7164  KNM Group Bhd 
64.  7153  Kossan Rubber Industries Bhd 
65.  8362  KYM Holdings Bhd 
66.  3794  Lafarge Malayan Cement Bhd 
67.  9326  LB Aluminium Bhd 
68.  5092  LCTH Corporation Bhd 
69.  9881  Leader Steel Holdings Bhd 
70.  4529  Leader Universal Holdings Bhd 
71.  8745  Leweko Resources Bhd 
72.  9504  Linear Corporation Bhd 
73.  2011  Lingui Development Bhd 
74.  3581  Lion Corporation Bhd 
75.  4235  Lion Industries Corporation Bhd 
76.  5068 Luster Industries Bhd 
77.  7087  Magni-Tech Industries Bhd 
78.  3743  Malaysia Aica Bhd 
79.  5916  Malaysia Smelting Corp. Bhd 
80.  5098  Malaysia Steel Works (KL) Bhd 
81.  7075  Malaysian Ae Models Hldgs. Bhd 
82.  9202  Maxtral Industry Bhd 
83.  3778  Melewar Industrial Group Bhd 
84.  5223  Mentiga Corporation Bhd 
85.  6149  Metrod (M) Bhd 
86.  5001  Mieco Chipboard Bhd 
87.  5576  Minho (M) Bhd 
88.  3883  Muda Holdings Bhd 
89.  5087  Mycron Steel Bhd 
90.  5000  Narra Industries Bhd 
 
 
 
 343 
SECTOR: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
91.  5025  NWP Holdings Bhd 
92.  4944  Nylex (M) Bhd 
93.  7109  Octagon Consolidated Bhd 
94.  7140  OKA Corporation Bhd 
95.  5065  Ornapaper Bhd 
96.  7225  P.A Resources Bhd 
97.  7095  P.I.E. Industrial Bhd 
98.  4081  Pan Malaysia Corporation Bhd 
99.  5022  Paos Holdings Bhd 
100. 5436  Per Sadur Timah(M) Perstima Bhd 
101. 5146  Perwaja Holdings Bhd 
102. 6033  Petronas Gas Bhd 
103. 6637 PNE PCB Bhd 
104. 7175  Poly Tower Ventures Bhd 
105. 8869  Press Metal Bhd 
106. 9873  Prestar Resources Bhd 
107. 7123  Priceworth Wood Products Bhd 
108. 7803  Rubberex Corporation (M)  Bhd 
109. 9113  Sanbumi Holdings Bhd 
110. 7811  Sapura Industrial Bhd 
111. 4731  Scientex Bhd 
112. 7158  Scomi Group Bhd 
113. 4286  Seal Incorporated Bhd 
114. 5145  Sealink International Bhd 
115. 4324  Shell Refining Co. (F.O.M.) Bhd 
116. 2739  Sino Hua-An International Bhd 
117. 6262  Sinora Industries (M) Bhd 
118. 4359  Sitt Tatt Bhd 
119. 7155 SKP Resources Bhd 
120. 5134  Southern Acids (M) Bhd 
121. 5665  Southern Steel Bhd 
122. 6904  Subur Tiasa Holdings Bhd 
123. 7207  Success Transformer Corp. Bhd 
124. 7106  Supermax Corporation Bhd 
125. 7131  Supportive Intl. Hldgs. Bhd 
126. 5012  Ta Ann Holdings Bhd 
127. 4448  Tasek Corporation Bhd 
128. 6378  Tekala Corporation Bhd 
129. 8257  Tenggara Oil Bhd 
130. 7034  Thong Guan Industries Bhd 
131. 0012  Three-A Resources Bhd 
132. 5103  Titan Chemical Corp. Bhd 
133. 5010  Tong Her Resources Bhd 
134. 7113  Top Glove Corporation Bhd 
135. 4537 UAC Bhd 
136. 7100  Uchi Technologies Bhd 
137. 7133  United U-Li Corporation Bhd 
138. 6963  V.S. Industry Bhd 
139. 4995  Versatile Creative Bhd 
140. 5142 Wah Seong Corporation Bhd 
141. 7111  Weida (M) Bhd 
142. 7231  Wellcall Holdings Bhd 
143. 5009  White Horse Bhd 
144. 4022  Wijaya Baru Global Bhd 
145. 4243  WTK Holdings Bhd 
146. 7463  Ye Chiu Metal Smelting Bhd 
147. 5048  Yi-Lai Bhd 
148. 7014 YLI Holdings Bhd 
149. 8737  YTL Cement Bhd 
150. 7020  Yung Kong Galvanising Ind. Bhd 
 
 
 
SECTOR: CONSTRUCTION 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
1.  7078  Ahmad Zaki Resources Bhd 
2.  5932  Bina Puri Holdings Bhd 
3.  8761  Brem Holdings Bhd 
4.  8591  Crest Builder Holdings Bhd 
5.  7528  DKLS Industries Bhd 
6.  8877  Ekovest Bhd 
7.  9261  Gadang Holdings Bhd 
8.  5398  Gamuda Bhd 
9.  5169  Ho Hup Construction Co. Bhd 
10. 6238  Hock Seng Lee Bhd 
11. 3336  IJM Corporation Bhd 
12.  8834  Ireka Corporation Bhd 
13.  5063  Isyoda Corporation Bhd 
14.  4723  Jaks Resources Bhd 
15.  7323  Ken Holdings Bhd 
16.  7706  Loh & Loh Corporation Bhd 
17.  1651  Malaysian Resources Corp. Bhd 
18.  5129  Melati Ehsan Holdings Bhd 
19.  5006  Merge Energy Bhd 
20.  9571  Mitrajaya Holdings Bhd 
21.  5924  MTD ACPI Engineering Bhd 
22.  5085  Mudajaya Group Bhd 
23.  5703  Muhibbah Engineering (M) Bhd 
24.  4901  Nam Fatt Corporation Bhd 
25.  5093  PECD Bhd 
26.  4073  Pilecon Engineering Bhd 
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27.  9598  Pintaras Jaya Bhd 
28.  7055  PLB Engineering Bhd 
29.  7145  Prinsiptek Corporation Bhd 
30.  5070  Protasco Bhd 
31.  5117  Putrajaya Perdana Bhd 
32.  5030 Ranhill Bhd 
33.  5207  SBC Corporation Bhd 
34.  1813  SPK-Sentosa Corporation Bhd 
35.  5054  TRC Synergy Bhd 
36.  5042  TSR Capital Bhd 
37.  4855  UEM Builders Bhd 
38.  1775  UEM World Bhd 
39.  9679  WCT Bhd 
40.  4677  YTL Corporation Bhd 
41.  2283  Zelan Bhd 
 
 
 
SECTOR: TRADING/SERVICES 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
1.  6599  AEON Co. (M) Bhd 
2.  5099  AirAsia Bhd 
3.  5115  Alam Maritim Resources Bhd 
4.  6351  Amway (Malaysia) Holdings Bhd 
5.  7083  Analabs Resources Bhd 
6.  5055  Atis Corporation Bhd 
7.  6025  Berjaya Media Bhd 
8.  6998  Bintai Kinden Corporation Bhd 
9.  5032  Bintulu Port Holdings Bhd 
10.  7209  Cheetah Holdings Bhd 
11.  5104  CNI Holdings Bhd 
12.  5136  Complete Logistic Services Bhd 
13.  5037  Compugates Holdings Bhd 
14.  5141  Dayang Enterprise Holdings Bhd 
15.  5132  Deleum Bhd 
16.  7277  Dialog Group Bhd 
17.  5908  DKSH Holdings (M) Bhd 
18.  8265  Eastern Pacific Ind. Corp. Bhd 
19.  3557  Ecofirst Consolidated Bhd 
20.  5036  Edaran Bhd 
21.  4774  Edaran Otomobil Nasional Bhd 
22.  0064  Efficient E-Solutions Bhd 
23.  5056  Engtex Group Bhd 
24.  5081  Esthetics International Group Bhd 
25.  1368  Faber Group Bhd 
26.  6939  Fiamma Holdings Bhd 
27.  9318  Fitters Diversified Bhd 
28.  7210  Freight Management Hldg. Bhd 
29.  0128  Frontken Corporation Bhd 
30.  3204  George Kent (Malaysia) Bhd 
31.  3034  Hap Seng Consolidated Bhd 
32.  2062  Harbour-Link Group Bhd 
33.  7455  Hexagon Holdings Bhd 
34.  5046  Hock Sin Leong Group Bhd 
35.  7013  Hubline Bhd 
36.  9555  Integrax Bhd 
37.  5673  Ipmuda Bhd 
38.  0058  JobStreet Corporation Bhd 
39.  8672  Kamdar Group (M) Bhd 
40.  5079  KBES Bhd 
41.  5122  Kencana Petroleum Bhd 
42.  3492  KFC Holdings (Malaysia) Bhd 
43.  5035  Knusford Bhd 
44.  6157  Konsortium Logistik Bhd 
45.  4847  Konsortium Transnasional Bhd 
46.  5878  KPJ Healthcare Bhd 
47.  6874  KUB Malaysia Bhd 
48.  6491  Kumpulan Fima Bhd 
49.  5843  Kump. Perangsang Selangor Bhd 
50.  7177  LCL Corporation Bhd 
51.  2534  Liqua Health Corporation Bhd 
52.  5143  Luxchem Corporation Bhd 
53.  8559  M3nergy Bhd 
54.  5077  Malaysian Bulk Carriers Bhd 
55.  7040  Malaysian Merchant Marine Bhd 
56.  3824  Malaysian Mosaics Bhd 
57.  3514  Marco Holdings Bhd 
58.  5983  MBM Resources Bhd 
59.  3875  Measat Global Bhd 
60.  3808  Mechmar Corporation Bhd 
61.  5090  Media Chinese International Ltd 
62.  3069  Mega First Corporation Bhd 
63.  8389  Metacorp Bhd 
64.  3816  MISC Bhd 
65.  2194  MMC Corporation Bhd 
66.  9032  MTD Capital Bhd 
67.  9768  MTD Infraperdana Bhd 
68.  4464  Naim Indah Corporation Bhd 
69.  9806  Nationwide Exp. Courier Serv. Bh 
70.  5509  NCB Holdings Bhd 
71.  5533  OCB Bhd 
72.  5128  Ogawa World Bhd 
73.  3697  Oilcorp Bhd 
74.  3549  Opus Group Bhd 
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75.  6866  Padiberas Nasional Bhd 
76.  5125  Pantech Group Holdings Bhd 
77.  5657  Parkson Holdings Bhd 
78.  5041  PBA Holdings Bhd 
79.  6254  PDZ Holdings (M) Bhd 
80.  8346  Perak Corporation Bhd 
81.  5133  Petra Energy Bhd 
82.  7108  Petra Perdana Bhd 
83.  5681  Petronas Dagangan Bhd 
84.  7081  Pharmaniaga Bhd 
85.  7122  PJI Holdings Bhd 
86.  5052  PLUS Expressways Bhd 
87.  4634  Pos Malaysia Bhd 
88.  7201  Progressive Impact Corp. Bhd 
89.  9415  QSR Brands Bhd 
90.  8885  Reliance Pacific Bhd 
91.  9652  SAAG Consolidated Bhd 
92.  8567  Salcon Bhd 
93.  8575  Sapuracrest Petroleum Bhd 
94.  2356  Sarawak Energy Bhd 
95.  7045  Scomi Marine Bhd 
96.  9792  SEG International Bhd 
97.  4197  Sime Darby Bhd  
98.  9989  SRII Bhd 
99.  6084  Star Publications (M) Bhd 
100.  1201  Sumatec Resources Bhd 
101.  6521  Suria Capital Holdings Bhd 
102. 5119  Swee Joo Bhd 
103. 0016  Symphony House Bhd 
104. 8524  Taliworks Corporation Bhd 
105. 7228  Tanjung Offshore Bhd 
106. 4863  Telekom Malaysia Bhd 
107. 5347  Tenaga Nasional Bhd 
108. 8702  Texchem Resources Bhd 
109. 3999  The New Straits Time Press (M) B 
110. 5711  The Store Corporation Bhd 
111. 4456  Time Engineering Bhd 
112. 8397  Tiong Nam Logistics Hldgs. Bhd 
113. 6888  TM International Bhd 
114. 5140  Trans-Asia Shipping Corp. Bhd 
115. 9911  Triumphal Associates Bhd 
116. 7091  Unimech Group Bhd 
117. 5754  Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd 
118. 7150  VADS Bhd 
119. 5016  Warisan TC Holdings Bhd 
120. 7293  Yinson Holdings Bhd 
 
 
 
SECTOR: PROPERTIES 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
1.  5959  A & M Realty Bhd 
2.  1007  AMDB Bhd 
3.  5975  Asas Dunia Bhd 
4.  4057  Asian Pac Holdings Bhd 
5.  1473  Bandar Raya Developments Bhd 
6.  6602  BCB Bhd 
7.  6173  Bina Darulaman Bhd 
8.  5057  B inaik Equity Bhd 
9.  1538  Bolton Bhd 
10.  5738  Country Heights Holdings Bhd 
11.  5049  Country View Bhd 
12.  6718  Crescendo Corporation Bhd 
13.  3484  Damansara Realty Bhd 
14.  5401  Dijaya Corporation Bhd 
15.  3417  Eastern & Oriental Bhd 
16.  3085  Ekran Bhd 
17.  1147  Equine Capital Bhd 
18.  6815  EUPE Corporation Bhd 
19.  6041  Farlim Group (M) Bhd 
20.  3107  FIMA Corporation Bhd 
21.  8206  Focal Aims Holdings Bhd 
22.  6335  Fountain View Development Bhd 
23.  2097  Furqan Business Organisation Bhd 
24.  5020  Glomac Bhd 
25.  7404  Gold Bridge Eng. & Const. Bhd 
26.  9962  Gromutual Bhd 
27.  5062  Hua Yang Bhd 
28.  5018  Hunza Properties Bhd 
29.  5084  Ibraco Bhd 
30.  5215  IJM Land Bhd 
31.  1635  IOI Properties Bhd 
32.  6564  Johor Land Bhd 
33.  6769  Keladi Maju Bhd 
34.  5089  KLCC Property Holdings Bhd 
35.  6653  Krisassets Holdings Bhd 
36.  5038  KSL Holdings Bhd 
37.  6246  Kumpulan Hartanah Selangor Bhd 
38.  5789  LBS Bina Group Bhd 
39.  8583  Mah Sing Group Bhd 
40.  9725  Mahajaya Bhd 
41.  8141  Majuperak Holdings Bhd 
42.  6548  Malaysia Pacific Corporation Bhd 
43.  6181  Malton Bhd 
44.  1694  Menang Corporation Bhd 
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45.  5033  Merge Housing Bhd 
46.  8893  MK Land Holdings Bhd 
47.  3913  MUI Properties Bhd 
48.  5043  Mutiara Goodyear Dev. Bhd 
49.  5073  Naim Cendera Holdings Bhd 
50.  5827  Oriental Interest Bhd 
51.  6661  OSK Property Holdings Bhd 
52.  6912  Pasdec Holdings Bhd 
53.  8613  Perduren (M) Bhd 
54.  2208  Petaling Tin Bhd 
55.  5339  PK Resources Bhd 
56.  5075  Plenitude Bhd 
57.  4596  Sapura Resources Bhd 
58.  2224  Selangor Dredging Bhd 
59.  1783  Selangor Properties Bhd 
60.  6017  SHL Consolidated Bhd 
61.  4375  South Malaysia Industries Bhd 
62.  8664  SP Setia Bhd 
63.  6165  Sunrise Bhd 
64.  6289  Sunway City Bhd 
65.  2305  TAHPS Group Bhd 
66.  2259  Talam Corporation Bhd 
67.  1589  Tebrau Teguh Bhd 
68.  5622  Triplc Bhd 
69.  5148  UEM Land Holdings Bhd 
70.  4561  United Malayan Land Bhd 
71.  3158  YNH Property Bhd 
72.  2577  YTL Land & Development Bhd 
 
 
SECTOR: PLANTATION 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
1.  2291  Asiatic Development Bhd 
2.  7054  Astral Asia Bhd 
3.  1899  Batu Kawan Bhd 
4.  5069  BLD Plantation Bhd 
5.  8982  Cepatwawasan Group Bhd 
6.  1929  Chin Teck Plantations Bhd 
7.  3948  Dutaland Bhd 
8.  5029  Far East Holdings Bhd 
9.  2372  Glenealy Plantations (M) Bhd 
10.  5138  Hap Seng Plantations Hldgs. Bhd 
11.  2216  IJM Plantations Bhd 
12.  2607  Inch Kenneth Kajang Rubber PLC 
13.  1961  IOI Corporation Bhd 
14.  5027  Kim Loong Resources Bhd 
15.  1996  Kretam Holdings Bhd 
16.  2445  Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd 
17.  2003  Kulim (Malaysia) Bhd 
18.  5193  Kurnia Setia Bhd 
19.  6572  Kwantas Corporation Bhd 
20.  5026  MHC Plantations Bhd 
21.  1902  Multi Vest Resources Bhd 
22.  2038  Negri Sembilan Oil Palms Bhd 
23.  5047  NPC Resources Bhd 
24.  5113  Rimbunan Sawit Bhd 
25.  2542  Riverview Rubber Estates Bhd 
26.  5126  Sarawak Oil Palms Bhd 
27.  5135  Sarawak Plantation Bhd 
28.  2054  TDM Bhd 
29.  8109  TH Group Bhd 
30.  5112  TH Plantations Bhd 
31.  2313  The Ayer Molek Rubber Co. Bhd 
32.  6327  Tradewinds Plantation Bhd 
33.  9059  TSH Resources Bhd 
34.  2593  United Malacca Bhd 
35.  2089  United Plantations Bhd 
 
 
 
SECTOR: TECHNOLOGY 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
1.  9547  AIC Corporation Bhd 
2.  7068  AKN Technology Bhd 
3.  7204  D&O Ventures Bhd 
4.  8826  Eng Teknologi Holdings Bhd 
5.  0021  GHL Systems Bhd 
6.  7022  Globetronics Technology Bhd 
7.  0082  Green Packet Bhd 
8.  5028  HeiTech Padu Bhd 
9.  6971  Kobay Technology Bhd 
10.  9075  Lityan Holdings Bhd 
11.  9822  LKT Industrial Bhd 
12.  3867  Malaysian Pacific Industries Bhd 
13.  5011  Mesiniaga Bhd 
14.  0043  Metronic Global Bhd 
15.  0083  Notion Vtec Bhd 
16.  7042  Patimas Computers Bhd 
17.  7160  Pentamaster Corporation Bhd 
18.  5005  Unisem (M) Bhd 
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SECTOR: INFRASTRUCTURE (IPC) SECTOR: FINANCE 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
1.  6947  Digi.Com Bhd 
2.  6645  Lingkaran Trans Kota Hldgs. Bhd 
3.  6807  Puncak Niaga Holdings Bhd 
4.  5031  TIME dotCom Bhd 
5.  6742  YTL Power International Bhd 
1.  5258  BIMB Holdings Bhd 
2.  1287  Pan Malaysia Holdings Bhd 
3.  6139  Syarikat Takaful (M'sia) Bhd 
 
 
 
 
LISTING BOARD: SECOND BOARD 
 
SECTOR: CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
1.  7051  Amtek Holdings Bhd 
2.  7165  App Industries Bhd 
3.  7156  Baswell Resources Bhd 
4.  7243  Bio Osmo Bhd 
5.  7193  Biosis Group Bhd 
6.  7154  Caely Holdings Bhd 
7.  7128  CAM Resources Bhd 
8.  7035  CCK Consolidated Holdings Bhd 
9.  9423  Chee Wah Corporation Bhd 
10.  7179  DBE Gurney Resources Bhd 
11.  9091  Emico Holdings Bhd 
12.  7208  Euro Holdings Bhd 
13.  7094  Eurospan Holdings Bhd 
14.  9776  Farm's Best Bhd 
15.  8605  Federal Furniture Hldgs. (M) Bhd 
16.  7098  Foremost Holdings Bhd 
17.  7722  Hing Yiap Knitting Industries Bhd 
18.  7141  Huat Lai Resources Bhd 
19.  7029  Hunza Consolidation Bhd 
20.  8478  Hwa Tai Industries Bhd 
21.  7216  Kawan Food Bhd 
22.  7062  Khind Holdings Bhd 
23.  8303  Kuantan Flour Mills Bhd 
24.  9385  Lay Hong Bhd 
25.  7943  Len Cheong Holding Bhd 
26.  7085  LTKM Bhd 
27.  7935  Milux Corporation Bhd 
28.  7002  Nakamichi Corporation Bhd 
29.  7237  Natural Bio Resources Bhd 
30.  7215  Ni Hsin Resources Bhd 
31.  9407  Paragon Union Bhd 
32.  8966  Prolexus Bhd 
33.  9946  Rex Industries Bhd 
34.  7412  SHH Resources Holdings Bhd 
35.  7246  Signature International Bhd 
36.  7103  Spritzer Bhd 
37.  7082  SYF Resources Bhd 
38.  7211  Tafi Industries Bhd 
39.  7439  Teck Guan Perdana Bhd 
40.  9369  Teo Guan Lee Corporation Bhd 
41.  7252  Teo Seng Capital Bhd 
42.  7176  TPC Plus Bhd 
43.  7203  Wang-Zheng Bhd 
44.  7139  Yikon Corporation Bhd 
45.  7066  Yong Tai Bhd 
 
 
 
SECTOR: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
1.  7061  Abric Bhd 
2.  9148  Advanced Pack. Tech (M) Bhd 
3.  7146  Ae Multi Holdings Bhd 
4.  7116  Aikbee Resources Bhd 
5.  7214 A-Rank Bhd 
6.  7070  Astral Supreme Bhd 
7.  7048  Atlan Holdings Bhd 
8.  7181  Aturmaju Resources Bhd 
9.  7044  Autoair Holdings Bhd 
10.  7008  AV Ventures CorporationBhd 
11.  7447  Axis Incorporation Bhd 
12.  7005  B.I.G Industries Bhd 
13.  7221  BSL Corporation Bhd 
14.  7188  BTM Resources Bhd 
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15.  8052  Central Industrial Corporation Bhd 
16.  7027  Changhuat Corporation Bhd 
17.  7016  Chuan Huat Resources Bhd 
18.  7986  CN Asia Corporation Bhd 
19.  7041  CNLT (Far East) Bhd 
20.  8044  Computer Forms (Malaysia) Bhd 
21.  8435  Concrete Engineering Prod. Bhd 
22.  7157  CYL Corporation Bhd 
23.  8176  Denko Industries Corporation Bhd 
24.  7114  D'nonce Technology Bhd 
25.  8907  EG Industries Bhd 
26.  7189  Emas Kiara Industries Bhd 
27.  8958  Energreen Corporation Bhd 
28.  7249  Ewein Bhd 
29.  7168  Furniweb Industrial Products Bhd 
30.  7161  Fututech Bhd 
31.  7086  Gefung Holdings Bhd 
32.  7197  Ge-Shen Corporation Bhd 
33.  8281  Golden Frontier Bhd 
34.  7192  Goodway Integrated Ind. Bhd 
35.  7096  GPA Holdings Bhd 
36.  7676  Gunung Capital Bhd 
37.  9342  Harvest Court Industries Bhd 
38.  7919  HPI Resources Bhd 
39.  7222  Imaspro Corporation Bhd 
40.  7183  Ire-Tex Corporation Bhd 
41.  7220  IRM Group Bhd 
42.  8648  Jasa Kita Bhd 
43.  7043  JMR Conglomeration Bhd 
44.  7104  Jotech Holdings Bhd 
45.  7092  JPK Holdings Bhd 
46.  7199  Kein Hing International Bhd 
47.  7017  Komarkcorp Bhd 
48.  9636  Kosmo Technology Industrial Bhd 
49.  7033  Kumpulan H & L High-Tech Bhd 
50.  7130  Kumpulan Powernet Bhd 
51.  7064  Latexx Partners Bhd 
52.  8494  LBI Capital Bhd 
53.  8079  Lee Swee Kiat Group Bhd 
54.  7194  Limahsoon Bhd 
55.  7118  Lipo Corporation Bhd 
56.  9199  Lysaght Galvanized Steel Bhd 
57.  7781  Major Team Holdings Bhd 
58.  8192  Mercury Industries Bhd 
59.  7059  Metal Reclamation Bhd 
60.  9024  Metech Group Bhd 
61.  7079  Minply Holdings (M) Bhd 
62.  8311  Mithril Bhd 
63.  7004  Multi-Code Elect. Ind. (M) Bhd 
64.  9539  Multi-Usage Holdings Bhd 
65.  7049  OCI Bhd 
66.  9954  Pahanco Corporation Bhd 
67.  7190  Pelangi Publishing Group Bhd 
68.  9997  Pensonic Holdings Bhd 
69.  7080  Permaju Industries Bhd 
70.  7163  PJBUMI Bhd 
71.  7172  PMB Technology Bhd 
72.  8117  Poly Glass Fibre (M) Bhd 
73.  9458  Premium Nutrients Bhd 
74.  8273  Public Packages Holding Bhd 
75.  7544  Quality Concrete Holdings Bhd 
76.  7498  Ralco Corporation Bhd 
77.  7765  Rapid Synergy Bhd 
78.  7232  Resintech Bhd 
79.  8087  Rock Chemical Ind. (M‟sia) Bhd 
80.  9237  Sarawak Concrete Industries Bhd 
81.  7239  Scanwolf Corporation Bhd 
82.  7247  SCGM Bhd 
83.  7366  Scomi Engineering Bhd 
84.  7073  Seacera Tiles Bhd 
85.  7115  SKB Shutters Corporation Bhd 
86.  7248  SLP Resources Bhd 
87.  7132  SMIS Corporation Bhd 
88.  7099  SMPC Corporation Bhd 
89.  7143  Stone Master Corporation Bhd 
90.  9741  STS Technic Bhd 
91.  7358  Sunchirin Industries (M) Bhd 
92.  8656  Super Enterprise Holdings Bhd 
93.  7235  Superlon Holdings Bhd 
94.  8699  Syarikat Kayu Wangi Bhd 
95.  7097  Ta Win Holdings Bhd 
96.  9849  Tai Kwong Yokohama Bhd 
97.  7024  Techventure Bhd 
98.  7854  Timberwell Bhd 
99.  7285  Tomypak Holdings Bhd 
100. 7173  Toyo Ink Group Bhd 
101. 7026  Toyochem Corporation Bhd 
102. 7147  Tracoma Holdings Bhd 
103. 7186  UDS Capital Bhd 
104. 7227  UMS-Neiken Group Bhd 
105. 9687  United Bintang Bhd 
106. 7127  United Kotak Bhd 
107. 7595  VTI Vintage Bhd 
108. 7226  Watta Holdings Bhd 
109. 8818  Wawasan TKH Holdings Bhd 
110. 7587  Wonderful Wire & Cable Bhd 
111. 7050  Wong Engineering Corp. Bhd 
112. 7025  Woodlandor Holdings Bhd 
113. 7245  WZ Steel Bhd 
114. 7196  Ya Horng Electronic (M) Bhd 
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SECTOR: CONSTRUCTION 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
1.  7007  ARK Resources Bhd 
2.  7023  Bina Goodyear Bhd 
3.  7047  Fajarbaru Builder Group Bhd 
4.  7010  Grand Hoover Bhd 
5.  9083  Kumpulan Jetson Bhd 
6.  9628  Lebar Daun Bhd 
7.  7617  Magna Prima Bhd 
8.  7641  Seloga Holdings Bhd 
9.  9717  Sycal Ventures Bhd 
10.  7028  Zecon Bhd  
 
 
 
SECTOR: TRADING/SERVICES 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
1.  7315  AHB Holdings Bhd 
2.  7031  Amtel Holdings Bhd 
3.  7579  AWC Facility Solutions Bhd 
4.  7241  BHS Industries Bhd 
5.  7117  Century Logistics Holdings Bhd 
6.  7018  CME Group Bhd 
7.  7471  Eden Inc Bhd 
8.  9377  FSBM Holdings Bhd 
9.  7242  Global Carriers Bhd 
10.  7105  Golsta Synergy Bhd 
11.  7110  Haisan Resources Bhd 
12.  7236  Help International Corp. Bhd 
13.  7185  Kejuruteraan Samudra Timur Bhd 
14.  9121  KPS Consortium Bhd 
15.  7170  LFE Corporation Bhd 
16.  8486  Lion Forest Industries Bhd 
17.  7234  MESB Bhd 
18.  7219  Minetech Resources Bhd 
19.  8923  Nagamas International Bhd 
20.  9903  Nepline Bhd 
21.  7927  Ngiu Kee Corporation (M) Bhd 
22.  7206  Ramunia Holdings Bhd 
23.  7032  Rhythm Consolidated Bhd 
24.  7212  Satang Holdings Bhd 
25.  7053  See Hup Consolidated Bhd 
26.  9431  Seni Jaya Corporation Bhd 
27.  9563  Stamford College Bhd 
28.  9474  Tamadam Bonded Warehouse Bhd 
29.  7218  Transocean Holdings Bhd 
30.  8842  TSM Global Bhd 
31.  7137  UMS Holdings Bhd 
32.  7250  Uzma Bhd 
33.  7251  Vastalux Energy Bhd 
34.  7240  Voir Holdings Bhd 
35.  7039  WWE Holdings Bhd 
 
 
 
 
SECTOR: PROPERTIES SECTOR: PLANTATION 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
1.  9814  Bertam Alliance Bhd 
2.  7889  Mulpha Land Bhd 
3.  7003  Y&G Corp Bhd 
1.  7501  Harn Len Corporation Bhd 
2.  9695  Pembinaan Limbongan Setia Bhd 
3.  8419  PWE Industries Bhd 
4.  7382  Tanah Emas Corporation Bhd 
 
 
 
SECTOR: TECHNOLOGY 
No. Code Name of Company 
1.  7195  Comintel Corporation Bhd 
2.  8338  Dataprep Holdings Bhd 
3.  9008  Formis Resources Bhd 
4.  9393  Industronics Bhd 
5.  9334  KESM Industries Bhd 
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LISTING BOARD: MESDAQ MARKET 
 
 
SECTOR: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
1.  0105  Asia Poly Holdings Bhd 
2.  0076  Carotech Bhd 
3.  0091  Daya Materials Bhd 
4.  0006  Discomp Bhd 
5.  0067  Ecofuture Bhd 
6.  0100  ES Ceramics Technology Bhd 
7.  0109  Flonic Hi-Tec Bhd 
8.  0136  Greenyield Bhd 
9.  0125  HDM-Carlaw Corporation Bhd 
10.  0061  Impressive Edge Group Bhd 
11.  0054  Karyon Industries Bhd 
12.  0025  LNG Resources Bhd 
13.  0070  MQ Technology Bhd 
14.  0049  Oceancash Pacific Bhd 
15.  0035  Opcom Holdings Bhd 
16.  0047  Perisai Petroleum Teknologi Bhd 
17.  0038  Plastrade Technology Bhd 
18.  0133  Sanichi Technology Bhd 
19.  0028  Scope Industries Bhd 
20.  0055  Sersol Technologies Bhd 
21.  0001  Supercomal Technologies Bhd 
22.  0084  Techfast Holdings Bhd 
 
 
 
SECTOR: TECHNOLOGY 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
1.  0123  Airocom Technology Bhd 
2.  0068  Asdion Bhd 
3.  0039  AsiaEP Bhd 
4.  0072  AT Systematization Bhd 
5.  0130  BCT Technology Bhd 
6.  0098  Borneo Aqua Harvest Bhd 
7.  0041  CBS Technology Bhd 
8.  0102  Connectcounty Holdings Bhd 
9.  0079  Cwork Systems Bhd 
10.  0022  Cybertowers Bhd 
11.  0029  Digistar Corporation Bhd 
12.  0063  DIS Technology Holdings Bhd 
13.  0036  DVM Technology Bhd 
14.  0030  eBworx Bhd 
15.  0090  Elsoft Research Bhd 
16.  0081  Equator Life Science Bhd 
17.  0118  ETI Tech Corporation Bhd 
18.  0065  Excel Force MSC Bhd 
19.  0119  Extol MSC Bhd 
20.  0116  Focus Dynamics Tech. Bhd 
21.  0071  Fotronics Corporation Bhd 
22.  0104  Genetec Technology Bhd 
23.  0020  Global Soft (MSC) Bhd 
24.  0045  GPRO Technology Bhd 
25.  0056  Grand-Flo Solution Bhd 
26.  0139  H-Display (MSC) Bhd 
27.  0023  IFCA MSC Bhd 
28.  0024  Infortech Alliance Bhd 
29.  0034  Ingenuity Solutions Bhd 
30.  0094  INIX Technologies Holdings Bhd 
31.  0088  INS Bioscience Bhd 
32.  0003  Intelligent Edge Technologies Bhd 
33.  0069  I-Power Bhd 
34.  0010  IRIS Corporation Bhd 
35.  0131  ISS Consulting Solutions Bhd 
36.  0146  JF Technology Bhd 
37.  0127  JHM Consolidation Bhd 
38.  0111  K-One Technology Bhd 
39.  0110  KZEN Solutions Bhd 
40.  0107  Litespeed Education Tech. Bhd 
41.  0017  M3 Technologies (Asia)Bhd 
42.  0052  MEMS Technology Bhd 
43.  0075  Mexter Technology Bhd 
44.  0126  Microlink Solutions Bhd 
45.  0112  Mikro Bhd 
46.  0085  MLABS Systems Bhd 
47.  0059  M-Mode Berhad 
48.  0113  MMS Ventures Bhd 
49.  0042  MoBif Bhd 
50.  0092  mTouche Technology Bhd 
51.  0108  N2N Connect Bhd 
52.  0096  Nextnation Communication Bhd 
53.  0026  Nova MSC Bhd 
54.  0074  Online One Corporation Bhd 
55.  0040  OpenSys (M) Bhd 
56.  0018  Oriented Media Group Bhd 
 
 351 
 
57.  0015  Orisoft Technology Bhd 
58.  0005  Palette Multimedia Bhd 
59.  0007  PUC Founder (MSC) Bhd 
60.  0106  Rexit Bhd 
61.  0135  Scan Associates Bhd 
62.  0129  Silver Ridge Holdings Bhd 
63.  0117  SMR Technologies Bhd 
64.  0093  Solution Engineering Hldgs. Bhd 
65.  0048  Tamco Corporate Holdings Bhd 
66.  0033  Tecasia Group Bhd 
67.  0132  TechnoDex Bhd 
68.  0140  Tejari Technologies Bhd 
69.  0060  The Media Shoppe Bhd 
70.  0062  Tricubes Bhd 
71.  0120  VisDynamics Holdings Bhd 
72.  0097  Vitrox Corporation Bhd 
73.  0050  Viztel Solutions Bhd 
74.  0008  Willowglen Msc Bhd 
75.  0115  Wimems Corporation Bhd 
76.  0141  Winsun Technologies Bhd 
77.  0086  YGL Convergence Bhd 
 
 
 
 
SECTOR: TRADING/SERVICES SECTOR: FINANCE 
No. Code Name of Company No. Code Name of Company 
1.  0122  Advance Information Mktg. Bhd 
2.  0011  Brite-Tech Bhd 
3.  0051  Cuscapi Bhd 
4.  0087  eB Capital Bhd 
5.  0080  Envair Holding Bhd 
6.  0078  GD Express Carrier Bhd 
7.  0147  Innity Corporation Bhd 
8.  0077  Kannaltec Bhd 
9.  0143  Key Asic Bhd 
10.  0095  Key West Global Telecom. Bhd 
11.  0138  My E.G. Services Bhd 
12.  0032  REDtone International Bhd 
13.  0099  Scicom (MSC) Bhd 
14.  0137  StemLife Bhd 
15.  0089  Tex Cycle Technology (M) Bhd 
16.  0145  TFP Solutions Bhd 
1.  0013  MCM Technologies Bhd 
2.  0053  OSK Ventures International Bhd 
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LIST OF NON-SHARIAH-COMPLIANT STOCKS 
No Company Name Sector 
Listing 
Board 
1 Advance Synergy Bhd Travel & Leisure MB 
2 Advance Synergy Capital Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
3 Affin Holdings Bhd Banks MB 
4 Aliran Ihsan Resources Bhd Industrial Engineering MB 
5 Alliance Financial Group Bhd Banks MB 
6 Allianz General Ins. Malaysia Bhd Nonlife Insurance MB 
7 AMMB Holdings Bhd Banks MB 
8 Apex Equity Holdings Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
9 Asia Pacific Land Bhd Real Estate Invest. & Service MB 
10 Astro All Asia Networks Plc. Media MB 
11 Berjaya Corporation Bhd Media MB 
12 Berjaya Land Bhd Travel & Leisure MB 
13 Berjaya Media Bhd Media MB 
14 Berjaya Sports Toto Bhd Travel & Leisure MB 
15 Boustead Holdings Bhd General Industrials MB 
16 Box-Pak (Malaysia) Bhd General Industrials MB 
17 British American Tobacco (M) Bhd Tobacco MB 
18 Bumiputra-Commerce Holdings Bhd Banks MB 
19 Bursa Malaysia Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
20 Cahya Mata Sarawak Bhd Construction & Materials MB 
21 Carlsberg Brewery Malaysia Bhd Beverages MB 
22 Daiman Development Bhd Real Estate Invest. & Service MB 
23 DFZ Capital Bhd General Retailers MB 
24 DRB-Hicom Bhd General Industrials MB 
25 Dreamgate Corporation Bhd Support Services MB 
26 ECM Libra Financial Group Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
27 Encorp Bhd Support Services MB 
28 EON Capital Bhd Banks MB 
29 Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd Beverages MB 
30 General Corporation Bhd Household Goods & Home Cons MB 
31 Genting Bhd Travel & Leisure MB 
32 Golden Plus Holdings Bhd Real Estate Invest. & Service MB 
33 Goldis Bhd General Industrials MB 
34 Grand Central Enterprises Bhd Travel & Leisure MB 
35 Guinness Anchor Bhd Beverages MB 
36 Gula Perak Bhd Travel & Leisure MB 
37 Guocoland (Malaysia) Bhd Real Estate Invest. & Service MB 
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38 Hai-O Enterprise Bhd Beverages MB 
39 Halim Mazmin Bhd Industrial Transportation MB 
40 Harrisons Holdings (M) Bhd Support Services MB 
41 Hexza Corporation Bhd Chemicals MB 
42 HLG Capital Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
43 Hong Leong Bank Bhd Banks MB 
44 Hong Leong Financial Group Bhd Banks MB 
45 Hwang-DBS (M) Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
46 I-Bhd Electronic & Electrical Equip. MB 
47 Idaman Unggul Bhd Nonlife Insurance MB 
48 IGB Corporation Bhd Real Estate Invest. & Service MB 
49 Integrated Logistics Bhd Industrial Transportation MB 
50 Jerneh Asia Bhd Nonlife Insurance MB 
51 Johan Holdings Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
52 JT International Bhd Tobacco MB 
53 K & N Kenanga Holdings Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
54 KAF-Seagroatt & Campbell Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
55 Karambunai Corporation Bhd Travel & Leisure MB 
56 Kluang Rubber Co. (M) Bhd Food Producers MB 
57 Kramat Tin Dredging Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
58 Kuchai Development Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
59 Kumpulan Europlus Bhd Real Estate Invest. & Service MB 
60 Kurnia Asia Bhd Nonlife Insurance MB 
61 Land & General Bhd Real Estate Invest. & Service MB 
62 Landmarks Bhd Travel & Leisure MB 
63 Lien Hoe Corporation Bhd Construction & Materials MB 
64 LPI Capital Bhd Nonlife Insurance MB 
65 MAA Holdings Bhd Life Insurance MB 
66 Malayan Banking Bhd Banks MB 
67 Malayan United Industries Bhd General Retailers MB 
68 Malaysia Airports Holdings Bhd Industrial Transportation MB 
69 Malaysia Building Society Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
70 Malaysian Airline System Bhd Travel & Leisure MB 
71 Malpac Holdings Bhd Food Producers MB 
72 Manulife Holdings Bhd Nonlife Insurance MB 
73 Matrix International Bhd Real Estate Invest. & Service MB 
74 MBf Holdings Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
75 Meda Inc. Bhd Real Estate Invest. & Service MB 
76 Metro Kajang Holdings Bhd Real Estate Invest. & Service MB 
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77 MNRB Holdings Bhd Nonlife Insurance MB 
78 Mulpha International Bhd Travel & Leisure MB 
79 Multi-Purpose Holdings Bhd Travel & Leisure MB 
80 NV Multi Corporation Bhd General Retailers MB 
81 Olympia Industries Bhd Travel & Leisure MB 
82 OSK Holdings Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
83 Pacific & Orient Bhd Nonlife Insurance MB 
84 Pacificmas Bhd Nonlife Insurance MB 
85 Pan Malaysia Capital Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
86 Pan Malaysian Industries Bhd General Retailers MB 
87 Paramount Corporation Bhd Real Estate Invest. & Service MB 
88 Petra Perdana Bhd Oil Equipment & Services MB 
89 PJ Development Holdings Bhd Construction & Materials MB 
90 Prime Utilities Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
91 Proton Holdings Bhd Automobiles & Parts MB 
92 Public Bank Bhd Banks MB 
93 Pulai Springs Bhd Travel & Leisure MB 
94 RCE Capital Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
95 Resorts World Bhd Travel & Leisure MB 
96 RHB Capital Bhd Banks MB 
97 Shangri-La Hotels (M) Bhd Travel & Leisure MB 
98 Silk Holdings Bhd Construction & Materials MB 
99 Sindora Bhd Food Producers MB 
100 Suiwah Corporation Bhd General Retailers MB 
101 Sungei Bagan Rubber Co. (M) Bhd Food Producers MB 
102 Sunway Holdings Bhd Construction & Materials MB 
103 TA Enterprise Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
104 Tanco Holdings Bhd Real Estate Invest. & Service MB 
105 The Nomad Group Bhd Financial Services (Sector) MB 
106 Tien Wah Press Holdings Bhd Support Services MB 
107 TMC Life Sciences Bhd Health Care Equip. & Service MB 
108 Tradewinds Corporation Bhd Travel & Leisure MB 
109 Transmile Group Bhd Aerospace & Defence MB 
110 UBG Bhd Banks MB 
111 Unico-Desa Plantations Bhd Food Producers MB 
112 Fast Track Solution Holdings Bhd Software & Computer Services MQ 
113 MNC Wireless Bhd Mobile Telecommunications MQ 
114 YTL E-Solutions Bhd Software & Computer Services MQ 
115 Borneo Oil Bhd Travel & Leisure SB 
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116 Bright Packaging Industry Bhd General Industrials SB 
117 GSB Group Bhd Leisure Goods SB 
118 Malaysia Packaging Industry Bhd General Industrials SB 
119 Takaso Resources Bhd Personal Goods SB 
120 Widetech (M) Bhd Construction & Materials SB 
 
Key: 
MB - Main Board 
SB - Second Board 
MQ - MESDAQ 
 
 
 
 
 
No. Management Company / Address No. Management Company / Address No. Management Company / Address No. Management Company / Address
1 Affin Fund Management Berhad 2 Alliance Investment Management Berhad 3 AmanahRaya Unit Trust Management Sdn 4 Amanah Mutual Berhad
Tingkat 22, Menara Boustead 23.01, Tingkat 23, Menara Multi-Purpose Bhd Tingkat 34, Menara PNB
Jalan Raja Chulan Capital Square Tingkat 7, Wisma Amanah Raya 201-A Jalan Tun Razak
(P.O. Box 11571) No. 8, Jalan Munshi Abdullah No. 2, Jalan Ampang 50400 Kuala Lumpur
50200 Kuala Lumpur 50100 Kuala Lumpur 50450 Kuala Lumpur 59000 Kuala Lumpur
Tel : 03-8142 4700 Tel : 03-2698 4299 Tel : 03-2054 7200 Tel : 03-2034 0800
Fax : 03-2034 2881 Fax : 03-2693 0792 Fax : 03-2054 7300 Fax : 03-2163 3212
5 Amanah Saham Kedah Berhad 6 Amanah Saham Nasional Berhad 7 Amanah Saham Sarawak Berhad 8 AmInvestment Services Berhad 
178 & 179, Jalan Sultanah Sambungan Tingkat 25, Menara PNB Lot 357, Section 5 Tingkat 9, Bangunan AmBank Group
05250 Alor Setar 201-A, Jalan Tun Razak KTLD, Jalan Satok 55, Jalan Raja Chulan
Kedah 50400 Kuala Lumpur 93400 Kuching, Sarawak 50200 Kuala Lumpur
Tel : 04-730 0323 Tel : 03-2050 5100 / 03-2161 0588 Tel : 082-231 433 / 082-231 434 Tel : 03-2032 2888 / 03-2036 2633
Fax : 04-730 0320 Fax : 03-2050 5750 / 03-2161 0082 Fax : 082-231 461 Fax : 03-2031 5210
9 Apex Investment Services Berhad 10 Areca Capital Sdn Bhd 11 Asia Unit Trusts Berhad 12 ASM Investment Services Berhad
Suite 7.02, Tingkat 7, Menara Apex 107, Block B,Pusat Dagangan Phileo Damansara 1 Level 8, Menara MIDF Tingkat Bawah, Wisma ASMB
Off Jalan Semenyih No. 9, Jalan 16/11 82, Jalan Raja Chulan No. 1A, Jalan Lumut
Bukit Mewah Off Jalan Damansara 50200 Kuala Lumpur 50400 Kuala Lumpur
43000 Kajang, Selangor 46350 Petaling Jaya, Selamgor Tel : 03-2173 8888 Tel : 03-4145 3800
Tel : 03-8736 1118 Tel : 03-7956 3111 Fax : 03-2173 8466 Fax : 03-4145 3801
Fax : 03-8737 4532 / 8737 7924 Fax : 03-7955 4111
13 Avenue Invest Berhad 14 BIMB Investment Management Berhad 15 CIMB-Principal Asset Management Bhd 16 CIMB Wealth Advisors Berhad
Tingkat 3, Wisma Genting (formerly known as BIMB Unit Trust Mgmt Bhd) Level 5, Menara Milenium 52 & 54, Jalan SS 21/39
Jalan Sultan Ismail Suite 15.01, Level 15 8 Jalan Damanlela, Bukit Damansara Damansara Utama
50250 Kuala Lumpur Menara Tun Razak 50490 Kuala Lumpur 47400 Petaling Jaya, Selangor
Tel : 03-2089 2900 / 2178 1600 Jalan Raja Laut Tel : 03-2084 2000 Selangor
Fax : 03-2089 2808 / 2020 6178 50350 Kuala Lumpur Fax : 03-2084 2031 Tel : 03-7718 5000
Tel : 03-2694 6617 / 2694 6619 Fax : 03-7726 5088
Fax : 03-2694 3516
17 CMS Trust Management Bhd 18 HLG  Unit  Trust Berhad 19 HWANGDBS Investment Management Bhd 20 ING Funds Berhad
Level 39, Menara Standard Chartered Level 8, Menara HLA Suite 12-03, Tingkat 12, Menara Keck Seng Level 18, Menara ING
(Peti Surat No. 11) No. 3, Jalan Kia Peng 203 Jalan Bukit Bintang 84 Jalan Raja Chulan
Jalan Sultan Ismail 50450 Kuala Lumpur 55100 Kuala Lumpur (P.O. Box 10846)
50250 Kuala Lumpur Tel : 03-2733 2500 Tel : 03-2142 1881 50927 Kuala Lumpur
Tel : 03-2142 6888 Fax : 03-2733 2550 Fax : 03-2143 1881 Tel : 03-2170 1888
Fax : 03-2142 6887 Fax : 03-2715 3800
List of Approved Unit Trust Management Company in Relation to Unit Trust Funds
(As at 30 April 2009)
No. Management Company / Address No. Management Company / Address No. Management Company / Address No. Management Company / Address
List of Approved Unit Trust Management Company in Relation to Unit Trust Funds
(As at 30 April 2009)
21 Inter-Pacific Asset Management Sdn Bhd 22 KAF Fund Management Sdn Bhd 23 Kenanga Unit Trust Berhad 24 KSC Capital Berhad
West Wing, Level 13, Berjaya Times Square Level 13, Chulan Tower Suite 9.05, Tingkat 9, Kenanga International Suite E-13A-15 Block E, Plaza Mont' Kiara
No. 1, Jalan Imbi No. 3, Jalan Conlay Jalan Sultan Ismail Plaza Mont' Kiara
55100 Kuala Lumpur 50450 Kuala Lumpur 50250 Kuala Lumpur 2 Jalan 1/70C, Mont' Kiara
Tel : 03-2117 1888 Tel : 03-2168 8998 Tel : 03-2161 9755 50480 Kuala Lumpur
Fax : 03-2144 1686 Fax : 03-2168 8988 Fax : 03-2161 9796 Tel : 03-6203 3888
Fax : 03-6201 2118
25 MAAKL Mutual Berhad 26 OSK-UOB Unit Trust Management Berhad 27 Pacific Mutual Fund Berhad 28 Pelaburan Johor Berhad
1.03 Mezzanine Floor, Menara MAA Tingkat 5, Plaza OSK 1001, Level 10, Uptown 1 L5-106-109, Aras Ledang
Menara MAA Jalan Ampang 1 Jalan SS21/58 Plaza Kotaraya
12, Jalan Dewan Bahasa 50450 Kuala Lumpur Damansara Uptown 80000 Johor Bahru, Johor
50460 Kuala Lumpur Tel : 03-2164 3036 47400 Petaling Jaya, Selangor Tel : 07-223 0350
Tel : 03-2146 9588 Fax : 2164 4226 Tel : 03-7725 9877 Fax : 07-224 5251
Fax : 03-2143 2143 Fax : 03-7725 9860
29 Pengurusan KUMIPA Berhad 30 Permodalan BSN Berhad 31 Pheim Unit Trusts Berhad 32 Phillip Mutual Berhad
Tingkat 20, Kompleks Teruntum Tingkat 18, Wissma BSN Tingkat 3 (Peti Surat 12), Menara Hap Seng B-2-7, Megan Phileo Avenue
Jalan Mahkota Jalan Ampang 1 & 3 Jalan P.Ramlee 12 Jalan Yap Kwan Seng
25720 Kuantan, Pahang 50450 Kuala Lumpur 50250 Kuala Lumpur 50450 Kuala Lumpur
Tel : 09-513 3900 Tel : 03-2162 3222 / 03-2164 5545 Tel : 03-2142 8888 Tel : 03-2715 9802
Fax : 09-513 3949 Fax : 03-2143 1910 Fax : 03-2141 9199 Fax : 03-2166 6417
33 Prudential Fund Management Berhad 34 PTB Unit Trust Berhad 35 Public Mutual Berhad 36 RHB Investment Management Sdn Bhd
Level 12, Menara Prudential Unit 822, Tingkat 8, Blok B, Lobby B Blok B, Sri Damansara Business Park (formerly known as RHB Unit Trust Mgmt Bhd)
10 Jalan Sultan Ismail Kelana Centre Point Persiaran Industri Tingkat 7, RHB 1
50250 Kuala Lumpur No. 3, Jalan SS7/19 Bandar Sri Damansara 424, Jalan Tun Razak
Tel : 03-2052 3388 47301 Petaling Jaya, Selangor 52200 Kuala Lumpur 50400 Kuala Lumpur
Fax : 03-2170 0299 Tel : 03-7880 0879 Tel : 03-6279 6800 Tel : 03-9286 2666
Fax : 03-7803 5779 Fax : 03-6277 9800 Fax : 03-9286 2835
37 Saham Sabah Berhad 38 TA Investment Management Berhad 39 Tune Money Capital Sdn Bhd
Suite 1-9-W2, W3 & W4 Tingkat 23, Menara TA One Level 7, Menara TSH
Tingkat 9, CPS Tower, Centre Point Sabah No. 22, Jalan P.Ramlee No. 8 Jalan Semantan
No. 1, Jalan Centre Point 50480 Kuala Lumpur Damansara Heights
88000 Kota Kinabalu, Sabah Tel : 03-2031  6603 50490 Kuala Lumpur
Tel : 082-266 588 Fax  : 03-2031 4479 Tel : 03-2092 8390
Fax : 082-262 588 Fax : 03-2092 8239
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 APPENDIX III 
 
 
LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 
Please note: 
1.  The following questions were designed to include the most important issues or subject interest 
of the study.  The questions would guide the interview session throughout.   
2. The questions are not exhaustive and in the event that further clarification to a particular 
question is required, additional follow-up questions may be asked during the interview session.    
3. Since we value our respondents’ confidentiality significantly, the interview questions have 
been designed so that they would not divulge our respondents’ secrecy in any way whatsoever.  
However, in the unlikely event that if any of the questions may be perceived as could seriously 
jeopardize our respondents’ confidentiality, such questions can be withdrawn in the best 
interest of our respondents by informing the interviewer prior to the interview session.  
Nevertheless, we do hope that our respondents will attempt to provide sincere and appropriate 
feedback to as many interview questions as possible.    
4. Efforts will be made to limit the duration of the interview session at between 45-60 minutes.  
Your kind cooperation is highly appreciated. Thank you! 
 
 
 
No Questions Remarks 
1 General questions about your company and unit trust investment fund(s) 
under your management: 
 
i) How long has your company been established?   
ii) How many staff and investment personnel or experts does your company 
have?  Their professional qualification?    
 
iii) How many clients (unit holders) do you have and their general investment 
profile in terms of their preferred types of investment.  
 
iv) What is the size of unit trust fund(s) under your management both in terms 
of their total value and number of units? 
 
v) How many conventional/unrestricted unit trust fund(s) under your 
management, their types and their total value? 
 
vi) Do you outsource your investment managers? Do you select them based 
on their religious background? 
 
vii) How many Islamic-based unit trust fund(s) under your management, their 
types and their total value? 
 
viii) What is the general profile of your Islamic-based unit trust clients in terms 
of their religion and trading behaviour?  
 
ix) Why do you think people invest in your fund? Economics or religious 
driven? 
 
x) Why do you offer Islamic funds? 
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No Questions Remarks 
2 Questions related to the operations and management of Islamic-based unit 
trust fund(s) 
 
i) What is the underlying Shariah principle applied with regards to the 
contract relationships between fund manager-fund management company-
unit holders?  
 
ii) What is the underlying Shariah principle used with regards to the fund 
deposited and its usage? 
 
iii) How return is calculated or distributed? PLS?  
iv) What is the underlying principle regarding the fund-manager-unit holders 
contract relationship? 
 
v) Is the operations of Shariah-based funds including the proceeds and 
revenues separated from non-Shariah-based funds? 
 
vi) How is the income purification being undertaken, and what is being 
purified: the fund earnings, or dividend? 
 
vii) Does your fund maintain a profit equalization reserves account to 
smoothen future earnings? 
 
viii) What type of investment instruments or securities that you invest the most 
in your Islamic unit trust portfolio?       
 
ix) Is your Islamic funds managed by the same people who managed non 
Islamic funds? 
 
x) Do you also invest in financial derivatives such as options and futures 
contracts for your Islamic unit trust portfolio? If yes, for what purpose is 
your investment in derivative financial instruments mainly? 
 
 
   
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions related to Shariah monitoring and supervision of Islamic-based 
unit trust fund(s) under your supervision: 
 
i) Are the operations of your fund entirely Shariah-compliant?  
ii) Does your company have an independent Shariah advisory board?  
iii) If your company does not have an independent Shariah advisory board, 
who is being given the responsibility to monitor your company’s 
investment operations to ensure strict compliant to the Shariah principles?    
 
iv) What is the primary role and authority of the Shariah advisory board?  
v) How does the Shariah advisory board involved in the day-to-day 
management and decision making process of your fund operations?     
 
vi) How does your fund operations monitored by the Shariah advisory board?  
Does your funds subjected to periodical Shariah auditing? 
 
vii) How frequent do you conduct review on your investment portfolio to 
ensure full compliant towards Shariah principles including to cater for the 
arrival of newly listed companies or to any changes in the halal 
(permissible) status of the existing companies in your portfolio. 
 
viii) Do you depend entirely on the list of Shariah-approved stocks issued by 
the Securities Commission (SC) for your halal status reference? 
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3 ix) In securities selection process, how do you make the decision whether or 
not to include a particular asset into your unit trust portfolios? 
 
 
   
4 Questions related to the performance of Islamic unit trust fund(s) under your 
management: 
 
i) How do you rate the performance of Islamic unit trust fund(s) under your 
management?  
 
ii) How do perceive the performance of Islamic unit trust fund(s) vis-à-vis 
conventional or unrestricted fund(s)?  
 
iii) What do you think the main contributing factor(s) that affect the 
performance of Islamic unit trust fund(s)? 
 
iv) What criteria do you use when allocating your assets, or selecting industry 
or stock? The small firm size effect? 
 
v) How do you evaluate the performance of Islamic fund(s) under your 
management? 
 
vi) Do you use the standard portfolio valuation method such as the Sharpe 
ratio, the Treynor measure or the Jensen-alpha measure to evaluate your 
Islamic fund(s)? 
 
vii) What is the benchmark that you use as comparison when assessing the 
performance of your Islamic fund(s)? 
 
 
   
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions related to your perception towards the need for an alternative fund 
valuation method specifically to measure Islamic fund performance: 
 
i) Do you think that an Islamic fund has a distinguished return and risk 
profile as compared to a conventional/unrestricted fund?      
 
ii) Do you think that the Shariah restrictions on asset selection have 
significantly reduces the asset selection universe of an Islamic fund?   
 
iii) Do you think that due to the limited asset selection universe, Islamic fund 
will not be able to attain portfolio optimality or efficiency? 
 
iv) Do you agree to the claim that by limiting the asset universe for Islamic 
investment portfolio to halal (permissible) securities, the Shariah 
restrictions may have adversely affect the performance of an Islamic fund?    
 
v) In your opinion, what is the main weakness or disadvantage (if any) of the 
standard portfolio measurement models when they are applied to evaluate 
an Islamic investment portfolio?   
 
vi) Given the fundamental differences between Islamic fund and conventional 
fund, do you think that the conventional portfolio valuation methods 
which were designed based on conventional portfolio valuation theory are 
also accurate for evaluating Islamic fund? 
 
vii) In your opinion, why do you think that there is no specific portfolio 
valuation method that has been developed to measure the performance of 
Islamic fund? 
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5 viii) Considering the uniqueness of Islamic investment, do you think that 
Islamic fund requires a specific portfolio valuation method that take into 
consideration the fundamental differences of Islamic fund and hence, 
would provide accurate valuation on the performance of Islamic fund?   
 
ix) If such a specific portfolio valuation method is to be developed, what 
factors (variables) do you think should be taken into consideration and be 
incorporated into the valuation model? 
 
x) Do you think the way Islamic finance industry is moving by mimicking 
conventional products is the right way forward? 
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 APPENDIX IV 
CODING ANALYSIS: INTERVIEW REPLY SUMMARY SHEET 
Focused 
Coding 
 
Research Question and Properties 1
st
 Level / 
Pattern Codes 
Question Response  
 
FMC 
1 
FMC 
2 
FMC 
3 
FMC 
4 
FMC 
5 
FMC 
6 
FMC 
7 
Q1 What are the general characteristics of 
the funds and the investors? 
 
CHAR          
Q1FC1 CHAR: Staff expertise/qualification CHAR-EXPT- 
 
PGNON 
UGNON 
1.1, 1.2 PG-Shariah. 
UG-Shariah. 
PG-Non Shariah. 
UG-Non Shariah. 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
Q1FC5 
 
CHAR: The size of Islamic funds relative 
to conventional funds. 
 
CHAR-SIZE- 
BIG 
SMALL 
NA 
1.4  
Bigger. 
Smaller. 
Not applicable. 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
Q1FC2 CHAR: Fund type CHAR-TYPE- 
SHAR 
MIXED 
 
1.5, 1.6, 
1.7 
 
Shariah only. 
Mixed. 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
Q1FC3 CHAR: Client’s profile CHAR-CLIENT 
ALM 
MIX 
LT 
INST 
1.3, 1.8  
All Muslims. 
Mixed. 
Long-term. 
Institutions. 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
Q1FC4 CHAR:  Motivation to invest 
 
   
 
 
 
   
  Motivation to offer 
CHAR-MOTI- 
RELIG 
RR 
DIVERS 
ETHIC 
DIRECT 
 
CHAR-MOTO-
UMMA 
ECON 
INHER 
 
1.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.10 
 
Religious. 
Return/Risk. 
Diversification. 
Ethical. 
Directive (esp. insti’nal) 
 
 
Benefit for the ummah. 
Economics (demand). 
Inherit. 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
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Q2 Are the current practices of the Islamic 
unit trust fund entirely Islamic-based? 
PRAC          
Q2FC1 PRAC: Shariah principles applied with 
regards to FM-FMC-UH relationships 
PRAC-CONT- 
BNAQ 
 
WADIA 
WAKA 
FEE 
DNTKN 
WAAD 
2.1, 2.4  
Ba’i an-naqdi (buying 
and selling using cash). 
Al-wadiah (safe keeping). 
Al-wakalah (represent.). 
Fee based (Al-ujr). 
Resp. doesn’t know. 
Al-Wa’ad 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
Q2FC2 PRAC: Shariah principles applied with 
regards to deposit keeping. 
 
PRAC-DEP-
WADIA 
ASUWAD 
2.2  
Al-wadiah. 
Not stated – assumed as 
al-wadiah. 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
Q2FC3 PRAC: Are the operations of Shariah 
funds segregated from non-Shariah funds. 
 
PRAC-SEGR-
YES 
NA 
2.5  
Yes. 
Not applicable. 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Q2FC4 PRAC: Is the dividend income purified? 
 
 
 
PRAC: Purification process explained in 
prospectus? 
PRAC-PURI 
 
 
 
PRAC-PUREX 
2.3, 2.6, 
2.7 
No. 
Yes – to charity. 
Yes – into own funds. 
 
Yes 
No 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
Q2FC5 PRAC: Types of instruments invested in. PRAC-INST-
EBCMM 
 
DERVY 
DERVN 
VARIES 
 
2.8, 2.10  
Instru.: Equities, bonds, 
cash, money market etc.  
Derivative – Yes. 
Derivative – No. 
Proportion – Varies. 
Proportion – Fixed. 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Q2FC6 PRAC: Is the Islamic funds being 
managed by similar FMs who manage 
non Islamic-based fund? 
 
 
PRAC: Allow non Muslim IMs to 
manage Islamic fund.  
 
PRAC-FM 
YES 
NO 
NA 
 
NMYES 
NMNO 
2.9  
Yes. 
No.  
Not applicable. 
 
Yes. 
No.  
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
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Q3 How the Shariah monitoring and 
supervision is being undertaken? 
 
MONI          
Q3FC1 MONI: Are the fund’s operation entirely 
Shariah compliant? 
MONI-COMP-
YES 
PART 
3.1  
Yes. 
Partly. 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
Q3FC2 MONI: Does the company have a Shariah 
advisory board? 
MONI-SAB-
INT 
EXT 
3.2  
Yes – own board. 
Yes – 3rd party 
(sharing). 
 
X (3) 
 
X(4) 
 
X(4) 
 
 
X(4) 
(BIMB) 
 
 
X(3) 
(IBFIM) 
 
 
X(3) 
(IBFIM) 
 
 
X(3) 
(IBFIM) 
Q3FC3 MONI: The primary role of SAB.  
 
MONI-ROLE-
SHAR 
3.4 Merely advising on 
Shariah matters ONLY. 
 
X X X X X X X 
Q3FC4 MONI: How the Shariah checking is 
done? 
MONI-CHEK- 
QTRM 
SFCHK 
3.5, 3.6, 
3.7  
 
Regular meeting (Qtr). 
Self-checking by FMs. 
  
 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Q3FC5 MONI: Dependency on the SC list of 
approved stocks. 
 
MONI-
SCLIST-YES 
3.8 Yes. X X X X X X X 
Q4 The performance of Shariah fund. 
 
PERF          
Q4FC1 PERF: How do you rate your Islamic-
based fund performance? 
PERF-RATE-
OUTBEN 
UNDER 
4.1  
Outperform benchmark. 
Underperformed conv. 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
Q4FC2 PERF: Comparison between Islamic and 
conventional fund performance. 
PERF-COMP-
DIFFER 
NODIF 
LTSIM 
STDIF 
 
4.2  
There is difference.  
There is no difference. 
Long term – similar. 
Short term – different. 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
Q4FC3 PERF: Main factors affecting 
performance 
PERF-FACTOR 
ALLO 
TIME 
PICK 
MKT 
STGY 
SHFE 
4.3  
Asset allocation. 
Timing. 
Stock selection. 
Market condition. 
Tactical strgy/Execution 
Shariah fees. 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
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Q4FC4 PERF: Criteria used for asset allocation 
and selection of stock and industry. 
 
PERF-ALLOC- 
LRGE 
GDFTL 
NOSM 
4.4  
Big cap, high liquidity. 
Good fundamental. 
Smallcap not preferred. 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
Q4FC5 PERF: Does the company do self-
valuation? 
PERF-SELVAL 
YES 
NO 
3PTY 
4.5  
Yes. 
No. 
3
rd
 party – Lipper. 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
Q4FC6 PERF: Does the company uses the three 
standard portfolio valuation methods? 
PERF-STDVAL 
YES 
NO 
4.6  
Yes. 
No. 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Q4FC7 PERF: What is the benchmark used for 
valuation? 
 
PERF-BENCH 
SHIDX 
FDIS 
FDCV 
KLCI 
 
4.7  
FBM Emas Shariah Indx. 
Al-Mudharabah GIA. 
Conventional GIA. 
KLCI. 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
Q5 Do we need alternative portfolio 
valuation model for Islamic funds? 
 
ALT          
Q5FC1 ALT: Are return and risk characteristics 
of Islamic funds significantly different 
from conventional funds?  
ALT-RRCHAR 
SAME 
DIFF 
5.1  
Similar. 
Different. 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
Q5FC2 ALT: Shariah restrictions reduces assett 
universe for Islamic funds. 
ALT-REDUNI- 
YES 
NO 
5.2 & 5.3  
Yes. 
No. 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
Q5FC3 ALT: Shariah restrictions reduces Islamic 
funds performance – cost of discipleship 
hypothesis. 
 
ALT-REDRET 
YES 
NO 
5.4  
Yes. 
No. 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
Q5FC4 ALT: Shortfall in the existing fund 
valuation model when used to measure 
Islamic funds. 
ALT-SHTFAL- 
RELIG 
NOSHF 
5.5  
Religious/Shariah elem. 
No shortfall (can be used 
for Islamic and conv). 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
Q5FC5 ALT: Are the conventional portfolio 
valuation models suitable for Islamic 
funds?  
 
ALT-SUIT- 
YES 
PROBLY 
5.6  
Yes. 
Probably. 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
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Q5FC6 ALT: Why there is no alternative 
portfolio valuation method developed for 
Islamic funds?  
ALT-WHYES- 
INGRO 
IDNTY 
ACAD 
 
ALT-WHYNO- 
NOND 
NOINF 
NODD 
EXOK 
 
5.7 & 5.8 Yes, because: 
- Industry is growing 
- Need for an identity 
- For academic purpos 
 
No, because: 
- Not needed/practical. 
- Lack of infrastructure. 
- Lack of demand - size 
- Existing valuation 
models are sufficient. 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
Q5FC7 ALT: What factor should be incorporated 
into an Islamic portfolio valuation model?  
 
ALT-ADDVAR 
SHA 
RAT 
INT 
CSR 
NOS 
5.9  
Shariah element. 
Shariah rating. 
Intention 
CSR practices. 
No suggestion. 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
NOTE: 
N.E :  Not explicitly mentioned 
 
 
 
 
 
 
